BHASKARI
PART III

K. C. PANDEY

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यदि देहं पृथक् कृत्वा चिति विश्राम्य तिष्ठसि
अधुनैव सुखी शान्तो बन्धमुक्तो भविष्यसि ॥

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BHĀSKARĪ

VOL. III

AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

OF

THE ĪŚVARA PRATYABHIJÑĀ VIMARŚINĪ

IN THE LIGHT OF THE BHĀSKARĪ

WITH

AN OUTLINE

OF

HISTORY OF ŚAIVA PHILOSOPHY

BY

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PREFACE

The present volume fulfils the promise, held out to the reader in my Abhinavagupta : An Historical and Philosophical Study (P. 152), to publish the Bhāskarī with an English Translation of the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta. It is the actualization of a dream, seen in Kashmir in 1931, the year of the discovery of the MS. of the Bhāskarī.

It contains an English Translation of (1) the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā of Utpalācārya and of (II) the Vimarśinī, a commentary on the above by Abhinavagupta, in the light of the Bhāskarī. These two are the well recognised authoritative texts, out of the six, referred to by Mādhava in his Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, in the section on the Pratyabhijñā system, the Recognitive School of Kashmir.

The original work on the system is the Śiva Dṛṣṭi of Somānanda (800 A. D.). The Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā of Utpalācārya, according to his own statement, is only a reflection (Pratibimba) of the system of Somānanda. On his Kārikā he himself wrote two commentaries : (I) the Vṛtti : no complete MS. of this work has so far been discovered; the available portion has been published in the Kashmir Sanskrit Series : and (II) the Vivṛti : only a fragment of this work has recently been traced in Kashmir, after a long and continuous search for it for about twenty-five years. Abhinavagupta wrote (I) the Vivṛti Vimarśinī, a commentary on the Vivṛti, which also has been published in the K. S. S. without the original, and (II) the Vimarśinī, a commentary on the Kārikā. Historically, the Vimarśinī is the last of the available works of Abhinavagupta and, according to his own statement, summarily presents his views on the system. Thus, besides the Śiva Dṛṣṭi of Somānanda, Utpalācārya's Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā and Abhinavagupta's Vimarśinī on it, an English Translation of which is given in the following pages, are the only two complete texts on the system, available so far.

The Kārikā, without the commentary, the Vimarśinī, is extremely difficult to understand. But the commentary also is from the pen of Abhinavagupta, whose style is notoriously difficult. Therefore, to facilitate the understanding of these, the publication of the Bhāskarī was undertaken.

Abhinavagupta is primarily a commentator. A reader, familiar with the commentaries on the philosophical works on the Western Philosophy, will be struck with the difference in the method of the commentator. He will find that a point, though of very great importance from the philosophical point of view and, therefore, is seriously taken up for a comment, is yet given up after just a few words ; and another point is taken in hand, which does not seem to be closely related to the point just discussed. Such a reader has to remember that Sanskrit authors comment, not on isolated points of a system, but on every word of the original. They do not attempt to criticise and to present an advance on the ideas contained in the original text. Even when they do so, they always attempt to show that all that they say, is implied by a word, construction, affix, case or personal termination.

Therefore, while approaching the commentary, the Vimarśinī, the reader has to jot down the philosophical points as they occur, eliminating the grammatical and other discussions, and arrange them systematically, in order to get the connected argument on a philosophical point.

Very often the reader will find that the text of the Vimarśinī, as it is printed at the top of the Bhāskarī, is not strictly followed in the Translation. In such cases he may refer to the foot-notes, where different readings, as found in the K. S. S. edition, are given, which are followed in the Translation, because they present the ideas more clearly. e.g. "Lokepi" Bh. Vol. I, 258.

At many places the interpretation of Bhāskara has been found to be unsatisfactory and inconsistent. The Translation, therefore, has been done in the light of another interpretation, found in another commentary which is still in MS. e. g. "Āntararūpa viparivṛtti mātrasya" Bh. Vol. II,161.

The Śaivaism is one of the living religions. It has a very large following even to-day and its history goes back to the time of the Indus Valley cultures and civilisations. And it is very unlikely that the Indus Valley, with such a culture as is revealed by the archaeological finds at Harappa and Mohenjo-daro, had no philosophy, allied to the religion, about the existence of which there is definite archaeological evidence. But we have no proof, available so far, of its existence at such a distant past. And if we admit that the Indus Valley cultures reflect the cultural life of the original inhabitants of this land ; and that the Aryans, whose inspired creations are the Vedas and who

were antagonistic to the aborigines of India, are emigrants; logically there can be no reference to the Śaiva Philosophy in the Vedas. And in fact there seems to be a contemptuous reference to the followers of Śaivaism as "Śiśnadevāḥ" in the earlier portion of the Ṛgveda.

A careful study of the Śaiva philosophic literature, however, shows that the Śaiva Philosophy is prior to the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya and the Vedānta. For, the Vaiśeṣika system is known to the tradition as "Aulūkya Darśana" because Śiva is said to have revealed the doctrines, incorporated by Kaṇāda in his system, in the form of an owl. The Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya systems are called by competent authorities Pāśupata and Śaiva, because of the devotion of the founders of these systems to Paśupati and Sadāśiva respectively. Both of them adopt the Dualistic Pāśupata metaphysics and the conception of Mokṣa. This system is referred to by Bādarāyaṇa in his Vedānta Sūtra and is elaborated upon and criticised in detail by Śaṅkara and his commentators. The dualistic Śaiva philosophy, thus, seems to be prior to three recognised Vedic systems. And if we accept the validity of the tradition that Nandikeśvara was an older contemporary of Pāṇini and admit that Patañjali refers to the view of Nandikeśvara in the Mahābhāṣya, we find that there was already a voluntaristic school of Śaivaism in the fifth century B. C., a school the fundamentals of which, were subsequently adopted and developed by the Monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir.

There are eight systems of the Śaiva philosophy, which we have been able to trace so far. They represent different currents of the philosophic thought such as dualism, dualism-cum-monism, monism, qualified monism, idealism and voluntarism etc. The Śaiva philosophy thus seems to be complete in itself and to have had an independent tradition, which was, at a later time, included in the Vedic literature in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka. "An Outline of History of Śaiva Philosophy" given in the following pages, throws light on the eight systems of Śaiva philosophy showing distinct family likeness among them. The full History of Śaiva Philosophy will follow in due course if He wills

For the information of the reader I must add here the following notes :—

1. Antique types have been used for the translation of the Kārikās of Utpalācārya and Roman types for that of the Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta.

2. Foot-notes are of two kinds: those which refer to Sanskrit texts, which are given in the Appendix; and those which refer to books in English. The latter are marked with asterisk.

3. There is a slight variation in the representation of two letters of the Devanāgarī script in Roman letters. ई is represented as ī or Ī and ञ as Ñ or Ñ.

4. When an English word is used in a wider than the ordinarily recognised meaning, the original Sanskrit word is given within brackets.

5. When the argument is obscure an explanatory note is added and when a connecting link seems to be missing it is given, within brackets, in the light of the information gathered from the Bhāskarī of Bhāskarakaṇṭha or the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta.

To print a work on Indian Philosophy with diacritical marks is the new venture of the New Government Press, Lucknow. And, I am sure, if the reader keeps this fact in mind, he will find enough evidence of the great care and attention with which the different sections of the Press have worked under the expert supervision of the Deputy Superintendent, Mr. K. L. Sikder, and the Assistant Superintendent, Mr. S. C. Ghosh.

I am greatly indebted to the editors of different texts, and authors of independent works on different schools of Śaiva philosophy, which have been of great help in writing "An Outline of History of Śaiva Philosophy". I very sincerely thank Pandit Tribhuvan Prasad Upadhyaya, Principal, Government Sanskrit College, Banaras, and Mr. M. G. Shome, Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, U. P. and his Deputies for all the help that they have so promptly given. And it is my sacred duty to acknowledge the deep debt of gratitude to Mahamahopadhyaya Pandit Gopinath Kaviraj, Prof. K. A. S. Iyer, Prof. Kaliprasad, Mr. C. D. Chatterjee, Sri Soma Dutta Pandey, and Mr. R. M. Loomba for reading certain portions of the type-script and giving valuable suggestions; and to Pandit Shrinath Shastri, Mr. Aditya Prakash Misra, M. A. and Mrs. Lila Pandey, B. A. for their assiduous assistance in research.

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AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION
OF
THE ĪŚVARA PRATYABHIJÑĀ VIMARŚINĪ
JÑĀNĀDHIKĀRA

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(THE INTRODUCTION)

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TATTVA SAṄGRAHĀDHIKĀRA

ĀHNIKA I

(PRESENTATION OF A SUMMARY—VIEW)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abh. .. Abhinavagupta (An Historical and Philosophical Study).
A. In. .. Ancient India No. 3 Bulletin of Archaeological Survey of India. (Delhi).
A. I. N. .. Ancient Indian Numismatics (D. R. Bhandarkar).
A. P. S. .. Ajaḍa Pramātṛ Siddhi.
A. Pra. .. Aṣṭa Prakaraṇa.
Arch. S. .. Archaeological Survey Annual report 1923-4.
Bh. .. Bhāskarī.
Bh. Ka. .. Bhoga Kārikā.
Car. .. Caraka.
E. H. I. .. Early History of India (Smith).
Ep. Ind. .. Epigraphia Indica.
G. K. .. Gaṇa Kārikā.
Hock. .. Hocking (Types of Philosophy).
H. Ph. E. W. History of Philosophy Eastern and Western.
H. S. L. .. History of Sanskrit Literature (Keith).
I. I. A. .. Invasion of India by Alexander (J. W. M'Crindle).
I. I. Ph. .. Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Chatterji and Dutta).
Inge. .. W. R. Inge : The Philosophy of Plotinus.
I. Ph. .. Indian Philosophy (Radhakrishnan).
I. P. V. .. Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī.
I. P. V. V. .. Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī.
J. B. B. R. A. S. Journal of Bengal Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
K. A. S. .. Kashmir Sanskrit Series.
K. P. .. Kūrma Purāṇa.
K. S. .. Kriyā Sāra.
L. C. .. Liṅga Dhāraṇa Candrikā.
M. Ka. .. Mokṣa Kārikā.
Ma. Ka. .. Mādhyamika Kārikā.
Ma. Tan. .. Mataṅga Tantra.
M. U. .. Mānasollāsa.
M. U. S. Bh. Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad Śaiva Bhāṣya.
M. Bh. .. Mahābhāṣya (Patañjali).
Mr. .. Mṛgendrāgama.
Mr. Vr. .. Mṛgendra Tantra Vṛtti.
Mr. Vr. Di. Mṛgendra Vṛtti Dīpikā.
N. K. .. Nandi Kārikā or Nandikeśvara Kāśikā (Mysore edition 1936).

N. Ka. .. Nāda Kārikā.
N. P. .. Nareśvara Parīkṣā.
P. Hr. .. Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya.
P. K. .. Paramokṣanirāsa Kārikā.
Pan. Bha. .. Pañcārtha Bhāsya.
P. Su. .. Pāśupta Sūtra.
P. V. .. Pramāṇa Vārtika.
R. A. .. Rasārṇava.
R. Hr. .. Rasa Hṛdaya.
Rg. .. Ṛgveda.
R. R. S. .. Rasa Ratna Samuccaya.
R. T. .. Ratna Traya.
R. U. .. Rasopaniṣad.
R. Y. .. Rudra Yāmala.
Ra. T. .. Rāja Taraṅgiṇī.
Ra. Tan. .. Ṛaurava Tantra.
S. Bh. .. Śāṅkar Bhāṣya on Vedānta Sūtra.
S. Bha. .. Ṣarvatobhadra.
S. C. .. Śivārcana Candrikā.
S. Dr. .. Śiva Dṛṣṭi.
S. D. S. .. Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha. (Abhyankar's edition, Poona).
S. D. Sam. Ṣaḍ-darśana Samuccaya.
S. K. .. Siddhānta Kaumudī.
S. P. .. Śaiva Siddhānta Paribhāṣā.
Sri Bh. .. Śrīkara Bhāṣya.
Srikam.Bh. .. Śrīkaṇṭha Bhāṣya.
S. S. .. Siddhānta Sārāvali (Mss).
S. Si. .. Siddhānta Śikhāmaṇi.
S. Sri. .. Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha. (Surya Narayan Shastri)
Sva. Tan. .. Svāyambhuva Tantra.
T. .. Translation of I. P. V.
T. A. .. Tantrāloka.
Tai. A. .. Taittirīya Āraṇyaka.
Thil. .. Thilly. (History of Philosophy).
T. P. .. Tattva Prakāśikā.
T. R. D. .. Tarka Rahasya Dīpikā.
T. San. .. Tattva Saṅgraha.
T. T. N. .. Tattva Traya Nirṇaya.
Ueb. .. Ueberbeg : A History of Philosophy.
V. .. Verse.
V. A. .. Vārtikālaṅkāra.
V. P. .. Vākyapadīya (Banaras edition).
V. P. (Cha) .. Vākyapadiya (Charudeva Shastri's edition).
V. Pari. .. Vedānta Paribhāṣā (R. K. Mission edition).
V. S. .. Vedāntasūtra.

Vi. S.	..	Vīra Śaivendu Śekhara.
Wint.	..	Winternitz.
Y. S.	..	Yoga Sūtra.



INTRODUCTION

AN OUTLINE OF HISTORY OF ŚAIVA PHILOSOPHY
PART I

HISTORICAL APPROACH TO EIGHT SYSTEMS OF ŚAIVA PHILOSOPHY

ANTIQUITY OF ŚAIVAISM AS A RELIGION

The Śaiva Philosophy is an outgrowth of the religion, the distinctive feature of which is the worship of the phallic form of God Śiva. Śaivaism as a religion has persisted since the prehistoric time of the archaeological finds of Harappa and Mohenjo-daro. It has a continuous history of at least five thousand years. The phallic emblem of Śiva, as found in the ruins of the Indus valley civilizations, is even today an object of worship among the followers of Śaivaism. It is a living faith all over India. That there was a dominant element of religion in the Indus valley cultures and civilizations is now well admitted[1]. And the Archaeological finds at Harappa, (I) a Śiva Liṅgam, a conical terracotta object with a rounded top, which, even according to the statement of Dr. R. E. M. Wheeler, represents "probably a phallus" and (II) a large thick ring representing "probably" a Yoni (female principle), lead to a fair assumption that whatever other religion or religions may have been, Śaivaism, in its characteristic prevalent form of worship of Śiva and Śakti[2] in union in the symbolic form of a Liṅgam on Yoni, was there.

These finds lend some support to the view, expressed by Mr. R. D. Banerji, about a water reservoir, provided with narrow covered channel, found in Harappa, analogous to the one, found at Mohenjo-daro[3], that it was used as Caraṇāmṛtakuṇḍa, a receptacle for the holy water, used for washing the sacred image. For, such a reservoir is a common feature of temples of Śiva even today.

ŚAIVAISM IN THE VEDA

Worship of the Phallus of Śiva is referred to in the Ṛgveda (Śiśnadevāḥ)[4]. Various names of Śiva, such as Rudra and Paśupati etc. occur in all the four Vedas.

•1. A. In., 76.
•2. A. In., 129.
•3. Arch. S., 52.
4. Rg. M. VII, S. 22 RK 5

In the Ṛgveda, there are verses, which refer to Rudra and Tryambaka, e.g.

(1) Imā Rudrāya Tapase.
(2) Imā Rudrāya Ṣatadhanvine.
(3) Tryambakam Yajāmahe.

In the Sāmaveda also in the Sāmavidhāna, there is a Saṁhitā, collection of hymns, addressed to Rudra, e.g. "Āvorājānam tadvargādeva pravṛjyāto hani".

In the Śukla Yajurveda[1] section XVI of the Vājasaneya Saṁhitā and in the Taittirīya Saṁhitā of Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda section IV, 5: hundred names of God Ṣiva are enumerated. To this fact there is reference in the Mṛgendrāgama[2], to show that the Ṣaiva tradition goes back to the Vedic times.

In the Atharvaveda also, there are many collections of hymns, addressed to Rudra and also dealing with the ways of worshipping him, e.g.

1. Kāṇḍa VI, Anuvāka 2, Prapāṭhaka 20.
2. Kāṇḍa VI, Anuvāka 4, Prapāṭhaka 1.
3. Kāṇḍa VI, Anuvāka 7, Prapāṭhaka 44.
4. Kāṇḍa VI, Anuvāka 7, Prapāṭhaka 57.
5. Kāṇḍa VI, Anuvāka 7, Prapāṭhaka 59.
6. Kāṇḍa VI, Anuvāka 9, Prapāṭhaka 90—93.
7. Kāṇḍa XI, Anuvāka 1, Prapāṭhaka 2.
8. The XV Kāṇḍa is devoted to Mahādeva.

In the Kalpa also, Ṣiva is well recognised. For instance, in Kāṭhaka Sūtrapariśiṣṭīya Rudra Kalpa the ritualistic way to the visualisation of Ṣiva as Pinākin, is given. In the Upaniṣads also the Ṣaiva philosophical doctrines are found. The Ṣaiva writers on the different aspects of the Ṣaiva thought were aware of the unbroken continuity of their religio-philosophic traditions from the Vedic time to their own days and very often refer to the Vedic and the post-Vedic texts in support of their views.

ṢAIVAISM AS KNOWN TO BUDDHA

Buddha refers to Ṣaivaism in his own way. In one of his sermons, he refers to it as Siva Vijjā, which the commentator Buddhaghoṣa (5th century A. D.) explains as Bhūta Vijjā or exorcism.

*1. Wint. Vol. I, 185. | 2. M. 19.r

ŚAIVAISM AMONGST THE KINGS

If we cast a glance at the early history of India we find that many kings and the members of the royal families were worshippers of Şiva and erected magnificent temples in honour of the deity, which stand even today. The temple of Paśupati in Nepal was already in existence when Ashoka visited the valley in 250 B. C. His daughter Cārumati,—who accompanied him, but stayed behind, when her imperial father returned to the plains,—built a convent to the North of Paśupatinātha[1]. Ashoka himself was a worshipper of Şiva in his early life. Jalauka, one of the sons of Ashoka, who was an active and vigorous king of Kashmir, was hostile to Buddhism and was devoted to Şiva. He and his queen Īśānadevī[2] erected many Şiva temples (one of them being called after his father "Ashokeśvara").

Āndhra became independent soon after the death of Ashoka (232 B. C.), under a king, named Simuka[3]. During the reigns of all thirty kings, who successively ruled for about 460 years, the worship of Şiva was popular[4].

The coin of Kadphises II, bears the image of Şiva on a Bull. He is supposed to have ruled[5] from 78 to 110 A.D. He is admitted to have been a devotee of Şiva. Kanishka I and Huvishka issued gold coins bearing the image of Şiva on the reverse side and the name of the deity has been given as "Oesho" (Umeśa). Huvishka also issued gold coins bearing on the reverse figures of Şiva and Pārvatī (Oesho and Nānā) (Punjab Museum catalogue vol. I, 197).

The coins of King Vāsudeva, the successor of Huvishka, who ruled from 182 to 220 A. D. which exhibit on the reverse the figures of Şiva, with or without Bull, Nandī, behind him and carrying noose and trident etc. are clearly indicative of the influence of Şaivaism.[6] That Puşyabhūti, a remote ancestor of King Harşa was an ardent devotee of Şiva and that Şiva was one of the gods, whom Harşa himself worshipped, are well known historical facts.[7] Harşa's contemporary, King Şaśāṅka of Gauḍa was an ardent believer in Şiva, as stated by Yuan Chwang and testified by his gold coins, bearing the image of Şiva on the obverse side.

•1. E. H. I. 170.
•2. E. H. I. 201. and R. T. BK. 1 VV 108--52.
•3. E. H. I. 218.
•4. E. H. I. 224.
•5. E. H. I. 271.
•6. E. H. I. 288.
•7. E. H. I. 358--364.

The temples, built during the two centuries of the rule of the early Chalukya dynasty of Vātāpi (550 to 750 A. D.) though now in ruins, form magnificent memorials of the kings of this period[1]. King Krishna I (760 A. D.) the successor and uncle of Dantidurga, (a Chieftain of the ancient Rāṣṭrakūṭa clan who overthrew Kīrtivarman II, the son and successor of Vikramāditya II) was a great devotee of Ṣiva, as is testified by the most marvellous architectural freak in our country, the Kailāśa monolithic temple of Ellora, the most extensive and sumptuous of the rock-cut shrines[2].

Chola kings were great devotees of Ṣiva. Rājarāja (985 A. D.) built a magnificent temple of Ṣiva, which stands even today as a memorial of his brilliant career, architectural taste and devotion to Ṣiva[3]. And his successor, Rājendra (1023 A. D.) adorned the capital city, Gangaikonda-Cholapuram, built to commemorate his exploit, with a gigantic temple enshrining a Liṅgam of Ṣiva 30 feet high.

The Vīra Ṣaivaism, the Liṅgāyat School, arose or rather, was revitalized after the abdication of Bijjala in 1167. It was founded or rather upheld, as we shall show, by Basava, the Brahman minister of Bijjal. It has a very large following even to-day in South India.

ṢAIVAISM AMONGST GREAT AUTHORS

Pāṇini was a Ṣaiva. The first fourteen Sūtras of his grammatical work are articulate representations of the inarticulate sounds, produced in fourteen sets by Ṣiva through his hand-drum, known as Ḍhakvā. Their grammatical importance has fully been brought out by Pāṇini. But they represent Ṣaiva philosophy also, which has been presented in the Nandikeśvara Kāśikā.

Kālidāsa was a Ṣaiva and followed the view of Nandikeśvara about the relation between Ṣiva and Ṣakti. He admitted that there is inseparable union between them, similar to that between language and meaning.

Nandikeśvara, while denying the separate being of Ṣiva from Ṣakti, cites two analogies (1) of the moon and her light and (2) of language and meaning, "Candra—candrikayoryadvad yathā Vāgarthayoriva"

(N. K., V. 11)

This idea seems to have been repeated by Kālidāsa in the very first verse of Raghuvaṁśa:—
"Vāgarthāviva sampṛktau".

1. E H. I. 444
2. E. H. I. 444—5.
3. E. H. I. 487.

He very clearly refers to one of the twelve jyotirliṅgas, namely, Mahākāla at Ujjayinī, (Ujjain) in his Meghadūta:—

"Mahākālamāsādya Kāle".

Naṭarāja temple was famous in the time of Aghora Śiva (1158 A. D.). He refers to a distant ancestor of his, Śrīkaṇṭha, who came to worship Naṭarāja Abhrasabheśana[1].

ŚAIVAISM AND THE VEDA

Whatever may have been the Brahmanic antagonism towards Śaivaism in the early Vedic period, as some hold on the basis of reference to its followers as "Phallus worshippers", etc., this antagonism died out with the passage of time; and Brahmanism and Śaivaism got more and more reconciled, as testified by the inclusion of the hundred names of Śiva in the Śukla and the Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda, numerous references to him in the Atharvaveda and change in the conception of the god from "terrific" under the name "Rudra" to "the protector of cattle" under the name "Paśupati". Towards the end of the Vedic period, in the tenth book of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, we find the five Mantras, on which the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system is based. And two out of the six recognised Vedic systems, (I) the Nyāya and (II) the Vaiśeṣika, present the Śaiva Dualistic Philosophy, according to both Haribhadra Sūri and Rājaśekhara as stated in the two summaries of six systems of Indian Philosophy, called by the same name, "Ṣaḍ-darśana Samuccaya". Though most of the authoritative works on the Eight systems of the Śaiva Philosophy, now available, professedly follow the authority of the Śaivāgamas, yet almost every one of them quotes from the Vedic texts at least to show that the particular principle, propounded, is in agreement with the Vedic text. Thus, for instance, Somānanda in his Śiva Dṛṣṭi, refers to the Vedic passages, such as

"Eka eva Rudrovatasthe na dvitīyaḥ"

and

"Sorodīt" Ś. Dṛ. 122.

A careful study of the works on the various Śaiva systems shows that the attitude of the Śaiva Philosophy as a whole towards the Veda was not that of condemnation, such as was taken up by the Cārvāka : nor that of opposition, which marked the Buddhism. It was rather like that of a step-daughter, whose agreements and differences with the father are those which the mother has with him. Thus, Śaivaism owes its allegiance

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[1] I. S. Sri, 73.

to, acknowledges the authority of, the Veda only in so far as the Veda agrees with the Śaivāgamas, some of which assert that the Śaivāgama is the essence of the Veda (Vedasāraḥ Śivāgamaḥ). It may, however, be noted here that some systems of the Śaiva Philosophy agree with the Veda more than others. This point we shall clarify when we deal with each Śaiva system separately.

EIGHT SYSTEMS OF THE ŚAIVA PHILOSOPHY

The available literature shows that there were eight system of the Śaiva Philosophy—

(1) Pāśupata Dualism.
(2) Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism.
(3) Dualistic-cum-non-dualistic Śaivaism of Lakulīśa Pāśupata.
(4) Viśiṣṭādvaita Śaivaism.
(5) Viśeṣādvaita Śaivaism (Vīra Śaiva).
(6) Nandikeśvara Śaivaism.
(7) Raseśvara Śaivaism.
(8) Monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir.

According to the classification of the Śaiva thought by Abhinavagupta in his Tantrāloka, however, there were three Śaiva systems (I) Dualism (Dvaita) (II) Dualism-cum-non-dualism (Dvaitādvaita) and (III) Monism (Advaita). And they were based upon ten, eighteen and sixty-four Śaivāgamas, respectively. Thus, logically the Śaiva Philosophy developed from dualism to monism, through dualism-cum-non-dualism.

These three groups of the Śaivāgama are known after three different names of Śiva. The dualistic, the dualistic-cum-monistic, and the monistic groups are called Siva, Rudra and [1]Bhairava groups respectively. They are recognised to have emanated from different mouths of the five-faced (Pañcavaktra) Śiva. Dualistic Śaivāgamas are said to have come from three, Īśa, Tatpuruṣa, and Sadyojāta, the dualistic-cum-monistic from Vāma and Aghora, and the monistic from the union of Śiva and Śakti.

Each Śaivāgama represents a separate school. Thus, there were ninety-two Schools of the Śaiva Philosophy. They have all, however, been put under three heads as stated above. They are not opposite schools, but are essential parts of an organic

1. T. A., Vol. I, 37—48.

whole. They have to be followed in succession. Each of them aims at taking its followers up to a certain stage of the whole path to the final emancipation. They present reality as it shines at different stages. They recognise that multiplicity, unity-in-multiplicity and unity are equally real in succession. They deal with different aspects of the Reality as a whole.

A group is called dualistic, because it deals with such aspects of the Reality as pre-suppose diversity; namely, action, knowledge and will, (Kriyā, Jñāna and Icchā). Another is called dualistic-cum-monistic, because it is concerned with the self and the self-awareness (Cit and Ānanda) as essentially identical but logically and formally different. And the third is called monistic, because it presents a spiritual level, which is beyond the reach of will, knowledge and action, where logical and formal diversities disappear, where the Real shines in itself, by itself and to itself.

Each Śaivāgama is generally divided into four sections:—

(*I*) Jñāna, (*II*), Yoga, (*III*) Kriyā and (*IV*) Caryā. The first deals with the Philosophy, including metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. The second deals with the yogic practices, necessary for the realisation of the goal that the philosophy promises. It gives the necessary details of the yogic discipline such as are not to be found elsewhere. It presents an advance on the yoga tradition recorded by Patañjali in his Yoga Sūtra, not in its philosophical but in its practical aspect. The third is concerned with the method of building the temples and sculpturing the images of the deities, which are to be enshrined therein. It records the architectural and sculptural traditions, in accordance with which the temples were built and the images made. This section of the Śaivāgama seems to have been the basis of the treatises on architecture, e.g. the Samarāṅgana Sūtradhāra by King Bhoja; who wrote many of the available works on the Śaiva Philosophy, such as Tattva Prakāśikā, etc. And the fourth deals with the rituals.

ŚAIVA ĀGAMIC LITERATURE

The Śaivāgama literature was very vast. Appayya Dīkṣita in his Śivārcana Candrikā states the number of verses in each of the twenty-eight Āgamas, which are the basis of the Siddhānta School of Śaivaism. According to him, the total number of verses in these Śaivāgamas was more than a Parārdha, a Śaṅkha and six Padmas[1]. Add to this the number

1. S.C. 104.

of verses in the sixty-four monistic Śaivāgamas, and there will be fabulous number of verses. Most of this literature is lost, probably beyond recovery. The Śaivāgamas, which have been printed in different scripts, such as Rudra Yāmala, Kāraṇa, Pauṣkarāgama, Suprabheda, Yogaja, Netra, Svacchanda, Mṛgendra, and Mataṅga, etc., and those the fragments of which are preserved in different MS. libraries, such as Ajitāgama, etc., represent a very small portion only of what actually once existed.

It may be pointed out here that Appayya Dīkṣita's statement about the number of verses in the Śaivāgamas of the Siddhānta School, represents a tradition which is found in the Ajitāgama, in the very first chapter, called Tantrāvatāra. A manuscript of this is found in the Madras Oriental Manuscript Library.

Whatever may be the time when the Śaivāgamas were written; the common opinion is that they are the products of the early centuries of the Christian era. It is clear that they were recognised as authoritative texts on the various aspects of the Śaivaism, before the time of Śaṅkarācārya (788—820 A. D.) For, he refers to the sixty-four monistic Śaivāgamas in his Saundarya Laharī : "Catuḥ ṣasṭhyā tantraiḥ ṣakalam abhisandhāya bhuvanam". That he had distinctive Śaivāgamic monistic doctrines in his mind when he wrote the Dakṣiṇāmūrti Stotra, admits of no doubt. This point has been dealt with in an earlier work[1]. Sureśvarācārya, a pupil of Śaṅkara, in his Mānasollāsa, distinctly refers to the thiry-six Śaiva categories :

"Brahmāṇḍādiśivāntāyāḥ ṣaṭtriṁśattattvasaṁhateḥ" M. U. 174.
"Teṣvakṣareṣu tiṣṭhanti ṣaṭtriṁśattattvasaṁyutāḥ" M. U. 168.
"Ṣaṭtriṁśattattvasaṁghātaḥ sarvatrāpyanuvartate" M. U. 154.
And Rāmatīrtha Yati, commenting on the last of the verses, quoted above, definitely says that the thirty-six categories are those which are well known in the Śaivāgama.

"Evaṁ ṣaṭtriṁśattattvāni yāni Śaivāgame prasiddhāni."

It may be pointed out here that these thirty-six categories are slightly different from those admitted by the Kashmir Śaivas. They may be stated as follows:—

Five vital airs, five elements, fourteen Indriyas, Mahān, Kāla, Pradhāna, Māyā, Vidyā, Puruṣa, Bindu, Nāda, Śakti, Śiva, Śānta and Atīta[2].

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*1. Abh., 80. | 2. M. U., 154.

(I) PĀŚUPATA DUALISM

In the Vedānta Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa in Chapter II pāda II, section VII is called Patyadhikaraṇa. Many students of the Vedānta are under the impression that the system, that is criticised there, is identical with the Lakulīśa Pāśupata. Some support seems to be lent to this view by reference to the categories of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system by Śaṅkara in the course of his commentary on the first aphorism of this section "Patyurasāmañjasyāt". There is no doubt about this that the categories, referred to by Śaṅkara, are the categories, admitted by Lakulīśa in his Pāśupata Sūtra in the very first Sūtra, according to the commentator, Kauṇḍinya[1]. They are as follows:—

(I) Kāraṇa (II) Kārya (III) Yoga (IV) Vidhi and (V) Duḥkhānta[2].

But the subsequent statement in the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya itself makes it clear that the system, which Śaṅkara is criticising, is a dualistic system, which asserts that Maheśvara is only an instrumental cause and that He depends on something external to Himself, as a material cause, for His creative activity; exactly as a potter does on clay. This statement raises doubt whether the system, referred to by Śaṅkara, is Lakulīśa Pāśupata or some other system, which preceded it and admitted the same categories as those of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata; but differed from it in its metaphysical theory.

That the system, referred to by Śaṅkara, is different from the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, is evident even from the colophon to this section in Śrīkaṇṭha Bhāṣya. It is called Pāśupatādhikaraṇa and not Lakulīśa Pāśupatādhikaraṇa. This difference becomes clearer if we take into account the metaphysical theory of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata. The Lakulīśa Pāśupata system, as presented in the Pāśupata Sūtra, with the commentary of Kauṇḍinya, is not a dualistic system. It is, on the contrary, dualism-cum-non-dualism (Dvaitādvaita). It holds that the effect, the Kārya, the triad of Vidyā, Kalā and Paśu, springs from the Pati. (Bhavodbhavaḥ)[3]. He is the origin, the abode, the Āsana, of the triad. The triad lies in His Śakti which constitutes his very being, the most essential nature, the principal attribute, the chief characteristic, Dharma or Guṇa[4].

1. P. Su., 6.
2. S. Bh., 488.
3. P. Su., 55.
4. P. Su., 58.

The objective world is in Him as the starry heaven is in Ākāśa or the ether. The cause and the effect have no confused being (Vṛttisaṅkara) like the water and milk. They have, on the other hand, distinct being like the light of the eyes and that of the sun or lamp that illumines the object at the time of perception.

That the Pāśupata system, under discussion, is different from the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, is evident from the three commentaries on the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya: (I) Ratna Prabhā, (II) Bhāmatī and (III) Ānandagirīya. For, commenting on "Kārya", the second category of the Pāśupata, every one of them says "Mahadādi". But we know that the Lakulīśa Pāśupata holds the triad of Vidyā, Kalā and Paśu to be the Kārya, but not "Mahadādi". Further, the conceptions of Mokṣa, as found in the two systems, are different. According to the Pāśupata, the end of all pains (duḥkhānta) is mokṣa. But, according to the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, not only the end of all pains but also the attainment of the supreme lordship (Pāramaiśvaryāvāpti) is Mokṣa, as pointed out by Mādhava[1]. We will deal with these and allied points in detail in the next section.

THE VAIŚEṢIKA AS A PĀŚUPATA SYSTEM

There are two summaries of six systems of Indian philosophy called Ṣaḍ-darśana Samuccaya ; one by Rājaśekhara (900 A. D.) and the other by Hari Bhadra Sūri (700-770 A. D.). The latter has two commentaries; one by Guṇa Ratna Sūri[2] (1466 Vikrama) 1409 A. D. called Bṛhatī, and the other by Maṇi Bhadra Sūri, called Laghvī. Maṇi Bhadra's commentary has a commentary on it by Vidyā Tilaka[3], who, according to his own statement, completed it in (1392 Vikrama) 1335 A. D. Both Rājaśekhara and Haribhadra are well known writers in the history of Sanskrit literature. Let us, therefore, see what light we can get from them on the Pāśupata system.

HARIBHADRA'S BASIS OF CLASSIFICATION

Haribhadra admits that there are hundreds of systems of thought in India. But philosophy is simply an outgrowth of religion and aims at pointing out the ways and means to final emancipation. Therefore, if we classify them on the basis of religion, the means to final emancipation and the essential nature

1. S.D. S., 171.
2. S.D. Sam. 118.
3. S.D. Sam. 154.

of it, and the categories, we find that there are only six systems of thought. On this basis he divides the systems of Indian thought under six heads[1] (I) Bauddha, (II) Naiyāyika, (III) Sāṅkhya (VI) Jaina (V) Vaiśeṣika and (VI) Jaiminīya.

Haribhadra, who is earlier than Śaṅkara and Rājaśekhara, asserts that both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika are the systems, the founders of which followed the Śaiva religion and had a common conception of Mokṣa, which consists, according to them, in the freedom from all kinds of pain. And Maṇibhadra, in the course of his commentary, points out that they have a common metaphysical theory also, namely, both admit Śiva or Īśvara to be the instrumental cause only of the creation[2]. But Haribhadra states the reason for classifying the Nyāya as a separate system from the Vaiśeṣika and that is the difference in the philosophical categories. For, while Nyāya is primarily concerned with the logical categories; the Vaiśeṣika presents phenomenological or metaphysical categories.

If we look at the categories of the systems of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika from the point of view of evolution of thought, the Vaiśeṣika system is nothing more than a more logical and essentially phenomenological presentation of the objective categories, hinted at by the Nyāya. The distinction, however, between the two systems in respect of the categories was recognised and is asserted by Haribhadra himself. But it appears that before the time of Haribhadra the distinction between Śaiva and Pāśupata was not emphasised. He, therefore, represents both Gautama and Kaṇāda to be the devotees of Śiva[3].

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika follow an earlier Śaiva tradition in respect of the metaphysical theory and the conception of Mokṣa. And from the reference to the Pāśupata system in the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya it is evident (I) that the system, referred to by Śaṅkara, admitted the five categories, which are retained in the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, which is a Dvaitādvaita system, as we find it in the available Pāśupata Sūtra, attributed to Lakulīśa; and (II) that the five categories belonged earlier to the Dvaita system, the dualistic metaphysics and the conception of Mokṣa of which were accepted in common by both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika. This explains the reference to the Pāśupata as distinct from the Vaiśeṣika by Śaṅkara.

1. S. D. Sam., 4—9.
2. S. D. Sam., 25.
3. S. D. Sam. 121.

LIGHT ON THE PĀŚUPATA THROWN BY RĀJAŞEKHARA

Rājaśekhara in his Ṣaḍ-darśana Samuccaya deals with the same systems as those on which Haribhadra wrote, though he names them differently: for instance, he gives the Nyāya system the name " Yauga ". There are two interesting and important points touched upon by Rājaśekhara. He speaks (i) of the dress and the life of the followers of the Śaiva religion and (ii) of the line of teachers as follows:—

The Yauga school is otherwise called the Śaiva. The religious teachers of this school bear staffs, put on thick piece of cloth over the privities, cover their bodies with blankets, keep matted hair, smear their bodies with ashes and eat insipid food. They hold gourds in their arm-pits and live mostly in the forest. They are devoted to the duties of hospitality and eat bulbs, roots and fruits. They are of two kinds : (I) with wives and (II) without wives; but those without wives are the best. They practise austerity, exposing themselves to five fires. (Pañcāgnisādhanaparāḥ). They wear a consecrated liṅga on their arms.

Here Rājaşekhara (900 A. D.) is talking of "Prāṇaliṅga" which is one of the important "Liṅgas" admitted by Vīra Śaivaism and also of wearing it on arm, exactly as do Vīra Ṣaivas. Thus it appears that Vīra Śaivaism in its characteristic form existed before Basava (1169). It would, therefore, be better to refer to Basava, not as the founder but as a great upholder of Vīra Śaivaism (Prāṇaliṅga-dharāḥ kare). (G. K. Appendix II 35).

After cleaning their teeth and washing their hands, feet and mouths, they apply ashes to the body thrice, meditating on Śiva. The lay worshippers, with folded hands, recite the formula "Salutation to Śiva". Their God is Śaṅkara, who creates and destroys the Universe. Eighteen are His best incarnations and these are worshipped by them. These are: Nakulīśa, Kauśika, Gārgya, Maitrya, Kauruṣa, Īśāna, Paragārgya, Kapilāṇḍa, Mānuṣyaka, Aparakuśika, Atri, Piṅgalākṣa, Puṣpaka, Bṛhadācārya, Agasti, Santāna, Rāśīkara, and Vidyāguru.

Akṣapāda, being their preceptor, they are called Ākṣapādakas. Among them those who have attained the best state of Self-restraint, wander naked. In all their religious places Bharatas[1] conduct the worship while others bow from a distance. There is no restriction of caste for taking the vow of the Bharatas. Any one, who is devoted to Śiva, may take the vow and become a Bharata.

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*1. G. K., (Intro.) III.

And Guṇa Ratna Sūri in his commentary on the Ṣaḍ-darśana Samuccaya of Haribhadra Sūri, gives the additional information about the similarities and differences between the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika as the followers of the dualistic Śaivaism, and refers to the four sects as follows:—

The Vaiśeṣika school, which is otherwise called Pāśupata, is akin to the Naiyāyika. The outward characteristics of the pāśupatas are the same as those of the Śaivas and they adore the same Tīrthakaras. The difference lies in the Pramāṇas and categories.

The Vaiśeṣika is called Aulūkya Darśana because Ṣiva revealed the doctrines, incorporated by Kaṇāda in his system, in the form of an owl. And the Nyāya is called Ākṣapāda because it was founded by Ākṣapāda. The former, on account of devotion of its founder to Paśupati, is called Pāśupata ; and the latter, on account of devotion of its founder to Sadāśiva is called Śaiva.

And referring to the various sects among the Śaiva ascetics, Guṇa Ratna states, on the basis of an earlier authority, that on account of difference of their practices they are divided into four sects (I) Śaiva (II) Pāśupata (III) Mahāvratadhara and (IV) Kālamukha[1].

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PĀṢUPATA SYSTEM IN ṢAṄKARA

If we keep in mind the facts, referred to in the preceding two sections, and take into consideration what the commentators on the Ṣāṅkara Bhāṣya say in the context of the Pāśupata system, we can identify the system, referred to by Śaṅkara, with the one that served as a common basis for the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika. (I) Ratna Prabhā and Ānandagirīya refer to this system as the system of the Śaivas with matted hair (Jaṭādhāri Śaiva-mata). (II) All the three commentaries refer to four sects of the Śaiva ascetics. The last two names, however, differ. Instead of Mahāvratadhara and Kālamukha, in Haribhadra's work, we have Kāruṇika siddhāntin and Kāpālika in the commentaries on the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya. Abhinavagupta refers to Mahāvrata (A. Bh., Vol. I. 338). (III) Bhāmatī and Ānandagirīya refer to the metaphysical doctrine that the Maheśvara is only the instrumental cause of the creation. (IV) All of them refer to the effect as Mahān, etc. the products of the Pradhāna. (V) They refer to the conception of Mokṣa as freedom from all kinds of pain.

1. S. D. Sam., 59-60.

Now if we compare the points, stated above, with those brought out by Haribhadra, Rājaśekhara and the commentators, there does not remain much doubt about the system, referred to by Śaṅkara and his commentators, as the same, the fundamentals of which were the basis of both the systems, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika. The common points may be stated as follows:—

(I) The followers of the system are represented to be ascetics with matted hair (Jaṭā paṭala śālinaḥ)[1]. (II) There were four sects among them: (1) Śaiva (2) Pāśupata (3) Mahāvratadhara (4) Kālamukha. (III) It is well known that the systems of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika accept the Īśvara to be the instrumental cause only of the creation: and this view is maintained by all the writers referred to above. (IV) The categories, which are generally taken to be those of the Sāṅkhya, the twenty-three categories from the Mahān to the earth, are admitted under the Kalā, a subdivision of the Kārya, not only by the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, which arose subsequently as distinct from the Pāśupata ; but also by all the dualistic Śaiva thinkers. (V) The conception of Mokṣa as freedom from all kinds of pain is adopted by both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika ; and it is improved upon by Lakulīśa in his Pāśupata Sūtra, where it is asserted, according to Mādhava's interpretation, that Mokṣa is not only freedom from all kinds of pain, but also the acquisition of omnipotence and omniscience.

There is, thus, very little doubt about this that there was a dualistic Śaiva system before the rise of the Vedānta, as presented by Bādarāyaṇa ; that it was followed by the founders of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika ; that it is this system, to which Lakulīśa refers; that it was known as Pāśupata, which is distinct from the Lakulīśa Pāśupata; that it had the five characteristics referred to above; and that it was a leading school of thought in pre-Christian era. But unfortunately no independent work on this system has so far been discovered. It seems to have been a system that arose before the Śaiva tradition assumed a systematic form in the Śaivāgamas, which are generally ascribed to the early centuries of the Christian era. Some of the ten Dualistic Śaivāgamas seem to incorporate the dualistic Pāśupata tradition.

1. G. K. (Appendix III) 35.

(II) SIDDHĀNTA ŚAIVA DUALISM

From the discussion on Śaṅkara's attitude towards the monistic sixty-four Śaivāgamas, as interpreted by his pupil-commentator, Sureśvarācārya, in the section "Āgamic Literature" it appears that from the point of view of Śaṅkara, there was no antagonism between the Vedic and the Āgamic monism in the fundamentals ; and that, leaving aside the details, on which the differences are apparent, the Veda and the Śaivāgama constituted a common basis of philosophy, which Śaṅkara himself lived. We know that Śaṅkara advocated the worship of Śiva and himself used to put the characteristic mark of a Śaiva, the "Tripuṇḍra", on his forehead and a "Rudrākṣa" on his neck.

He identified the Śaiva Philosophy with Monism. But perfect monism does not fit in well with religion. In it logically there is no place for religion. According to this, the devotion to God is meaningless. For, the object of devotion is nothing but an illusion and, therefore, the cry of a devotee in trouble and distress is nothing but a cry in wilderness. It deprives the humanity of a hope of rescue from suffering, which the religion holds out. It strikes at the very root of religion. Sadyojyoti, who belonged to the close of the 9th century A. D., therefore, took up the task of justifying dualism on the basis of the dualistic Śaivāgamas, which had been ignored by Śaṅkara. He is the earliest of the pronouncedly Āgamic dualists, whose works are available so far.

It appears, however, that the tradition of the monistic Śaivāgamas, as reflected in some of the writings of Śaṅkara and his pupils and successors, lived side by side with the Dualistic Śaivāgama tradition, which acknowledged the authority of the twenty-eight Śaivāgamas; ten of the Śiva group and eighteen of the Rudra group, referred to above. For, Sadyojyoti, as is clear from his own statement, belonged to the line of the exponents of the Dualistic Śaivaism.

SADYOJYOTI

According to the statement of Sadyojyoti, at the end of his own Mokṣa Kārikā, as interpreted by his commentator, the tradition of Rauravāgama persisted unbroken from Ruru through Ātreya, etc. to Sadyojyoti himself[1]. He, according to the available literature, was the first man to start writing commentaries

1. M. Ka., 79.

on the Śaivāgamas, which formed the basis of the Siddhānta School of Śaivaism. There is definite information available in the existing literature that he wrote commentaries on the Rauravāgama[1] and the Svāyambhuvāgama[2]. He presented the fundamentals of the Dualistic Śaivaism in independent works, based upon the authority of the Śaivāgamas, such as Tattvatraya Nirṇaya, Bhoga Kārikā, Mokṣa Kārikā and Tattva Saṅgraha. He also wrote other works, in which he refuted the theories of the Schools of the opponents, such as Paramokṣa Nirāsa Kārikā. He, for the first time, used the word Siddhānta for the views propounded in the Rauravāgama[3]. This word "Siddhānta" was soon adopted as the name of the Śaiva Philosophy, based on the twenty-eight Śaivāgamas[4]. The name of the teacher of Sadyojyoti was Ugrajyoti[5]. He was an opponent not only of the Śaiva monism but also of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system[6]. For, he criticises the Saṅkrānti theory of Mokṣa propounded by it.

Sadyojyoti was a recognised authority on the Dualistic Śaivaism at the time of Abhinavagupta (990—1015 A. D.). He was also known as Kheṭapāla or Kheṭakanandana. He is quoted by Abhinava and his theory of impurity (Mala) as a substance (Dravya) is refuted in the Tantrāloka, Vol. *VIII*, 36. His conception of the categories comes in for a detailed criticism in Āhnika IX of the Tantrāloka. In fact, the section of the Tantrāloka, dealing with the Śaiva categories, had as one of its aims to refute the Dualist Śaiva conception of Categories; and Jayaratha explicitly mentions the authorities by names as Śaṅkaranandana Sadyojyoti, Devabala and Kaṇabhuk[7].

BṚHASPATI

Bṛhaspati was as great an authority on Dualistic Śaivaism as Sadyojyoti. The two are coupled by Aghoraśiva in his commentary on the Mokṣa Kārikā[8], and are spoken of as the objects of reverence to the teachers. From this coupling it appears that they were regarded as contemporaries. Like Sadyojyoti, he is also quoted and referred to by Abhinavagupta in different contexts in the Tantrāloka in Āhnikas, first, eighth and ninth. All these references and quotations are from a single work, the Śivatanu Śāstra. Some of them are on the points of agreement; for instance, the etymology of the word "Deva" (T. A., Vol. I, 143—6), others are on points of difference; for instance, the conception of Mala, which Bṛhaspati regarded, in common with

1. T. S. 52
2. N. P. 216.
3. Bh. Ka., 2.
4. R. T. 5—6.
5. M. Ka., 79.
6. P. K. 27—32.
7. T. A. Vol. VI, 250.
8. M. ka., I.

the other dualist thinkers, as a substance (T. A. Vol. VI, 166). He is quoted as an authority by the Dualist writers, such as Aghoraśiva and Rāmakaṇṭha II. Thus, he may be said to belong to the 9th century A. D.

ŚAṄKARA NANDANA

We learn from Jayaratha's commentary on the Tantrāloka[1] that Śaṅkara Nandana was a dualist Śaiva writer. For, he couples this name with those of the other dualistic thinkers such as Sadyojyoti, whose views he professedly controverts. Abhinavagupta refers to one work of Śaṅkara Nandana, the Prajñālaṅkāra, in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī (Bh., Vol. I, 225) in the course of the refutation of the atomic theory of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika. We know that the dualist Śaivas, in common with the Monists, reject the atomic theory and propound the Māyā as the material cause of the universe. It appears that this critical view was first put forward by Śaṅkara Nandana. For, Abhinava clearly states that for detailed criticism of this theory the reader should refer to the Prajñālaṅkāra by Ācārya Śaṅkara Nandana. The circumstantial evidence goes to show that he also belonged to the 9th century A. D.

DEVABALA

Devabala, as a dualist Śaiva authority, is known from the Tantrāloka. His views on the Śaiva categories are intended to be refuted along with those of the other dualist thinkers. He may have belonged to the 10th century A. D.

We know nothing about the places of births of the writers, mentioned above. But writers, with whom we are going to deal, definitely belonged to Kashmir. The most important thing to be noted about them is that they belonged to the Kaṇṭha family of Kashmir, the learned tradition of which was maintained by our commentator, Bhāskara Kaṇṭha, in the Bhāskarī.

ŚAIVA DUALISM IN KASHMIR

Sadyojyoti had strong following in Kashmir. He had a great commentator in Rāmakaṇṭha II who, according to his own statement at the end of the Nāda Kārikā belonged to Kashmir.

If we survey the literature that Kashmir produced during the 9th, 10th and 11th century A. D. we find two parallel Philosophic currents, the Śaiva Monism and the Śaiva Dualism. Both

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1 T. A., Vol. VI 250.

seem to have been equally strong. Each was aggressive towards the other. The followers of each school tried to interpret the authoritative texts of the other school in the light of their own school. Thus, we find that Kṣemarāja, in the beginning of his commentary on the Svacchanda Tantra, refers to a commentary on the said Āgama from the dualistic point of view and asserts that such an attempt is unjustifiable. For, the very name of the Āgama, apart from its content, advocates the doctrine of Freedom, the monistic voluntarism. In a similar tone Aghoraśivācārya, at the beginning of his commentary on the Tattva Prakāśikā of King Bhoja, says that he is writing this commentary, because it had been commented upon from the monistic point of view by those who had no knowledge of the Siddhānta[1].

RĀMAKAṆṬHA I

Rāmakaṇṭha I is the earliest Kashmir writer on the Dualistic Śaivaism. According to Abhinavagupta, the different Schools of Śaivāgama were propagated at the command of the Lord, Śrīkaṇṭha[2]. This tradition seems to have been common to both the dualistic and the monistic schools of Śaivaism. For, Aghora Śiva also refers to it in his commentary on the introductory verse of the Ratna Traya by Śrīkaṇṭha. Rāmakaṇṭha I is spoken of as the incarnation of Lord Śrīkaṇṭha[3], at whose command the various Śaivāgamic schools were propagated, as stated just above. It appears, therefore, that he was an exponent of both the dualistic and the monistic schools of Śaivaism. If we accept this, it will not be difficult to fix the period of his literary activity. For, we know of a Rāmakaṇṭha, as the author of a commentary on the Spanda Kārikā, who talks of himself as a pupil of Utpalācārya, the author of the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā. The colophon to his commentary runs as follows:—

> "Kṛtiḥ Śrīmad-Utpaladevapādapadmopajīvinaḥ śrīmad Rājānaka Rāmakaṇṭhasya."

He, therefore, belonged to the second half of the tenth century A. D.

Rāmakaṇṭha I is also referred to as the author of a work, called Sadvṛtti, by Śrīkaṇṭha in the concluding verses of his Ratna Traya[4]. This work, according to the author's statement,

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1 T. P., 1.
2 T. A., Vol. I, 26.
3 Mr. Vr., 4.
4 R. T., 107.

is a mere imitation of the Sadvṛtti by Rāmakaṇṭha I. It was, therefore, a work on dualistic Śaivaism.

Rāma Kaṇṭha I is also referred to as his grand-teacher (Prācārya) by Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha, the author of the commentary, the Vṛtti, on the Mṛgendra Tantra[1]. And Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha also is referred to by Rāma Kaṇṭha II, as his father, in the concluding verse of his Nādakārikā. Here it may be noted that he talks of himself as belonging to Kashmir. Rāma Kaṇṭha II was a teacher of Aghoraśiva[2], who according to his own statement in his Paddhati, completed it in the Śaka year 1080 i.e. 1158 A. D.

Thus, we find that, Rāma Kaṇṭha I lived four generations earlier than Āghora Śiva. The names of the teachers, who came in succession between Rāmakaṇṭha I and Āghora Śiva are (1) Vidyākaṇṭha, (2) Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha and (3) Rāma Kaṇṭha II.

Thus, it is clear that Rāma Kaṇṭha I belonged to the close of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century A. D. There is, therefore, some justification in identifying Rāma Kaṇṭha I, the author of the Sadvṛtti, with Rāma Kaṇṭha, the author of a commentary on the Spanda Kārikā. In view of the scanty literary evidence, however, this may still be treated as an open question.

The reason, why we assign the Sadvṛtti to Rāma Kaṇṭha I, is that the Ratna Traya by Śrī Kaṇṭha is commented upon by Aghoraśiva, who is admittedly a pupil of Rāma Kaṇṭha II. In the course of his commentary on the Kārikā 53, which deals with "Bindu"[3], he says:—

"This subject has been extensively dealt with by Rāma Kaṇṭha in his Nāda Kārikā". This means that the treatment of the Bindu in the Nāda Kārikā is of the nature of an elaboration of what was said on the subject by Śrīkaṇṭha in his Ratna Traya. Further, if we accept Śrīkaṇṭha to be a successor of Rāma Kaṇṭha II, and admit that the Sadvṛtti, referred to by Śrīkaṇṭha is the work of Rāmakaṇṭha II, we will bring him (Śrīkaṇṭha) down chronologically to a younger contemporary of Aghoraśiva, who has commented upon the Ratna Traya. But Aghoraśiva was too great a writer to write a commentary on the work of a younger contemporary. There is, therefore, sufficient justification to hold that Rāma Kaṇṭha I was the author of the Sadvṛtti.

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1 Mr. Vr., 4.
2 Mr. Vr. Di., 1.
3 R. T., 24.

ŚRĪKAṆṬHA

If we accept the conclusion arrived at in the preceding section that the Sadvṛtti, which Śrīkaṇṭha imitates in his Ratna Traya, is the work of Rāma Kaṇṭha I, it will follow that he was a pupil of Rāma Kaṇṭha I and therefore, belonged to the 1st half of the 11th century A. D.

He quotes many verses[1] such as "Svarūpajyotirevāntaḥ," dealing with the aspects of speech, admitted in the philosophy of grammar. These verses, it may be pointed out, occur in the commentary on the Vākyapadīyam by Bhartṛhari himself[2] on

"Trayyā Vācaḥ param Padam"

V. P. ch. I, 144.

But Bhartṛhari himself says that these verses are quoted from the Mahābhārata, Āśvamedhika Parva, Brāhmaṇa Gītā. However, though the first set of verses is actually found in the Āśvamedhika Parva, as stated by him, in Chapter XXI, with some minor variations: yet the other set, which is introduced with "Punaścāha" and begins with

"Sthāneṣu Vivṛte Vāyau"

is not found there. It is apparently a quotation from elsewhere.

About the time of the rise of the monistic school of Śaivaism in the 9th century A. D. for three centuries, there was intense discussion on the theory of Meaning in Kashmir. Somānanda, Helārāja[3] and Abhinavagupta are three great exponents of it from the monistic point of view. And Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmakaṇṭha II are from the dualistic. All belonged to Kashmir.

NĀRĀYAṆA KAṆṬHA

Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha was a grand-pupil of Rāma Kaṇṭha I and a pupil of Vidyā Kaṇṭha[4], who was his father also, as it is clear from the colophon appended to each chapter. He was thus, a successor of Śrīkaṇṭha, the author of the Ratna Traya and, therefore, belonged to the middle of the 11th century A. D.

We know of two works of this writer (I) Mṛgendra Vṛtti, which has been published and (II) Bṛhaṭṭīkā or Śaranniśā, a commentary on the Tattva Saṅgraha of Sadyojyoti, which

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1 R. T. 32.
2 V. P. (Intro. Cha.) 2.
3 V. P. (Ban.) 744.
4 Mr. Vr., 4.

we know from reference to it by Aghora Śiva in an introductory verse to his own commentary[1]. It appears that many commentaries had been written on the Mṛgendra Āgama before Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha. He refers to them and points out their defects[2]. Following the text he criticises many systems of thought, such as Bauddha, Jaina, Cārvāka, Vedānta, Mīmāṁsā, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. He refers to Sadyojyoti[3], alias Kheṭaka Nandana and Bṛhaspati[4]. He also quotes the Tattva Traya Nirṇaya[5] and the Bhoga Kārikā[6]. He was the father of Rāma Kaṇṭha II.

RĀMA KAṆṬHA, THE AUTHOR OF THE SARVATOBHADRA.

The name, Rāmakaṇṭha, is very confusing in the history of the Śaiva philosophy. We have already dealt with Rama kaṇṭha I and have assigned him to the second half of the 10th century A. D. on the basis of his relation to Aghora Śiva, who, according to his own statement in the Paddhati, completed it in 1158 A. D.

But Rāmakaṇṭha, the author of a commentary, the Sarvatobhadra, on the Bhagavadgītā, speaks of himself (I) as a descendant of Nārāyaṇa who belonged to Kānyakubja, and (II) as a younger brother of Muktākaṇa. We know of a Muktākaṇa as a contemporary of King Avanti Varman of Kashmir (855-883 A. D.).

Is this Muktākaṇa, who adorned the court of Avanti Varman as a poet, identical with the brother of Rāma Kaṇṭha, the author of the Sarvatobhadra ? We can identify if we suppose that an ancestor of his, like that of Abhinavagupta, was taken over to Kashmir from Kānyakubja, by king Lalitāditya of Kashmir (8th century A. D.). On the basis of this identification we can assign Rāma Kaṇṭha, the author of the Sarvatobhadra, to the first half of the 10th century A. D.

There is, however, a clue to distinguish Rāmakaṇṭha, the author of the Sarvatobhadra, from both Rāmakaṇṭha I and II. For, this Rāma Kaṇṭha does not talk of himself as the son of Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha, as does Rāma Kaṇṭha II (refer just below) but as a descendant (Tadvaṁśe). Nor does he talk of

1 T. San., 1.
2 Mr. Vr., 3-4.
3 Mr. Vr. 80,
4 132.
5 Mr Vr., 229.
6 . Vr., 331,

Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha as such. He simply refers to Nārāyaṇa, who belonged to Kānyakubja. He can, therefore, be easily distinguished from Rāmakaṇṭha II. He quotes from the Stotrāvali of Utpala, referring to the author with great respect "Utpaladevapāda". He, therefore, seems to be a generation or so later than Utpalācārya, who belonged to the end of the 9th and the first half of the 10th century A. D. But Rāmakaṇṭha I was a contemporary of Utpala and hence cannot be identified with Rāmakaṇṭha, the author of the Sarvatobhadra. If, however, we do not interpret the respectful reference to Utpalācārya, as indicative of a later date, or hold that it is indicative of his being a pupil of Utpala; because Rāmakaṇṭha I, in his commentary on the Spandakārikā, refers to himself as such; we may identify this Rāmakaṇṭha with Rāmakaṇṭha I, the author of the Sadvṛtti, of which the Ratna Traya of Śrīkaṇṭha, referred to earlier, is merely an imitation as stated above. In this case we have to suppose that Rāma Kaṇṭha I was blessed with long life.

RĀMA KAṆṬHA II

Rāmakaṇṭha II, the son of Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha (11th century A. D.) was "predominantly a dualist Śaiva thinker. He wrote commentaries on the Āgamas of the Siddhānta School and independent works, dealing with the various important philosophical problems from the dualistic point of view. He criticises the Lakulīśa Pāśupata conception of Mukti as attainment of similarity with Śiva.

A MS. of his commentary on the Mataṅgāgama is preserved in the library of the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta. His commentary on the Svāyambhuvāgama, called the Svāyambhuvodyota, is known from his own reference to it in his commentary on the Nareśvaraparīkṣā, page 89.

By his time the dualist Śaiva School, based on the twenty-eight Śaivāgamas, was well established. He refers to its followers as the Siddhāntavādin. Following this school, he asserts the being of the individual independently of the Universal, the Īśvara.

The theory of meaning was hotly discussed by his predecessors, both the monists and the dualists. Helārāja,—who, at the end of his commentary on the Vākyapadīya Chapter III refers to himself as a descendant of Lakṣmaṇa, who was a minister to King Lalitāditya Muktāpīḍa of Kashmir (733 A. D.) and as a son of Bhūtirāja, to whom Abhinavagupta refers as his teacher

in dualism and who, therefore, belonged to the later half of the 10th century A. D.—had already spoken on it from the monistic point of view. And Śrīkaṇṭha in his Ratna Traya had spoken on it from the dualistic point of view. Following the dualistic current of thought, he, therefore, wrote his Nāda Kārikā, refuting the Sphoṭavāda of the Indian grammarians.

The theory of liberation is an essential part of every system of Indian thought. Sadyojyoti in his two works had refuted the conceptions of Mokṣa, as propounded by other systems in his two works, dealing with this subject (I) Mokṣa Kārikā and (II) Paramokṣa Nirāsa Kārikā. Rāmakaṇṭha II in his commentaries on these works refutes (I) Utpatti Samatāpakṣa, the theory that the omniscience and omnipotence do not originally belong to the individual limited subject and that they arise at liberation: (II) Samatā saṅkrānti pakṣa of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, which held that just as the fragrance of musk passes on to other things, so omniscience and omnipotence of Śiva pass on to the limited subject at liberation: (III) Āveśapakṣa, which asserted that just as a Graha, while at its own place, enters into a person so do the powers of Śiva into the liberated. He propounded (IV) Abhivyakti pakṣa.

Other two works of this author, which are known from references only, are (I) Mantra Viveka Ṭīkā (M. Kā. 4) and (II) Āgama Viveka (P. K. 49).

KING BHOJA OF DHĀRĀ

The preceding discussion has shown that Śaiva dualism was very popular in Kashmir during the four centuries about the rise of monism in Kashmir and that writers on it were descendants of Nārāyaṇa, who had migrated from Kānyakubja to Kashmir exactly as the ancestor of Abhinavagupta, Atrigupta, had. It is thus clear that the currents of the Śaiva dualism and monism were running in Kānyakubja and flowed from there to Kashmir.

Śaiva dualism was equally popular in central India also. It engaged the attention of no less a person than King Bhoja of Dhārā (1018-60 A. D.), who is a recognised authority on so many subjects, such as Alaṅkāra and Vāstu Śāstra etc. and who is considered to have been a great patron of Sanskrit learning. His available work on Śaiva dualism is the Tattva Prakāśikā.

Aghora Śiva wrote a commentary on it. Therein he maintains that the Siddhānta school is dualistic and that his commentary aims at refuting the monistic interpretation of the text by those who were ignorant of the fundamentals of the Siddhānta Śaivaism. Another commentary on it was written by Kumāradeva, who is recognised as an authority in the various Paddhatis. He is referred to as "Taduktam Kumāradevena".

The Tattva Prakāśikā is quoted by Vidyāraṇya Yatīndra[1] in his commentary on the Sūta Saṁhitā. It admits thirty-six categories and holds that Śiva with Śakti, which is inherently in Him, is beyond the categories.

The name of the teacher of King Bhoja in dualistic Śaivaism was Uttuṅga Śiva, who lived in Kalyāṇa Nagarī in Lāṭa or Southern Gujarāt, wrote a Paddhati and was recognised authority in interpreting the Śaivāgamas. This we know from the Paddhati of Aghora Śiva[2].

AGHORA ŚIVA

In the course of the preceding sections it has been shown that the dualistic Śaiva school had its exponents in Kānyakubja, Kashmir, central India and Lāṭa or Southern Gujarāt, during three or four centuries about the rise of the monistic Śaivaism in Kashmir. It has to be shown now that the south was not without an exponent of this system.

Aghora Śiva, a great commentator on the works on dualistic Śaivaism, according to his own statement, was an inhabitant of Cola country and belonged to the city of Kuṇḍina Kula[3]. He flourished in the middle of the Twelfth century A. D. For, he completed his Paddhati, as he himself says at its conclusion[4], in 1158 A. D. He was a great teacher and had no less than two Lakhs of pupils[5]. The name of his teacher was Sarvātma Śiva[6]. He was not only a great religious leader and commentator on the dualistic Śaiva works, but also a poet and dramatist. He wrote the following Kāvyas:

1. Āścaryasāra
2. Pākhaṇḍāpajaya
3. Bhaktaprakāśa

1 A. Pra. (Intro) 4.
2 A. Pra. (Intro) 4.
3 T. T. N. 22.
4 A. Pra. (Intro) 6.
5 T. P. 58.
6 T. T. N. 22.

He also wrote a Drama (Nāṭaka), entitled *Abhyudaya*. He commented upon the following dualistic Ṣaiva works:—

1. Tattva Prakāśikā of Bhoja.
2. Tattva Saṅgraha of Sadyojyoti.
3. Tattva Traya Nirṇaya of Sadyojyoti.
4. Ratna Traya of Ṣrīkaṇṭha.
5. Bhogakārikā of Sadyojyoti.
6. Nāda Kārikā of Rāma Kaṇṭha II.
7. Mṛgendra Vṛtti of Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha.

He refers to the last named commentary on the Mṛgendra Vṛtti in his commentary on the Ratna Traya[1].

It appears that before the time of Aghora Ṣiva commentaries on many of the Twenty-eight Tantras of the Siddhānta school had been written. For, he distinctly mentions commentaries on Svāyambhuva, Kiraṇa and Mataṅga Āgamas together and puts the word etc. at the end[2]. And referring to their authors he states the name of Rāma Kaṇṭha using the word, etc. (Ādi) at the end[3]. He also mentions a Vṛtti on the Kālottara Āgama by Rāma Kaṇṭha, in his Dīpikā, a commentary on Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha's Vṛtti on the Mṛgendra Tantra[4].

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1 R. T. 8.
2 R. T. 105.
3 R. T. 8.
4 Mr. Vr. Di. 421.

(III) LAKULĪŞA PĀŞUPATA SYSTEM OF ŞAIVAISM

In the foregoing pages we have dealt with a system of Şaiva Dualism, which,—in the light of (I) our conclusion on the identification of the system, referred to in the Pāśupaṭa section of the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtra, with the system, which served as the common basis of both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika and (II) reference to the founder of the Vaiśeṣika as a Pāśupata,—may be called Pāśupata. There is no independent work on this system available so far. We can get an idea of the fundamentals of this system from references only.

The Lakulīśa Pāśupata is different from the Pāśupata. In fact, Mādhava, in his Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, seems to have the distinction between the Pāśupata and the Lakulīśa Pāśupata in his mind, when he called the system, dealt with after the dualistic Şaivaism, Lakulīśa Pāśupata. The two systems differ from each other in so far as the one is dualistic (Dvaita) but the other is dualistic-cum-non-dualistic (Dvaitādvaita) : the one has no available independent literature, but the other has authoritative texts, such as (1) Pāśupata Sūtra by Lakulīşa himself with the commentary of Kauṇḍinya : (2) Gaṇa Kārikā of Bhāsarvajña with a commentary by a writer whose name we do not yet know: (3) Yama Prakaraṇa and Ātma Samarpaṇa by Viśuddha Muni: (4) Kāraṇapadārtha etc. The first two are referred to by Mādhava, who quotes the first aphorism of the available Pāśupata Sūtra and some verses from the Gaṇa Kārikā. There is, therefore, no doubt about it that these works are on the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system.

In dealing with the Lakulīśa Pāśupata we are on surer historical ground. For, there is epigraphical evidence to show that Lakulīşa, the founder of the system, flourished in the second century A. D. The Lakulīśa Pāśupata system is very closely related to the Veda in general and the Black Yajurveda in particular. In fact, the five objects of contemplation for the gradual attainment of the liberation, as stated in the Pāśupata Sūtra, are the five aspects of Şiva as presented in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka in its closing sections.

The Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, in its last three books, from the 7th to the 10th, contains an Upaniṣad, which is divided into three parts: (I) Sāṁhitī (II) Vāruṇī and (III) Yājñikī. (I) Sāṁhitī is contained in the 7th Book. It contains prayers of different kinds

and instructions, which have necessarily to be followed to attain fitness to tread on the path to Self-realisation. (II) Vāruṇī is the content of the VIII and the IX Books. It deals with Brahma Vidyā. It is called Vāruṇī, because it was promulgated by Varuṇa. (III) Yājñikī forms the X Book[1].

NĀRĀYAṆOPANIṢAD

The tradition current among the Vedic teachers represents the X Book of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, which constitutes the Yājñikī Upaniṣad and which is also called Nārāyaṇopaniṣad, to be a miscellaneous collection (Khila)[2]. It is so called because it is a collection of miscellaneous things, which are put together at the end, after all, that is of importance, has been said in earlier sections in regard to rites, contemplation, symbols and the Ultimate Reality. There are different recensions of this Book, in different regions[3]. They considerably differ from one another. The Draviḍas have sixty-four sub-sections, the Āndhras 80, the Karṇāṭakas 74, and others 89.

It appears that the closing section of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, the miscellaneous collection, belongs to a period when the antagonism between Brāhmanism, as represented by the earlier portion of the Vedic Saṁhitās, and Śaivaism, as represented in the subsequent Śaivāgamas, had completely disappeared. This becomes clear from the following facts :—

(I) The Mantras from "Sadasaspatī" to "Mānohiṁsīḥ" are found in the Karmakāṇḍa of the original Taittirīya Āraṇyaka. They are repeated in the Khila[4].

(II) In regard to the Mantras, beginning with "Puruṣasya vidma", Sāyaṇa says that from this point onward there are different readings in different places. He, however, follows the reading, as found in Draviḍa : because it was accepted by earlier compilers like Vijñānātma[5].

(III) The Mantras, as Sāyaṇa points out, from "Tatpuruṣāya" to "Nārāyaṇāya" state the forms of the various gods as found in the Āgamas. He also quotes from them.

And the similarity between the philosophical doctrines, presented in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, with those, propounded in the Pāśupata Sūtra of Lakulīśa, is so great that there seems very

1 Tai. A., 487.
2 Tai. A., 689.
3 Tai A., 690.
4 Tai. A., 698.
5 Tai. A., 699.

little doubt about it that the latter contains the philosophic tradition, presented in the former. Both present the Māyā to be the power of the Brahman and, therefore, as having no existence independently of the Brahman. Both talk of the Brahman as Māyin and, therefore, Saguṇa. Both present the monistic-cum-dualistic (Dvaitādvaita) philosophy. That the concluding section of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, the Nārāyaṇopaniṣad, presents such a philosophy, is evident from the fact that it is taken as an authoritative text by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins : it is commented upon from the point of view of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vaiṣṇavaism also. We shall deal with the points of agreement between the philosophical doctrines, presented in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka and the Pāśupata Sūtra of Lakulīśa, in detail in a subsequent section.

THE DATE OF THE LAKULĪṢA PĀṢUPATA SYSTEM

In determining the date of the rise of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system, we have to take the following material into consideration:—

(I) Mathurā Pillar inscription of Chandragupta II.

(II) Stone slab inscription of Somanātha.

(III) References to the successive pupils of Lakulīśa, as found in (a) the Vāyu Purāṇa (b) Liṅga Purāṇa (c) Sūta Saṁhitā (d) Ṣaḍ-darśana Samuccaya of Rājaśekhara.

There is enough historical evidence to show that the Lakulīṣa Pāśupata system was propounded in the 2nd century A. D. There is epigraphical evidence of the Mathurā Pillar inscription of Chandragupta II in support of this view. The inscription refers itself to the reign of Chandragupta, son of Samudragupta. The date of the inscription is 61, which for reasons, stated below, has to be referred to the current Gupta era. Though, unfortunately the part of the inscription, which states the era, is mutilated; yet the portion, stating the day, is well preserved and there is the indication of month also through the word "Prathame":—

"Ekaṣaṣṭhe 60 1 (Pra) thame Śukla divase Pañcamyām".

It means that in the year 61 there was an intercalary month. And on the evidence of Jain works, Dr. K.B. Pathak has proved that expired or current Gupta years can be converted into corresponding Śāka years by adding 241. Thus, if we add 241 to 61 Gupta year of the inscription, we obtain 302 Śāka which is equal to 380 A.D. The year of inscription, therefore, is 380 A.D. For, the year 61 in the inscription refers to current Gupta years. This

becomes clear, if we refer to page 42 of Table X of the Indian Chronology by Swami Kannu Pillai. Therein we find that there was an intercalary month only in 380 A. D. and that this was Āṣāḍha. Therefore, the year referred to in the inscription, has to be taken to be current Gupta year.

REFERENCE TO ŚAIVA TEACHER, UDITĀCĀRYA.

Uditācārya, according to the inscription, was a Māheśvara, a pupil of Upamitācārya and grand--pupil of Kapila and great-grand-pupil of Pārāśara. Thus, Uditācārya was the fourth in succession from Pārāśara. The inscription also states (I) that Uditācārya was the tenth in succession from Kauśika: (II) that he installed two images, called Kapileśvara and Upamiteśvara. The second part of these two names indicates that these two were Liṅgas, one in the name of Upamita and the other in the name of Kapila, who were his teacher and grand-teacher respectively.

These images were installed in Gurvāyatana, the teachers' shrine, the place where the memorials of teachers were established. It was a shrine, similar to that of which Bhāsa talks in the third act of his Pratimā Nāṭaka. These images comprised the Liṅgas, set up in the names and to the memory of teachers of that lineage, to which Upmitācārya belonged. The Liṅgas were not only named after the teachers, but also bore the portraits of teachers, Upamita and Kapila, separately.

IDENTIFICATION OF KAUŞIKA

The inscription presents a problem. Though it mentions the two teachers, who preceded Upamitācārya in the lineage from Pārāśara; yet it does not state the names of the five teachers, who came in between Kauśika and Pārāśara. The problem, therefore, arises "Who was this Kauśika ?" We can fix the date of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system, if we can correctly identify Kauśika. Let us, therefore, see what help we can get from the Purāṇas and other sources on this point.

A passage which is common to both the Vāyu and the Liṅga Purāṇa, shows (I) that Lakulī was the last incarnation of Maheśvara (II) that this incarnation took place in Kāyārohaṇa or Kāyāvatāra, which is identical with Kārvān in Baroda state : and (III) that he had four ascetic pupils: Kauśika, Garga, Mitra and Kauruśya[1].

*1 J. B. B. R. A. S. VOL. XXII, PP. 154 ff.

The statement, as found in the Purāṇas, is corroborated by a stone slab inscription, which originally belonged to Somanātha in Kāṭhiābād, but is now in Portugal. This was edited by Dr. Buhler in Ep. Ind. Vol. I, p. 271 ff. All the four names are found in it, though with slight variation. But the name Kauśika is unaltered. This belongs to the reign of Chalukya king Sāraṅgadeva.

The name, Kauśika, occurs as that of the first pupil of Lakulī, not only in the Purāṇas, referred to above, but also in (a) the commentary by Kauṇḍinya on the Pāśupata Sūtra as Kuśika[1] (b) Sūta Sṁhitā IV, section dealing with Lakulīśa Kṣetra, (c) Ṣaḍ-darśana Samuccaya by Rājaśekhara[2] and (d) Bṛhadvṛtti[3] by Guṇa Ratna Sūri. There is, therefore, very little doubt that Kauśika was the first pupil of Lakulīśa.

The stone slab inscription of Somanātha states also (I) that these four pupils of Lakulī, who came in succession, were founders of four lines among the Pāśupatas (II) that the three Ācāryas, mentioned in it (1) Kārtikarāśi (2) Vālmikirāśi and (3) Tripurāntaka belonged to the line of Gārgya; and (III) that the last was a contemporary of Sāraṅgadeva, in whose reign the inscription was incised[4].

Thus, the two inscriptions refer to two lines of teachers from the two pupils of Lakulī (1) Gārgya (2) Kauśika. The one, it seems, settled down at Somanātha and the other at Mathurā.

Uditācārya (380 A. D.) therefore, is the eleventh in the line of teachers from Lakulīśa, being the tenth from Kauśika, the direct pupil of Lakulīśa. If we allow 25 years for each generation, Lakulīśa may be said to belong to the first half of the 2nd century A. D.

THE PROBABLE SHAPE OF THE MEMORIAL LIṄGAS

The custom of erecting memorials of the outstanding personalities is very old in India. They were of different forms. From reference to one such memorial in the Pratimā Nāṭaka of Bhāsa, we understand that about the time of Bhāsa there was the custom of putting up images of the Kings, belonging to an important dynasty, in a building, which very closely resembled a Devakula. These images were so faithful reproductions

1 P. Su., 4.
2 G.K. (Appendix III) 35.
3 S. D. Sam. 59.
4 E. Ind., Vol, XXI. 6.

of the originals that the latter could be recognised in the former. The memorials of Upamitācārya and Kapilācārya, put up by Uditācārya, to which there is reference in the Mathurā Pillar inscription, do not seem to have been in the form of images of the teachers alone. Their images seem to have been carved out in the Liṅgas of Śiva. This is clear from reference to Liṅgas in the inscription itself. The conclusion that these Liṅgas had the portraits of the teachers carved out in them, seems to find support from the fact that there are two Liṅgas with portraits of Lakulī, sculptured in front. One of these is in the temple of Nakleśvara and the other in that of Rājarājeśvara, both at Kārvān in Baroda state. Thus, the custom of combining a Liṅga with a portrait of the person in the memory of whom it was put up, seems to have been prevalent among the followers of Lakulīśa. The Liṅgas, therefore, put up by Uditācārya, seem to have had the portraits of the teachers carved out in them.

(IV) THE ŚAIVA VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA

The Viśiṣṭādvaitism is generally identified with Vaiṣṇavaism, as presented by Rāmānuja, who was born in Śrīperumbudūr in 1027, A. D. If we look at the history of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vaiṣṇavaism, we find that it has evolved out of the Dualism-cum-non-dualism (Bhedābhedavāda). For, before Rāmānuja the Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa had been commented upon by two eminent authorities.

(I) Bhāskarācārya, who lived about 900 A. D. upheld the Bhedābhedavāda. He did not agree with the views of Śaṅkara or those of the Pañcarātra Vaiṣṇavas. He asserted that unity and multiplicity are equally real; that the Brahman is not an undifferentiated mass of pure consciousness, but possesses all perfections; that the causal state of the Brahman is a unity, but its evolved state is a multiplicity; that things are non-different in their causal or generic aspect, but are different as effects and individuals; and that non-difference does not absorb difference, as fire consumes grass.

(II) Yādavaprakāśa, who was for some time the Guru of Rāmānuja and lived in the 11th century A. D., wrote an independent commentary, leaning to advaita interpretation. His theory also is called Bhedābhedavāda. He holds that Brahman changes into Cit (Jīva) Acit (matter) and Īśvara (God). He asserts that both Cit and Acit are only different states of one substance and not different substances in themselves; that the Brahman, though it undergoes changes, yet it does not forfeit its purity; that there is no contradiction in saying that a thing can be different and at the same time non-different from itself[1]: for, every thing is unity from one point of view and multiplicity from another.

Thus, it is clear that in the history of the Vaiṣṇava thought, the Viśiṣṭādvaita has been preceded by the Bhedābhedavāda. And if we study the available literature on the Śaiva Philosophy, we find that the Śaiva Viśiṣṭādvaita also evolved in the same way.

ŚAIVA VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA AND ŚRĪKAṆṬHA

One thing that can very definitely be said about the time of Śrīkaṇṭha is that he was a successor of Utpalācārya, the author

*1 I. Ph., Vol. II, 670—1.

of the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā, a recognised authoritative text on the monistic Śaiva Philosophy of Kashmir, on which Abhinavagupta has written a commentary, called Vimarśinī, an English translation of which is given in the body of the present volume. Śrīkaṇṭha quotes from the above work, a well known verse :

"Cidātmaiva hi devontaḥ" etc.

I. P. V. (Bhāskarī) Vol. I, 226.

He quotes it not less than three times in the course of his commentary on the Vedāntasūtra : Vol. I, 341, Vol. II 29 and 111. Utpalācārya belonged to the first half of the 10th century A. D. Śrīkaṇṭha quotes from the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā with the following remarks:—

(I) "Tathā abhiyuktasūktiḥ" Śrikam. Bh. Vol. I, 341.

(II) "Tathā" āptavacanamapi" Śrikam. Bh. Vol. II, 29.

(III) "Ityādyāgamaprāmāṇyācca" Śrikam. Bh. Vol. II, 111.

From these it is clear that by the time of Śrīkaṇṭha, the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā of Utpalācārya had already been recognised as an authoritative text on Śaivaism. We shall, therefore, be not wrong if we assign him to the 11th century A. D.

It may be pointed out here that the verse under discussion is quoted by Śrīpati Paṇḍitārādhya in his Śrīkara Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtra and is said to be taken from the Vātulāgama. But this does not affect our position. For, the verse as quoted from the Āgama differs though slightly from the verse as we find in the commentary of Śrīkaṇṭha. Śrīkaṇṭha's quotation fully agrees with the reading of Utpalācārya's verse as printed in the Bhāskarī Vol. I, 226. And it is important to note that this is not quoted by Utpala but presents his view in the context of criticism of the subjectivist Bauddha.

Utpalācārya belonged to the first half of the 10th century A. D. This, therefore, is the upper limit of Śrīkaṇṭha's date. The lower limit, which can definitely be fixed is the 16th century, to which Appayya Dīkṣita, who has commented on the Bhāṣya of Śrīkaṇṭha, belongs. That Śrīkaṇṭha belongs to some distant period from Utpalācārya is clear from his respectful references, quoted above. He was probably a contemporary of Rāmānuja as the circumstantial evidence shows. Thus, in the 11th century both Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha seem to have propounded viśiṣṭādvaita. One from the point of view of Vaiṣṇavaism and the other from that of Śaivaism.

According to him, there is no antagonism between the Veda and the Śaivāgama. He recognises both to be of equal authority. He insists on the use of the word "Śivāgama" for the Veda also. He holds that Śivāgama is of two types, (I) for the twice-born only, and (II) for all, irrespective of the caste to which they belong. The Veda is of the former type and the Āgama is of the latter[1].

Śrīkaṇṭha refers to an interpretation of the Pāśupatādhikaraṇa, which seems to agree with our view, expressed earlier: (I) that the Pāśupata system, criticised by Śaṅkara in the Pāśupatādhikaraṇa of his commentary on the Vedāntasūtra, is not the system, as presented in the Pāśupata Sūtra by Lakulīśa, which is clearly a Dvaitādvaita system, and to which, therefore, the criticism does not apply; (II) that the system, under criticism, is dualistic, different from that presented by Mādhava, in his Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, under the title "Śaiva Darśana". Śrīkaṇṭha, in the course of his commentary, says that the earlier authorities maintained that "Patyurasāmañjasyāt" criticises[2] "Śivāgamaikadeśa" which asserted that the material cause is separate from and perfectly independent of the instrumental, and that Śiva is the instrumental (Nimitta) cause only.

He is an exponent of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Śaivaism. He rejects the Bhedābhedavāda as impossible. For, unity and multiplicity being opposite in nature, cannot co-exist on the same substratum. It is against the fact of experience. He distinguishes his view from many others. He holds that the difference between the Ultimate Unity and the phenomenal multiplicity is not such as we experience between a jar and a piece of cloth: nor are they perfectly identical, as mother of pearl and silver, for which the former is mistaken. He asserts that he is a Viśiṣṭādvaitavādin[3], admitting the relation between the Śiva and the phenomenal multiplicity to be similar to that which exists between a body and a soul or between a substance and a quality. The non-difference of them is similar to that of clay and jar or of quality and substance, in so far as the two, being cause and effect or substance and quality, do not exist in isolation from each other. For, just as jar has no existence without clay nor does lotus exist without blueness; so the power to produce multiplicity cannot exist without Brahman or Śiva; nor can Brahman have being without the power. Just as we cannot

1 Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 111.
2 Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 111.
3 Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 31.

know fire without heat, so we cannot know Brahman without the power. And the one, which is invariably experienced together with the other, is the attribute; and an invariable attribute constitutes the essential nature. The power to produce multiplicity is invariably in the Brahman. The Brahman, therefore, has the power as the invariable attribute. Hence, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, Viśiṣṭādvaita is the only sound metaphysical theory.

CRITICISM OF ŚRĪKAṆṬHA'S VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA

THE above discussion reveals the weakness of the theory of Śrīkaṇṭha. He identifies an attribute with essential nature. He has no hesitation in admitting heat to be an attribute of fire. But the difference between an attribute and the essential nature has logically to be admitted. For, a thing does not necessarily have the same attribute. Lotus is not necessarily blue. It can be white or red; and blueness can and does belong to many other things, sky or cloth, for instance. But the essential nature does not belong to any other thing than that of which it is the essential nature. Warmth, for instance, cannot belong, as the essential nature, to any other thing than fire.

The fact is that he has put together the analogies, cited by the opposite systems, Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita, without distinguishing them from each other logically. He has also quoted the opposing authorities similarly. This becomes evident, if we take into account his quotation of Utpalācārya's famous verse:—

"Cidātmaiva hi devontaḥ"

I. P. V. (Bhāskarī) Vol. I, 226.

which presents the fundamental doctrine of the monistic Śaiva School of Kashmir. He also accepts the view of identity of power and its possessor, which is the basic view of the Pratyabhijñā system, as presented by Somānanda in his Śiva Dṛṣṭi[1]. He also quotes the verse, cited by Bhāskarakaṇṭha in the Bhāskarī in support of the monistic view:

(I) "Śaktayosya jagat kṛtsnam"

Bh., Vol. I, 266, 345.
Śrikam. Bh. Vol. I. 300.

(II) "Śaktiśca śaktimadrūpāt"

Bh., Vol. II, 153.
Śrikam. Bh., Vol. I, 300.

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1 S. Dr. 96.

The monistic tendency of Śrīkaṇṭha was noticed by his great commentator, Appayya Dīkṣita (1550 A. D.) in the Ānanda Laharī and Śivādvaita Nirṇaya, wherein he inquired into the precise implications of Śrīkaṇṭha's system and established that, in essence, Śrīkaṇṭha is a monist[1]. Our inquiry from the point of view of the works of authorities on the monistic Śaiva Philosophy of Kashmir confirms the above view.

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1 S. Sri. 35.

(V) VIŚEṢĀDVAITA OR PURE DVAITĀDVAITA OF VĪRA ŚAIVAISM

The historians say that Vīra Śaivaism was founded by Basava, the Brāhmaṇa minister of Bijjala, in 1167 A. D. The word "Vīra Śaiva" seems to have a historical significance. It seems to refer to the heroic attitude of the followers of Śaivaism in defence of their faith and philosophy. The Chalukya dynasty is well known. After the death of Vikramāṅka, the hero of Bilhaṇa's historical poem, Vikramāṅkadeva Carita, the Chalukya power declined. And during the reign of Taila III (1156—62 A.D.) Bijjal or Vijjana, the commander-in-chief, revolted and obtained possession of the greater part of the kingdom. One legend says that Bijjala was a Jain and wontonly blinded two Śaiva ascetics. This led to a religious revolution. The revolutionaries, it seems, took to a kind of 'passive resistance'. In defiance of the attitude of Bijjala towards Śaivaism, the followers of the faith courted the wrath of the cruel king by wearing the phallic form of Śiva on arm, neck or head. They identified the life (Prāṇa) with the phallic form (Liṅga) so that they refused to part with it while they lived. Parting with it meant parting with life.

Śrīpati Paṇḍitārādhya seems to be referring to such a movement in the course of his commentary on "Jīvamukhya Prāṇaliṅgāt" (Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 91). He refers to the religious ceremony of identifying Prāṇa with Liṅga and quotes the religious instruction, given to the disciple at the end of it. It runs as follows:—

"Resolve to keep this phallic image of Śiva as if it were your very life. Do not part with it so long as you live" (Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 92.)

Thus, it seems that the wearers of the phallic image of Śiva were called "Vīra" (Hero), because of the bravery with which they faced the wrath of the cruel king Bijjala.

As a religious sect of Śaivaism, it is distinct from other Śaiva sects, (1) Sāmānya, (2) Miśra and (3) Śuddha. The followers of the first two worship both Śiva and Viṣṇu. And the followers of the last, worship Śiva exclusively as do the Vīra Śaivas. Vīra Śaivaism, however, is distinct from Śuddha Śaivaism in so far

as the followers of Vīra Śaivaism wear Liṅga on the body, preferably on the head or suspend it from the neck[1].

Vīra Śaivaism follows the authority of Twenty-eight Śaivāgamas of the Siddhānta School, on which we have spoken earlier. The leading doctrines of the system are (1) Aṣṭavarṇa and (2) Ṣaṭsthala, on which we shall write subsequently. It is a living faith, particularly in South India. Its followers, because of their wearing the Liṅga on the body, are called Liṅgāyat. As a religious sect it emphasizes devotion to Śiva.

The religious tradition, current among the living Vīra Śaivas, however, says that Vīra Śaivaism was founded by five Ācāryas : (1) Reṇuka (2) Dāruka (3) Ekorāma (4) Paṇḍitārādhya and (5) Viśvārādhya : that these Ācāryas belonged to hoary past, and that Basava simply revived and popularised it. These Ācāryas are believed to have sprung from the Śiva Liṅgas (1) of Someśvara at Kollipaki, (2) of Vaṭa Vṛkṣa Siddheśvara (3) of Rāmanātha at Drākṣārāma Kṣetra (4) of Mallikārjuna at Śrīśaila and (5) of Viśvanātha at Kāśī. It is interesting to note in this connection that Maṭhas, associated with the names of these teachers, exist even to this day. They are found respectively at the following places which have been identified with those, mentioned just above:—

(1) Balehonnur (Rambhāpurī) in Kadur district in Mysore State : (2) Ujjain in Bellary District in Madras Presidency; (3) Himavat Kedāra in the Himalaya ; (4) Śrīśaila in Kurnool district in Madras Presidency ; and (5) Kāśi (Banaras) in U. P. The tradition about the five teachers of Vīra Śaivaism has the support of Suprabhedāgama[2].

The religious tradition, which says that Basava was not the founder of Vīra Śaivaism but only a great exponent and upholder of it, seems to find some support in Rājaśekhara's reference to the wearing of Prāṇaliṅga on arm by a Śaiva sect, as we have stated earlier. And Rājaśekhara belonged to 900 A. D. Śrīpati Paṇḍita quotes from the Sadānandopaniṣad, which belongs to the Sāmajaigīśīya Śākhā[3], in justification of wearing of Prāṇaliṅga on arm. He also quotes from other ancient texts including the Veda to support the wearing of Liṅga. And Liṅgadhāraṇa Candrikā by Nandikeśvara has as its sole aim as its title shows, to prove that wearing of Liṅga is enjoined by the Vedas, the

1. Sri. Bh. Vol. I, 7.
2. Vi. S., 102.,
3. Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 92.

Purāṇas and the Śaivāgamas, such as Kāmika[1] etc. Thus the literary evidence makes us believe that the characteristic religious practices of Vīra Śaivaism go back to very much earlier period than the 12th century A. D. and that Basava was a great upholder and propounder of the Śaiva Religion and emphasized the wearing of Liṅga.

THE FIVE TEACHERS AS HISTORICAL PERSONALITIES

The mythical account of the earliest five teachers, given in the preceding section, in accordance with the religious tradition, current among the living Vīra Ṣaivas, should not lead us to think that these teachers have no historicity. Mythology of a religion has a propaganda value and contains the same amount of truth as does the propaganda literature of a political party. It needs verification just like the identification of the author of a particular work with that of another, because both have the same name. For, in the history of our literature we find many persons, belonging to distant periods, having the same name, and identification of one writer with another, on account of identity of the name, leads to very serious confusion.

Keeping these two things in mind, if we try to find out the historical element in the religious tradition of the Vīra Ṣaiva, we have to base our conclusions on the references to them in the available literature from the pens of those whose historical reality is beyond all doubts and who can be assigned to definite periods.

If we study the authoritative literature on Vīra Ṣaivaism; we get a fairly clear idea of the five teachers, referred to above, as historical personalities. We come across references to them in (I) the Ṣrīkara Bhāṣya of Ṣrīpati Paṇḍitārādhya and (II) the Ṣaiva Bhāṣya on the Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad by Vṛṣabhendra Paṇḍita, who claims to be a descendant of Ṣrīpati Paṇḍitārādhya. Paṇḍitārādhya refers to at least three of the five teachers in the very introductory verses to his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, (I) Revaṇa (II) Marula and (III) Ekorāma.

Revaṇa is the first historical personality that is mentioned in a long list of teachers, which is based upon the Ṣaivāgamas, and which gives the teachers as they came in succession :(I) Sadāśiva (II) Ṣaktidhara (III) Sukeśa (IV) Caṇḍīśvara (V) Bhṛṅgi riṭa (VI) Śilāda (VII) Kumbhodbhava(Agastya) (VIII) Vāmadeva (IX) Revaṇa.

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1 L. C., 2.

Revaṇa is represented to be well versed in the rituals[1] and ceremonies of the Ṣaivaism, very popular among his pupils, a man of perfect self-control, who had become a Siddha, had attained spiritual greatness and, therefore, could grant any boon, like a Kalpavṛkṣa. He is said to have refuted the theories of the opponents, such as (I) Mithyādvaita (II) Ṣūnyādvaita, (III) Jaina (IV) Bauddha and (V) Lokāyatika[2]. He is said to have written a commentary, or at least to have expressed views on some important problems, discussed in the Vedānta Sūtra. Thus, he is said to have held that in the aphorism "Patyurasāmañjasyāt" (Sri. Bh. 232-4.) Bādarāyaṇa refutes the dualistic Pāśupata[3] (and not Lakulīśa Pāśupata, as we said earlier). He is said to have attained final emancipation, on account of his devotion, renunciation and faith in and practice of Ṣravaṇa, Manana and Nididhyāsana. He is spoken of as a great Vedic scholar, who had mastered all the Ṣākhās and written commentaries on the Vedāntic works. He is said to have held that all the passages in the Ṣrutis, which talk of Saguṇa Brahman, refer to the manifested state of the Ṣakti of Brahman; while those which talk of the Nirguṇa Brahman refer to the unmanifested state of the Śakti[4]. He[5] along with Vemana etc. is said to have held that the Puruṣa Sūkta, beginning with "Sahasraśīrṣā' etc. is to be interpreted as referring to Parama Śiva, though there are epithets in it, which are applicable to Viṣṇu only.

REVAṆA SIDDHA AND REVAṆĀRYA

Ṣrīpati Paṇḍita refers[6] to Siddhānta Ṣikhāmaṇi by Revaṇārya. But we have to distinguish between Revaṇa Siddha and Revaṇārya. For, the author of the Siddhānta Ṣikhāmaṇi in the introduction to his work, speaks of himself as Revaṇārya, son of Revaṇa Siddha and grandson of Vīraṇārādhya. He gives the names of two more of his ancestors, who came before Vīraṇārādhya in succession: (I) Viśvanātha and (II) Sarveśa Deśika. It is thus clear that Revaṇa Siddha was the father of Revaṇārya, the author of the Siddhānta Ṣikhāmaṇi and that Ṣrīpati Paṇḍita in the references, given in the preceding section, refers to Revaṇa Siddha but not Revaṇārya.

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1 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 1.
2 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 193.
3 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 234.
4 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 382.
5 M. U.. S. Bh. 57.
6 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 12.

Siddhānta Şikhāmaṇi is a very important work on Vīra Şaivaism. Hardly there is any work on this system, in which it is not referred to. It has a commentary by Bhoga Malleśa, a copy of which is preserved in the Madras Oriental MSS. Library (X no. 5119). It was translated into Tamil by Turaimaṅgalam Şiva Prakāśasvāmin in the 17th century A. D.

It may be pointed out here that Şrīpati Paṇḍita quotes from the Siddhānta Şikhāmaṇi[1] and attributes it to Reṇuka Bhagavatpādācārya. The question, therefore, arises : "Is it a work of Revaṇārya, as stated above or of Reṇuka, *alias* Revaṇa, whose descendant he claims to be ?". In view of the fact that in the introduction to this work, the author calls himself Revaṇārya and speaks of himself as a descendant of Reṇuka[2], Şrīpati seems to have used the family name of the author, instead of the personal name.

Revaṇārya, the author of the Siddhānta Şikhāmaṇi, wrote four other works, each of which is a commentary on the work of his grand-father, Sosali-Vīraṇārādhya. These are :—(1) Pañcaratnavyākhyā (or Tantrasāraprakāśikā), which is a commentary on the Tantrasārapañcaratna of Sosali-Vīraṇārādhya; (2) Tārakapañcaratnavyākhyā (or Tārakapradīpikā), which is a commentary on the Tārakapañcaratna by the same author; (3) Pañcaratnavyākhyā (or Şivatattvaprakāśikā) , which is a commentary on the Şivaratnapañcaratna by the same author; (4) Pañcaratnavyākhyā (Şrutyarthapradīpikā), which is a commentary on the Şrutipañcaratna by the same author. This work is also called Şrutyarthaprakāśikā. In it, Revaṇārya mentions both his father's and grand-father's names, Revaṇasiddheśvara and Sosali-Vīraṇārādhya, which apear in the Siddhānta Şikhāmaṇi as Revaṇasiddha and Vīraṇārādhya, and his own name as Revaṇārya. This establishes the identity of the author of the above works with the author of the Siddhānta Şikhāmaṇi beyond all doubts. (MSS. of these works are in the Madras Government Oriental MSS. Library. *See* Madras D. C. X, nos. 5090.)

MARULA

Marula is the second of the five teachers of Vīra Şaivaism. He was a pupil of Revaṇa. He also was a Siddha and had attained spiritual greatness. He commanded the respect of the learned. He was well versed in various arts[3]. In many of the

1 Sri Bh Vol II, 15.
2 Sri Bh Vol I, 54.
3 Sri Bh Vol II, 1.

references to Marula in the Śrīkara Bhāṣya his name is coupled with that of Revaṇa. Thus, he is said to have rejected false monism, nihilistic monism, Jainism and Buddhism, in common with Durvāsā and Revaṇa[1]. Similarly in common with Revaṇa he is said to hold (I) that the system, criticised in the Pāśupatādhikaraṇa of the Vedānta Sūtra, is the Dualistic Pāśupata, the principles of which are opposed to the teaching of the Śaivāgama; (II) that all the Śrutis, referring to Saguṇa Brahman, refer to the manifested state of Śakti and those which speak of the Nirguṇa refer to the unmanifested state of Śakti[2], and that the Puruṣa Sūkta refers to Parama Śiva.

EKORĀMA

Ekorāma was a grand-pupil of Revaṇa and pupil of Marula. The learned bowed to him because of his character. He had a large following. He was a great exponent of the twenty-eight Śaivāgamas. He was a keen controvertialist. He was master of Tarka, Vyākaraṇa Mīmāṁsā and the literature on monism. He was a great yogin and used the garb of a Vīra Śaiva Sanyāsin. He[3] was the teacher of Śrīpati Paṇḍita, the author of the Śrīkara Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtra.

It appears that Ekorāma also wrote a commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra. For, Śrīpati Paṇḍita at many places in his own commentary refers to the views of Ekorāma on important points and says that he sticks to it, because it was held by Ekorāma. For instance, he refers to Ekorāma's view[4] on "Śrotavyaḥ" etc., in the course of the commentary on, "Tattu Samanvayāt". Similarly in the commentary on the word "Jijñāsā" of the first Sūtra, he prefers the interpretation that was put upon it by Ekorāma.

Very often Śrīpati refers to Ekorāma as Rāma. This is particularly so, when he couples Ekorāma with his predecessors such as Revaṇa and Marula because of their agreement on a certain point or something else that is common to them. Thus, he is represented to agree with his predecessors that the Pāśupatādhikaraṇa refutes dualistic Pāśupata School, and to have followed the same means to the final emancipation as did Revaṇa and Marula[5].

1 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 193.
2 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 382.
3 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 1—2.
4. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 23.
5. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 26.

ŚRĪPATI PAṆḌITA

Śrīpati Paṇḍita, the author of the Śrīkara Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtra from the point of view of Vīra Śaivaism, is a very important person in the history of the Vīra Śaiva literature exactly as Abhinavagupta is, in the history of the monistic Śaiva literature of Kashmir. For, it is in relation to him that we can fix the dates of other authorities. In fact, if we can talk of the dates of the five great teachers of Vīra Śaivaism with a certain amount of plausibility and certainty, that is because of his references to at least three of them. He occupies the central position among them, being the fourth, as a pupil of Ekorāma. Naturally, therefore, he does not mention the fifth of the great Vīra Śaiva teachers, Viśvārādhya, who was a successor. We identify Śrīpati Paṇḍita with Paṇḍitārādhya for two very important reasons. (I) His own reference to Ekorāma as his own teacher. This is important; because all the three teachers, whom he represents to have come in succession and to have been related to one another as teacher and taught in the descending order, are the earlier of the recognised five teachers of Vīra Śaivaism. (II) Paṇḍita is the last part of his name, as it is clear from its repeated occurrence in the colophon at the end of each chapter. And it seems to have been the practice during the period, to which he belonged, to refer to the authorities by stating the last part of their names, as he himself does in the case of Ekorāma, as Rāma.[1] Further, the word "Ārādhya" was a recognised reverential title added to the names of the persons, held in high esteem for their learning and devotion to the cause of the Vīra Śaivaism, as in the case of Viśvārādhya etc.

ŚRĪPATI PAṆḌITA'S DATE

Confining ourselves to the evidence, available in the Śrīkara Bhāṣya itself, we can definitely say that he belonged to the 14th century A. D. For, among the systems referred to and criticised by him is that of Madhva. There are two fundamental principles of it, which he refutes: (I) the all-pervasive nature of the soul[2]: and (II) dualism[3]. And the recognised date of Madhva[4] is 1238—1317 A. D. Madhva was founder of a School of philosophy and a religious sect. He may, therefore, be supposed to have been recognised as an authority in his own life time.

1 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 269
2 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 263.
3 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 273.
4 H. S. L., 479.

We, therefore,, need not suppose the lapse of any time between Madhva and Śrīpati Paṇḍita to justify reference to the former by the latter. This agrees with the reference to him in an inscription belonging to the reign of Rudrāmbā, the Kākatīya Empress, who ruled from 1295 to 1323 A. D. He seems to have been a younger contemporary of Rudrāmbā and to have continued to live long after her reign. He may, therefore, be assigned to the first half of the 14th century A. D.

If we accept the conclusion, arrived at in regard to the date of Śrīpati Paṇḍita, that he belonged to the first half of the 14th century A. D., there remains no difficulty in fixing the dates of his teacher, Ekorāma, grand-teacher, Marula, and great-grand-teacher Revana. They may be said to belong to the period from the close of the 12th to the close of the 13th century A. D.

He had embraced asceticism[1], had become a Sanyāsin, at the time when he wrote the Śrīkara Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtra. He had a number of followers of the same order. He was a Vīra Śaiva and wrote the commentary from the point of view of the Vīra Śaivaism. He called his system Viśeṣādvaita in order to distinguish it from the Nirviśeṣādvaita of Śaṅkara and the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja. He asserts[2] that while other systems can present only a part of the Vedic text as an authority, the Vīra Śaivaism can claim the whole of it as such, i.e. every section of the Veda admits of consistent interpretation in the light of the Vīra Śaivaism only. He holds that the Veda is of equal authority with the Śaivāgama.

In the Basaveśa Vijaya by Śaṅkarārādhya, a miracle[3] is attributed to him. It is said that he collected burning embers in a piece of cloth and suspended it at the end of a branch of Śamī tree. This miracle is referred to by a Kannaḍa poet also.

He holds that all the Śrutis propound the dualism-cum-non-dulism, Dvaitādvaita, and that it is also a fact of the common experience. For,[4] we experience duality in the states of wakefulness and sleep, but non-duality in the deep sleep and hold both the experiences to be equally real. In the field of philosophy also, therefore, dualism cannot be maintained to be antagonistic to and inconsistent with non-dualism. We can refer dualism to the em-

1 Sri, Bh., Vol, II, 2,
2 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 2.
3 Sri. Bh., Vol. I, 9.
4 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 189.

pirical level and monism to the transcendental level, at which the individual gets united with Śiva and becomes one with Him, as the water of a river does with that of the ocean, wherein it falls.

This analogy to convey the idea of union of the individual with the universal, in final emancipation, is found in the Kulārṇava Tantra also (MS. P. 123).

HIS COMMENTARY

Śrīpati Paṇḍita follows the brief commentary, the Vṛtti, on the Vedānta Sūtra by Agastya[1]. He mentions Agastya, as Kumbhodbhava, in the line of teachers[2] (Pāramparya). It is a very learned commentary, as is clear from references to and quotations from the Veda, Upaniṣads, Āgamas, Purāṇas and philosophical texts and commentaries on them, which were written from the earliest time down to that of his immediate predecessor, Madhva. It takes into consideration not only the systems, with which we are familiar, on account of references to them by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, but also those about which we can have no idea whatsoever from them.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja and Niṣprapañca-Brahmādvaita of Śaṅkara are the main targets, at which Śrīpati Paṇḍita's criticism is aimed. He criticises the former, for instance, in the course of his commentary on :—

(I) "Asminnasya ca tadyogam śāsti" I, i, 6, 20.

(II) "Muktopasṛpyavyapadeśāt" .. I, iii, 1, 4.

(III) "Utpatterasambhavāt" .. II, ii, 9, 42.

In the course of his commentary on the last of the above quoted Sūtras, he enters into an interesting discussion about the caste of Viṣṇu and tries to show that Viṣṇu is recognised to be a Kṣatriya in all texts from the Vedas down to the Purāṇas, and that Viṣṇu is to be worshipped by Kṣatriyas only. In contrast to the above, he attempts to prove that Śiva is recognised to be Brāhmaṇa in all texts and as such is an object of worship to Brāhmaṇas. He asserts on the basis of the names of famous images of Viṣṇu, during his time, that the names of the images of Viṣṇu have the word "Rāja" at the end, for instance, (I) Govindarāja, (II) Varadarāja and (III) Raṅgarāja. This clearly means that

1 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 2. | 2 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 1.

not only the scripture but the persistent religious tradition also recognises that Viṣṇu is Kṣatriya. He also points out that in the religious festivals of the Vaiṣṇava, which are celebrated according to the Pāñcarātrāgama, the word "Varma" is used for Viṣṇu. In contrast to this he points out that the word "Īśvara" is used at the end of the names of the images of Śiva, symbolic or representative.

AGGRESSIVENESS OF RĀMĀNUJA

In the above context, in the course of his commentary, Śrīpati Paṇḍita refers to the aggressive Vaiṣṇavaism of Rāmānuja. An objection is raised "How can it be asserted that the names of the images of Śiva alone have the word "Īśvara" at the end ?" For, the image of Viṣṇu (which still exists at Tirupati and is visited by thousands of pilgrims daily even now) is called Veṅkaṭeśvara.

In reply to this Śrīpati[1] asserts that the image of Veṅkaṭeśvara simply appears to be of Viṣṇu. In reality it is the image of Śiva "Veṅkaṭeśvarasya ābhāsa-viṣṇutvam". For, the image is decorated with snakes, and in the original image ("Mūlavigraha") there are no characteristic marks of Viṣṇu, such as Śaṅkha and Cakra. It may be pointed out here that Śaṅkha and Cakra, which we find in the image of Veṅkaṭeśvara, are not of stone, of which the whole body is made, but of metal. It was the image of Vīreśvara (Vīrabhadra) which was changed into Veṅkaṭeśvara by Rāmānuja. This is proved by an additional existing fact that just below the hand of the image, there is a Śiva Liṅga.

Similarly in regard to the use of the word "Īśvara" at the end of the name 'Viṭhaleśvara', he asserts that the image has Śiva Liṅga on the head and, therefore, has been called "Viṭhaleśvara". For, it has been accepted that the name is to be dissolved as the genetive determinative compound "Viṭhalasya īśvaraḥ".

He declares that the Vaiṣṇava Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja, the characteristic philosophical technique of which consists of (I) Cit, (II) Acit and (III) Īśvara, is not based upon the authority of the Veda and, therefore, has to be rejected[2]. He says that the Brāhmaṇa Vaiṣṇavas, who are antagonistic to Śiva, should be treated as outcaste[3].

1 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 241.
2 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 247.
3 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 242.

He is equally opposed to the Śaiva Viśiṣṭādvaita, propounded by Śrīkaṇṭha in his Brahmamīmāṁsā Bhāṣya, and says that it is to be ignored[1].

He seems to refer to Śaṅkara, when he talks of "a Bauddha in disguise" (Pracchanna Bauddha)[2] and gives the name "Nirviśeṣādvaita" to his philosophy. He holds that the section "Abhāvādhikaraṇa" in the Brahma Sūtra, II, ii, refutes the system that presents the world, the soul and the Īśvara to be nothing more than illusion. He attributes "Nirviśeṣādvaita" to Vaśiṣtha and seems to point out that Śaṅkara, in his presentation of the triad of God, soul and world as an illusion, follows Vaśiṣṭha, who propounded this view for the first time[3]. Similarly another aspect of Śaṅkara's philosophy he seems to call Śūnyādvaita, and attributes it to Sāndīpa. He holds that the section "Sarvathānupapatti" of the Vedānta Sūtra refutes it. He asserts that "Niṣprapañca Brahmādvaitavāda", which holds that the phenomenal world is due to 'ignorance' (Avidyā) lacks the support of the Veda[4].

Other systems refuted by Śrīpati are (I) Raudra[5], the followers of which are branded with red-hot Śiva Liṅga, (II) Tantra Pāśupata, the followers of which bear the marks of Śūla and Ḍamaru, (III) Gāṇapatya, (IV) Saura, (V) Śākta, (VI) Kāpālika, (VII) Madhva, (VIII) Sāṅkhya, (IX) Yoga, (X) Nyāya, (XI) Vaiśeṣika, (XII) Bauddha and (XIII) Jaina etc.

SOME UNFAMILIAR AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO IN THE COMMENTARY

(I) Paramaśivārādhya. Two works are attributed to him : (1) Kaivalya Prakāśa and (2) Śivajñāna Candrodaya.[6] (II) Jyotirnātha (III) Ghanṭānātha (IV) Bhīmanātha and (V) Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara. These[7] are spoken of as masters of all the Vedas, opponents of the systems of Bauddha, Pāñcarātra and Advaita, and as expounders of the view that Śiva is Para Brahman. (VI) Durvāsā. There is a work, referred to as "Durvāsīya", wherein he is said to have discussed the implication of the affix "Śatṛ" in "Pivantau"[8] in the Vedic passage "Ṛtaṁ pivantau". He is also said to have refuted the views of those who hold that God, soul

1 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 200.
2 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 225.
3 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 228.
4 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 134.
5 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 232-3
6 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 24.
7 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 28,74.
8 Sri Bh., Vol. II, 25.

and world are illusory. (VII) Upamanyu. He also, along with Durvāsā, Revaṇa Siddha and Marula Siddha, is said to have criticised the views, stated just above[1]. Is he identical with the author of the commentary on the Nandikeśvara Kāśikā by Nandikeśvara ? (VIII) Udbhaṭārādhya and (IX) Vemanārādhya. They, along with Revaṇa Siddha etc. are said to have held that the Vedic passages, such as "Īśānaḥ sarvavidyānām" speak of Śiva only as the Lord of all[2].

SRĪPATI'S VIŚEṢĀDVAITA.

The system, propounded by Śrīpati, was known by various names, such as (I) Dvaitādvaita, (II) Viśeṣādvaita, (III) Seśvarādvaita, (IV) Śivādvaita, (V) Sarvaśrutisāramata and (VI) Bhedābheda[3]. The word 'Viśeṣa' which differentiates his monism from those of others, is interpreted in various ways in different contexts[4]. We shall revert to this topic in the proper context. He admits thirty-six categories[5], common to the monistic school of Kashmir. Among the various exponents of the Vedānta, referred to by Bādarāyaṇa in his Vedānta Sūtra, such as Jaimini, Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi, Bādari and Kāśakṛtsna, he follows the last, Kāśakṛtsna, because he is an exponent of the Bhedābhedavāda, takes all the Śruti texts into account and represents the central view of the Vedānta[6]. He admits the powers of will[7], knowledge and action, which were earlier recognised by the monistic school of Kashmir. He also admits three impurities (mala) Āṇava, Kārma and Māyīya[8]: and refers to six ways[9] to final emancipation (Ṣaḍadhva) on which Abhinavagupta in his Tantrāloka has written at length.

1 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 193.
2 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 234,269.
3 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 195.
4 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 136,189.
5 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 105,168.
6 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 177, 333.
7 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 494.
8 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 176.
9 Sri. Bh., Vol. I, 69.

(VI) NANDIKEŚVARA ŚAIVAISM

The school of Śaiva Philosophy, which is to be considered now, is monistic and has been called "Nandikeśvara Śaivaism", because it was propounded by Nandikeśvara, the author of the Nandikeśvara Kāśikā.

TRADITION ABOUT NANDIKEŚVARA

Upamanyu, the commentator on the Nandikeśvara Kāśikā, in the course of his commentary, Tattva Vimarśinī, records the following tradition, which persists even now among the students of Pāṇini's system of grammer:—

The sages, Nandikeśa, Patañjali, Vyāghrapāt and Vaśiṣṭha, etc. contemplated on Śiva for inspiration. As an act of grace to them, Śiva appeared and struck his hand-drum (Ḍamaru). The sounds, produced by it, symbolically presented the fourteen Sūtras. The Sūtras, found at the commencement of Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, are articulate representations of the inarticulate sounds of Śiva's hand-drum. The sages, unable to understand the meaning of the Sūtras, approached Nandikeśvara for clarification. He (Nandikeśvara) expounded the meaning in Twenty-six verses, which constitute the text of the Nandikeśvara Kāśikā.

In the Nandikeśvara Kāśikā there is only one verse, number two, which is for the guidance of Pāṇini etc. This is referred to by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in the Udyota[1]. It says that the last letter, at the end of each of the fourteen Sūtras, is for the sake of Pāṇini to enable him to build up the system of grammar. The rest of the verses present a monistic system of Śaiva philosophy.

THE DATE OF THE NANDIKEŚVARA KĀŚIKĀ

The literary tradition, referred to in the preceding section recognises Nandikeśvara to be a contemporary of Pāṇini. There seems to be some truth in this tradition. For, Patañjali, in his Mahābhāṣya[2], seems to refer to the interpretation of the system of sounds, represented in the fourteen Sūtras, by Nandikeśvara. For, he talks of it as "Brahmarāśiḥ". This view seems to find support in the interpretation of "Brahmarāśiḥ" as

1. M. Bh. 89. | 2. M. Bh. 132.

"Brahmatattvam" by Kaiyaṭa. But in the opinion of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, as expressed in the course of his commentary on the above, Patañjali had Nandikeśvara's view in his mind. For, Nāgeśa definit ely quotes the fourth verse of the Nandikeśvara Kāśikā.

UPAMANYU, THE COMMENTATOR.

Upamanyu is the only known commentator on the Nandikeśvara Kāśikā. The commentary is called Tattva Vimarśinī. He seems to have come very long after Nandikeśvara. For, by his time variants of the text had become current. For instance, he refers to two readings of the verse number two, besides the one that he adopts. He seems to refer to the founder of another system of grammar "Indra"[1]. He quotes from (I) the Upaniṣads, (II) the Gītā, (III) Sanaka-Dakṣiṇāmūrti-Saṁvāda-Vivaraṇa, (IV) Mahāmantratattva Prakāśikā, (V) Svara Vimarśinī, (VI) Jñānottama and (VII) Tantrarāja. He declares that his commentary is in the light of the information on the subject, gathered from the Tantras.

It may be pointed out here that two recensions of this work are at present available. One was edited by Balakrishna Shastri and was published from Banaras. The other is included in the Mahā Bhāṣya. (Navāhnika), edited by Mahamahopadhyaya Pandit Shiva Dutta and published from Nirnaya Sagar. They truly represent two different recensions. The most important difference between them is that while in the former there is no commentary on the verse no. 18, in the latter there is commentary and therein the declaration given at the end of the preceding paragraph appears[2]. Besides this there are many other differences, such as difference in the names of the works referred to, e.g. in place of Svara Vimarśinī in the former, there is Īśvara Vimarśinī in the latter.

From the references, found in Upamanyu's commentary, he seems to belong to a period when the Śaiva-Āgamas or Tantras had assumed definite form and commentaries on some of them had already been written. And we know that the commentaries on the Śaivāgamas were begun to be written in the 9th century A. D. We cannot, therefore, assign him to a date earlier than this. Upamanyu is referred to as an ancient authority along with Revaṇa Siddha and Marula Siddha in the Śrīkara Bhāṣya by Śrīpati Paṇḍita[3]. Here he is spoken of as one who had refuted

1. N. K. 2.
2. M. Bh. 134.
3. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 193.

false monism (Mithyādvaita), nihilistic monism (Śūnyādvaita) Jainism and Buddhism. And we know that Śrīpati Paṇḍita belonged to the middle of the 14th century A. D. As Upamanyu is referred to as an ancient authority, probably earlier than even Revaṇa Siddha, we shall, therefore, be not very wrong if we assign him to the close of the 11th and the beginning of the 12th century A. D. This conclusion seems to find some support in the fact that about this time various attempts were made to study and to systematise those sections of the Śaivāgamas, in which the Devanāgarī alphabetical system was presented as representing the Śaiva metaphysics. For, during this period Abhinavagupta wrote his famous Tantrāloka, in the third Āhnika of which this view is presented ; and Śrīkaṇṭha in his Ratna Traya and Rāmakaṇṭha in his Nāda Kārikā, attempted allied problems.

Nandikeśvara, according to Upamanyu, admitted thirty-six categories, though some of them are different from those of the monistic Śaiva School of Kashmir. He also held that Parama Śiva is beyond categories, exactly as did Abhinavagupta. There is close similarity between the Voluntaristic metaphysics of Nandikeśvara and that of the monistic Kashmir Śaivaism; compare, for instance,

"Svecchayā Svasya Cicchaktau
Viśvamunmīlayatyasau"

N. K. 12

and

"Svecchayā svabhittau Viśvamunmilayati"

P. Hr. Sūtra 2.

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(VII) RASEŞVARA ŞAIVAISM

The Raseśvara system is so called, because its followers, though they admit the essential identity of soul with Maheśvara, assert that the liberation in life (Jīvanmukti) depends upon the stability of the bodily frame and that it is possible to have a perdurable body through the use of the processed and purified (Siddha) mercury (Raseśvara). They say that mercury is called "Pārada" because it is a means to get beyond the series of transmigratory states[1] ; and that it is called Raseśvara, because it is the most powerful of all medicines, which are prepared by subjecting a metal to a medical process: it is the king of chemicals.

THE CAUSE OF THE RISE OF THE RASEŞVARA SYSTEM

It appears that seakers after liberation felt frustrated in their efforts, because of short life and diseases. The only means to liberation, known to people, before the rise of the Raseśvara system, was that which was pointed by the Yoga system, and which consisted in the control of vital air and the concentration on the Self. The practice of Yoga seems to have come to an abrupt and futile end in the majority of cases, because of disease or untimely death. Hence there seems to have grown a tendency to look upon the efforts at liberation as futile. Raseśvara Darśana, therefore, sprang up to fight this tendency. It emphasized the importance of healthy and durable body for the successful practice of Yoga. It gave the processed and refined mercury and mica as the means to the attainment of a perdurable and healthy body and thus revived the dying faith in the highest goal of human life, the liberation.

RASEŚVARA AS A ŚAIVA SYSTEM

The Raseśvara system is admittedly a Śaiva system. Mādhavācārya, in the very beginning of his summary statement, attributes it to some Māheśvaras, the followers of the school of Philosophy that held the Maheśvara, the Highest Lord, to be the Ultimate metaphysical principle. There is no doubt about it that the Buddhists, such as Nāgārjuna, who is referred to as an authority on the system, made substantial contributions to it. The majority of the writers on it, however, have been the Şaivas, and the origin of Raseśvara, mercury, has been mythically attributed to Şiva. For,

1. S. D. S., 202.

mercury is held to be nothing but the semen, dropped from the body of Śiva.

Thus, in Rasasaṅketa Kalikā, Cāmuṇḍā says that the semen, that dropped from Śiva, was taken by Agni in his mouth and was scattered all round. On three sides there was water, wherein it got merged. On the fourth side there was earth whereon it fell and became mercury. This explains mythically the existence of mercury-wells in the west only. It is also said that it got deep down into the earth and was taken out by gods and Nāgas, who sank wells, thousand Yojanas deep. And this seems to refer to the fact that mercury is found at the depth of about 25 thousand feet.

The literary evidence seems to support the view that mercury came to India from the West, particularly Misra (Egypt). For, one of the names of mercury is Misraka, which may well be said, to convey the idea of the place wherefrom it came first to India, though the commentators interpret it differently. And Bhagavad Govinda Pāda, the teacher of Ṣaṅkara, in his Rasa Hṛdaya says that Rasendra (Pārada) should be worshipped in the west, probably because he knew that it came from that direction.

Another tradition says that Ṣiva, the founder of Chemistry, imparted instructions to Pārvatī about the method of subjecting mercury to some scientific process, so as to make it capable of converting iron into gold and of giving immortality to human body. These two effects of mercury on iron and on human body are known as (I) Lohasiddhi and (II) Dehasiddhi respectively.

It also says that at first mercury was processed and refined for converting iron into gold and that after its effect on iron had been tested, it was further processed to give immortality to human body. In fact, Bhagavat Govinda pāda[1], according to Mādhava, insisted on testing the efficacy of the processed mercury on iron to convert it into gold, before subjecting it to further process for using it on human body to give it immortality. The view that mercury, after subjection to certain processes, becomes capable of converting iron into gold is common to Misra.

That success had been attained in this field is testified by the literary tradition about Rasasiddhas. It asserts that there were persons, who actually attained immortality by the use of the processed mercury. The Vāgbhaṭa Saṁhitā by

1. S. D. S., 206.

Vāgbhaṭācārya, for instance, gives a list of twenty-seven Rasasiddhas, including Nāgārjuna and Bhagavad Govinda Pāda. They are as follows :—

1. Ādinātha (Śiva)
2. Candrasena.
3. Laṅkeśa
4. Viśārada
5. Kapāli
6. Matta.
7. Magaḍavya
8. Bhāskara.
9. Śūrasena
10. Ratnaghoṣa.
11. Śambhu
12. Sāttvika.
13. Naravāhana
14. Indrada.
15. Gomukha
16. Kambali.
17. Vyāḍi
18. Nāgārjuna.
19. Surānanda
20. Nāgabodhi.
21. Yaśodhana
22. Khaṇḍa.
23. Kāpālika
24. Brahmā.
25. Govinda
26. Lampaka
27. Hari.

The Ānanda Kanda also gives a list of Rasasiddhas. It also includes Nāgārjuna and Govinda, though the latter is referred to as Bālagovinda. A similar list[1] is given by Mādhava also.

The tradition about the efficacy of the processed mercury to give immortality to human body, is common to Buddhism also. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtāyana in an article published in the Gaṅgā in Sam. 1993 (1936 A. D.) mentions 84 Rasasiddhas. Among these also Nāgārjuna is mentioned.

It seems that many scholars and sages wrote on the efficacy of mercury and on the ways of processing it for various purposes. The Vāgbhaṭa Saṁhitā gives a list of eighteen writers on Rasa Tantra.

Two works on Rasa by Nāgārjuna, are referred to by Chinese traveller Hiuen Tsang. They are Rasa Ratnākara and Rasendra Maṅgala. There is another work on Rasa, called Kakṣāpuṭa, attributed to Nāgārjuna.

Rasārṇava, which has been edited by Profulla Chandra Ray, eulogises mercury and says that the liberation, promised by the six Schools of thought, is got only after death : but such is the efficacy of mercury that it brings liberation right in the life time. It brings the liberation objectively before the user, like an

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1. S. D. S., 204.

Āmalaka on the palm. There is a list of twenty-five works on Rasa, given in S. D. S. (P.520-1). Besides these MSS. of about 70 books on Rasa have so far been discovered.

PROBABLE TIME OF RASEȘVARA DARȘANA

There is no reference to mercury in the Vedas. In the Ṛgveda only three metals are referred to, i.e. gold, silver and copper. In the Yajurveda "Kṛṣṇa Āyasa" (Iron) also is mentioned. And in the Atharva Veda compound metals such as brass etc. are referred to in addition to the above. It is unknown in the Brāhmaṇic literature also.

There is evidence to show that nickel was used for coinage by Indian tribes, Kṣudrakas and Mālavas[1] in the time of Alexander (4th century B. C.). Kṣudrakas are said to have presented to Alexander the Great hundred pieces of nickel coins along with so many other things[2]. Nickel was, therefore, known in India long before the Indo-Grecian dynasties, though in Europe it was first shown to be a metal by the researches of Cronstedt in 1751. But there is no evidence to show that mercury was known in India in the 4th century B. C.

We find reference to mercury in Suśruta for the first time as an ingredient in some plasters. There it is not recognised as capable of giving immortality. In Caraka also there is no such talk. It seems, therefore, that the Raseśvara system arose about the commencement of the Christian era, particularly because Nāgārjuna is a recognised authority on it and he was a contemporary of King Kanishka and is credited with the authorship of a commentary on Suśruta. It seems to have lived up to the time of Șaṅkara ; because Śaṅkara's teacher Bhagavad Govinda Pāda also is a recognised authority on it.

•1. A. I. N. 143—4 | •2. I. I. A. 252.

(VIII) MONISTIC ŚAIVAISM OF KASHMIR

The historical survey of the seven systems of the Śaiva Philosophy, dealt with so far, has shown :—

(i) that in the Veda, though different names of Śiva occur, yet there is no reference to any of the distinctive features of the Śaiva Philosophy ;

(ii) that it is in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka that we find the Vedic basis of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, which arose in the second century A. D ;

(iii) that if we believe in the tradition about the origin of the fourteen Sūtras, which we find at the beginning of Pāṇini's grammar, and admit that Patañjali refers, to the view of Nandikeśvara, the Nandikeśvara Śaivaism, a voluntaristic monistic system, belongs to the 4th century B. C. ;

(iv) that if we accept the view that the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika follow an earlier Pāśupata system, which is referred to by Bādarāyaṇa in his Vedānta Sūtra, the dualistic Pāśupata School also may be said to belong to about the 4th century B. C. ;

(v) that the Dualistic Siddhānta Śaivaism was reoriented and revitalised by the great writers, who flourished in different parts of India, such as Chola and Kashmir, from the 8th to the 12th century A. D. ;

(vi) that Śrīkaṇṭha propounded the Viśiṣṭādvaita Śaivaism in the 11th century A. D. ;

(vii) that the Vīra Śaivaism, as we find it in the available literature was reoriented and revitalised by Basava in 1167 A. D. and was subsequently propounded by the five well recognised teachers, Revaṇa etc. ; and

(viii) that the Raseśvara system is more a science than a school of philosophy and as such it follows dualistic Śaivaism and grew from the second to the 8th century A. D.

Thus, as far as we can trace back the history of the Śaiva Philosophy, we discover the two currents, monistic and dualistic, running parallel. In the pre-Christian era we find the

voluntaristic monism of Nandikeśvara side by side with the realistic dualism of the Pāśupata school. And similarly from the 9th to the 13th century we find the monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir developing along with the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism. The Monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir thus historically and fundamentally owes its origin to Nandikeśvara Śaivaism exactly as the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism does to the Pāśupata Dualism.

The two systems occupy the central position in the history of the Śaiva Philosophy, systematising logically what had been thought and said on the two systems by their respective authorities. But the Monistic Śaiva Philosophy of Kashmir attained predominance ;

(1) because the writers on it evolved out a system in terms of which every field of experience could be explained ;

(2) because they approached the problem of metaphysics from the psycho-epistemic point of view, in contrast to the traditional, which was stuck to by others ;

(3) because it was taken up for exposition by such an encyclopaedic thinker as Abhinavagupta, who applied its technique to explain not only the empirical and the transcendental experiences, but also the Aesthetic.

There is no room for any controversy about the dates of the authors of the works on the Monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir, because Abhinavagupta, in contrast to the writers in Sanskrit in general, mentions the dates of composition of three of his works. In relation to him, therefore, the dates of his predecessors and successors can definitely be fixed. The history of this school has been written at some length in Abhinavagupta : An Historical and Philosophical Study; and it has been summarised in the History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western, Vol. I, pages 382 ff. The reader may refer to them. We, therefore, need not present the historical approach to this system here.

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PART II

PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

PRELIMINARY

The Veda, by common consent, is the earliest literary monument that humanity possesses. It is the presupposition of all currents of thought, religious, cultural and philosophical, which we find to-day. In tracing the historical development of any aspect of Indian life, therefore, beginning has to be made with early references to it in the Veda. Therein we find the foundations, on which almost all the systems of thought, with which we are familiar to-day, have been built. And if we use the word "Veda" for the entire literature from the Saṁhitā, collection of hymns, to the Upaniṣads, we find in it a fairly complete picture of the evolution of the earliest human thought from mythology to complex philosophical systems.

The Veda, as representing "Brahmanism", is prior to the Jainism and the Buddhism, which developed in antagonism to the Vedic ritualism. It is prior to the materialistic school of the Cārvāka or Lokāyatika, which denies all spiritual values and, therefore, ridicules the Veda, presenting it to be nothing more than the creation of buffoons, knaves and demons. It is the authority on which the six well known Vedic systems of Indian Philosophy are based. Vaiṣṇavaism, though it acknowledges the Pañcarātra Āgama as the authoritative basis of the system, holds that there is no antagonism between the teaching of the Veda and that of the Pañcarātra Āgama and interprets the Vedic texts so as to show that they maintain the Vaiṣṇava doctrines. All the eight systems of the Śaiva Philosophy, dealt with earlier here from the historical point of view, though they are based primarily on the Śaivāgama, trace their fundamentals to the Vedas, Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. And the authoritative works on them very often quote from the Veda to show that the particular doctrine, under discussion, is in consonance with the Vedic teaching.

Art, religion and philosophy are closely connected. They constitute the final triad of the Hegelian system. Art is the thesis, religion the antithesis and philosophy the synthesis.

Opinions may differ about the exact nature of the relation of one of this triad, with the other, as Croce differs from Hegel on the relation of art and religion as thesis and antithesis. But religion seems to be an artistic conception of the phenomena of nature. This can very definitely be said with regard to religions that have grown on Indian soil. In the Vedas we find phenomena of nature artistically conceived as gods, which are recognised as the objects of religious worship. The earlier hymns of the Ṛgveda are addressed to the shining sun, the gleaming moon in the nocturnal sky, the fire, blazing on the hearth or on the altar or even the lightning, shooting forth from the cloud, the bright sky of day, or the starry sky of night, the roaring storms, the flowing waters of rivers , the glowing dawn and the spread-out fruitful earth. All these natural phenomena are, as such, glorified, worshipped and invoked. Only gradually is accomplished, in the songs of the Ṛgveda itself, the transformation of these natural phenomena into mythological figures, into gods and goddesses such as Sūrya (Sun), Soma (Moon), Agni (Fire), Dyaus (Sky), Maruts (Storms), Vāyu (Wind), Āpas (Waters), Uṣas (Dawn), and Pṛthivī (Earth), whose names still indubitably indicate what they originally were. So the songs of the Ṛgveda prove indisputably that the most prominent figures of mythology have proceeded from personifications of the most striking natural phenomena.

In the context of the Śaiva Philosophy the question would, therefore, arise: which phenomenon of nature is the basis of this philosophy? And we get a clear reply to it from the Ṛgveda. Śaivaism, as a religion, has sprung from the poetic conception of the terrific aspect of nature. For, if we try to trace the origin of the conception of Rudra, the earliest of the names of Śiva, we find that Rudra is the storm-god, because he is the father of storm-gods (the Maruts)[1].

This conception of Rudra is subsequently developed in mythology. The Vaiśeṣika system recognises four types of beings, belonging to the four elements, earth, water, fire and air, and holds that airy beings are Bhūta, Preta and Piśāca. And mythology represents Rudra as the Lord of Bhūtas, "Bhūtanātha". The science of control of vital air is attributed to Rudra, because it is concerned with air. Bhāsa in his Pratimā Nāṭaka refers to this tradition, when he talks of Māheśvaram yoga śāstram. Aestheticians have called the "terrific" basic emotion after Rudra. They have given it the name 'Raudra' and recognise Rudra to be its god.

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[1] Wint., Vol. I, 77.

But closer observation of the terrific aspect of nature revealed that the apparently destructive and, therefore, terrific aspect of nature, the storm, is ultimately beneficial. It brings rains, on which the agricultural life and, therefore, the very existence of men and animals mostly depends. Therefore, the storm-god was soon conceived as "Śiva" (auspicious or propitious) and "Paśupati" (the lord of cattle). And in the Yajurveda, Rudra is spoken of as the Lord of all the three worlds (Jagatām pati, Yaju. XVI, 18).

This Vedic conception of Rudra as Paśupati is the basis of the two Pāśupata systems :—

(*i*) Dualistic, which was followed by Gautama and Kaṇāda; and

(*ii*) Dualistic-cum-monistic, which was presented by Lakulīśa and is known as Lakulīśa Pāśupata. And the two words which constitute one of names of Śiva "Paśupati", in the Vedic period, become the names of the two highest categories, (I) Pati, and (II) Paśu in the two Pāśupata systems and are admitted as such in the three Siddhānta Śaiva systems of philosophy : (i) the Śaiva, which is a dualistic system, as we know from Mādhava's presentation of it in his Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha; (ii) the Śaiva Viśiṣṭādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha ; and (iii) the Śaiva Viśeṣādvaita of Śrīpati Paṇḍita.

THE BASIS OF THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE SYSTEMS

A history of Śaiva Philosophy, presenting the various known systems in a chronological order, such as may be beyond all controversies, and showing the logical evolution of a later school from an earlier one, is well nigh impossible. For, very few of the Śaivāgamas, on which many of the Śaiva systems are based, are available either in print or in MSS. Those which have been printed are mere copies of the MSS. They have not been critically edited. And those which are yet in MSS. are in so many different scripts that it is extremely difficult to make full use of them. Many of them have not so far been even traced. The same is true of most of the commentaries on them, which were actually written, as we know from references to them in many of the available works on Śaivaism . It is no less true of many of the philosophical works, which were written on the basis of the Śaivāgamas, and references to which we very often come

across in the available works. Out of the several systems of Śaiva Philosophy, at least one is such as we know from references only ; that is the dualistic Pāśupata, which we know from Śaṅkara's criticism, and indirect references to it by Haribhadra Sūri and Rājaśekhara. The dates of many of the important writers cannot be fixed beyond doubt.

It was probably because of the reasons, stated above, that no History of Philosophy was attempted by thinkers in India before the British period. Thinkers, like Mādhava, Haribhadra Sūri and Rājaśekhara etc. put together various systems of Indian Philosophy, but on a basis other than the historical. Mādhava seems to have arranged the systems in a logical order. His presentation of a following system is prefaced with a criticism of the preceding. Haribhadra Sūri, according to his own statement, has recognised six systems only as the basic. The difference of one system from another, he holds, is due either to the deity, by whom it was revealed, or the conception of the categories[1].

All the eight systems, with which we are concerned here, have been revealed by Śiva. They, therefore, constitute one group. And if we are to speak on them in a logical order, we should begin with the dualism and pass on to the monism, through the Dualism-cum-monism. Out of the eight Śaiva systems, that we know, two are Dualistic. One of these had its adherents all over India from the 9th to the 12th century A. D. and was propounded by great thinkers, such as Sadyojyoti, Bṛhaspati and King Bhoja etc. We call this system Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism, for reasons to be stated in the course of the presentation of it. The tradition of this was unbroken from the time of Ruru, the founder of an Āgamic school, incorporated in the Rauravāgama, to the time of Sadyojyoti, whose works are available. And the other, the Pāśupata, belongs to the pre-Christian era, because it is presupposed by Lakulīśa Pāśupata, which arose in the first half of the Second century A. D.

In our arrangement of the Śaiva systems in a logical order we give the first place to the Pāśupata Dualism, not because of the historial priority of the Pāśupata to the Siddhānta Śaiva, but because we have no independent work presenting this system. We know it from references only. And logically Pāśupata Dualism seems to be prior to Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism, because while the former admits five independent

1 S. D. Sam., 4.

categories, the latter admits only three, eliminating the two, Yoga and Vidhi, which are not philosophical categories but only the means to the attainment of the final emancipation.

After the two Dualistic Ṣaiva Schools, we come to the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, which is a Dualistic-cum-monistic (Bhedābheda) School. There is sufficient literature available on it. Then we come to the Viśiṣṭādvaita Ṣaivaism of Ṣrīkaṇṭha, which both historically and logically comes after the Dvaita and the Dvaitādvaita Schools. Next we deal with the Viśeṣādvaita of Ṣrīpati Paṇḍita for the same reason. Then we come to a monistic system, the Nandikeśvara Ṣaivaism. The Raseśvara Ṣaivaism has been put thereafter, because it is more a science than philosophy. And finally we deal with the Monistic Ṣaivaism of Kashmir, because it presents the crowning phases of the Ṣaiva Philosophy.

ṢAIVA DUALISM.

The Ṣaiva Dualism originally was propounded in the following ten Ṣaivāgamas :—

(1) Kāmaja; (2) Yogaja; (3) Cintya; (4) Kāraṇa; (5) Ajita; (6) Dīpta; (7) Sūkṣma; (8) Sahasra; (9) Aṁśumān; and (10) Suprabheda.

Though the system, presented in these Āgamas, admits three primary categories : (1) Pati, (2) Paśu, (3) Pāśa; and, therefore strictly speaking, it should be called "Pluralism", yet we have stuck to the word "Dualism", because Abhinavagupta, in his division of the Ṣaivāgamas into three groups, as the bases of three primary systems of the Śaiva Philosophy, puts the above stated ten Āgamas under the head "Dvaita". This school is different from the Siddhānta School of Śaiva Dualism. For, the Siddhānta School is based on the Twenty-eight Ṣaivāgamas, ten of the Dualistic School, and Eighteen of the Dualistic-cum-monistic school, which are the following :—

1. Vijaya,
2. Niśvāsa,
3. Madgīta,
4. Pārameśvara,
5. Mukhabimba,
6. Siddha,
7. Santāna,
8. Nārasiṁhaka,
9. Candrāṁśu,
10. Vīrabhadra,
11. Āgneya,
12. Svāyambhuva,
13. Visara,
14. Raurava,
15. Vimala,
16. Kiraṇa,
17. Lalita,
18. Saurabheya.

But the Śaiva Dualism is based on the ten Āgamas only.

It is very disappointing to find that no work, which is exclusively based on the ten Dualistic Śaivāgamas, is traceable.

The summary of the Dualistic Śaivaism, that we find in the Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha, under the title "Śaiva Darśana" is a presentation of Śaiva Dualism, based upon the authority of the Twenty-eight Śaivāgamas, including the Ten of the Dualistic and Eighteen of the Dualistic-cum-monistic group, which constitute the basis of the Siddhānta School. For, Mādhava refers not only to the Mṛgendrāgama, which is a part of the Kāmika, referred to above in the list of the Dualistic Śaivāgamas, but also to the Kiraṇa and the Saurabheya, which belong to the Dualistic-cum-monistic group, given above. He also refers to the Tattva Saṅgraha of Sadyojyoti, Tattva Prakāśikā of Bhoja, and the commentary on the Tattva Prakāśikā by Aghora Śiva, which are recognised authorities on the dualistic branch of the Siddhānta School.

That the Eighteen Śaivāgamas have a non-dualistic trend mixed up with the Dualistic, is clear from the fact that the twenty-eight Śaivāgamas, on which the Siddhānta School is based, have been interpreted by Śrīkaṇṭha to propound the Viśiṣṭādvaita Śaivaism in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra ; and Śrīpati Paṇḍita has similarly interpreted them to propound the Viśeṣādvaita in his Śrīkara Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtra. It is interesting to find out how the Śaiva Dualism, as presented on the basis of the Twenty-eight Śaivāgamas differs from that, found in the admittedly dualistic Śaivāgamas. We have fortunately most of the Dualistic Śaivāgamas before us; some in print, such as Mṛgendra etc.; others in MSS., such as Sūkṣma and Ajita etc.; and still others in scripts other than the Devanāgarī, such as Kāraṇa, Suprabheda and Yogaja etc. But it is too big a topic to attempt in the introduction. We shall present the Śaiva Dualism on the basis of these Āgamas in the projected History of Śaiva Philosophy.

(I) PĀŚUPATA DUALISM

SALIENT FEATURES OF THE PĀŚUPATA DUALISM

The Pāśupata Dualism is the philosophic interpretation of the Vedic conception of God Rudra as Paśupati. In fact, two out of the five primary categories, admitted by this system, are elaborations of the two ideas, represented by the two words, constituting the name "Paśupati" ; and the first two categories are called "Pati" and "Paśu" or Kāraṇa and Kārya [1]. The individual souls are conceived to be under the control of and dependent on the Lord (Pati), exactly as are animals, dogs for instance, under the control of their master, hunter for instance, who holds them by chains.

The Pāśupata metaphysics seems to be the earliest. Its metaphysical theory, which is based upon the conception of the uncaused cause, was adopted by both, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika. For, according to Haribhadra Sūri, Kaṇāda was a Pāśupata and Akṣapāda was a Śaiva. The former was earlier than the latter, who follows the metaphysical view of the former. It is presupposed by the Vedānta, because Bādarāyaṇa in his Vedānta Sūtra criticises it. It admits the material cause to be distinct from and independent of the efficient. It asserts the relation between the efficient cause and the material to be the same as exists between a potter and clay. It seems to be prior to the Buddhism and the Jainism. For, it is a presupposition of the Vaiśeṣika; and the Buddhist theory of Nirvāṇa is traced to the Asatkāryavāda of the Vaiśeṣika and the Astikāyas of the Jains, as well as their atomic theory are traced to the Vaiśeṣika, which is mentioned in many jain works and in the Lalitavistara[2].

We have no literature, presenting the Dualistic Pāśupata school, which, on the basis of references to it, we are speaking of as prior to the Vaiśeṣika. We, therefore, do not know the details of its metaphysical theory.

But if we put together what we find in the references to it by Śaṅkara, in the course of his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra, and by his commentators such as Vācaspati and Ānandagiri,

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1 P. Su. 6. | •2 I. Ph. Vol. II, 177.

we get a fairly clear idea of the fundamentals of the Pāśupata Dualism, which may be stated as follows :—

1—It admitted the Lord (Pati) to be the efficient cause only. It asserted the independent existence of the material cause, as we have already stated above.

2—It admitted the five primary categories : (1) Cause (Kāraṇa);(2) Effect (Kārya); (3) Union (Yoga); (4)Ritual (Vidhi); (5) Liberation as the end of all pains (Duḥkhānta).

These categories are common to the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, which is distinct from the Pāśupata. For, the former is Dualistic-cum-monistic and the latter is Dualistic. This view is supported by the two Śaiva commentators on the Vedānta Sūtra, Śrīkaṇṭha and Śrīpati Paṇḍita, both of whom refute pure Dualism, and assert that the system criticised by Bādarāyaṇa is a Dualistic Śaiva system.

3—It seems to have put under the Kārya the categories from Mahān to Earth, which are admitted by the Sāṅkhya, as dependent categories. These categories are admitted by the Lakulīśa Pāśupata also, but as the sub-divisions of 'Kalā', one of the three dependent categories, Vidyā, Kalā and Paśu.

4—It seems to have admitted Pradhāna as the material cause, separate from the Lord (Pati) the efficient cause.

5—It accepted the individual souls to be co-eternal with both the causes, the material and the efficient, a view which has been retained by the Vaiśeṣika.

6—It seems to have admitted that the Lord, in the creation of the diversity of the empirical world, is influenced by Karma.

7—It recognised the liberation (Mokṣa) to be nothing more than the end of all pains. The last two points also have been retained by the Vaiśeṣika.

(II) SIDDHĀNTA ŚAIVA DUALISM

The Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism, that, is presented here, is an aspect of the Siddhānta school of Śaivaism, which admitted the authority of the Twenty-eight Śaivāgamas, as has already been stated. If we compare its fundamentals with those of the other systems of Indian Philosophy, we find that it has fundamental differences from the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya, the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta.

SIDDHĀNTA ŚAIVA DUALISM AND THE VAIŚEṢIKA

(1) The metaphysical theory of the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism is different from that of the Vaiśeṣika. It accepts the theory of evolution which is similar to that of the Sāṅkhya. It holds that the Māyā evolves, abandons a former state to assume a later ; just as milk does to assume the state of curd.

It is Satkāryavāda. It holds that the existing curd becomes manifest (Abhivyajyate). Accordingly it asserts that the Māyā evolves into Kalā etc. as milk does into curd. But the Māyā does not exhaust itself in its evolute as does milk in curd. The evolution is partial, just as change in Ghee, because of the fall of an insect into it, is only in a small quantity of it[1] (Ghṛtakīṭa-nyāya). Thus, it is Satkāryavāda, as opposed to the Asatkāryavāda of the Vaiśeṣika.

(2) Karma, according to the Dualistic Siddhānta Śaivaism, is a quality of Buddhi[2] and not of the Ātman as the Vaiśeṣika holds. For, to admit Karma to be a quality of Ātman is to admit it as transient, because of the changes, due to the changing Karma.

(3) Similarly Kāla, according to the Dualist Siddhānta Śaiva is non-eternal, because it is insentient and many, such as present, past and future[3]. For, whatever has insentiency and multiplicity is transient. But the Vaiśeṣika admits "Time" to be eternal.

(4) It differs from the Vaiśeṣika (I) in holding the Ākāśa to be 'space' wherein all material things exist, and (II) in asserting that the sound (Śabda) is not the quality of Ākāśa only, as the

1 R. T. 17-18.
2 T. P. 36.
3 T. P. 37.

Vaiśeṣika holds, but of earth, air, water and fire also, because the peculiar sounds are actually found in them[1].

It may be pointed out here, by the way, that because of the aforesaid conception of Ākāśa, the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism differs (*a*) from the Cārvāka, who denies the existence of Ākāśa ; (*b*) from the Mīmāṁsaka, who holds that it is perceptible, and (*c*) from the Naiyāyika, who maintains that it is eternal in so far as it has an eternal being and does not owe its being to the Tanmātras.

(5) It does not admit eternal atoms[2], as do the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya. For, according to the Dualistic Siddhānta Śaivaism, all that has insentiency and multiplicity is transient.

(6) It holds that the individual soul is essentially sentient (Cit) or sentiency itself (Jñānasvarūpa). The Jñāna, therefore, is not a quality of the self as the Vaiśeṣika maintains.

THE SIDDHĀNTA ŚAIVA DUALISM AND THE SĀṄKHYA

The Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism differs from the Sāṅkhya on the following important points:—

(1) It does not admit that Puruṣa or individual self is originally pure, (Puṣkarapalāśavannirlepaḥ) as the Sāṅkhya maintains. It asserts that the self has beginningless impurities. For, otherwise the empirical experience, due to the tendency to enjoy, cannot be explained. But if it (the tendency to enjoy) be said to be inherent in the self, it would be difficult to explain why the liberated do not have it[3]. The Sāṅkhya cannot say that the tendency to enjoy is due to Rāga or attachment. For, the attachment (Rāga) can function in relation to that self only which is impure.

(2) Its conception of Bhoga is different from that of the Sāṅkhya, which may be stated as follows :—

Bhoga[4] involves the following four :—

(I) Puruṣa, identified with its reflection, falling on the Buddhi.

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1 T. San., 4-5.
2 T. San., 5.
3 Bh. Ka., 3.
4 I. P. V. V. Vol. I, 153.

(II) Buddhi, which receives the reflection of Puruṣa from within and that of the object from without.

(III) The reflection of object on the Buddhi.

(IV) Ahaṅkāra[1] which is responsible;

(*a*) for the unification of the two reflections of the subject and the object;

(*b*) for identification of the reflection of the subject with the subject itself;

(*c*) for the use of this union of the subject and the object for practical purposes;

(*d*) for the rise of consciousness "I know this".

THE PROCESS

1. The Buddhi receives the reflection of the object from without.

2. The reflection of the subject comes from within.

3. Ahaṅkāra unites them.

4. The two reflections merge into each other.

5. The object shines. This shining of the object, because of union with the reflection of the subject, is the culminating point of the process, described so far. Hence it is spoken of as the fruit of the cognitive activity. It is called Jñāna.

Union of the reflections of the subject and the object, when used for practical purposes by Ahaṅkāra through giving rise to the consciousness "I know this", which refers the object to the subject without recognising the difference between the subject and its reflection, is called *Bhoga*, because it involves union of the two reflections in the common ground of the Buddhi and also because the consciousness, that has been aroused by Ahaṅkāra, has the common substratum with the reflection of the Puruṣa.

But the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism holds that *Bhoga* is the awareness of the modifications of the Buddhi, involved in the judgements about external pleasure or pain, by the sentient self. It is a mere awareness of the affected Buddhi by the self. It does not involve real affection of the self by the modifications of the Buddhi. In *Bhoga*, the self is in contact with the affected Buddhi exactly as the moon is with the water wherein her

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1. I. P. V. V., Vol. I, 155.

reflection falls. Accordingly it maintains that the sentient self is the enjoyer and, therefore, doer, and that the Buddhi is not the doer, because it is objective and insentient[1].

THE SIDDHĀNTA ŚAIVA DUALISM AND THE VEDĀNTA

The Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism differs from the Vedānta on the following points :—

(1) It denies the identity of the individual souls with the Universal Self, and asserts that they are innumerable and are distinct from the Brahman, though they are dependent on the Lord[2] for both, the enjoyment of the fruits of action (Karma) and the liberation. Accordingly it holds that all the Vedic texts, which are interpreted by the Vedāntin as propounding the identity of the individual and the Universal, admit of dualistic interpretation.

(2) It admits the material cause of the universe to be distinct from the efficient, and criticises the Vedāntin, who asserts that the Brahman is both. For, the effect can have those characteristic attributes only which belong to the cause and, therefore, if the Brahman be held to be the cause of both the sentient and the insentient, it (Brahman) will have to be admitted to be both[3].

(3) It criticises the monism of the Vedānta. For, the monism is inconsistent with the Vedāntin's assertion that the knowledge of the Brahman is the means to Liberation. It asks : where is the room for talk about the means and the end in extreme monism ?

(4) It asks : how can the Vedānta assert that the Brahman is characterised by pure being, sentiency and bliss ? For, the characteristics shine in relation to that which is distinct and separate from that which possesses them. For instance, the heat of fire becomes manifest in relation to wood only. Therefore, if in reality there be nothing external to the Brahman its characteristics cannot shine[4].

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1 Bh. Ka. 39.
2 R. T. 8.
3 M. Ka. 12.
4 S. P. 25.

In the same way the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism differs from and criticises every other system, because it flourished at a time when almost every system of Indian philosophy had taken a definite shape. Some of the important works on it definitely, openly and purposively take up the refutation of other systems : for instance, the Para Mokṣa Nirāsa Kārikā by Sadyojyoti, which has no other end in view than the refutation of the conception of Mokṣa of every known system.

THE PĀŚUPATA DUALISM AND THE SIDDHĀNTA ŚAIVA DUALISM

The Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism is distinct from the Pāśupata Dualism. The latter admits the five primary categories: (1) Kāraṇa, (2) Kārya; (3) Yoga; (4) Vidhi; and (5) Duḥkhānta. But the former admits three only: (1) Pati, (2) Paśu, and (3) Pāśa. It seems that the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism and the earlier Śaiva Dualism which it represents, both were influenced by the Pāśupata system, which seems to be earlier. For, the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism seems to have borrowed the conception of Kāraṇa, the uncaused cause, from the Pāśupata and to have called it 'Pati', because there is no conceptual difference between Kāraṇa and Pati. The difference is verbal only. For, in the Pāśupata Sūtra by Lakulīśa, we find the word "Pati" used for Kāraṇa[1].

At the present state of our information about the Pāśupata system, which is based upon Śaṅkara's reference to it, we do not know exactly what was the conception of the material cause, admitted by the Pāśupata. But if we follow the Ratna Prabhā, we are led to think that it was 'Pradhāna' (Kāraṇam Pradhānam Īśvaraśca). It also talked of Paśu and Pāśa. For, Śaṅkara in stating the purpose of propounding the five categories definitely says that it was to bring about the freedom of the individual self (Paśu) from bondage (Pāśa) (Paśupāśa-vimokṣaṇāya). It seems, therefore, that the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism was influenced by the Pāśupata Dualism in the conception of the two categories: (1) Paśu and (2) Pāśa.

The Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism accepted the metaphysical theory of the Pāśupata, namely, that the material cause is different from the efficient. But it improved upon the conception of the liberation. For, while the liberation, according to the Pāśupata, consisted in the end of all pains, the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism held that it was the attainment of similarity, in respect of powers of knowledge and action, with Śiva. Thus, it seems to have reoriented the earlier Pāśupata Philosophy.

1 P. Su. 6.

THE SIDDHĀNTA ŚAIVA DUALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF GRAMMAR

The Philosophy of Grammar, which deals with the various aspects of speech, such as Parā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī, and allied problems, is traced to the Vedic passages, such as:

(1) "Catvāri vākparimitā Padāni"; and

(2) "Catvāri śṛṅgāstrayo asya pādā"

which are quoted by Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya. It may be pointed out here that there is difference of opinion between Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in the interpretation of these Vedic texts. For, while the former interprets the word "Catvāri" as referring to four kinds of words : (1) noun, (2) verb, (3) preposition (upasarga) and (4) particle (Nipāta) ; the latter holds that it refers to the four aspects of speech, stated above.

The well recognised work on it, is the Vākyapadīyam of Bhartṛhari. But Bhartṛhari himself declares that what he presents is based on an ancient tradition. He traces the tradition back to Pāṇini. He refers to a work, covering one lakh of Granthas, written by Vyāḍi, to expound the system of Pāṇini[1]. This work, however, was lost due to the neglect of it by the students of Grammar, because of its big size. Patañjali, therefore, in order that the tradition of 'Vyākaraṇa Smṛti' may not be broken, wrote his Mahābhāṣya, which closely followed the work of Vyāḍi. The followers of Patañjali, however, lost touch with it. The Mahābhāṣya, therefore, remained only in a book in South India. Thus again the tradition of the system of Grammar was lost.

Some time later a Brahmarākṣasa brought the original Vyākaraṇāgama, written by Rāvaṇa, from a place in Triliṅga in the mountain Trikūṭa, to Candrācārya and Vasurāta, who after properly understanding it expounded it in many ways to their pupils. Vasurāta, the teacher of Bhartṛhari, wrote a digest of the said Vyākaraṇāgama. Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīyam is based on the same. It consists of three chapters : (1) Brahmakāṇḍa; (2) Vākyakāṇḍa and (3) Padakāṇḍa.

Bhartṛhari and his critic, Somānanda, the founder of the Recognitive (Pratyabhījñā) School of Śaivaism in Kashmir, both present the monistic tradition of the Philosophy of Grammar. But the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism presents the Dualistic tradition of the same. According to the Siddhānta Śaiva

1 V. P. 283.

Dualism, the first category is the Śiva, which is also called Para Bindu. And the problem of the Philosophy of Grammar, concerning the four aspects of speech, is discussed in the context of this category. We shall revert to this topic in the course of our discussion on the Bindu. Rāma Kaṇṭha II in his Nāda Kārikā and Śrīkaṇṭha in his Ratna Traya deal with this problem from the Dualistic point of view.

THE CATEGORIES OF THE SIDDHĀNTA ŚAIVA DUALISM

The Siddhānta Śaiva Dualist's conception of the category is very closely connected with his conception of the universal annihilation (Mahārtha Saṁhāra). He holds that a category[1] (Tattva) is that which persists even when there is the universal annihilation, and is a condition, directly or indirectly, of all the experiences, empirical or transcendental. And the universal annihilation is that in which all that is the product of Māyā[2] or Mahāmāyā merges back into its material cause and has its being therein in the state of non-difference, of unity, which is a mere potentiality for diversity. He admits that the creation is of two types: (1) Pure (Śuddha); and (2) Impure (Aśuddha), and that the Māyā also is of two types; one, the products of which are the necessary conditions of the empirical experiences: this is called Māyā; and the other, the products of which are the equally necessary conditions of the transcendental experiences, which the transcendental subjects, like Mantra, Mantreśa and Mantra Maheśa, have. This is called Mahāmāyā. Accordingly he holds that at the universal annihilation all that constitutes the material condition of any experience, merges back into the Śakti, one of the dependent categories, on which we shall write in the proper context: and the Śakti merges back into the Mahāmāyā.

Thus, the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualist holds that there are only three Primary categories: (1) Māyā or, to state more accurately, Mahāmāyā, (2) Puruṣa and (3) Śiva[3].

It may be pointed out here that the conception of these categories is based upon metaphysical view: and that when the metaphysical thought does not dominate in the mind of an exponent of the system, these categories are called by different names: (1) Pati (2) Paśu and (3) Pāśa. And though there is no difference in the ideas when the word Pati is substituted for Śiva, and Paśu

1. T. P. 56.
2. T. P. 53.
3. T. P. 54.

for Puruṣa: yet the conception underlying the word 'Mahāmāyā' is different from that, for which the word Pāśa stands. For, the Pāśa as a primary category, in the original conception of the triad of categories, is more comprehensive than Mahāmāyā. The Pāśa as an original primary category has five dependent categories (1) Mala, (2) Rodhaśakti, (3) Karma, (4) Māyā and (5) Bindu, which is also called Mahāmāyā. When, therefore, a writer on the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualistic School, substitutes the word Māyā or Mahāmāyā, by either of which he means all that is implied by both, Māyā and Bindu, as the dependent categories of Pāśa, he presents a very much narrower conception than that for which the word Pāśa stands.

Further, though the Dualistic Siddhānta School admits three primary categories[1], (1) Pati, (2) Paśu and (3) Pāśa : yet it also talks of Thirty-six categories. But they are dependent categories of the above three. That is as follows :—

The first category is sub-divided into five : (1) Śiva, (2) Śakti (3) Mantra-maheśa (4) Mantreśa and (5) Mantra.

The second category, Paśu, though sub-divided into three:-- (1) Vijñānākala, (2) Pralayākala and (3) Sakala—is yet counted as only one category. Its sub-divisions are not included in the *thirty-six categories*.

The third category, Pāśa, is sub-divided into five : (1) Mala, (2) Rodhaśakti, (3) Karma, (4) Māyā and (5) Bindu. But none of these, excepting the Māyā, is counted in the thirty-six categories. The number Thirty-six is made up by adding the twenty nine sub-divisions of Māyā. From the Māyā in the descending order the succeeding evolves out of the preceding. The order may be stated as follows :—

(1) Kalā, (2) Kāla, (3) Niyati, (4) Rāga, (5) Vidyā and the twenty-four categories of the Sāṅkhya.

Thus, it tries to talk of the thirty-six categories of the monistic Kashmir Śaivaism. Probably, this is done to justify the interpretation of the passages in the non-dualistic Āgamas in the dualistic light. It may, however, be pointed out here that the authorities on the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism differ in the conception of the dependent categories.

THE PRIMARY AND THE DEPENDENT CATEGORIES

The Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism maintains two sets of categories: (1) Primary and (2) Dependent. The primary categories are three:

1 T. P. 6.

(1) Pati, (2) Paśu and (3) Pāśa. These seem to have been borrowed from the earlier Pāśupata Dualism, which admitted five categories: (1) Kāraṇa, (2) Kārya, (3) Yoga, (4) Vidhi and (5) Duḥkhānta. For, even according to the scanty information, that we can collect about the Pāśupata Dualism from the references, it is clear that it admitted the existence of Paśu and Pāśa ; because the categories are said to have been expounded to bring about the freedom of Paśus, the limited individual selves, from the Pāśa, the bondage (Paśu-Pāśa-Vimokṣaṇāya) : and the first category, the cause, (Kāraṇa), seems to have been inclusive of both the causes, the efficient and the material.

(Kāraṇam Pradhānam Īśvaraśca)

The Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism , therefore, seems to have adopted the first category, perhaps with the modification, that it excluded the conception of the material cause from the first category and maintained it to be nothing more than the Īśvara or Pati, the efficient cause. It brought the material cause under Pāśa, which it admitted to be an independent category, subsuming under it the five dependent categories, including Māyā, the material cause of the limited objective world. Thus, the five dependent categories of Pāśa, are admitted to be: (1) Mala, (2) Māyā, (3) Karma, (4) Nirodhaśakti and (5) Bindu. Similarly Paśu is admitted to be an independent category ; and three types of the limited subject, (1) Vijñānākala, (2) Pralayākala and (3) Sakala, are subsumed under it.

Thus, in the early stages in its development, the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism, discarded the two religious categories: (1) Yoga; and (2) Vidhi, amalgamated the last, Duḥkhānta, with the first, the Pati ; adopted Paśu and Pāśa as independent categories; widened the conception of Pradhāna as Māyā and subsumed it under the Pāśa. Thus, it propounded the three primary categories.

The Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism seems to be the outcome of a tendency to separate philosophy from religion. For, this seems to be the possible reason for discarding the two religious categories of the Pāśupata Dualism. This tendency seems to have continued to develop. For, King Bhoja, in his Tattva Prakāśikā towards the end, talks of three categories, (1) Śiva or Pati, (2) Puruṣa or Paśu and (3) Māyā[1]; eliminating Pāśa, under which are included the five impurities, which are of importance from the ritualistic point of view ; and assuming Māyā, which is one of the impurities, as a separate category, which constitutes the material cause of the limited objective world.

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1 T. P. 54.

The Pāśupata Dualism thus seems to have been the origin, not only of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, but also of the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism. It seems to have been the source of the Yoga and the Sāṅkhya also. For, the Yoga also talks of the three fundamentals, (I) Iśvara, (II) Pradhāna and (III) Puruṣa: and the difference of the Yoga from the Sāṅkhya lies in the acceptance of the Īśvara besides Pradhāna and Puruṣa, which are common to both and seem to have been borrowed from the Pāśupata Dualism.

(I) PATI, THE TRANSCENDENTAL ŚIVA.

The Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism sticks to the cosmological and teleological arguments, according to the Kantian terminology, to prove the existence of God, who is called "Pati" in this system. If we consider "Pati" in relation to the Bindu, the metaphysical matter of this system, we find Him to be very much like "Prime Mover" as Aristotle has presented God. And if we consider God in relation to the meaningful multiplicity of the objective world, we find Him to be very similar to the Efficient Cause, (the Agent, the Kartā) as Anslem, Acquinas, Descartes, Leibniz and Wolff have conceived God. Similarly, if we consider God in relation to Karma, we find Him to be nothing more than a presupposition of Ethics, as Kant presented God.

Pati, as the first independent category of the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism is the magnification of the idea of Paśupati as found in the Vedas. In the Veda, Pati was the Lord of cattle. In the Dualistic philosophy, He is magnified into the Lord of every thing. In the Veda He had the power of protecting cattle. In the Dualistic philosophy He is omnipotent.

He is one. He is all-pervasive, eternal, without beginning or end. He[1] is eternally free or liberated (Mukta). He is free from all impurities, such as natural likes and dislikes etc. He is 'graceful' to all. He is sentient. He is the prompter of all. His freedom is uncaused. He is the uncaused cause. He remains unchanged in spite of His creating the worlds; just as the Sun does in spite of his causing the opening of the lotuses[2]. He is the efficient cause. He creates the objective limited world out of the material cause, the Māyā, by means of His power, Śakti, the instrumental cause.

1 T. P. 2. | 2 R. T. 104.

Śakti[1], the power, is the means wherewith the Śiva effects or creates the world, where the bound souls suffer or enjoy the fruits of their past deeds, and finally brings about the liberation of the bound. It is one, though because of the varying conditions, constituted by what is to be effected, it appears to be many. It is essentially sentient and, therefore, does not undergo modifications like Māyā. It is the principal power and is inherent in Śiva.

In the Ratna Traya it is said to be related to Śiva as the rays are to the Sun[2]. It knows no obstruction. It is always operative in some form or another. It is limitless and, therefore, indeterminate. It does not owe its being to anything. It is self-shining. It is all-transcending. It is extremely subtle. It is also said to be non-different from Śiva, (Svaśaktyānanyabhūtayā R. T. 42) and yet the difference between Śiva and Śakti[3] is recognised to be similar to that of substance and attribute. The fact is that the dualistic tendency in the Siddhānta School is mixed up with the monistic; because it recognises the authority of the 18 Śaivāgamas, which present Bhedābheda, in addition to those which present Bhedavāda.

In the Ratna Traya the dualistic-cum-monistic tendencies of the Siddhānta are clear. It is asserted that the Śiva and the Śakti are essentially identical inasmuch as both are essentially Cit. But there is relational, functional or logical difference in so far as the Cit, resting on itself, is Śiva (Svaniṣṭha), but resting on the object in order to know it, Cit is Śakti : and as such they are conceived as substance and attribute (Dharmin and Dharma). The one is unrelated to anything external to itself (Parānapekṣa), but the other is related to the external objective world (Parāpekṣa). Just as the capacity of fire to burn becomes manifest in relation to fuel, so the Śakti of Śiva shows itself in relation to the objective world.

The Siddhāntin rejects the view of the Śaktyadvayavādin, who asserts that Śakti alone is the cause of the world and that Śiva is an unnecessary assumption. He justifies the admission of Śiva on the basis that Śakti is an attribute (Dharma) and as such it can have no existence without a substratum (Dharmin)[4].

Accordingly, Pati is very often spoken of as possessing two powers. For, the word 'Cit', according to this system, means

1 T. P. 5.
2 R.T. 68.
3 R. T. 100
4 R.T., 103.

the powers of knowledge and action: (Jñāna-kriyā-Śakti). Therefore, when it asserts that the transcendental Śiva is 'Cidghana'[1], it means that the powers of knowledge and action are to Him, what body is to the soul. The idea intended to be conveyed by this analogy is that just as the soul effects its purpose by means of the body, so God does by means of the powers.

Equally often His powers are said to be three: Will (Icchā) knowledge (Jñāna) and action (Kriyā)[2]; and also five: creation, maintenance, destruction, obscuration (Nirodha) and grace (Anugraha) on the basis of His characteristic five functions. These five powers, under the five names, Īśa, Tatpuruṣa, Sadyojāta, Vāma and Aghora, referred to in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, are spoken of as the five faces of the Lord (Pañcavaktra) and the Śaivāgamas are said to have proceeded from the five mouths of Śiva exactly as the Vedas are admitted to have proceeded from the four mouths of Brahmā. It is, however, asserted that all this is merely figurative and the object of this figurative presentation of powers is only to make contemplation on Him possible[3].

THE DIFFERENCE IN THE CONCEPTION OF POWERS EXPLAINED.

Pati is a substance with an attribute; and both substance and attribute are essentially sentiency (Cit). The Śakti is conceived in two ways : (I) that which persists in its operation even when there is no objective world, created or in the process of creation : and (II) that which is operative in relation to the objective world. The two powers, the power of knowledge and that of action, the omniscience and the omnipotence, are admitted to be in Pati even when there is not even the idea of the objective world.

This becomes clear if we remember that, according to this system, the three independent categories, Pati, Paśu and Pāśa, persist even in Mahāpralaya : and that Pāśa includes the Mahāmāyā or Bindu, the material cause. Thus, the two powers, the omniscience and the omnipotence, are the powers attributed to Pati as He is conceived to be in Mahāpralaya. The power of knowledge is operative in relation to Mahāmāyā, which exists even in Mahāpralaya : and the power of action is the presupposition to account for the creative activity at the time of fresh creation after Mahāpralaya.

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1 T. P. 2.
2 T. P. 27.
3 T. P. 8.

The power of will is attributed to Pati, due to the monistic trend in the Eighteen out of the twenty-eight Ṣaivāgamas, the authority of which is accepted by even the Dualist Siddhānta Śaivas. The Will is attributed to Him, when the evolutionistic metaphysics is substituted by the voluntaristic : when the Pati is represented to create the objective world not as a potter creates a jar, but by means of his will (Saṅkalpa mātreṇa : Icchā-mātreṇa) as we shall soon show.

And He is spoken of as possessing five powers, when He is conceived in relation to the objective world, as its creator, maintainer, destroyer, as one that affords opportunities to the impurities of the individual selves to attain maturity and as one that does grace to the bound souls.

POWERS OF THE LORD (PATI)

(1) THE POWER OF KNOWLEDGE—

The power of knowledge of the Lord works independently of the Buddhi[1]. It is unlike the cognitive power of the indivi dual subject. This power of Śiva[2] has always objective reference. For, it is related to the eternal Bindu, even when there is no objective world. Hence it is not transitory but eternal.

(2) THE POWER OF ACTION—

The power of action or omnipotence is the presupposition of the powers of creation etc., which are attributed to Him, when He is presented in relation to the objective world, as its creator etc. It is the potentiality which expresses itself in the five functions of Pati, which are spoken of as His powers.

(3) THE POWER OF WILL—

The power of Will is talked of, as stated earlier, under voluntaristic influence. It is said that Śiva pervades the Bindu[3] with His power and, therefore, all that is below. He is not pervaded by anything higher. He, therefore, knows and does everything.

He pervades everything inasmuch as he is related to everything in the manner in which the Ākāśa is to the material things. It is because of this pervasion that the objects have their origin and continuance. The creation takes place because of the mere

1 R. T., 98.
2 R. T., 99.
3 R. T., 42—3.

presence of this power in a determinate form (Saṅkalpa mātreṇa), exactly as the opening of a lotus takes place because of the mere 'presence' of the rays of the sun.

Here the Siddhāntin seems to deviate from the Sāṅkhya in talking of the creation as due to determinate[1] presence of this power "Saṅkalpamātreṇa", which ordinarily means "Icchāmātreṇa".

(4) THE POWER OF CREATION—

Power of creation consists in creating the bodies, the senses, the worlds and the objects out of Bindu and Māyā[2] and in uniting the souls, according as their impurities are mature or immature, with suitable bodies in order that they may have the experiences befitting their impurities. For a clear understanding of this power, it is necessary to remember that the creation is of two kinds : (1) the pure and (2) the impure.

THE PURE CREATION

(1) The pure creation (Ṣūddhādhva)[3] is the direct creation of Śiva. The material cause of this is Bindu. It consists of the pure categories and the pure worlds wherein the liberated live. Here some of the liberated, such as Vidyeśvaras are united with bodies, which are made up of Bindu. Here Vidyā evolves out of Bindu, through the successive stages of modification such as Nāda etc. Śiva or Pati has all-transcending, pure and eternal powers of knowledge and action in relation to everything. He, therefore, creates the pure world without having a body exactly as an individual self, independently of a body, produces stir (Spanda)[4] in his body. Further, the efficient cause must necessarily possess a body if his creative activity is related to an object, which is to be grasped by determinate knowledge. As the pure creation is not the object of determinate knowledge, therefore, a body for Ṣiva, to create the pure world, is unnecessary. The pure creation is characterised by indeterminacy ; because it belongs to a higher level than that at which language evolves. And because determinacy consists in the affection of "Citi" by the words i.e. so long as the affection of consciousness is not associated with the words, there is no determinacy. Therefore, the pure creation is said to belong to the level of indeterminacy,

1 R. T. 43.
2 S. P. 20-1.
3 T. P. 9..
4 R. T. 20.

because here the affection of consciousness by language is not possible.

THE IMPURE CREATION

(II) *The impure creation*[1] is the product of the creative activity, not of the Lord but that of Ananta etc. i.e. the Vidyeśvaras, who have been given the bodies, made up of Bindu, and to whom the power to create has been delegated by the Lord. It is called the impure world, because its material cause is the Māyā and also because herein the bound live. It is characterised by determinacy ; because it evolves after the evolution of language. We shall discuss this point under Bindu.

The omnipotence of the Lord, however, does not become limited because of the creative activity of Ananta etc.[2], because He is the prompter of Ananta etc.; and the creative power, which the creators of the impure creation have, is the one that is delegated to them by the Lord.

This conception of Pati and Ananta etc. as the Supreme Lord and the dependent ones, seems to have been the basis of the form of government, which we call monarchy : or, it may have been the other way. For, just as the power of a monarch does not get limited, because of the exercise of the governmental power by the territorial lords, so the creative power of the Lord does not get limited because it is exercised by dependent lords, Ananta etc. For, power in both the cases is delegated.

(5) THE POWER OF MAINTENANCE (STHITI ŚAKTI)

The created objects, according to this system, are not momentary. They persist as means of enjoying or suffering the fruits of past deeds (Karma). The power, which is responsible for the short continuous existence of the created, is called the power of maintenance. It is responsible not only for the continuity of the created, but also for the relation of the souls[3] in bondage with the objects to make the various types of experience possible, so that the innate impurities of the souls may attain maturity and make the operation of the power of Grace possible to bring about the liberation of the bound. The relation of the souls with the objective world is due, not to the power of maintenance alone but to the co-operation with it of the power of obscuration.

1 T. P. 9.
2 R. T. 19.
3 M. Ka. 18.

(6) THE POWER OF ANNIHILATION (SAṀHĀRA ŚAKTI)

The view of the universal annihilation, maintained by this system, differs from that of the Sāṅkhya, inasmuch as it holds that not only the triad of Guṇas merge into Prakṛti but that the latter also merges into Māyā and that too in Mahāmāyā or Bindu. In Mahāpralaya the three primary categories, Pati, Paśu and Bindu, only persist[1]. The power, which is responsible for such a universal annihilation, is called Saṁhāra śakti.

The creation, according to this system, is of two kinds, pure and impure. In the dissolution of the pure creation Vidyā etc. merge back into Śakti and the latter into the Bindu[2]. The Bindu even then has separate existence from the Parama Śiva or Pati. It does not get related to Him by the relation of Samavāya.

Similarly in the dissolution of the impure creation all the evolutes from the earth to Prakṛti merge into Māyā and that too merges into Mahāmāyā, as stated earlier.

The universal annihilation is brought about to give rest to tired souls and the material cause of the objective world, in order that they may gain vigour and start vigorous fresh life when the world is created again[3].

(7) THE POWER OF OBSCURATION (TIROBHĀVA)

Modification or change in everything necessarily depends upon contact with something that is external. The Prakṛti evolves, because of contact with the Puruṣa. Milk changes into curd because of contact with heat. The impurity that obscures the perfect powers of knowledge and action, which are innate in the individual, can, therefore, change and attain maturity due to some contact only i. e. the contact with the products of the Māyā. To bring about this contact in co-operation with the power of maintenance is the function of the power of obscuration[4]. The individual is thus put in the field, where he can reap the fruits of his action and, with His grace, sow the seed that produces the fruit, called liberation. The Kashmir Śaiva conception of the power of obscuration is very different from the above. This power of obscuration is referred to as Rodhaśakti, Nirodhaśakti, Tirodhānaśakti or Tirobhāvaśakti. It is also spoken of as the power,

1 T. P. 54.
2 T. P. 53.
3 M. Ka. 18.—19.
4 S. P. 2.

which is responsible for obscuring the knowledge that the objective world is to be shunned[1].

(8) THE POWER OF GRACE (ANUGRAHA ŚAKTI)

It is the power of Grace[2], to which the liberation is ultimately due. It removes the impurity which hides the omnipotence and the omniscience, which are inherent in the individual. It requires the maturity of the Mala or impurity in order that it may be able to remove it. It is like a surgical instrument, which can remove the film from over the eye only when it has matured. It is a prompter as it were of the creative power; because the motive of the operation of the creative power is nothing but grace.

II PĀŚA, THE BONDAGE.

Pāśa, the bondage, which binds the souls and is responsible for the distinction of Paśu from Pati, is the second of the three primary categories of the system. It has five sub-categories: (1) Mala, (2) Māyā, (3) Karma, (4) Nirodhaśakti and (5) Bindu. The dependent categories of Pāśa are very closely connected with the conception of liberation. Karma and Māyā are the two bondages, admitted by the Vedāntin also, who asserts that liberation is freedom from the two aforesaid bondages. But this system holds that such a liberation is of the lower type, inasmuch as it is partial liberation. For, another bondage, Mala, which is also called Paśutva Mala, is still there.

It may be pointed out here that this system admits that there are at least three stages, through which the souls, free from the bondages of Māyā and Karma, have to pass before they can attain final emancipation. The souls, which are free from the said two impurities but still have the third, inclined towards disappearance, are called Vijñānākalas. And when these are given the subtle bodies, made up of Bindu, and are put at higher levels of Vidyā, Īśvara and Sadāśiva, they are known as Mantra, Mantreśa and Mantramaheśa respectively.

But there is lack of definiteness, precision and uniformity in the statements about Pāśa. The number of the dependent categories of Pāśa, ordinarily stated, is five. But very often Bindu is not included and the number is stated to be four[3]. And the reason for its non-inclusion is that of the two types of liberation, (I) Para (Higher) and (II) Apara (Lower), the latter is attained, even

1· S. P. 21.
2· T. P. 10.
3· T. P. 18.

when there is the bondage of Bindu. And the liberated souls with this bondage are the Mantra and the Mantreśa etc., who belong to the "pure creation".

Similarly Nirodha or Tirodhāna Ṣakti is spoken of as a bondage, but in a secondary sense only[1]. Of these four bondages Karma and Mala are beginningless. But Māyīya and Tirodhāyaka, which are often used for Māyā and Nirodhaśakti respectively, are the products of the Lord's power.

(1) MALA

Mala is beginningless[2]. It conceals the powers of knowledge and action of the self. It is one but has innumerable powers. It conceals the powers of knowledge and action of each individual by means of a separate power. Hence the removal of Mala from one individual does not mean the liberation of all.

It covers the individual much as husk covers the rice seed or as the black substance covers the copper. The Siddhānta Śaivas admit three impurities in common with Kashmir Śaivaism. One of these they often refer to by the simple name Mala. But it is clear from other texts that by this they mean the same thing as Āṇavamala. It is very often called Paśutva Mala. It can be removed by His grace only. The impurity, according to them, is of the nature of a substance, similar to the film over the eye (cakṣuḥ paṭala)[3]. (This view has been very adversely criticised by Abhinava in the Tantrāloka.)

The maturity (paripāka) of the impurity, which comes through undergoing the discipline, prescribed for the purpose in the sacred texts, is the necessary condition of the operation of the power of grace, exactly as the maturity of the film over the eye is the necessary condition of the surgical operation of the eye.

Mala or Paśutvamala is spoken of as Adhikārimala, when it is related to the beings, who are free from the two impurities, Karma and Māyā. It is called Ādhikārikamala, because it is on account of the presence of this in a state of advanced maturity that the powers of creation etc. in regard to the impure creation (Aśuddhādhva) are delegated to the beings, belonging to the level of Īśvara. They are eight in number and are called (1) Ananta (2) Sūkṣma, (3) Ṣivottama, (4) Ekanetra, (5) Ekarudra, (6) Trimūrti, (7) Ṣrīkaṇṭha and (8) Ṣikhaṇḍin. The Lord

1 T. P. 19.
2 T. P. 19.
3 S. P. 2.

removes their Mala with His grace, reveals their perfect powers of knowledge and action and puts them in charge of the impure creation[1].

(2) MĀYĀ

Māyā[2] is essentially of the nature of being. It is real and not unreal as the Vedānta maintains. It is the material cause of everything gross or subtle at the empirical level. Māyā, as a bondage means the effects of the Māyā[3] and as such it is very often called Māyīyamala.

The superimposition of the self on body and intellect etc. is due to Māyāmala[4], which is responsible for mistaking "not-this" as "this".

The mere absence of the consciousness of distinction between the two, as admitted by the Sāṅkhya, cannot account for identification of the self with Buddhi. For, that which is uncaused, does not admit of destruction. Therefore, if the absence of consciousness of distinction between self and not-self, be admitted to be without a cause, it would be indestructible and, therefore, it would be difficult to explain why it does not persist in the so called liberated. Hence Māyā as an impurity, which is the cause of mistaking 'not-this' as 'this' has to be admitted[5], so that the destruction of the mistake may be accounted for in terms of the destruction of its cause and the non-rise of the mistake in the liberated may logically be explained. We shall deal with Māyā, as a metaphysical category, in the proper context.

(3) KARMA

Karma, the individual destiny, the accumulated effect of the past deeds of each individual soul, is cyclically beginningless[6]. It determines the kind of body and senses, which the soul gets at rebirth, as also the determinate experiences and their objects, which each individual has. In short, it determines all associations of each soul[7]. It determines the creative activity of the Lord also, because He creates the world, consisting of bodies, means and objects of experiences, according to the sum total of Karma or destiny of each of the individual souls, who are to be born into it to enjoy or suffer the consequences of their past actions.

1 T. P. 12.
2 T. P. 20.
3 T. P. 18
4 R. T. 85
5 R. T. 85.
6 T. P. 20.
7 R. T. 85.

Karma is a recognition of the fact that human being cannot always correctly foresee the consequences of his action. It is a force that leads a Caesar or Hitler to the tragic end. It accounts for the lack of proportion between act and its fruit. It is an ethical principle: and the belief that there is no ultimate escape from the deed done, if used as the determining principle of individual action, surely improves the individual morally.

(4) NIRODHAŚAKTI OR TIROBHĀVA

Rodhaśakti or Nirodhaśakti is counted not only among the five Malas but also among the five powers of the Lord. And it is admitted that really speaking it is a power of the Lord and that it is spoken of as a dependent category of Pāśa, in a secondary sense[1], because it is a means by which the Lord, in co-operation with other impurities, brings the individual souls, by means of a chain as it were, to the experiences[2], which are their deserts.

(5) BINDU

Bindu is conceived not only as an impurity but also as the material cause of the pure creation. It is spoken of as an impurity from the point of view of religious mysticism, and as the material cause of the pure creation from the metaphysical point of view. It is the first of the thirty-six dependent metaphysical categories of this system, as we shall soon show. It is very often talked of as Mahāmāyā.

BINDU AS AN IMPURITY OR MALA

The conception of Bindu as an impurity is very closely connected with the view that 'Liberation' (Mukti) is of two types, Para and Apara; and that even after a soul has got freedom from the bondages of Karma and Māyā, it is not perfectly free; it has freedom of the lower type only. For, the impurity of Mala, which is also called Paśutvamala, is still there.

The Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism admits that there are worlds beyond the one in which we, the bound, live, and which is a creation of Māyā. It admits that there are five categories beyond Māyā; that there are three worlds, corresponding to the three categories, (1) Sadāśiva, (2) Īśvara and (3) Vidyā; and that the souls, who have got freedom from the bondages of Māyā and Karma and are called Vijñānakevalas, live in them.

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1 T. P. 7. | 2 T. P. 10.

Such souls are of three types[1], according to the higher and higher stages of maturity of their Paśutvamala. They are accordingly called (1) Mantramaheśa, (2) Mantreśa and (3) Mantra, and live in the worlds belonging to the three categories, (1) Sadāśiva, (2) Īśvara and (3) Vidyā, respectively. They are partly liberated because they have still the Paśutvamala. In such a context of religious mysticism, Bindu or Mahāmāyā, as a dependent category of Pāśa, is spoken of as the material cause of the worlds beyond Māyā and of the bodies of the partly liberated beings, who live in them.

MYSTICISM OF THE ŚAIVA DUALISM AND PLOTINUS

The idea of the worlds beyond Māyā, will become clearer to the students of the Western philosophy, if we compare it with the 'world of Nous', according to Plotinus.

(1) Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism agrees with Plotinus in holding that the 'world of Nous' or 'spiritual world' is midway between the empirical world and the 'One'. For, it holds that the lower liberation (Apara mukti) is the intermediate stage between the bondage of Māyā and Karma, and the final emancipation (Paramukti or Śivasāmya); just as Plotinus holds that soul has to reach the level of spirit before the One can appear to her.

(2) It admits that in the pure creation there is the distinction of subject, object and means of knowledge at least logically, just as Plotinus admits the distinction of "Nous, Noeta and Noesis" or "Spirit, Spiritual world and Spiritual perception"[2].

(3) It differs from the monists in holding the individuality to be real, exactly as Plotinus differs from Plato and Aristotle. For, according to both, Plato and Aristotle, the individuality, both subjective and objective, is not ideal and, therefore, not real. It has no place in the world of ideas. It is due only to the peculiar nature of the matter, which splits up the universal into numerous individuals or particulars, just as prism splits up the light of the sun into rays of different colours. According to Plotinus, however, individuality is real and independent of the material condition. There are individual spirits in the real world.

(4) It asserts, like Plotinus, that the individuality of spirits at the spiritual level does not imply any limitation in their know-

1. R.T. 12. | 2. Inge. Vol. II, 38-9.

ledge and that the individuality of spirit is no bar to its knowing all the contents of the spiritual world. For, spirits are not separated from one another by physical barriers as souls are. They penetrate one another. The spiritual world is like a transparent sphere[1], placed outside the spirit, in which it can see all the contents of the spiritual world.

(5) It also agrees with Plotinus that the object of the Noús or spirit is the spiritual world, which is made up of ideas and that the ideas have their material constitution, but it is of supersensible nature[2]. For, it admits Bindu or Mahāmāyā as the material cause of the pure world and holds it to be distinct from Māyā, which is the material cause of the empirical world.

(6) But there is a fundamental difference between the philosophy of Plotinus and Siddhānta Şaiva Dualism. For, the former propounds the theory of emanation and holds that both, spirit and soul, emanate from the One : but the latter adheres to the theory of evolution and maintains that the individual souls in both the worlds, pure and impure, have eternal separate existence from the Lord (Pati).

BINDU AS THE FIRST DEPENDENT CATEGORY

Siddhānta Şaiva Dualism admits thirty-six dependent categories, as has already been stated. Bindu as the first dependent category is called Şiva. The word "Şiva", however, is very often used for the first primary category, Pati, also. The reader, therefore, has to take the context into account in determining the meaning of this word. In the available text, occasionally we find the word "Parama Şiva"[3], instead of Şiva, used for the first primary category and it is asserted that He is beyond the thirty-six categories.

Bindu or Şiva, the first dependent category, is the material cause of the pure creation and as such it is also called Mahāmāyā, as has been stated already. It is eternal, like Māyā. The other four categories (Tattvas) Şakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara and Vidyā[4], are the effects or evolutes of it. It pervades the entire creation. It is one. For, if it had been many, being insentient, it would have been transient like jar etc. It reveals[5] the powers of knowledge and action to those who enter into the pure world by subjecting

*1. Inge. Vol. II, 194.
*2. Ueb. Vol. I, 248.
3. T. P. 26.
4. T. P. 22.
5. T. P. 25.

themselves to spiritual discipline. The powers revealed by it are different from those revealed by Māyā. For, the sphere of the former is the unlimited, while that of the latter is the limited. It reveals the wealth of knowledge and power to the souls, which really belongs to them. The powers of knowledge and action do not belong to it; because it is insentient.

This category is not to be confused with the transcendental Şiva. For, if it be supposed to be identical with the Parama Şiva, it being evolutionary, the insentiency of Parama Şiva will follow. It is not inherent in the transcendental Şiva, like the Şakti. Being the material cause, it is related to Him as clay is to a potter. It is also spoken of as Kuṇḍalinī. It is an external power (Şakti) of the Lord (Parigraha śakti). It is not free, because it is insentient. It works under the control of the powers of Parama Şiva[1], such as Icchā etc.

THE REASONS FOR ADMITTING THE BINDU

(1) *Bindu as the material cause of the Pure Creation—*

Śiva and Śakti both are sentient. They do not undergo any modification or change, whether it be evolutionary as in the case of milk changing into curd, or formal as in the case of a piece of cloth changed into the shape of a house. Neither, therefore, can serve as the material cause of the pure world. Hence Bindu is necessary[2].

(2) *Bindu And The Impure World*

This system admits that the creation is of two types; pure and impure. The impure world is created by Ananta etc., to whom the power to create is delegated by Pati. Its material cause is Māyā. But the creation of an object of determinate knowledge presupposes determinate thought in the creator. The determinacy in thought, however, is due to words. But words, as sounds, are admitted by the logicians to be products or manifestations of gross ether (Ākāśa), which is a distant evolute of Māyā and, therefore, is non-existent at the commencement of impure creation. The question, therefore, arises: how is the determinacy in the thought of Ananta, the creator of the impure world, is to be accounted for? For, unless there be determinacy in the thought of the creator the created cannot be such as can be the object of determinate knowledge. Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism, therefore, maintains that there is a subtle sound

1. T. P. 27. | 2. R. T. 22.

(Śabda), which evolves out of Bindu, in consequence of its stirring by the Lord[1]. This subtle sound is called Vidyā or Nāda. It constitutes the body as it were of Ananta and gives determinacy as it were to his thought to enable him to proceed with impure creation.

(3) *Bindu and Individual Self*—

The problem is : what is the relation between the individual self and the empirical knowledge? The relation cannot be admitted to be that of inherence. For, we find that the knowledge of the same individual grows and decays. The admission of the relation of inherence between knowledge and soul, as admitted by the Vaiśeṣika, therefore, would mean that soul changes and, therefore, is transient. This, however, is against the fundamental assumption of the eternality of the soul. Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism, therefore, maintains that the growing and decaying empirical knowledge of the individual subject belongs to him, not directly or inherently, but to a condition of his: and that this condition is constituted by Nāda[2].

This Nāda, as a condition of the individual subject, is an evolute of Bindu. It is as innumerable as are the souls, a limiting condition of each of which it forms separately. It is like a seed of the entire 'knowledge' which is signified by words at the empirical level (Abhidheyabuddhibīja)[3]. The power of knowledge of each individual self is related to a Nāda, and as such it grasps the objects determinately at the level of Māyā. The variety of forms of knowledge, are the forms of Nāda and the soul shines variously, not because of any change in itself, but because of the formal changes in its limiting condition, the Nāda[4]. The growth and decay in knowledge, therefore, do not imply any change in the soul and so do not mean that it is transient. Bindu, therefore, is admitted to account for eternality and changelessness of soul in spite of its changing knowledge.

Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism asserts that determinate knowledge cannot be explained in terms of Buddhi, because determinacy is found in those levels also, which are beyond Māyā. Ananta, for instance, belongs to the level of Īśvara, but he also has a kind of determinate knowledge. For, otherwise the creation of the empirical world would not be possible. Further, the function of

1 R.T. 21.
2 R.T. 23.
3 R.T. 23-4.
4 R.T., 24.

Buddhi is to judge (Adhyavasāya). Buddhi, therefore, employs[1] words and presupposes their existence. Bindu, therefore, as the cause of words, through Nāda and lower Bindu is necessary. We shall deal with Nāda etc. in detail in a subsequent section.

ANOTHER VIEW OF THE BINDU

Some hold that the Bindu is inherently present in the Śiva[2] like the power of knowledge. They assert that it is the power of action (Kriyāśakti). It does not have separate existence from Him, like the Māyā. It is the Parā Kuṇḍalinī. They hold that the two powers are inherent in Śiva, (I) the power of knowledge, Saṁvid or Vijñāna and (II) the power of action or the Parā Kuṇḍalinī. Through the former He knows and through the latter He creates.

The two are inseparable. Śiva has no being, isolated from the powers, nor do the powers exist independently of Śiva. Thus, Śiva is represented to be the creator of the pure world, the world of indeterminacy, as also of Nāda etc. Accordingly it is asserted that everything is within Bindu and, therefore, within Śiva, wherein Bindu inheres.

ITS REFUTATION BY THE DUALISTS

Dualists assert that whatever evolves is insentient like milk. The admission, therefore, that the insentient is inherently related to Śiva will mean bringing the Śiva[3], who is pure sentiency, down to the level of the insentient.

Further, this admission is against the texts[4], which present the Śiva to be the creator on the basis of inference, based on the analogy of the potter. Furthermore, if Śiva be admitted to be insentient, the selves also which belong to the category of Śiva, will have to be admitted to be insentient.

Similarly there are many other views of Bindu, which Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism refutes: for instance, the following:—

Māyā is of three types, gross, subtle and transcendental. The first is made up of qualities. The second is the undifferentiated state of all the categories from Kalā to earth. And the third is the Bindu or Mahāmāyā[5].

1 R.T. 27.
2 R.T. 44-5.
3 R.T. 47.
4 R.T. 48.
5 R.T. 55-6.

NĀDA AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR SPHOṬA OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF GRAMMAR

The problem, "How do the words and sentences of a language give rise to the consciousness of meaning in the hearer?" is the central problem in the philosophy of Grammar. And the Grammarians assert (I) that the last letter of a word, together with the revived residual traces of the preceding letters, manifests Sphoṭa, which is a unity of all letters, exactly as the yolk of peacock's egg is a unity of various colours and (II) that this Sphoṭa[1] is of three types, relating to (I) letter, (II) word and (III) sentence. It is this which is the cause of the rise of the consciousness of the meaning. It is eternal and all-pervasive.

The aforesaid view seems to have evolved as follows:— The letters of a word, which are the objects of the sense of hearing, come in succession one after another, are lost no sooner than they are uttered and do not affect one another. They, therefore, cannot be spoken of as the cause of the rise of the consciousness of meaning. Nor can a word or a sentence be said to be the cause. For, the words and sentences have no being apart from the letters, such as may be the object of perception. For, a word is said to be a collection of letters. But the letters being successive and momentary, there can never be a collection of them. And because word and sentence are never perceived, they cannot, therefore, be known through inference either[2]. Nor can the rise of the consciousness of meaning be said to be due to the last letter of a word[3]; for instance, the aspirate (Visarjanīya) at the end of the word "Gauḥ". For, in that case there will remain no reason why consciousness of a horned animal should not arise on hearing the word "Naraḥ", because the aspirate sound is at the end of both the words, cited above.

The Grammarians, therefore, asserted that the last letter together with the revived residual traces of the previous ones, is responsible for the manifestation of Sphoṭa, the eternal word and so for the rise of the consciousness of the meaning.

THE CRITICISM OF THE GRAMMARIANS' VIEW

The view that the last letter of a word, together with the revived residual traces of the previous ones, is responsible for the arousal of the meaning in the hearer, through bringing about the manifestation of Sphoṭa, cannot stand. For, the residual traces arouse the memory of that only, by which they are caused :

1 N. Ka. 4.
2 N. Ka., 2.
3 N. Ka., 3.

for instance, the revived residual trace of a jar, arouses the memory of that jar alone, by which it was caused. But it cannot give rise to the consciousness of the new one which was never experienced before. The revival of the memory of the letters, preceding the last one, may, therefore, give rise to the consciousness of each letter separately, but it cannot give rise to the consciousness of the meaning. Nor can it be said that the word, which is made up of the letters, remembered and directly perceived, is the indicator of, or brings to light, the meaning (Abhidhāyaka). For, the remembered lamps can bring nothing to light[1].

And the assumption of Sphoṭa, as the universal and eternal word, which is supposed to be manifested by the last letter together with the revived residual traces of the previous ones, cannot help in explaining the rise of the meaning. For, the so called Sphoṭa is not experienced as distinct from letters. And it cannot be represented to be either different from or identical with the letters[2]. The former position is untenable; because Sphoṭa is not experienced as distinct from letters; hence it cannot be known through inference either. It cannot be said that it is unnecessary that the Sphoṭa should be experienced. For, the Sphoṭa is admitted to make the meaning known (Jñāpaka) and as such it must be perceived. For, only a perceived light makes the object known, just as a compression of the eye conveys the meaning of the person who compresses his eye, but only when it is perceived. Therefore, if Sphoṭa be admitted to make the meaning known, it must be perceived.

And the latter position, namely, that Sphoṭa is identical with letters, is no better. For, if it be admitted to be identical with letters and not distinct from them, it would mean that Sphoṭa is a synonym of Varṇa. It is, therefore, illogical to attribute to Sphoṭa a function, which the letters cannot discharge.

Further, the admission that Sphoṭa is eternal and all-pervasive is faulty: because if it be such, how is it that all people do not become conscious of meaning when the eternal and all-pervasive Sphoṭa is manifested ?

VIJÑĀNA AS THE AROUSER OF THE MEANING

Some account for the arousal of the meaning in the consciousness of the hearer as follows:—

The speaker determinately apprehends an object by means of the Buddhi[3], recollects the word that stands for it, and then utters

1 N. Ka., 4.
2 N. Ka., 5.
3 N. Ka., 6.

the gross word. Thus, a form of Buddhi,—which is due to its affection by an object, is associated with the remembered word that stands for it and is the cause of the utterance of the gross word,—is the arouser of the meaning in the consciousness of that hearer, in whose mind the heard word is associated with the particular meaning.

ITS CRITICISM AND A REPLY TO IT

The Siddhāntin criticises this view by pointing out that this would mean that the word and its meaning are essentially identical, because both are essentially of the nature of consciousness; both are mere affections of Buddhi and, therefore, there is no essential distinction between the signifying word and the signified meaning. But the exponent of the Vijñāna as the cause of the rise of meaning in the consciousness of the hearer, asserts in reply that the form of Buddhi[1], which represents the word, is distinct from that of its meaning, in so far as it (the word) is a form of consciousness that signifies what is outside it, namely, the external object, which is the meaning. It can, therefore, be maintained logically that what arouses the meaning is the significant form of consciousness (Buddhi), wherewith the external objects such as cow etc. are grasped.

THE THEORY OF NĀDA

The exponent of the theory of Nāda admits what has been asserted above, namely, that that which arouses the consciousness of meaning (Vācaka) is really a significant form of consciousness (Vimarśātmaka). But he points out that the significant form of consciousness is not without a cause, because it is occasional.

The point may be elaborated as follows:—

The object, to which the determinative judgement of the Buddhi is related, is not the product of the Buddhi itself. On the contrary, it has external existence and as such is perceived through one of the senses. The internal object, the reflection of an external object on Buddhi, which is determinately judged by the Buddhi, must, therefore, be something that has already been indeterminately grasped by some sense. For, such an assumption alone can explain why only a certain object is determinately grasped at a certain time. Hence he asserts that that which gives to Buddhi the subtle inner word (Antaḥ sañjalpa), by means of which it determinately grasps the object,

1. N. Ka., 7.

reflected in it, is the Nāda[1], which is nothing but the cause of the inner speech (Antaḥ sañjalpātmā), which is nothing more than Akṣarabindu. Hence he asserts that it is the Nāda, which really arouses the consciousness of meaning, because it is the cause of the inner speech, in terms of which the determinative judgement is formed. The external articulate sounds are only external forms of it and, therefore, are not the real causes of the rise of the consciousness of meaning in the hearer.

The process of the arousal of meaning in the hearer may be explained as follows:—

After the affection of a sense by an external object, the Nāda in the speaker presents to his Buddhi, an object in the form of inner speech, which is undifferentiated unity of the word and its meaning, for the determinative judgement of the Buddhi. The Buddhi judges. This judgement is expressed in articulate audible sounds. They manifest the Nāda in the hearer. It presents to Buddhi an object which is an undifferentiated unity of subtle word and the indeterminate object. Buddhi judges in so far as it differentiates between the two and relates them as signifier and signified. This arouses the consciousness of meaning.

The exponent of the theory of Nāda asserts that the statement in the Āgama that the last letter of a word, together with the revived residual traces of the preceding, is responsible for the arousal of the meaning, is to be interpreted in the secondary sense that it manifests Nāda.

Thus, Nāda is the undifferentiated cause of the subtle inner speech. It is nothing but an embodiment of all words and their meanings, all of which exist in a state of undifferentiated unity, exactly as the different colours exist in the yolk of peacock's egg. At the time of stimulation of an external sense by an object, this Nāda manifests a particular word and its meaning in an undifferentiated form. This constitutes the indeterminate object of the determinative judgement by Buddhi, which differentiates the two from each other and relates them as the signifier and the signified. This judgement is expressed in articulate sounds. Similarly at the time of stimulation of the sense of hearing by an uttered word, the corresponding word and its meaning as an undifferentiated unity is given rise to by Nāda. This forms the object of judgment by Buddhi and the consciousness of definite meaning as distinct from the word arises.

1. N. Ka., 8.

This conception of Nāda is very much like that of the 'Monad' of Leibniz, in so far as it is a microcosm, in which all expressions and their meanings exist in undifferentiated unity in a rudimentary form; and the representative activity in one monad gives rise to a corresponding activity in others, who become conscious of such an activity through sense of hearing. But the dualist Ṣaiva holds the soul (Paśu) to be different from Nāda. It is a condition of soul but not soul itself. It is because of this Nāda, the cause of Akṣara Bindu, that there is no confusion in the meaning. It is separate in the case of each individual. It is not identical with the self or its powers: because they are unchanging, but the Nāda changes. It is, therefore, different from both. It is a distinct associate of each limited self. It is the product of Mahāmāyā as a material cause. It is beyond Māyā, because it is an associate of pure beings also.

Ṣaiva Dualism asserts that the statement in the Āgama that one who thoroughly grasps the Ṣabda-Brahman realises the Highest Brahman (Ṣabdabrahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ parambrahmādhigacchati), means that the grasp of the former is a means to the realisation of the latter. It recognises the distinction between the former and the latter. Ṣabda-Brahma, according to it, is nothing more than Nāda, an embodiment of all words and their meanings in an undifferentiated unity: and there are innumerable Nādas, as innumerable as are the souls. For, a Nāda is a necessary condition of each soul.

NĀDA AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC

Nāda-Brahma-Vāda, the Philosophy of Music, propounded by the Siddhāntin, holds this Nāda to be the reality, which is to be grasped through the medium of music. It is the original motion. It is the first motion. It is the unity of all thoughts and expressions. It is the root or the seed, from which all words and meanings spring, or to put it in terms of music, it is the original vibration from which all musical vibrations and their meanings arise. It is this Nāda, the Original Vibration, that the Art of Music represents and suggests.

BINDU AND NĀDA

Bindu, as has been stated earlier, is the material cause of the pure world. It is also the cause of Nāda, which we have discussed above. In relation to Nāda, therefore, Bindu is called Para Nāda[1]. The set of subtle sound-images,---of which the articulate sounds, constituting a word, are mere gross forms, and

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1 R. T., 11.

which in itself is the undifferentiated unity of a particular word and its meaning,—gets manifested from Nāda in the hearer when the sense of hearing is stimulated by its object, the articulate sounds. This manifestation of Nāda is technically called Akṣara-Bindu. And Akṣara-Bindu naturally consists of the letter-images and the meaning which is associated with them, because it is a unity of thought and expression. Thus, Bindu is very often spoken of as the cause of Nāda, Akṣara-Bindu and Varṇa.

BINDU AND THE THEORY OF PAṢYANTĪ ETC. IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF GRAMMAR

Bindu is called by various names, according as it stands for different conceptions, on the basis of which various problems are attempted. It is thus called (1) Ṣabda Tattva, (2) Amoghā-Vāk, (3) Brahma, (4) Kuṇḍalinī, (5) Vidyā, (6) Ṣakti, (7) Para-nāda, (8) Mahāmāyā and (9) Anāhatavyoma.

The last name, "Anāhata-vyoma"[1], represents the conception of Bindu as ether (Ākāśa), which is a mere ground or possibility of all sounds, but is without sound, because it is without any collision (Anāhata), which is the immediate cause of manifestation of sound from it (Ākāśa). This conception of Bindu is the basis of the Śaiva Dualist's explanation of the various aspects of speech; (1) Parā, (2) Paśyantī, (3) Madhyamā and (4) Vaikharī, which are important problems in the Philosophy of Grammar and have been dealt with by important authorities, such as Bhartṛhari and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, in the Vākya Padīyam and the Mañjūṣā respectively.

Bhartṛhari has dealt with these topics from the monistic point of view and has asserted that there are only three aspects of speech: (1) Paśyantī (2) Madhyamā and (3) Vaikharī. He has not admitted Parā as higher than and distinct from Paśyantī[2]. He has been criticized for this non-admission by Somānanda in his Ṣivadṛṣṭi from the point of view of the monistic Ṣaiva Philosophy of Kashmir.

Ṣrīkaṇṭha in his Ratna Traya, as interpreted by Aghora Ṣiva in his commentary, Ratna Trayollekhinī, writes on these topics from the point of view of the Ṣaiva Dualism. He splits up the problem, which is dealt with by Bhartṛhari under the heads of Paśyantī etc. into two. Bhartṛhari attempts together the problem of the different stages in the gradual separation of meaning and expression from the stage of their unity; and that of the different stages in the growth of gross expression from the subtle. No doubt, he talks of Paśyantī etc. in the context of the

1 R. T., 30. | 2 V. P., ch. I, V. 144.

former and of Sphoṭa in that of the latter. But, as pointed out by Somānanda, the admission of two Ultimate Realities is illogical[1]. And accordingly it is admitted that the distinction between the meaning and the expression is imaginary.

Śrīkaṇṭha deals with the different stages of separation of meaning and expression from the stage of their undifferentiated unity in Nāda, under the heads, Nāda, Akṣara-Bindu, and Varṇa, as we have discussed in an earlier section. And similarly he deals with the problem of the rise of gross audible word from the most subtle, through different stages of grossification, under the heads of Sūkṣmā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī. He identifies Parā, which he calls Sūkṣmā, with Nāda[2], and Paśyantī with Akṣara-Bindu[3]. And Madhyamā is nothing but a clear mental picture of the successive letters, which constitute the word. It is prior to the activity of the vital air (Prāṇa) which is the cause of the gross audible sound. Similarly Vaikharī, the gross audible word, is due to vital air, which being checked at different places of articulation and then let off, produces the word, which is audible.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BHARTṚHARI AND ŚRĪKAṆṬHA

We have already spoken on the common text, on which both, Bhartṛhari and Śrīkaṇṭha base their views. There is not much difference between them in regard to the last two i.e. Madhyamā and Vaikharī. But in regard to the first two there is fundamental difference.

(1) Bhartṛhari identifies Sūkṣmā with Paśyantī, holding that the word Sūkṣmā does not stand for an aspect of speech, higher than Paśyantī, but it is simply an adjunct, qualifying Paśyantī. But Śrīkaṇṭha holds that Sūkṣmā stands for the highest aspect of speech; that it is distinct from and higher than Paśyantī; that it is identical with Nāda, that it is the first evolute of Bindu or Mahāmāyā and that it is insentient because the principle of sentiency, Paśu, is a distinct and separate entity from it.

(2) Paśyantī is the highest aspect of speech, according to Bhartṛhari. It is an undifferentiated unity of all words and meanings. It is exactly what Nāda is, according to Śrīkaṇṭha; but with this difference that, according to Bhartṛhari, it is sentiency itself (Saṁvidrūpā)[4]. But, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, it is insentient, because it is an evolute of Mahā māyā. Further, Śrīkaṇṭha identifies Paśyantī, according to Aghora Śiva's inter-

1. S. Dr., 73.
2. R. T., 32.33
3. R. T., 31
4. V. P., 117. (Ben.)

pretation, with Akṣara-Bindu. His conception of Paśyantī, therefore, is fundamentally different. It is an undifferentiated unity, not of all words and meanings but of a particular word and its meaning; and the word also at this stage is not split up into letters. It is, therefore, marked by the absence of all duality and succession. It is what is manifested by Nāda, in consequence of affection of a sense by an object. It is responsible for the sound-picture of a particular word, detailed into distinct letters, which controls the movement of vital air to definite places of articulation, the speech-organs. It is the cause of Madhyamā.

(3) Bhartṛhari holds that the realisation of Paśyantī is the realisation of the Ultimate; because, according to him, Paśyantī is the Brahman. But Śrīkaṇṭha, in consonance with his dualistic philosophy, holds that the realisation of distinction of Sūkṣmā from Puruṣa frees a man from subjection to limited experiences (Bhogādhikāra)[1]. Sūkṣmā or, in the context of Bhartṛhari, Paśyantī is not Brahman but distinct from it.

(4) The Śabdabrahmavādin, who differs from Bhartṛhari, maintains that Parā or Sūkṣmā Vāk is one of the sixteen aspects of Puruṣa[2], and that it is inherent in Him. But the Śaiva Dualism holds that it is separate from Puruṣa and that it is a creation of Mahāmāyā[3].

NĀDA AND THE SECOND DEPENDENT CATEGORY, ŚAKTI TATTVA

The transcendental Śiva or Pati operates on the Mahāmāyā by means of his powers, Icchā, Jñāna and Kriyā. The first evolute of the Mahāmāyā under the direction of the power of will (Icchāśakti) is in the form of Nāda[4] and that of the world of peace etc. (Śāntyādi bhuvanātmaka). It is called Śakti Tattva. It is without parts (Niravayava). It is the effect of the Bindu or Mahāmāyā. This category arises when the desire arises in the Parama Śiva to create the world with a view to doing grace (I) to the limited selves by providing opportunities to them to reap the fruits of the past deeds and to get liberation and (II) to the bondages by giving them the power to function as such.

SADĀŚIVA TATTVA, THE THIRD DEPENDENT CATEGORY

The Sadāśiva category is the second evolute of the Bindu under the control of the powers of knowledge and action in perfect equilibrium[5]. It is the third dependent category.

1. R. T., 32.
2. R. T., 32.
3. R. T., 33.
4. T. P., 28.
5. T. P., 29.

ĪŚVARA TATTVA, THE FOURTH DEPENDENT CATEGORY

The Īśvara Tattva[1] is the third evolute of the Bindu, when it is under the control of the power of action with the power of knowledge, occupying a subordinate position to it. Ananta etc. belong to this category. They are called Vidyeśas. It is the fourth dependent category.

VIDYĀ TATTVA, THE FIFTH DEPENDENT CATEGORY.

Vidyā Tattva[2] is the fourth evolute when the Bindu evolves under the direction of the power of knowledge with the power of action as its subordinate. The beings, belonging to this category, are omniscient. It is called the Vidyā, because here it is that the omniscience of the souls is revealed for the first time.

These five categories belong to the pure creation, wherein there is no limitation to the knowledge of the pure beings which belong to it. They are very much like the five categories, Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara and Vidyā, admitted by the monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir. The difference being confined to the fundamental assumptions of monism and dualism, namely, the identity or difference of the efficient and the material causes. All these five categories[3] are beyond time and, therefore, without any order of succession. They are conceived separately, because of their functional difference.

BINDU, SUBTLE AND GROSS

The Bindu and the Nāda are frequently represented to be of two types, gross and subtle. The subtle Bindu and Nāda are identified with Śiva and Śakti Tattvas respectively. But the gross Bindu, which is the material cause of the articulate sounds and the gross Nāda[4], which is the material cause of the inarticulate sounds, according to this view, are included in the Sadāśiva Tattva. Ananta etc. belong to Īśvara Tattva. The Mantras, seven crores in number, the words, the Vidyās, Vyomavyāpi etc. and the 28 Āgamas, Kāmika etc. belong to the Vidyā Tattva.

MĀYĀ, THE SIXTH DEPENDENT CATEGORY

Pāśa is one of the three primary categories of the Dualistic Śaivaism, Pati, Paśu and Pāśa. And under Pāśa five dependent categories are subsumed; Mala, Māyā, Karma, Nirodhaśakti and Bindu. Māyā, therefore, is one of the dependent categories of Pāśa. It is distinct from Mahāmāyā or Bindu. For, it is

1 T. P., 29.
2 T. P., 30.
3 T. P., 31.
4 T. P., 30-1.

the material cause of the impure, the empirical world; while Mahāmāyā is the material cause of pure creation. It is one[1], eternal, all-pervasive in the gross world, subtle and related to Parama Śiva or Pati, exactly as clay is related to a potter. It is common material cause of all bodies of all individual selves, as also of all the gross worlds, wherein they live[2]. It is painted over or affected (Khacita) by the sum total of the effects of deeds (Karma) of all the individual souls. For, according to the Dualist Śaiva, Karma is not related to soul as its quality but to Buddhi only: because Karma grows and is destroyed; and, therefore, its admission as a quality of soul, would mean that soul changes, and, therefore, is transient. It is the cause of the ignorance of the true nature of the objects of experience, because of which individual souls take the objects, which are really transient, polluting, painful and not-self, to be eternal, holy, pleasant and self. All the thirty dependent categories from Kāla to earth, excepting Puruṣa, exist potentially in Māyā, at the time of the universal annihilation. Thus, it is from Māyā that all the lower categories, mentioned above, evolve and the variety of the gross world comes into being, when it is stirred to action by the Lord in accordance with the sum total of Karmas of all souls.

KĀLA, THE SEVENTH DEPENDENT CATEGORY

The categories of the impure creation, which evolve out of Māyā, are stated in two different orders ; the order of creation and that of function. Kāla, time, is the first category in the order of evolution from Māyā, though it functions only after the Kāla, Vidyā and Rāga have functioned. It is the cause (Nimitta)[3] of the idea of priority and posteriority; quickness and slowness; second and minute etc. Śaiva Dualist's conception of time, thus, seems to be the same as that of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika. The following, however, are the points of difference:—

It is not an independent eternal substance as the Nyāya holds. It is only a limiting condition of Jīva or Paśu. It is not one; but there are as many times as are individual subjects. It is not eternal but non-eternal, because it is insentient and many: and all that is such is not eternal[4].

NIYATI, THE EIGHTH DEPENDENT CATEGORY

Niyati, order, is the second evolute of Māyā. It also is a limiting condition of each individual self. It is because of Niyati that each individual reaps the fruits of what he sows; but no

1. T. P., 35.
2. T. P., 35-6.
3. Mr. T., 264.
4. T.P., 37.

other can enjoy or suffer the consequences of what one does. It is like an order of the King, in the absence of which the bad characters (Dasyavaḥ) enjoy the food, produced by the cultivators[1].

KALĀ, THE NINTH DEPENDENT CATEGORY.

Kalā is a very important dependent category of the Śaiva Dualism. It is the category from which the subsequent three dependent categories, Vidyā, Rāga and Pradhāna evolve. It brings about partly the manifestation of the essential nature of the individual subject. We know that, according to this system, the powers of knowledge and action, without any limitation, are inherent in each individual self. The individual self is omnipotent and omniscient in reality. But its powers are shrouded by the impurities (Mala) ; and consequently it cannot experience the fruits of its Karma, so as to exhaust it and attain 'liberation'. Kalā, therefore, removes the shroud partly and partly manifests the inherent powers of the individual. It is an inner and the chief limiting condition of each soul ; because it helps to give rise to the individual as a limited experiencer (Bhoktṛsvarūpopakārakatvena)[2].

VIDYĀ, THE TENTH DEPENDENT CATEGORY.

Vidyā is the first evolute of Kalā. It is self-luminous (Prakāśasvarūpā)[3]. It is a means of knowledge of what is objective. But it may be asked here:—

Kalā is assumed to remove the shroud partly and to manifest partly the inherent powers of the individual subject. The objective knowledge will, therefore, arise in consequence of the operation of the power of knowledge. What is then the use of admitting an additional dependent category, called Vidyā, to account for the awareness of the object?

To this the Śaiva Dualist replies:—

The power of knowledge, though partly manifested, because of the operation of Kalā, which partly removes the shroud of Malas, cannot grasp the object without a means ; exactly as a person, though capable of going, cannot reach the destination without the help of a path and light. (Pathā dīpikayā vā yāti)[4]. And in reply to the objection that Buddhi and senses being there as the means of knowledge, the assumption of another means, the Vidyā, is unnecessary; the Dualist Śaiva points

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1. T. P., 38.
2. T. P., 38-9.
3. T. P., 39.
4. T. P., 40.

out that Buddhi and senses are the external means: but Vidyā is the internal means. This point may be elaborated as follows:—

The Buddhi determines the object, which is presented to it by the senses, under the control of Manas. Such an object, the individual self grasps[1]. Buddhi cannot be an instrument of grasping the object by Puruṣa ; because her function is only to determine. Hence the admission of Vidyā, as an internal means to get at the object, determined by Buddhi, is necessary. Further, just as the knowledge of an external object is not possible without senses, Manas and Buddhi, so the knowledge of inner feelings, like pleasure and pain, is not possible without the instrumentality of Vidyā.

It may be pointed out here that the word "Vidyā" is used as the name of two dependent categories, the fifth and the tenth. It has, therefore, to be remembered that the former belongs to the pure but the latter to the impure creation.

RĀGA, THE ELEVENTH DEPENDENT CATEGORY.

Rāga is the innate tendency of the subject towards the external objects. It is the cause of desire, which necessarily has an objective reference. It cannot be said that to draw the subject to itself and so to arouse desire in him is a quality of the object ; and, therefore, assumption of Rāga, as a separate dependent category, is useless. For, such an assumption would make freedom from desire for object (Vairāgya) impossible. It is distinct from "Avairāgya"[2], admitted by the Sāṅkhya. For, the Avairāgya as a quality of Budhhi is simply a set of residual traces of unfulfilled desires. Therefore, it cannot account for the rise of desire itself.

III PAŚU, THE THIRD PRIMARY CATEGORY AND PURUṢA, THE TWELFTH DEPENDENT CATEGORY.

The Paśu is the individual self, called by such words as Kṣetrajña etc. It is not identical with body, as according to the Materialists: nor is it an object of knowledge, as according to the Naiyāyikas. For, such an admission leads to infinite regress. Nor is it of the size of the body, as admitted by the Jains: nor is it momentary, as according to the Bauddha; for, in that case unification of facts of experience would be impossible. It is not limited by time and space. It is not one i.e. identical with the Brahman, as the Vedāntin holds; for,

1. T. P., 40—1. | 2. T. P., 41.

the distinct experiences of different individuals clearly establish the plurality of individual selves. It is not without the power of action, as the Sāṅkhya says; for, after the removal of the impurities, the eternal Caitanya, consisting in the unsurpassed powers of knowledge and action, is admitted to become manifest through His grace.

Paśu is of three types; (1) Vijñānākala, (2) Pralayākala and (3) Sakala. Vijñānākala is free from the impurities of Karma and Māyā. He is, therefore, free from Kalā etc., which are the means of reaping the fruits of Karma. He has (Āṇava) Mala only[1].

TWO TYPES OF VIJÑĀNĀKALA

(1) The Vijñānākalas are of two types: (1) Those whose Mala has fully matured and consequently in whose cases the power of obscuration is inoperative. They are made Vidyeśvaras, Ananta etc. (2) Those whose Mala has not fully matured. Such are made Mantras, which are seven crores in number. They are limited selves, their limitation is nothing more than Mala.

(2) *Pralayākala* is the second type of Paśu. It is different from Vijñānākala in so far as it has not only Paśutvamala, but also Kārma Mala[2]. It is the individual self as it exists at the time of universal annihilation (Pralaya), when all the dependent categories from Kalā to earth merge back into Māyā and, therefore, Māyā-mala does not itself exist. It is given the appropriate bodies etc., according to its Karma at the creation and made to transmigrate.

(3) *Sakala* is the third type of Paśu. It has all the three Malas[3]: Paśutva, Karma and Māyā. It is associated with all the thirty categories from Kalā to earth in so far as it has a gross body, made up of the five gross elements, five senses of perception; five organs of action; five subtle elements (Tanmātra); Pradhāna and Guṇas; three internal senses; Manas; Buddhi and Ahaṅkāra; five inner limitations, in terms of which all experiences and actions at the empirical level are finally explained, i.e. Kalā, Niyati, Vidyā, Rāga and Kāla. These thirty dependent categories are very often divided into eight groups and are referred to as Puryaṣṭaka[4]. It may be pointed out here that the Kashmir Śaiva conception of Puryaṣṭaka is very different from the above.

1 S. D. S. 182.
2. T. P., 11,
3. T. P., 11.
4. T. P., 14.

Puruṣa, the twelfth dependent category of this system is Paśu, the Sentient Subject, possessing perfect powers of knowledge and action, but limited or covered by the shroud of the last thirty dependent categories. As such he is an experiencer of the fruits of the accumulated effect of all the past deeds (Bhoktā)[1].

AVYAKTA, THE THIRTEENTH DEPENDENT CATEGORY.

Avyakta, Pradhāna or Prakṛti, is the third evolute of Kalā, the first two being Vidyā and Rāga. It is subtle, because the three Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, are in it in a subtle state. It is the cause of the Guṇas, the forms of experience, the pleasure, the pain and the senselessness. Hence the Dualist Ṣaiva conception of Pradhāna is different from that of the Sāṅkhya. The Ṣaiva Dualist holds that all that is insentient and many must have a cause. For, that is our common experience. Guṇas, therefore, being insentient and many must have a cause. And that cause is Pradhāna.

It is transient and not eternal. There is a separate Prakṛti for each Puruṣa. It is, therefore, many. It is insentient. And all that is insentient and many is transient. Therefore, Prakṛti is transient. This is another point of difference from the Sāṅkhya[2].

GUṆA TATTVA, THE FOURTEENTH DEPENDENT CATEGORY.

Guṇa Tattva implies all the three Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. It is said to be the product of Pradhāna[3]. The Dualist Ṣaiva conception of Guṇas agrees with that of the Sāṅkhya in other respects. There is difference of opinion among the authorities on Ṣaiva Dualism on Guṇa as a separate dependent category. Many do not accept it as such. In any case, if Guṇa be accepted as a separate dependent category, the number of dependent categories cannot be asserted to be thirty-six[4]; it would come up to thirty-seven. For, Śaiva Dualism accepts the twenty-three categories from Buddhi to earth in common with the Sāṅkhya. Thus, the Dualist Śaiva holds that there are thirty-six dependent categories from Bindu or Ṣiva to earth. They may be stated as follows:—

(1) Śiva, (2) Śakti, (3) Sadāśiva, (4) Īśvara, (5) Vidyā, (6) Māyā, (7) Kāla, (8) Niyati, (9) Kalā, (10) Vidyā,

1. T. P., 42.
2. T. P., 43.
3. T. P., 43.
4. T. P., 24.

(11) Rāga, (12) Puruṣa, (13) Pradhāna and (14-36) Buddhi to Earth, which are in common with those admitted by the Sāṅkhya.

No doubt, there are differences between the Sāṅkhya and the Śaiva Dualism in the conceptions of these categories and we have referred to the difference in regard to Buddhi in an earlier section. But to point them out in detail is more than what can be done in a summary.

LIBERATION OR MOKṢA

The Liberation is admitted to be of two types : (I) Higher (Para) and (II) Lower (Apara)[1]. The first consists in freedom from all the five types of impurity (Mala) and in the revelation of the perfect powers of knowledge and action and consequent similarity with Śiva (Śivasāmya). This is attainable through the grace of Śiva. Thus, Mantra Maheśvara etc. are said to have attained higher liberation.

The lower liberation, however, consists in the partial maturity of Mala, technically called Paśutva; in freedom from Māyā and Karma; and in the possession of a body made up of Bindu. For, according to this system, the souls, whose Paśutva Mala has partly matured, may still be empowered by Śiva to carry on the creative activity in a limited sphere. This type of liberation is called Apara, simply because of the association of the freed souls with the "Baindava Śarīra".

It is not something that can be brought about by the individual subject[2], as is implied by the Upaniṣadic passages like "Ātmā Jñātavyaḥ". For, the limited subject is to be freed from impurities by the Lord and, therefore, he is objective in his nature. It is a peculiarity which is made to manifest itself in the limited self by the Lord.

Thus, Mokṣa consists in the attainment of similarity with Parama Śiva in respect of powers of knowledge and action. The powers are not a new acquisition. They do not come from outside; they are in the individual, but are obscured by impurities. Therefore, Mokṣa is nothing but coming to light of what was obscured by the impurities: it is the emergence of the powers of omniscience and omnipotence, which were merged in the impurities ; it is the becoming manifest of the essential nature of the individual.

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1. T. P., 8 | 2. M. Ka., 25.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LIBERATED

The experience of the liberated is characterised by indeterminacy when the limited Saṁvid, which is essentially identical with Parasaṁvid, is free from bondage. To the liberated the objectivity shines only as such, without limitation or determination: it does not shine as an object of enjoyment or aversion. Hence the experience of the liberated is characterised by omniscience[1]. It is not a mere self-consciousness, free from limitations. For, not to know what really exists, means ignorance and is due to Moha. Thus, if the liberated were not to know the objective world, he would be ignorant and, therefore, not liberated. The liberated is above Akṣara Bindu. He, therefore, does not have determinate knowledge. Though possessed of omniscience and omnipotence, he does not actively employ the creative power[2]. For, there is no reason to admit many creators.

THE DUALIST ŚAIVA CONCEPTION OF MOKṢA AND THAT OF THE VEDĀNTIN.

The Dualist Śaiva conception of Liberation is distinct from that of the Vedāntin, which is technically called Kaivalya[3]. For, Kaivalya means freedom from the impurities of Māyā and Karma only, but not from that of Āṇavamala also. This is clear from the fact that no Vedāntic text talks of omniscience as the characteristic of liberation. The implication of this silence is that they do not admit the liberated to be omniscient. For, had the impurities been thoroughly removed, there would have certainly been omniscience.

The Dualist Śaiva criticises the Vedāntin in the context of Mokṣa, on the following points:—

(1) The Vedāntin does not admit anything apart and distinct from the Self, which is characterised by pure being, sentiency and bliss[4]. He denies the existence of all that is objective. The question, therefore, arises: how can he maintain that the Brahman or Ātman is characterised by pure being etc., as stated above? For, the characteristics of everything, that has them, shine only in relation to what is external to it; for instance, the heat of fire becomes manifest only in relation to wood. Therefore, if in reality there be no object external to the Brahman, its characteristics will have no objective relation and, therefore, they cannot shine. Their admission, therefore, would be a mere matter of belief, without any rational foundation. If, however, he were to say that the objective world is, but only imaginary

1. R. T. 86.
2. R. T., 88.
3. S. P., 24.
4. S. P., 25.

or illusory, it would follow that the characteristics, which shine in relation to it, are also equally illusory and if so, it would follow that the Brahman, that has them, is also illusory and so is Mokṣa.

(2) The Vedāntin denies the duality of the subject and the object. He maintains monistic idealism. But if his position be taken to be right, it would follow that all the texts, which talk of contemplation (Upāsanā) are useless. For, every relation depends on two. And contemplation is a relation and would be impossible in the absence of a real contemplator, distinct from the object of contemplation. If it be said that the one shines as many, because of the limiting condition, the question will arise: "Is the condition real?" If so, monism fails. If not, the contemplation, which is practised only with the object of getting freedom from the limiting condition, becomes useless.

The Siddhāntin, therefore, asserts that the distinction between the Lord, the Īśvara, and the soul, the Jīva, has to be admitted to be real. These would become the objects of knowledge to each other. For, only such an admission can justify the admission that the Brahman is omniscient and establish the utility of the texts dealing with contemplation, which leads to Mokṣa.

(3) The Dualist Siddhāntin criticizes the Vedāntin, who maintains that Mala is nothing but ignorance, which disappears at the dawn of knowledge, exactly as ignorance in the form of mistake, such as the one which consists in mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl for silver, disappears when the mother-of-pearl is known as such. For, ignorance must be admitted to be either an attribute of the self or 'nothing'. In the former case, if it be admitted to disappear, that will mean that the self changes. In the latter case, it being nothing and, therefore, being without causal efficiency, the knowledge, as a means of driving it away, would be a useless assumption[1].

Accordingly the Dualist Siddhāntin asserts that it is not an attribute of the self, but something material, similar to the film over the eye[2]. He replies to the objection that if the Mala be admitted to be a substance, the jñāna will not be able to drive it away, as follows:—

The Ajñāna, ignorance, is of two types:—

(I) That which is due to non-recognition of similarity and consists in mistaking one thing for another, e. g. mother-of-pearl for silver.

1. M. Ka., 28. | 2. M. Ka., 28.

(II) That which is due to jaundice etc., because of which white things also look to be yellow. The first goes because of the dawn of knowledge. But the second can be removed by God only, like a physician or surgeon[1].

(4) The Vedāntin holds the Brahman to be both the final and the material cause. Hence just as the Brahman is insentient, at least partly, in so far as He is the material cause also, so will become the liberated, who attain oneness with Him. Further, the Vedāntin maintains monism and denies reality to everything besides Brahman. How can then he talk of the knowledge of Brahman as a means to the realisation of Him (It)? For, the same thing cannot logically be spoken of as both the means and the end[2].

LAKULĪŚA PĀŚUPATA CONCEPTION OF MOKṢA CRITICIZED

The Śaiva Dualist criticizes the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system also, which holds that the union with or acquisition of the perfect powers of knowledge and action is Mokṣa and that the powers of the Lord pass on to the liberated. He points out that if the powers of the Lord pass on to the Mukta, the Lord will become powerless and that it is against the fact of experience that the qualities leave the substance in which they inhere, and pass on to another.

OTHER CONCEPTIONS OF MOKṢA, CRITICIZED BY THE ŚAIVA DUALIST

(1) *Utpattisamatāpakṣa—*

Some maintain that the omniscience and the omnipotence do not originally belong to the limited subject: but they arise at liberation and consequently Mokṣa consists in the attainment of similarity with Śiva[3].

(2) *Samatāsaṅkrānti Pakṣa—*

Others maintain that just as the fragrance of musk passes on to other things, so the omniscience and the omnipotence of Śiva pass on to the limited subject at liberation This is the position of the Lakulīśa Pāśupatas.

(3) *Āveśa Pakṣa—*

Still others maintain that just as a Graha, while at its own place, enters into or possesses a man (Grahairiva puruṣaḥ), so do the powers of Śiva.

1. M. Ka., 28—9.
2. M. Ka., 67.
3. P. K., 12.

The three views of Mokṣa are refuted as follows:—

(1) If the powers arise at Mokṣa, it is transient. For, everything, that has a beginning, has an end also[1].

(2) If the powers were said to pass on to the liberated, the position is untenable; because the powers being imperceptible, their passing into the person, to be liberated, cannot be perceived: nor is the inference possible; because there is no analogy[2]. Further, it would mean that that from which the powers pass becomes powerless.

(3) If at liberation, powers enter into or possess the liberated like a Graha; the liberation is without freedom, because the liberated is possessed by an evil spirit or Graha as it were.

Similarly the Śaiva Dualist criticizes the conception of Moksa of almost every system. In fact, Sadyojyoti has written the Para Mokṣa Nirāsa Kārikā, which aims at nothing else than the refutation of the rival theories of Mokṣa.

THE TEACHER AND THE LOWER LIBERATION

The liberation, according to the Siddhānta School is of two types : (I) Higher (Para) and (II) Lower (Apara). Only that person can be a teacher, who has attained lower liberation[3]; that is, one who is free from the impurities of Karma and Māyā and, therefore, is omniscient, but who has still a little of the impurity of Āṇavamala and, therefore, has a body made up of Bindu, which enables him to know everything; who is free from the body that is a creation of Māyā, the cause of ignorance. He is an external body of the Lord himself. He, therefore, possesses the qualities similar to those of the Lord. He is the instrument, through which the Lord bestows grace[4] on the deserving. He is, accordingly spoken of as the Lord himself. He is also prompted to action like an ordinary mortal by the Lord. But the action, to which he is prompted, is of a different nature. It is not the action, which leads to the enjoyment of the fruits of the past Karmas, but the action which is purely for the sake of others[5], the action which brings no merit or demerit to the performer.

FUNDAMENTAL IDENTITY OF THE TAMIL ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA AND THE SIDDHĀNTA ŚAIVA DUALISM

If we compare the fundamentals of the Dualistic Śaiva Siddhānta with those of what is known as Tamil Śaiva Siddhānta,

1. P. K., 19. 2. P. K., 19-20. 3. S. P., 37.
4. S. P., 39. 5. S. P., 38.

we find that the two are fundamentally identical. The difference is confined to the language only. Both admit the same three primary categories, Pati, Paśu and Pāśa[1]; the same thirty-six dependent categories; three impurities, Mala, Māyā and Karma; two types of creation, pure and impure; four aspects of speech, Parā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī; and the authority of the same twenty-eight Śaivāgamas, Kāmika etc. In fact Meykaṇḍadeva, the author of the Śivajñānabodha, the basic philosophical work on Tamil Siddhānta Śaivaism, belonged to the 13th century A. D., when most of the works on the Siddhānta Śaiva Dualism had already been written in Sanskrit by great writers from Sadyojyoti to Aghora Śiva, on whom we have spoken earlier in this section. There are, no doubt, minor differences here and there between the presentation of the Siddhānta School in Tamil and that in Sanskrit. But, as we have already pointed out, such differences are found in the works of the exponents of this system in Sanskrit also.

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1. H. Ph. E. W. Vol. I. 369—79.

(III) DUALISM-CUM-MONISM OF LAKULĪŚA PĀŚUPATA

The Lakulīśa Pāśupata system is different from the Pāśupata, which is a dualistic system, though both admit the same five primary categories; (1) Kāraṇa, (2) Kārya, (3) Yoga, (4) Vidhi and (5) Duḥkhānta. Pāśupata system is, therefore, a presupposition of Lakulīśa Pāśupata. The distinction of this system from the pāśupata, seems to be referred to in the commentary, called Ratna Ṭīkā, on the Gaṇa Kārikā[1] of Bhāsarvajña, when it points out the distinction of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata from another system (Śāstrāntare). The statement of the distinctive features looks to be authoritative, because it is quoted by Mādhava in his Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha. This may be stated as follows:—

(1) In another system the liberation is nothing more than the end of all miseries. But, according to this system, it is the attainment of Supremacy or the divine perfection.

Here the distinction of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata from the Pāśupata seems to be pointed out. For, Lakulīśa seems to begin his Pāśupata Ṣūtra with the object of pointing out the distinction of his system from the earlier Pāśupata system: because the aim of the work, as stated in the very first aphorism, is to present the spiritual discipline, necessary for union with the Lord, as propounded by the Lord Himself (Athātaḥ Paśupateḥ pāśupatam yogavidhiṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ). We know that the Pāśupata conception of liberation was adopted by both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika. For, the Nyāya Sūtra of Gautam clearly refers to it in the course of the second aphorism; and Vātsyāyana, in his commentary, makes it clearer still when he says:—

"How can a wise man not like this liberation (Apavarga), which is characterised by the total cessation of all miseries and is nothing more than the absence of consciousness of all miseries" (Katham buddhimān sarva—duḥkhocchedaṁ sarvaduḥkhā—saṁvidamapavargam na rocayet.)

(2) Another system admits that the effect (Kārya), has no being before coming into being. But, according to this system, the effect (Kārya), under which are subsumed three dependent categories, (1) Kalā, (2) Vidyā and (3) Paśu, is eternal. At the present state of our knowledge of the Pāśupata system, which we

1. G. K., 14-5.

get from references to it by Śaṅkara and his commentators, we cannot say definitely how far this point refers to the Pāśupata system. But if we admit that the view of the Vaiśeṣika that the effect has no being before coming into being (Asatkāryavāda) is adopted from the Pāśupata, like the conception of the liberation as the end of all miseries, we may say that this is another point of distinction of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata from the Pāśupata. For, the former holds that all effects exist as identical with the Lord's power (Śakti) from which He manifests them at will.

(3) According to another system, Īśvara and Pradhāna, the two causes, the efficient and the material, are not free; because the creation cannot begin in the absence of either. But, according to the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, the Lord is free, because, as we shall show, metaphysically this system is rationalistic voluntarism. This point of difference definitely refers to the Pāśupata system. For, as we pointed out earlier on the authority of the Ratna Prabhā, the Pāśupata admits the two distinct causes, Īśvara and Pradhāna[1]. Other two points of distinction, stated there, seem to refer to the systems of the Yoga and the Mīmāṁsā respectively.

LAKULĪŚA PĀŚUPATA AND THE VEDA

The tradition of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system is found, not only in the miscellaneous portion of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka in the five Anuvākas from the 17th to the 21st, but also in the main body of the book, in the five Anuvākas from the 43rd to the 47th. The Mantras, which constitute the text of these Anuvākas, have been adopted by Lakulīśa in his Pāśupata Sūtra with very few modifications to represent the Brahman or Śiva, as He is to be contemplated upon at the various stages of the path to final emancipation. These five Mantras are at the basis of his division of the book into five chapters. They also seem to have directed the thinkers of this school to think mostly in number five. Thus, in the Gaṇa Kārikā, which summarily gives the fundamentals of this system, we find eight groups, each consisting of five constituents.

Sāyaṇa, in the course of his commentary on the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka refers to the following points, which are important features of Lakulīśa Pāśupata system:—

THE CONCEPTION OF BRAHMAN OR PATI

It appears that at the time of the rise of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system, the word Brahman did not stand exclusively for the Vedāntin's conception of the Ultimate Reality. For, in the

1. S. Bh., 488.

Pāśupata Sūtra of Lakulīśa, we find the word "Brahman" used for the Reality as an object of contemplation at different levels. Keeping this fact in mind, if we read Sāyaṇa's commentary, we find that what he says about the Brahman is very much like what the authorities on the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system say about Pati, the first category.

Thus, the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, according to Sāyaṇa, admits:

(*a*) That the Brahman is the cause of the objective world. It is the material cause in so far as the Māyā is its power and, therefore, has no being independently of the Brahman. It is, therefore, Māyin[1] and hence Saguṇa and Māyāviśiṣṭa[2].

(*b*) That just as it is the very nature of the Nirguṇa Brahman to be the unity of Saccidānanda, so it is that of Saguṇa Brahman to create, to maintain and to destroy the world (Svabhāva)[3].

(*c*) That the Īśvara gives the fruits of the action and not Karma by itself[4].

(*d*) That the objective world and the limited selves are the effects of the Brahman, qualified by Māyā.

(*e*) That the effect can have no being outside the cause, therefore, the Brahman is all pervasive and Ananta.

(*f*) That the Brahman is Sat[5] : it creates the world and then enters into it, just as a man builds up a house and then enters into it and sits there. The Brahman, after creating all, from Ākāśa to Puruṣa, enters into it as if it were. For, it is found as the perceiver and knower in the Buddhi in the 'Lotus of the heart'. (To this there is reference in the Pāśupata Sūtra.)

(*g*) That the Brahman becomes everything perceptible and imperceptible, determinate and indeterminate, sentient and insentient, truth and untruth[6].

(*h*) That Brahman is Sukṛta[7]; because it creates everything independently. This idea is expressed through the word "Svatantra" in the Pāśupata Sūtra.

1. Tai. A., 564.
2. Tai. A., 566.
3. Tai. A., 571.
4. Tai. A., 571.
5. Tai. A., 622.
6. Tai. A., 641.
7. Tai. A., 642.

(*i*) That Rudra is everything[1]: He is the self of all living beings : He is "being" : He is all-transcending: He is all that had, has or will have being: He is Umāpati i.e. the Lord of learning[2].

(*j*) That the Brahman is the cause of the origin, persistence and destruction of the objective world[3].

(*k*) That the Brahman is distinct from the five Kośas[4] ; Anna, Prāṇa, Manas, Vijñāna and Ānanda.

(*l*) That the Brahman has various forms Jyeṣṭha[5] etc They are nine in number. They are the lords of the nine powers, Vāmā etc.

(*m*) That the Brahman has three forms corresponding to three qualities, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas : (1) that which is predominantly Sattva and, therefore, is calm, (Śānta), is called Aghora; (2) that which is predominantly Rajas and, therefore, is terrific, is called Ghora; (3) that which is extremely terrible, because of predominance of Tamas, is called Ghoratara.

THE CONCEPTION OF MOKṢA

According to Sāyaṇa, the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka admits :

(*a*) That Mokṣa[6] consists in the Jīva's having Pratiṣṭhā in the Brahman who is imperceptible.

(*b*) That Pratiṣṭhā means the firmness of the thought of identity of the individual and the universal or the realisation that the Brahman is the very self of one's own self.

(*c*) That the person who knows the identity of the Ānanda that is the individual with that which is the Brahman, slowly gets union with the Brahman, the Ānanda, (Upasaṅkrāmati). The word "Saṅkramaṇa"[7] implies strong union, similar to that which a leech has with a living organism from which the blood passes into it. (Saṅkramaṇaṁ nāma dṛḍhasaṁyoga-rūpaprāptiḥ Jalūkā tṛṇe saṁkrāmatītyādau tathā dṛṣṭatvāt). Here Sāyaṇa seems to use the word "Tṛṇa" in a special sense. Another implication of this analogy is that, just as leech gets on a piece of grass without leaving the

1. Tai. A., 736.
2. Tai. A., 737.
3. Tai. A., 662.
4. Tai. A., 590.
5. Tai. A., 754.
6. Tai. A., 644.
7. Tai. A., 652.

place from which it gets on, so the individual gets related to the Universal, but does not give up the individuality. The liberated belongs to the highest category. The liberation, therefore, consists in the penetration into Brahman by Jīva so that the powers of Brahman pass into it, exactly as the blood of a living organism passes into a leech, which penetrates it. This text seems to have been the basis of the conception of Sāyujya Mokṣa in the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system. But some earlier authorities, under the influence of the monistic Vedānta, as pointed out by Sāyaṇa, held that the word "Saṅkrāmati" in the text, under discussion, is used in the secondary sense of the fruit of knowledge, which destroys illusion[1].

(*d*) That the liberated (Mukta) goes to the world of the Brahman.

(*e*) That the object of contemplation may be the Brahman or an aspect of it: that the contemplation may be strong or weak. Accordingly if the contemplation be strong and its object be the Brahman, the contemplator gets union (Sāyujya) with the Brahman. But if it be weak, he gets to the world of the Brahman (Salokatā). Similarly if the object of contemplation be an aspect of the Brahman and the contemplation be strong, middling or weak, the contemplator gets union with, similar powers (Sārṣṭikatā-Samānaiśvaryatā) or the world of the divinity (Samānalokatā)[2].

(*f*) That the final emancipation is attained through various stages and that in the final stage the liberated attains the greatness (mahimā) of the Brahman[3].

OTHER POINTS COMMON OR SIMILAR TO THE LAKULĪŚA PĀŚUPATA

According to the interpretation of Sāyaṇa, Taittirīya Āraṇyaka admits :

(*a*) That the self in the Guhā, made up of the five kośas, is essentially identical with Brahman[4] and the person, who realises this, experiences the entire objectivity simultaneously.

Tai. A., 652.
Tai. A., 781.
2. Tai. A., 734-5.
4. Tai. A., 562.

(b) That the Puruṣa is an effect (Annāt Puruṣaḥ)[1].

(c) That Ākāśa[2] is both (1) space and (2) the substance wherein the sound inheres.

(d) That the creation is to enable the limited subjects to enjoy and suffer the fruits of Karma.

(e) That there is no fundamental contradiction between identity and difference[3]. The identity refers to the essence, the Brahman, and the difference to the form (Ākāra). (Brahmākāreṇa Advaitam, Bhoktṛbhogyākāreṇa Dvaitam).

Thus, the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka presents the Dualism-cum-monism (Bhedābhedavāda).

SĀYAṆA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT, THE VEDIC BASIS OF THE LAKULĪŚA PĀŚUPATA.

We have referred to the five Anuvākas in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, which are the basis of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system. Sāyaṇa in his interpretation of this text agrees that they refer to Śaivaism in general, both as a religion and as a philosophy. Thus, he asserts that the five Mantras, (1) Sadyojātam (2) Vamadevāya (3) Aghorebhyaḥ (4) Tatpuruṣāya (5) Īśānaḥ, present the five faces[4] (Vaktra) of Mahādeva or Śiva. Of these faces the first four, face four directions, one each, and the fifth is at the top (ūrdhva) and is turned upward.

His interpretation may be put as follows:—

1. "I approach Sadyojāta, the Western face, the Lord in that form. I bow to (namaḥ) Sadyojāta. O Lord ! prompt me, not to transmigratory existence, but to get beyond it. I bow to him who frees from the cycle of births and deaths.

2. I bow to Vāmadeva, the Northern face, which has nine aspects, represented by nine powers, (1) Jyeṣṭha, (2) Śreṣṭha, (3) Rudra, (4) Kāla, (5) Kalavikaraṇa, (6) Balavikaraṇa, (7) Balapramathana, (8) Sarvabhūtadamana and (9) Manonmana.

3. I bow to Aghora, the Southern face, which has three types of forms: (I) those which are calm and quiet, because of the predominance of Sattva, (II) those which are terrific, because of the predominance of Rajas and (III) those which are surpassingly terrible, because of the predominance of Tamas. O All-inclusive Lord! I bow to all the terrific forms, which work destruction at the time of universal annihilation.

1. Tai. A., 563.
2. Tai. A., 566.
3. Tai. A., 576.
4. Tai. A., 753—55.

4. I know Tatpuruṣa, the Eastern face. I contemplate on the Great Lord (Mahādeva). May Rudra prompt me to knowledge and contemplation.

5. Īśāna, the top-face (Ūrdhva-Vaktra), is the master of all knowledge, the controller of all beings, the protector of the Vedas. The all-transcending Self is higher than even Hiraṇyagarbha Brahman. May He be graceful to manifest His peaceful aspect to me. I am Sadā Śiva.

We shall point out the difference (1) of Sāyaṇa's interpretation of these Mantras from the one, given by Lakulīśa in his Pāśupata Sūtra, and (2) of the text of these Mantras, as found in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, from that as adapted by Lakulīśa.

THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE LAKULĪŚA PĀŚUPATA SYSTEM

(1) It is distinct from the Nyāya in the conception of Mokṣa. According to this, Mokṣa does not consist in the cessation of all miseries (Duḥkhānta) only, as according to the Nyāya, but also in the attainment of the powers of knowledge and action.

(2) The effect, according to some other systems, the Vaiśeṣika, for instance, is that which has no being before coming into being (Asatkāryavāda) : but, according to this system, it is eternal. Thus, Kalā, Vidyā and Paśu are eternal.

(3) According to some other systems, the efficient cause depends upon something external in the creation of the effect. The Īśvara of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, for instance, depends on the atoms and Karma. But, according to this system, the cause is thoroughly independent.

(4) The rituals, prescribed by some other systems, lead to heaven etc., from which there is sure fall. But the Pāśupata rituals lead to *Sāmīpya*[1] etc., from which there is no return to transmigratory existence.

(5) The Lakulīśa Pāśupata rejects the conception of Mokṣa, as propounded or represented by Rāmānuja and Ānanda Tīrtha, which is technically called "Servitude" (Dāsatva)[2]. For, servitude, does not matter to whom it is, is painful and, therefore, cannot be the end of all miseries. Accordingly it asserts that the liberation is the attainment of the attributes of the Supreme.

1. S. D. S., 171.
2. S. D. S., 161.

THE POINTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DUALIST ŚAIVA AND THE LAKULĪŚA PĀŚUPATA

(1) According to the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, the Lord is independent of Karma in His creative activity. But according to the Dualist Śaiva, He depends on Karma.

(2) According to the Lakulīśa Pāśupata the powers of knowledge and action pass into the liberated (Saṅkrānti) : but, according to the Dualist Śaiva, they become manifest (Abhivyakti). The one holds that the powers do not belong to Paśu: but the other asserts that they do, but are obscured.

(3) The Dualist Śaiva admits the Śiva to be the creator on the basis of inference. His argument is cosmological. He holds that the dependence on the means, such as Karma, is not inconsistent with the freedom of the creator. For, freedom of a king, in making gifts, is not affected though he makes them through the treasurer. The freedom of the creator consists in having none to prompt Him to action and in making use of the instruments and not in being independent of them[1]. But the Lakulīśa Pāśupata holds that the Lord is independent of Karma in His creative activity; and that the object of creation has its being in Him as His power. He, therefore, is independent of everything, that is external, in the act of creation. He is free (Svatantra). He manifests the effect at His Will.

LAKULĪŚA PĀŚUPATA AS RATIONALISTIC VOLUNTARISM

According to the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, the Lord (Pati) is free. He does not depend upon anything that is external to Him in His creative activity. The so called matter is not independent of and external to Him but within Him as His power. He is not controlled in his creative activity by Karma also. Fruition of action depends upon Him : therefore, the limited subjects depend upon Him for fruition of action. But He is independent of both. (This idea is common to the Nyāya, which holds : "Īśvaraḥ Kāraṇam puruṣa Karmāphalya darśanāt".) His creative activity, however, is always in accordance with the causal laws. He does not change the essential nature and order of the effect (Kārya). He does not unite the liberated again with pain and suffering : nor does He subject them to transmigratory existence[2]. Thus, rationalism is implied in the very conception of the ultimate category as the cause (Kāraṇa).

1. S. D. S., 177.
2. P. Su., 60.

Thus, this system is **rationalistic voluntarism**. It is distinct from pure voluntarism; because of its rationalism, its recognition of causal law as inviolable, as absolute. This is responsible for admission by this system that what is subsumed under the category of Kārya, i.e. Vidyā, Kalā and Paśu, exists in Him as His power. He is, therefore, not dependent on what is external to Him, as is the Īśvara, as conceived by the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika. For, the matter, according to them, is external to the Īśvara, as the clay is to the potter. Matter, on the contrary, according to the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, is within the Lord as the stars are in the sky or as the seed is within the earth or as colour is in water.

The Lakulīśa Pāśupata is not idealism. It does not admit matter to be essentially mind, to be of the nature of idea, but non-idea, which is yet within that which is essentially of the nature of mind (Cit). The matter has its being in the potentiality (Śakti)[1] of the Lord, which is non-different from Him and is just an aspect of Him exactly as the heat is that of the fire. It is thus monism-cum-dualism (Bhedābhedavāda). For, though it admits the essential difference between mind and matter and the individual and the universal, yet it holds the matter to be not outside the Cit, the Lord, but within Him. It is Saguṇa Brahmavāda [2]. It admits that the Gods and celestial beings also have their being in the power of Rudra[3] as the objects of His creative and destructive activities.

THE CATEGORIES OF THE LAKULĪŚA PĀŚUPATA.

The commentary on the Pāśupata Sūtra of Lakulīśa by Kauṇḍinya is called Pañcārtha Bhāṣya, because it deals with the five primary categories of the system. The word, therefore, for which "Category" is used in this presentation, is "Artha". The word "Artha" seems to stand for more than what "Padārtha", (for which the word, in English, is "category"), signifies. "Padārthas" and "Categories," stand for metaphysical concepts, in terms of which the entire field of experience is explained. By the words "Categories" and "Padārthas" we understand the metaphysical and, therefore, philosophical categories. But the five principal categories of this system include three religious categories. Only the first two, Pati and Paśu, are purely philosophical categories. This system, therefore, does not seem to recognise the bifurcation between philosophy and religion. Thus the five categories are (1) Kāraṇa (Pati) (2) Kārya (Paśu) (3)

1. P. Su., 58.
2. P. Su., 63.
3. P. Su., 63.

Yoga (4) Vidhi and (5) Duḥkhānta, or (1) Cause (Lord), (2) Effect, (3) Union, (4) Ritual and (5) Liberation.

THE CAUSE (PATI), THE FIRST PRIMARY CATEGORY.

It appears that at the time when the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system arose, there was not much antagonism between the Vedānta and the Lakulīśa Pāśupata. In the Pāśupata Sūtra, the word Brahman is used for the object of contemplation. The words, Pati, Kāraṇa, and Brahman are synonymous. For, the Sūtra "Atredam Brahma Japet" is repeated five times at the commencement of the presentation of Brahman or Pati on the basis of each of the five Mantras, "Sadyojātam" etc.

Pati or Brahman is "being" (Sat), as distinct from "not-being" (Asat). He is eternal (Ādya). But His eternality is distinct from that of the liberation. For, the Lakulīśa Pāśupata holds that eternality is of two kinds, (I) that which has no beginning and no end and (II) that which has beginning but no end. To the first type belongs the cause, the Pati : and to the second type belongs liberation, mokṣa[1]; because it has beginning but no end. Pati is the uncaused eternal cause. His beginninglessness is distinct from that of Puruṣa, as conceived by the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga. The puruṣa is subjected to birth and death but Pati is free from them.

The above is the interpretation of the word "Sadyojātam" by Kauṇḍinya. But this word, according to Sāyaṇa, is a mere name of the Western face of Śiva, who is artistically conceived by the religious minds as five-faced (Pañcavaktra).

This Sadyojāta has to be grasped mentally to the exclusion of everything else and the contemplator has to dedicate his whole being to it[2]. The object of this dedication is to get beyond the created, the effect, i.e. all that which is subsumed under the category, technically called 'Kārya' and to deserve "Grace"[3].

(Bhave bhave nāti bhave, Bhajasva mām)

Here it may be pointed out that not only this interpretation is different from that of Sāyaṇa, but the text also is slightly different from that, found in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka. Here we have "Bhajasva" instead of "Bhavasva". Pati is the cause of all that is of the nature of effect (Kārya) i.e. Vidyā, Kalā and Paśu[4]. He is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe. From Him the universe springs up (Bhavodbhavaḥ),

1. P. Su., 52
2. P. Su., 53,
3. P. Su.,54.
4. P. Su., 55.

exactly as does a sprout from a seed. He is the cause of both the coming into being and the dissolution of the world. He bestows grace. He transcends all. He is playful[1] and creation, dissolution and grace are mere manifestations of the playfulness. He is higher than the liberated (Siddha)[2], those who are striving for liberation and those who are in bondage. He has the perfect powers of knowledge and action (Dṛk kriyāśakti). They constitute His essential nature exactly as heat does that of fire. He inspires fear of the immoral deeds in the bound souls and unites them with the merit and demerit of the deeds[3]. Compare :

"Bhavodbhavāya namaḥ. Vāmadevāya namo jyeṣṭhāya namaḥ. Śreṣṭhāya namo Rudrāya namaḥ." (Tai. A)

and

"Bhavodbhavaḥ"............Rudrasya (P. Su., 55-7.)

Pati pervades the individual selves through the power of knowledge (Jñāna śakti) and it is because of His Will that the individual is connected with individuality. The relation of the individual with body, action and inaction etc. depends upon His Will[4].

Pati is responsible for disintegrating as well as reintegrating the world[5], consisting of the fourteen kinds of beings, their objects and their abodes.

He controls all the powers. He is responsible for inspiring attachment to body, senses, their objects and homes in all the limited beings, excepting the Siddhas[6]. He is not limited by Manas, i.e. all that is subsumed under Kalā i.e. thirteen Indriyas, five Tanmātras and five elements. He is the controller, the director, of all effects and means (Kārya and Karaṇa in the sense of the Sāṅkhya). He is, therefore, spoken of as Sakala[7], only by transference of epithet. But in reality He is above and beyond them. He is, therefore, spoken of as Akala or Amanas[8]. Compare:

Kālāya namaḥ Kalavikaraṇāya namaḥ Balāya namo Balapramathanāya namaḥ. Sarvabhūtadamanāya namo Manonmanāya namaḥ. (Tai. A.)

and

Kālāya namaḥ. ....Mano manāya namaḥ.

(P. Su., 72-6)

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1. P. Su., 56.
2. P. Su., 57.
3. P. Su., 57.
4. P. Su., 5
5. P. Su., 73.
6. P. Su. 75.
7. P. Su., 74.
8. P. Su., 76.

He is the cause[1] of diverse objects of opposing nature. He is, therefore, conceived to be of diverse forms. He has terrific as well as peaceful forms. He has bewildering forms also[2]. He is the abode of all that is subsumed under the category "Kārya", that is, Vidyā, Kalā and Paśu.

Compare:

Aghorebhyothaghorebhyo Ghora ghoratarebhyaḥ
Sarvebhyaḥ Śarva sarvebhyo namaste astu **R**udrarūpebhyaḥ

(Tai. A.)

and

Aghorebhyaḥ............Rudrarūpebhyaḥ.

(P. Su., 89-91).

Pati is also referred to as Mahādeva[3]. He is the God of gods. Playfulness is His essential nature. He is higher and more powerful than any being. He is different from the individual selves. He creates all that is of the nature of effect i.e. Vidyā, Kalā and Paśu, because of His playfulness. He is the cause of creation, maintenance, destruction, obscuration and grace[4]. He is one, though spoken of differently as Pati and Ādya, because of the various attributes and functions. He is called Pati, because He possesses all-transcending powers of knowledge and action. (Niratiśaya dṛkkriyāśaktimattvam). His powers are beginningless and endless.

Compare:

Tatpuruṣāya vidmahe Mahādevāya dhīmahi.
Tanno Rudraḥ Pracodayāt. (Tai. A) and
Tatpuruṣāya..............Pracodayāt (P. Su., 107-8)

His power is manifest in all that is limited, unlimited, or limited in one aspect and unlimited in another, beautiful or ugly[5]. He is the god Rudra, the ocean, the sun, the ether, the Self, the Brahman. Nothing can be looked upon as different from Him. (Na śakyam bhedadarśanam).

The Lord is spoken of as the beginningless and causeless cause, which is essentially of the nature of "being" in the first Chapter,Sūtra 38, 40, 44. He is also spoken of as many, because of His being presented as possessing many attributes and discharging

1. P. Su., 89.
2. P. Su., 90.
3. P. Su., 108.
4. S. D. S., 168.
5. P. Su., 93.

diverse functions in Chapter two, Sūtra 1,4,5,20, 23—27. He is also admitted to have forms of the opposing natures, such as Ghora, Aghora and Ghoratara. The question, therefore, arises : "Is the Ultimate Reality, according to this system, a multiplicity"? And the reply is : He is one in many forms : the Ultimate Reality is unity in multiplicity (Tatpuruṣa)[1]. He is spoken of Ṛṣi[2] because He controls all that is of the nature of effect (Kārya). He is called Vipra, because He is omniscient. His power of knowledge extends over the entire field of knowledge. He is great (Mahān), because His powers of knowledge and action, are natural and not acquired and far surpass those belonging to any other being. They belong to Him as His qualities. In fact He is called Īśvara, because these qualities are in Him (Aiśvaryam Tadguṇasadbhāvaḥ)[3]. He is beyond the sensible. He is higher than Puruṣa. He is to be meditated upon, leaving the speech and Manas. For, He is beyond the reach of words and Manas. He is Niṣkala and yet He is different from Pralayākala. Even as Niṣkala[4], He has his qualities of omniscience and omnipotence.

He is the master, the Lord, of all learnings, which lead to the attainment of the four recognised goals of humanity[5]. He is the lord of all sentient beings, excepting Siddhas and Īśvaras. He is called Brahman[6], because He is responsible for the grossification of Vidyā, Kalā and Bhūtas, and yet is beyond them. He is the Lord of Brahmā, the sentient being, who is distinct from all limited subjects and is spoken of as Viriñci. He is called Śiva[7] because He is free from all miseries and as such represents the eternal (Nitya) final experience of the liberated.

Compare:

Īśānaḥ sarvavidyānām Īśvaraḥ sarvabhūtānām.

Brahmādhipatiḥ Brahmaṇodhipatirbrahmā.

Śivo me astu Sadāśivom. (Tai. A.)

and

Īśānaḥ.............Śivaḥ (P. Su., 144-6)

1. P. Su., 107.
2. P. Su., 126.
3. P. Su.. 127.
4. P. Su., 128.
5. P. Su., 144.
6. P. Su., 145.
7. P. Su., 146.

THE EFFECT (KĀRYA) OR PAŚU, THE SECOND PRIMARY CATEGORY.

The conception of the effect or Kārya, according to the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, is very different from that according to the other systems. It is not what Vikṛti, as opposed to Prakṛti is, according to the Sāṅkhya. For, it includes not only all that is called "Vikṛti" by the Sāṅkhya, but also the Puruṣa, the subject, which is neither Prakṛti, the cause, nor Vikṛti, the evolute. Further, it does not admit the theory of evolution that Mahān evolves from Prakṛti and so on. On the contrary, it holds that everything exists in the power (Śakti) of the Lord and that creation is nothing more than grossification of what so exists and organisation of what exists separately, into wholes, according to His free will.

Nor is the effect of the nature of mere "idea" in the Universal Mind, as the Idealistic voluntarism of Kashmir holds. For, the Lakulīśa Pāśupata recognises the distinction between the sentient and the insentient (Cit and Acit) even as they exist in the power of the Lord. Nor is the effect mere illusion, as the Vedāntin asserts. For, the Lakulīśa Pāśupata is not Monism, but Dualism-cum-non-dualism. It admits that the Reality is not pure unity but unity in multiplicity and, therefore, the multiplicity, according to it, exists in the unity just as do the stars in heaven. Nor is the effect not-being before coming into being, as the Asatkāryavādins, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, hold. For, the effect, according to them, is non-eternal; but the effect, as a category, according to the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, is eternal.

It seems that the Lakulīśa Pāśupata was influenced in the conception of the second primary category, the effect, by its conception of the first primary category, the Pati, which, perhaps only at a later stage in the development of the system, was called the cause (Kāraṇa). For, "Pati" is the only word that is used for the first category in the Pāśupata Sūtra in the first aphorism: and similarly the word "Paśu" is used for the second category. The original conception of the second category, therefore, seems to have been that which is controlled by the Lord (Pāśanāt Paśuḥ)[1]. And subsequently the first two, which are the only metaphysical categories, were given the more philosophical names, the Cause (Kāraṇa) and the Effect (Kārya). The word Kārya, as the name of the second category, therefore, in this philosophy, does not mean "that which is effected or produced and which has no being before the production"; but that which is the object the Lord's Free Will i.e. that which is "not free"

1. P. Su., 5.

(Asvatantra) as opposed to the Lord (Pati) who is Free. For, this system points out that "Pati" the Lord, has no meaning without Paśu, the lorded over. Accordingly this system subsumes under the second primary category, Kārya or Paśu, three dependent categories: (1) Vidyā, the attribute of the limited subject (Paśuguṇo Vidyā), (2) Kalā, the matter and (3) Paśu, the individual subject.

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE CAUSE (PATI OR KĀRAṄA) AND THE EFFECT (KĀRYA).

Many systems of Indian thought admit the cause of the world. They, however, differ from one another in holding the cause to be dependent or independent. Some hold that God is the cause of the world but depends upon the external matter for creation. To this class belong the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika etc. According to them, God is the efficient cause only and the matter that is external to Him, is the material cause. The Vedāntin admits the cause, the Brahman, to be both the material and the efficient cause. The Lakulīśa Pāśupata holds that the effect, the Kārya, the triad of Vidyā, Kalā and Paśu, springs up from Pati (Bhavodbhavāya)[1]. The so called effect has its eternal being in the Lord. And creation is nothing more than the arrangement of what exists, in a certain form (Vṛttilābha)[2]. He is the origin, the abode, the Āsana of the triad. The triad lies in His Śakti[3], which constitutes His very being, the most essential nature, the principal attribute, the chief characteristic, Dharma or Guṇa. The objective world is in Him as the starry heaven is in the Ākāśa or the ether. The cause and the effect have no confused being (Vṛttisaṅkara)[4] like water in milk. They have, on the other hand, distinct being, like the light of the eyes and that of the sun or of lamp, which illumines the object at the time of perception. He is all-pervasive. But the pervasiveness of the different dependent categories of the 'effect' (kārya), is of limited nature. Each higher category pervades the lower. Thus the Puruṣa, the self, pervades the twenty-four categories, as conceived by the Sāṅkhya. And similarly Pradhāna, for which Kalā seems to be substituted here, pervades all the lower categories beginning with Mahat or Buddhi and so on[5].

Different effects do not have their being in isolation from each other, like cells in a honey-comb. But the higher pervades the

1. P. Su., 55.
2. P. Su., 60.
3. P. Su., 58.
4. P. Su., 59
5. P. Su., 58.

lower, as stated just above. The pervaded and the pervading are grasped distinctly as water is grasped distinctly from the colour that colours it. In water that is coloured with the root of turmeric (Haridrā) for instance, we perceive water in so far as we see liquidity and feel cold touch: and we perceive turmeric in so far as we experience colour, smell and a certain taste[1].


Thus, the cause (Kāraṇa) and the effect (Kārya) exist together, but maintain their respective entities, because they have distinctive beings: though both of them are pervasive. The effect is as eternal as the cause. For, the cause cannot be logically represented to be the cause without the effect : nor can Pati (Lord) be spoken of as Pati without something to lord over. The effect has its being in the cause as does a seed in the earth. Kāraṇa and Kārya are synonymous with Free (Svatantra) and 'Not-Free' (Asvatantra)[2]. The former is the Lord (Pati) and the latter is the 'Lorded over' (Paśu). The one stands for the Cit and the other for both Cit and Acit. The one is the cause of the world, the other is the effect, the world.

(1) VIDYĀ OR SENTIENCY

Vidyā is the first of the three dependent categories of the Effect (Kārya). It is an attribute of the individual subject. It is the basis of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata theory of knowledge and Ethics. It is the sentiency, which, as an attribute of the limited subject, distinguishes him from the insentient Kalā, the matter, the second dependent category of the Effect (Kārya). As the basis of the theory of knowledge, it is self-luminous and illumines what is external to it, the object, like a lamp[3]. It reveals the hidden meaning of the sacred texts and leads to the knowledge of the essential nature of the impurities (Mala), the means (Upāya) to get rid of them and the acquisition (Lābha) consequent on freedom from the impurities[4]. It is the light of learning, that is manifested by the Lord and leads to the attainment of the four goals of humanity, Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Mokṣa. It is the first acquisition, consequent on the disciplined life, according to the Lakulīśa Pāśupata[5], and as such it is called knowledge (Jñāna). It is the right knowledge and as such is opposed to wrong knowledge (Mithyājñāna), which is due to the defective means of knowledge (Pramāṇābhāsajam jñānam)[6]

1. P. Su., 59.
2. S. D. S., 167.
3. P. Su., 92.
4. P. Su., 88.
5. G. K., 9.
6. G. K., 22.

and includes doubt, error, attachment, aversion and anger together with their root cause. Thus, the word "Vidyā", in different contexts, stands for (1) the attribute of the individual subject; (2) the knowledge that is got through it; and (3) the lore that is manifested by the Lord and therefore, is the object of knowledge. It is subdivided as follows :—



Vidyā, as a dependent category, is conceived in relation to the individual subject, as his limiting condition, attribute or quality. Its sub-divisions present this attribute as it appears and functions in different situations, in which the individual is put or finds himself. In a religious situation, in which a devotee is listening with devout attention to a lecture on the Ultimate Reality, Vidyā, the sentiency, appears as mere awareness of the Ultimate Reality, as presented by the teacher. To such an awareness, the spiritual instruction (Upadeśa) is the only means. This is called "Vivekavṛtti"[2].

It is interesting to find in this context, slight difference in the terminology, used by Mādhava in his Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, and that which we find in the commentary on the Gaṇa Kārikā by an unknown author, from which Mādhava mostly quotes in his presentation of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata. Mādhava uses "Pravṛtti" instead of "Vṛtti" as found in the commentary on the Gaṇa Kārikā. The word "Pravṛtti" ordinarily means the movement. But "Vṛtti" ordinarily means an affected state of mind. It means that state of mind, in which the affections of the external objects appear, very much like the reflection of an object in a mirror. The question, therefore, arises: what is the meaning of "Pravṛtti" in the present context? It seems to stand for both (1) the affected state of mind and (2) the cognitive activity of the mind.

1. S. D. S., 167 and G. K., 10.
2. G. K., 10.

Vidyā, sentiency, is self-luminous. But it may or may not be illumining. When it illumines an object it is called "Bodhasvabhāvā" illuminative. But when it does not illumine an object but is self-luminous only ; it is called "Abodhasvabhāvā", non-illuminative. To this class belong the effects of the deeds done, pious or sinful, on the central aspect of human personality. These effects are called "Dharma" and "Adharma". As such Vidyā is the basis of Lakulīśa Pāśupata Ethics. The subsumption of Dharma and Adharma under Vidyā, that is non-illuminative (Abodhasvabhāvā) means that the ethical aspect of human personality is self-luminous : that piety and sinfulness are the aspects of human personality, which are self-luminous : that the personality is as aware of these as it is aware of itself : that they are the attributes of the personality, without which the personality cannot think of itself. This is the basis of the *Lakulīśa Pāśupata Ethics.*

The third subdivision of Vidyā Abodhasvabhāvā, is *Saṁskāra.* This is the effect, not of the deeds done, but of the objects known. It is related, not to the theory of Ethics, but to the theory of knowledge. This accounts for memory, a very important factor in the rise of determinate knowledge. For, the determinacy of knowledge consists in the relation of the object, known, with a word, remembered.

Let us now consider the other sub-division of Vidyā, which is illuminative (Bhodhasvabhāvā). This subdivision, as shown in the table, is further subdivided into Vivekavṛtti or Vivekapravṛtti, and Sādhāraṇavṛtti or Avivekapravṛtti. It is to be noted here that there is a difference of opinion between the commentator on the Gaṇa Kārikā and Mādhava on this point. For, while the former calls the second sub-division of Vidyā-Bodhasvabhāvā "Sāmānyavṛtti", the latter names it as "Avivekapravṛtti". We have dealt with the Vivekavṛtti, an affected state of the sentiency, in which the Ultimate Reality appears in the consciousness of a devotee in consequence of his listening to a lecture on the ultimate Reality, with devout attention.

The second sub-division "Sāmānyavṛtti" or Avivekapravṛtti is the basis of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata theory of Empirical knowledge, as pointed out earlier.

LAKULĪŚA PĀŚUPATA THEORY OF PERCEPTION

The Lakulīśa Pāśupata accounts for perception in terms of "Citta". It is a means of perception. But it is not one of the inner senses (Antaḥ karaṇa), as according to the Vedāntin. It is the activity of the self-luminous and illuminating sentiency

(Vidyā-Bodhasvabhāvā-Sāmānyavṛtti),which is an attribute of the individual subject. This activity consists in the movement of the light, which proceeds from the illuminating aspect (Bhodhasvabhāvā) of the sentiency (Vidyā). It illumines the object of knowledge like the light of a lamp[1]. Consequently internal and external senses work and an affection of the sentiency by the object follows. This is called perception. It is of two kinds : determinate and indeterminate. When the memory, which is nothing but revived residual trace (Saṁskāra), co-operates in presenting to consciousness the word, which stands for the object, known, as related to the affection, the perception is determinate. But when the memory does not co-operate, the perception is indeterminate. In the former case, we have determinate knowledge and in the latter, indeterminate.

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

The Lakulīśa Pāśupata admits three means of knowledge: (I) Perception (II) Inference (III) Verbal testimony. It holds that all other means, admitted by other systems, such as Arthāpatti, Sambhava, Abhāva, Aitihya and Pratibhā, are included in them.

PERCEPTION

It is of two types: (I) Sensuous perception (Indriya Pratyakṣa (II) Spiritual perception (Ātma Pratyakṣa).

(I) The valid sensuous perception is due to the contact of a sense with its object. It depends upon the set of illuminating causes and the co-operation of merit and demerit, light, time, place and His will.

(II) the spiritual perception is due to the contact of Citta and the inner sense (Antaḥkaraṇa).

INFERENCE

Inference is due to the contact of Citta and inner sense (Antaḥ Karaṇa). Its main cause is the memory, aroused by merit, demerit, time, place and His will. It is of two types: (I) Relating to what was perceived before in particular (Dṛṣṭa) and (II) to what was perceived before in general (Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa). The former is further subdivided into (I) Pūrvavat and (II) Śeṣavat.

This is very similar to the division of the inference by the Sāṅkhya, who calls the main divisions Vīta and Avīta. And the similarity with the Nyāya on this point is the same as bet-

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1. S. D. S., 167. and commentary.

ween the Sāṅkhya and the Nyāya. For, the latter primarily divides inference into three. The instances, with the exception of that of dṛṣṭa-Pūrvavat, are the same as those given by Vātsyāyana. The instance of Dṛṣṭa-Pūrvavat is "This six-fingured man was seen before. He is the same"[1].


ĀGAMA

Āgama, the verbal testimony, as a means of knowledge, is the scripture, which emanates from the Lord and comes to the follower of religion or philosophy through an unbroken line of teachers.

(2) KALĀ

Kalā, the second dependent category of Effect, is insentient (Jaḍa). It is very much like Pradhāna in the Sāṅkhya system, in so far as the twenty-three categories, subsumed under it, are common to the Sāṅkhya. It constitutes the psychophysical limitation or condition of the individual subject. But it depends upon the sentient[2]. It is under the control of the sentient very much as a chariot with horses is under that of a charioteer. Its subdivisions may be presented in the form of a table as follows:—

1. P. Su., 6.—7.
2. G. K. 10—11.


Kala
Empirical Effect
(Kārya)
Empirical Means
(Karaṇ)
Five Elements (Pañca
bhūta)
Qualities of Elements
(Bhūtaguṇa)
Five senses of
perception
(Pañca Jñānendriya)
Five Organs of
action
(Pañca Karmendriya)
Three internal
senses
(Antaḥ Karaṇa)

(3) PAŚU.

The sentient subject, Paśu, is the third dependent category of Effect (Kārya). It is subsumed under effect, because it is what it has been made by Lord. Every sentient being, excepting Siddha and Īśvara, is Paśu. Paśu is so called because it is in bondage, it is not free (Svatantra); because its power to cause is restrained (Kāraṇaśakti sannirodha)[1]. Its bondage is beginningless: it has a limitation, constituted by Kalā and the twenty-three categories, common to the Sāṅkhya, which are subsumed under it. Paśu is also so called because it depends on what is objective.

A limited being (Paśu) does not cease to be limited even if the limitation of the insentient Kalā disappears. For, separation of limited self from body takes place at the time of dissolution of the world. But the limited beings, who thus get separation from their bodies, are born again. (Here is the origin of the conception of Pralayākala, as found in the monistic Kashmir Śaivaism). It is also called Paśu, because though it is pervasive and essentially sentient, yet it identifies itself with body. (Here is the origin of the conception of Dehapramātā as found in the monistic Kashmir Śaivaism). It is also called Paśu; because after it is separated from body in universal dissolution, it is not free to assume a body. For, that depends upon the maturity of merit and demerit, time and space and the will of the Lord[2].

Paśu is that whose everything,—action, inaction, existence, attainments and failures, relation with a body and its cessation, and the experience of the objective world,—depends upon the Lord (Pati).

According to the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, self or Ātman is that which knows the body, including internal and external senses. It is the Kṣetrajña[3]. It is self-conscious (Cetana). It is so called, because it is constantly active: it knows the objects by illuminating them with its own light. It is inferred[4] from the experience of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and conscious effort. This is just what the Nyāya says:—

"Icchā dveṣa prayatna sukha duḥkha jñānāni ātmano liṅgam"

Paśu is distinct from Pati. Both the Paśu and the Pati are all-pervasive. But knowledge of the former is limited: the latter is omniscient. This distinction exists only when the

1. P. Su., 5.
2. P. Su., 5.
3. P. Su., 111.
4. P. Su., 112

Paśu is at the empirical level. But when he ascends the higher spiritual level[1], he gets united with the powers of knowledge and action, becomes omniscient and capable of creating and destroying things at his own will.

IMPURITIES (MALA) OF THE INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT (PAŚU).

The Lakulīśa Pāśupata admits five impurities (Mala) : (1) wrong knowledge (Mithyājñāna) (2) Demerit (Adharma) (3) Attachment and its cause (Saktihetu) (4) Fall of mind (Cyuti) and (5) Subjective-individuality (Paśutva). This conception of five impurities is slightly different from that, accepted by the Dualist Śaiva, with which we have already dealt.

(1) Wrong knowledge [2](Mithyājñāna) is the knowledge that is due to the defective means of knowledge, such as doubt and error etc. It is also all that is of the nature of filth to the mind (Kaluṣa), which makes the mind dirty, the base emotions, such as love of earthly objects, anger, avarice, pride and enmity etc.

(2) Demerit (Adharma) is the accumulated effect of the sinful deeds on the individual subject.

(3) The cause of attachment together with the attachment to the wordly objects (Saktihetu) is the tendency, because of which the individual subject identifies himself with body, vital air and intellect, and feels attached to their respective objects. It is due to the accumulated effect of the performance of the rituals, prescribed by other systems than the Lakulīśa Pāśupata.

(4) The fall (Cyuti) is that because of which the mind of the devotee gets away from the object of devotion and inclines towards the empirical objects, though it does not get into touch with them.

(5) The subjective-individuality is that impurity, because of which the individual subject (Paśu) is the opposite of the Lord (Pati). It has fourteen characteristics. These characteristics distinguish Paśu, the soul in bondage, from a Siddha, the liberated soul. They are the opposite of those which belong to Siddha[3]. They may be stated as follows:—

(1) Absence of omniscience and (2) omnipotence. These distinguish the Lakulīśa Pāśupata conception of the individual self from that of the Sāṅkhya. For, the Sāṅkhya holds that the


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1. P. Su., 41—51
2. G. K., 22
3. G. K. 23

self is free or liberated as soon as it gets freedom from the Prakṛti and its twenty-three evolutes. This is called "Isolation" (Kaivalya) and is got through the dawn of knowledge of distinction between the sentient principle, the Puruṣa, and the insentient, the Prakṛti. But the Lakulīśa Pāśupata asserts that the attainment of Kaivalya does not mean liberation. For, the impurity, called Paśutva, which is characterised by the absence of omniscience and omnipotence is still there; that such souls as attain Kaivalya only, are reborn[1]; and that there is no true freedom so long as there is no Union (Sāyujya) with the Lord, which is characterised by passing of the powers of the Lord, such as omniscience and omnipotence, into Paśu.

(3) Absence of the power of Will. (4) Relation with the limited means of Knowledge. (5) Absence of the capacity to know and to do all, even without any relation with the "means" and the "effects". (6) Absence of the capacity to control all. (7) Absence of the capacity to enter into all. (8) Absence of the capacity to separate body from the principle of life. (9) Subjection to fear; (10) to decay; (11) to old age; and (12) to transmigratory existence. (13) Restricted motion. (14) Absence of the power to lord over[2].

The subdivisions of Paśu may be presented in a table as follows :—



EIGHT PENTADS (PAÑCAKAS) OF THE LAKULĪŚA PĀŚUPATA

The conception of the five impurities, discussed above, seems to have lead the Lakulīśa Pāśupata to think in terms of the

1. G. K. . 23. 2. P. Su., 43—51.

"Pentads" (Pañcaka). There are eight "pentads", including the one, constituted by the five impurities. The remaining seven are as follows: —

(I) The five means to freedom from five impurities:—

(1) *Bāsa*: It is the intellectual capacity to grasp and assimilate the real meaning of the lectures, delivered by the teacher (Bāsa)[1].

(2) *Caryā*[2]: It is the means of acquiring religious merit, Dharma, according to this system. It includes the mode of life and the mode of worship. It is presented in the Pāśupata Sūtra from the 2nd Sūtra Chapter I to the 8th Sūtra Chapter IV. Of course, there are other topics, dealt with in between. It may be pointed out here that Caryā, the means of acquiring religious merit, is often taken in a very much wider sense than the one, indicated above. The commentary on the Gaṇa Kārikā, for instance, subsumes under it the entire discipline, physical, mental and spiritual and, therefore, includes within Caryā the principal means of union with the Lord, such as japa-dhyāna (including within it Pratyāhāra, Dhāraṇā and Samādhi). The Caryā may be presented in the form of a table as follows:—

1. G. K., 17.
2. G. K., 17.

CARYĀ (Mode of living and worship)

- Dāna (Self-surrender)
- Yāga (Mode of living according to scripture)
  - Vrata (Mode of daily religious life)
    - Snāna (Bath in ashes)
    - Śayana (Sleep in ashes)
    - Upahāra (Identification through acting in temple)
    - Japa (Mental concentration) (This is the second stage in which concentration is practised on "Vāmadeva")
    - Pradakṣiṇā
    - (This is the first stage in which mental concentration is practised on "Sadyojāta")
      - Pratyāhāraphala (Voluntary concentration)
        - Apara — With internal objective reference
        - Para — Without internal objective reference
          - Dhyāna (Continuous concentration)
            - Japapūrvaka (This is the third stage in which concentration is practised on "Aghora")
            - Dhāraṇāpūrvaka (This is the fourth stage in which concentration is practised on "Tatpuruṣa")
      - Samādhiphala (Involuntary concentration) (This is the fifth, the last, stage in which concentration is on "Īśāna")
  - Dvāra (Identification through acting in public)
    - Krāthana
    - Spandana
    - Mandana
    - Sṛṅgāraṇa
    - Apitatkaraṇa
    - Apitadbhāṣaṇa
- Tapa (Endurance without resistance)

Dhyāna is compounded with japa in the Commentary on the Gaṇa kārikā.

(3) Japa-Dhyāna

In the table, presented above, on the basis of the commentary on the Gaṇa Kārikā, we find that 'Japa-Dhyāna' are closely connected with Caryā. The only distinction between Caryā and Japa-Dhyāna, is that the former is physical discipline, while the latter are mental.

Japa necessarly involves the withdrawal of the mind from the external objects (Pratyāhāra). It may be due to the voluntary effort of the internal senses (Antaḥkaraṇa pūrvakaḥ). As such it is called lower (Apara)[1]. But when, because of the continuous effort at withdrawal of the mind from the external objects and its concentration on the object of meditation, the mind gets automatically withdrawn and is uninterruptedly related to the object of meditation i.e. when there is no gap in the mental activity in relation to the object of meditation, in so far as it does not get related to any external object, just as there is none in the circle of light, when a fire-brand is moved circularly with great velocity (Ālātacakravat), the Pratyāhāra is higher (Para). The higher concentration destroys the accumulated effect of Karma and fixes the mind on the object of meditation like a nail on wood.

Dhyāna is the continuous flow of mental activity towards the object of concentration. It is of two kinds. (1) Japapūrvaka : this has been discussed just above. (2) Dhāraṇāpūrvaka : Dhāraṇā consists in the freedom of the mind of the individual subject, who is neither in the state of the universal annihilation nor in a fainting fit, from the objective reference. In Dhāraṇā the object of contemplation does not figure objectively, as distinct from the subject and as external to it. In it the object of concentration is not something that is outside the mind, towards which the mental activity is to be directed. It is simply an affection of mind, as one with it.

(4) *Sadārudrasmṛti :* The uninterrupted recollection of Rudra (Sadārudrasmṛti) is the principal means to the fixity of mind on the object of meditation. It prevents the mind from running away from the object of concentration.

(5) *Prasāda (Grace) :* It is the means to freedom from the impurity, technically called "Paśutva", which has already been discussed earlier.

(II) Deśa : It is the second pentad. The places (Deśa), where the person, striving for final emancipation, should live during the five stages, are also five :—

(1) Temple (2) Place, where the devotees assemble (3) Cave (4) Cremation ground and (5) Rudra.

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1 G. K., 20.

(III) Avasthā : It is the third Pentad. The states (Avasthā), in which an aspirant for 'freedom' is enjoined to live in the aforesaid places, are also five:—

(1) Vyakta[1] is the state in which the aspirant is enjoined to have all the characteristic marks of a follower of the Pāśupata path to final emancipation.

(2) Avyakta is the state in which the external marks are discarded.

(3) Jaya is the state in which the aspirant has acquired control over his senses. (Indriyajaya).

(4) Cheda is the state of complete detachment from the world. It is also called Dāna[2], because it means giving up all possessions (Sarvasvatyāga).

(5) Niṣṭhā is complete cessation of all activities.

(IV) Śuddhi : It is the fourth pentad. The purification (śuddhi) that is attained through the five means, stated above, is also of five kinds:—

(1) Disappearance of ignorance; (2) of Adharma; (3) of attachment; (4) of getting of the mind away from the object of concentration; and (5) of the impurity, called Paśutva.

(V) Bala : It is the fifth pentad. The powers of the individual subject, which enable him to use the means, stated above, are also five:—

(1) Devotion to the teacher[3], (2) Freedom of mind from the disturbing passions (Prasāda), (3) Equanimity of mind in the midst of pains and sufferings of all types, (4) Religious merit, (5) True knowledge.

(VI) Dīkṣākāri : It is the sixth pentad. The means of spiritual initiation (Dīkṣākāri) are also five:—

(1) The 'Material' (Dravya)[4] is a technical term; which means (a) Vidyā, the learning, which the disciple and the teacher possess, (*b*) Kuśa etc. and (c) the Brāhmaṇa disciple, who is to be initiated. (2) Time (Kāla), prescribed for initiation in the scripture. (3) Ceremony, as described in the Saṁskāra Kārikā. (4) The image of the deity. (5) Teacher.

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1 G. K., 8
2 S. D. S., 164.
3 G. K., 5.
4 G. K., 8.

(VII) Lābha : It is the seventh pentad. The attainable (Lābha) is that which is attained through initiation (Dīkṣā). This is also of five types:—

(1) The mastery over the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system(Jñāna)[1]. (2) The religious merit, accruing from the performance of the daily ritual (Tapas)[2]. (3) Capacity to concentrate on the object of meditation, without break or interruption (Nityatva)[3]. (4) The fixity of mind on Rudra, because of the disappearance of distracting factors (Sthiti). (5) The powers of the liberated (Siddhi), because of which a person is called "Siddha".

SIDDHA

The Pāśupata system is primarily concerned with pointing out the spiritual discipline which gradually leads to the union with the Lord. But in order to induce the pupils to undergo the discipline, the powers of a Siddha, the man who has attained the union, are stated.

A Siddha gets the powers of knowledge and action. The power of knowledge is really one but is called by different names, such as the power of seeing far distant object (Dūradarśana), because of its relation with different kinds of objects[4]. The power of action consists in having the speed of mind in the productive activity, so that there is no gap between the thought of production and the production itself[5], as there is in the case of Prajāpati etc., who are said to practise austerity after the rise of the thought of production, before they can actually produce. He produces all ' forms' at will. He has at his command the matter, which produces ' forms' (Earth etc.). His mind is pervasive. Therefore, he can think in all sentient beings, who can think. He is one with, non-different from, Maheśvara, because he is all-pervasive. This is one of the implications of "Rudra-sāyujya".

In all these cases there is a clear consciousness of the triad (Trika) ; the subject, the object and the means. *This idea Nāgārjuna seems to be refuting in his Mādhyamika kārikā.* He is also capable of annihilating all that he produces[6]. He is not like Viśvāmitra, who can create but cannot destroy. The dissolution is brought out by his mere rising above the level of means (Vikaraṇa). That is, the dissolution of the creation is

1 G. K., 9.
2 G. K., 15.
3 G. K., 16.
4 P. Su., 43.
5 P. Su., 44.
6 P. Su., 45.

nothing but the dissolution of the idea of creation, which coincides with his rising to the level of pure consciousness(Kaivalya).

A Yogin is Siddha, when he gets the capacity to see the remotest etc. Such a person is not affected by Karma[1], done in consequence of his relation with body, senses and their objects.

(III) YOGA, THE THIRD PRIMARY CATEGORY OF THE LAKULĪŚA PĀŚUPATA.

The word "Yoga" in this system is used, not in the sense, in which Patañjali uses it in his Yoga Sūtra, namely, "Checking the rise of mental affection" (Yogaścittavṛtti nirodhaḥ) but in the sense of "Union with the Lord". Thus, according to Patañjali, Yoga is simply the means to Kaivalya, but it is the end, according to this system. It may, however, be noted that in some contexts it is used for the means also.

The system aims at giving the discipline, which brings about union with the Lord, a union which is of a distinct type from others, as presented in other systems. This union takes place in successive stages[2]. It is consequent on the withdrawal of senses from their objects. The practice of austerities is a means to it. It is the union of an individual subject, who strives for it, with the Lord and in the Lord. It consists in the realisation of the Maheśvara as the very self of himself by the aspirant. It is the cessation of the idea of identity of the individual self with body. It presupposes the freedom of the mind from all tendencies such as attachment and enmity etc. The occupation of mind with the Śaiva thought, because of close application to the study of scripture or because of concentration on Śiva (Adhyayana dhyānādilakṣaṇaḥ Kriyāyogaḥ)[3] is the first stage of union with the Lord.

Yoga, the union with Śiva or Īśvara, is not due to the activity of the limited subject only, as in the case of the contact of a bird with a rock. But it is due to the activity of both, the limited self and the Īśvara, as in the case of the two fighting rams. This means that howsoever hard an individual may try for the union, it cannot be achieved without His grace.

The individual soul is admitted by the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, just like the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, to be all-pervasive (Vibhu).

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1 P. Su., 121.
2 P. Su., 41.
3 P. Su., 41.

Therefore, in reality, the soul is always in union with the Īśvara. Its separation consists in the inoperation of the powers of knowledge and action, due to the beginningless bondage. The union presupposes freedom from the bondage, the limiting condition that separates the individual from the Lord. It can be achieved through the spiritual discipline, including Samādhi[1], as enjoined by the Pāśupata Śāstra.

The Lakulīśa Pāśupata system admits eight means to union with the Lord, which are known as the eight parts of yoga (Aṣṭāṅgayoga) i. e. (1) Daily observances (Niyama) (2) Abstention (Yama). (3) Posture (Āsana). (4) Breath-control (Prāṇāyāma). (5) Withdrawal of mind from external things (Pratyāhāra). (6) Concentration with objective reference (Dhyāna). (7) Concentration without objective reference (Dhāraṇā). (8) Involuntary concentration (Samādhi).

The ideas, signified by these technical expressions, are different from those, for which these expressions stand in the Yoga system of Patañjali. We shall show this in the future work on this system.

This system admits super-normal powers of a Yogin and asserts that within six months, in quick succession, arise the powers of distant vision etc. in a Yogin, who lives in a cave and has his mind firmly fixed on the Lord[2].

According to the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, Yoga is primarily of two types : (1) Kriyālakṣaṇa, that which is characterised by physical activities. The Lakulīśa Pāśupata system recognises acting of four types, dance and vocal music, as the means to spiritual union with the Lord. It also admits that there are five stages of union, similar to the five stages of action in a drama. The first stage of Yoga is the beginning, in which the aspirant has to embrace asceticism, bathe in ashes[3], sleep in ashes, bathe in ashes as many times as he gets polluted, because of the contact or even the sight of polluting things ; put on the garland etc., which are offered to the deity in temple ; bear the characteristic external signs of a follower of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata sect ; wear only one piece of cloth or none; live in the vicinity of a Śaiva temple; stick to the vow[4] of non-violence in thought, word and deed ; of celebacy, truth, detachment, abstention from theft, freedom from anger, devotion to teacher, piety of life, light food and assiduity in the observance of the rules of asceticism. Thus, when the aspirant gets freedom from all passions, he should

1 P. Su., 6.
2 P. Su., 116—18.
3 P. Su., 8—13.
4 P. Su., 16.

practise breath-control (Prāṇāyāma) and concentrate his mind on the meaning of the first of the five Mantras of the Taittirīya Āranyaka, "Sadyojātam Prapadyāmi" etc., sitting to the south of the deity in temple. At the end of contemplation, he should attempt to merge in, surrender to, or identify himself with the Lord through acting Śiva, in respect of his loud laughter (Attahāsa) or his Bull, in respect of bellow (Ḍuṇḍukāra). He should also attempt to do the same by means of dance and vocal music[1].

When, as a result of the discipline in the first stage, as stated above, the true knowledge dawns in him and he is perfectly free from passions, he should enter into the second stage to test that he has no trace of passion left in him. In this stage, in public, he should act deep sleep (Krāthana), trembling (Spandana), irregular and slow movement like that of one whose legs are paralysed (Mandaṇa), acting a lover at the sight of young beautiful woman (Śṛṅgāraṇa) ; doing the condemnable things, like one who does not distinguish the right act from the wrong (Apitatkaraṇa) ; and speaking incoherently and irrelevently (Apitadbhāṣaṇa). All these he has to do in order that he may become the object of condemnation and hatred, and satisfy himself that no passion arises in him in the face of insult and injuries[2].

Lakulīśa, in his Pāśupata Sūtra, records a tradition, which says that Indra followed this Pāśupata method of acquiring accumulated merit of the demons (Indro vā agre asureṣu Pāśupatamācarat)[3]. This constitutes the second stage, at which the aspirant has to concentrate his mind on the second of the five mantras "Vāmadevāya namaḥ". At this stage the aspirant attains to a higher spiritual level than the one, attained by the followers of the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga. Here the mind of the aspirant gets the union with the Lord (Yoga), which is technically called "proximity" (Samīpa)[4]. This seems to have given rise to the conception of Sāmīpya Mokṣa.

Thus, the union, which is charâcterised by action, i. e. attained through living the life as presented above, is the first type of union technically called Kriyālakṣana Yoga. (2) Kriyoparama Lakṣana, is the second type of union (Yoga), which needs no physical action of the above type. It needs nothing but pure mental concentration. The remaining three stages of Yoga come under this.

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1 P. Su., 13.
2 G. K., 19.
3 P. Su., 101.
4 P. Su., 106.

The third stage begins with the retirement of the aspirant to a cave and the practice of concentration, with his mind completely withdrawn from all that is empirical. Here the mind of the aspirant moves towards, reaches and touches the object of contemplation presented by the third Mantra "Aghorebhyaḥ". But soon after the touch, the mind gets away from the object, because of the weakness of concentration. Here the mind moves forward and backward, so much so that its touch with the object seems to be unbroken and uninterrupted, very much as a circle of light seems to appear when a fire-brand is moved with great velocity, in a circle, (Brahmaṇyeva ālātacakravat avatiṣṭhate G. K. 20). This is attained through concentration (Dhyāna), which is accompanied by withdrawal of the mind from all that is empirical and its voluntary movement towards the Lord.


The fourth stage begins with the stay in the cremation ground. At this stage the mind gets fixed on the object of contemplation, the Lord, as presented by the fourth mantra "Tatpuruṣāya vidmahe" as a nail does on a piece of wood, (Stambhanikṣipta ayaḥ kīlavat niścalīkaroti. G. K. 20). This is attained through "Dhāraṇā", as discussed above. This kind of union with the Lord is technically called "Niṣṭhāyoga" or "Devanityatā". At this stage the ascetic eats anything that is put in his bowl, even meat[1].

The last stage is that of such a penetration into the Lord that the powers of the Lord pass into the individual. This is got through "Samādhi" on the Lord as presented in the fifth Mantra "Īśānaḥ sarvavidyānām". This is technically called "Sāyujya" (Labhate Rudra Sāyujyam P. Su., 139). The individual becomes Śiva for ever (Sadāśiva P. Su., 146). This idea seems to have been the basis of the Sadāśiva category in the monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir.

(IV) VIDHI

Vidhi is the fourth primary category of this system. It includes ascetic life, devotional rites and control of senses. Lakulīśa very much emphasises the conquest of the senses for the spiritual insight and the union with the Lord or Maheśvara. He holds that mere intellectual knowledge of the distinction between the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa is not sufficient for the attainment of Kaivalya and that the discipline, as prescribed in the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system, has to be undergone for its realisation. We have already spoken on the various aspects of the discipline, under Caryā. For the convenience of the reader it may be presented in the form of a table as follows:—

1 P. Su., 119.


VIDHI
Pradhāna
Apradhāna
Vrata
Bhasmasnāna
Bhasmaśayana
Upahāra
Japa
Pradakṣiṇā
Dvāra
Snāna
Bhakṣya
Krāthana
Mandana
Apitatkaraṇa
Spandana
Sṛṅgāraṇa
Apitadbhāṣaṇa
Hasita
Gīta
Nṛtya
Huḍukkāra
Ṣaḍaṅgopahāra

(V) DUḤKHĀNTA (END OF ALL MISERIES)

Duḥkhānta, the end of all miseries, is the fifth and the last primary category of this system. Lakulīśa asserts that it is ultimately due to His grace and that it cannot be got through knowledge and detachment (Jñāna-Vairāgya) independently. It is of two types (1) Anātmaka and (2) Sātmaka[1].

The Anātmaka consists in mere cessation of all miseries. This seems to represent the conception of Mokṣa as presented by Gautama in his Nyāya Sūtra. This lends some support to the view that Gautama was a Pāśupata. For, his conception of Mokṣa as given in "Duḥkhajanmapravṛtti" (N. S. ch. I, S. 2) is just what is presented here as Nirātmaka. The same may be said about the Vaiśeṣika.

The Sātmaka consists not only in the freedom from all miseries, but also in the attainment of the powers of knowledge and action, which characterise a Siddha, a clear picture of whom has already been given earlier. It is attained when the individual penetrates into the Lord so that the powers pass into him ; when he attains the Yoga, which is technically called Sāyujya, as discussed above.

YUKTA AND MUKTA

The liberation, according to the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, is not only freedom from bondage but also union (Yoga). In fact, union is very much emphasised in this system to bring out its distinction from the Yoga, the Sāṅkhya, the Bauddha and the Vedānta, according to which the liberation consists in mere freedom from the limiting conditions ; in losing the individuality ; in the disappearance of the separate existence, similar to that of ether in a jar (Ghaṭākāśa) when the jar is broken. It declares that the spiritual insight (Darśana)[2] of the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga is defective, just as is the perception of the moon by the man with dim vision.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNITED (YUKTA)

The Lakulīśa Pāśupata admits the limited self-consciousness, selfhood, or personality to be simply a limited form of the 'mind' (Vṛtyākārasya)[3]. Accompanied by the Manas, it flies to the objects and rests on them like a bird on a tree. When this limited form, the affected 'Mind' (Citta) that constitutes

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1. G. K., 9. 2. P. Su., 115. 3. P. Su. 111.

personality, disappears and the mind does no longer run towards the object to rest there ; on the contrary, it rests on Maheśvara, it is said to be Yukta or united.


THE CONDITIONS OF THE UNION

The limited self gets united with the Lord, when it gets freedom from the limiting conditions ; when it is purified from the impurities (Doṣa) ; when it is no longer drawn by the objective world; when it gives up the thought of the sensuous objects[1] ; when its activity is constantly and exclusively directed towards the Lord; when it rises above all that is grasped by the internal or external senses (Aja) ; and when it is free from all desires and aversions[2] and has the Citta irremovably fixed on the Lord (Maitra). These conditions arise as soon as the Citta gets fixed on the Lord, though it is still connected with body and senses.

1. P. Su., 110. 2. P. Su., 112.

TABLE OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE LAKULĪŚA PĀŚUPATA SYSTEM

(*PRIMARY CATEGORIES*)



(IV) VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA OR QUALIFIED MONISTIC ŚAIVAISM

In the Eleventh century A. D. there was concentrated effort at bridging the gulf that separated Śaivaism and Vaiṣṇavaism from Brahmanism. Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja are the two great intellectual luminaries, who attempted this task, as presented in the two commentaries on the Vedānta Sūtra, (1) Brahma-mīmāṁsā Bhāṣya and (2) Śrībhāṣya.

In the course of his interpretation of the Pāśupatādhikaraṇa, which, according to Śaṅkara, refutes the Pāśupata (Śaiva) Philosophy, Śrīkaṇṭha asserts that there is no antagonism between the Veda and the Śaivāgama. Both are equally authoritative. Both have proceeded from the ultimate source of everything, the Brahman or the Para Śiva, and therefore, it is reasonable to talk of the Veda also as "Śivāgama". The only difference between them is that the Veda is for the three higher castes only; but the Śaivāgama is for all, irrespective of the caste. Recognition of the universal brotherhood of man and non-recognition of the barrier of caste in the field of religion is the distinctive mark of all schools of Śaivaism.

He points out that the characteristic rituals and religious practices of the Śaiva, such as besmearing the body with ashes and bearing the mark of Tripuṇḍra, are stated in the Upaniṣads such as Atharvaśiras, Kālāgni Rudra and Bṛhajjāvāla.

Accordingly in his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra, he shows that the system, presented therein, is the qualified Monism, as presented, in common, by both the Upaniṣads and the Śaivāgamas. Through out his work, he quotes from both the Śaivāgama and the Veda on every point that needs a textual support. Often the quotations on a particular point are so many that mere numerical strength dazzles the reader and convinces him of the soundness of the thesis. He is a bold commentator. He has no hesitation in rejecting such doctrines as do not fit in with his view. For instance, the Pāśupata metaphysics as presented by Śaṅkara in his commentary and criticised, though admitted to be based upon the authority of the Śaivāgama, is rejected as belonging to a section (Śivāgamaikadeśa)[1].

VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA AND BHEDĀBHEDA

The qualified monism, both Śaivaite and Vaiṣṇavaite, is based on the respective Āgamas of each sect. It is a direct outcome of the Dualism-*cum*-Monism (Bhedābhedavāda). Before the

1 Srikam. Bh., Vol. II, 111.

rise of the Vaiṣṇava Qualified Monism, two great authorities had spoken on Bhedābheda. One, Yādava Prakāśa, was the teacher of Rāmānuja himself. And the other, Bhāskara, was a non-sectarion authority belonging to the 9th century A. D. Similarly the Ṣaivāgama literature, openly propounding Bhedābheda, and the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system, presenting the same, were already there before the rise of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Ṣaivaism of Ṣrīkaṇṭha.

THE INFLUENCES

The Viśiṣṭādvaita Ṣaivaism, as presented by Śrīkaṇṭha, arose in the 11th century A. D. There is definite evidence in support of this view. For, he quotes from Utpalācārya's Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā the oft quoted verse:—

"Cidātmaiva hi devontaḥ".

Śrīkaṇṭha differes from Abhinavagupta in his interpretation of the above quoted verse and holds that "independently of the material cause" (Nirupādānam) does not mean without any material cause[1], but only without any material cause that is external to the Lord.

He is a follower of the Śiddhānta School of Ṣaivaism which, as pointed out earlier, accepts the authority of the 28 Ṣaivāgamas, out of which eighteen present Dualistic-cum-Monistic (Bhedābheda) philosophy. He adopts the basic philosophical ideas of the Dualistic Siddhānta Ṣaivaism, as presented in an earlier section. Thus, he admits (1) that there are three primary categories ; Pati, Paśu and Pāśa[2] : (2) that from another point of view there are thirty-six categories : this seems to be due to the influence of the Monistic Ṣaivaism of Kashmir, as we know from the statement of his commentator, Appayya Dīkṣita[3] : (3) that there are three impurities ; Paśutva, Kārma and Māyīya[4] : they are material like blackness in copper : (4) that Mokṣa (Liberation) is the attainment of similarity (Sāmya) with Ṣiva : (5) that the individual subject possesses omniscience and omnipotence, but these powers are obscured by the impurities, so that when he gets freedom from them his hidden powers become manifest and he becomes similar to the Lord : (6) that Para Ṣiva transcends all categories and possesses the power (Ṣakti) which is inherent in Him and constitutes His essential quality (Guṇa).

1. Srikam. Bh., Vol. II, 29.
2. Srikam. Bh., Vol. II, 111.
3. Srikam. Bh., Vol. II, 109-10
4. Srikam. Bh., Vol. II, 142-3.,

The Lakulīśa Pāśupata system flourished in the 2nd century A. D. And its tradition continued to live during the time when independent works on Dualistic Siddhānta Śaivaism and the commentaries on them were written down to the 12th century A. D. It is clear from the criticism of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata view that at liberation the powers of knowledge and action pass into the individual from the Lord (Saṅkrānti) by Sadyojyoti in his Paramokṣa Nirāsa Kārikā and Rāmakaṇṭha II in his commentary on the above. A careful comparison of the conception of the Lord, His power (Śakti) and the relation between the two, as presented in the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system, with the one as found in the commentary of Śrīkaṇṭha on the Vedānta Sūtra, as interpreted by Appayya Dīkṣita, leaves very little doubt about the fact that Śrīkaṇṭha has adopted the Dualistic-cum-Monistic view of the Lakulīśa Pāśupata.

BHEDĀBHEDA AND VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA DISTINGUISHED

Śrīkaṇṭha openly declares that he is opposed to the Bhedābheda[1]. He admits that there are Vedic texts, which talk of the identity of the objective world and the Ultimate Reality, such as are referred to by "Tadananyatvamārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ" and that there are also such texts as speak of the difference of the two ; for instance, those to which "Adhikantu bhedanirdeśāt" refers. But he asserts that this does not mean that both the assertions in regard to the relation of the Śiva with world have equal validity and, therefore, Bhedābheda is the only sound philosophy. For, such a view is illogical, because it makes contrary assertions in regard to one and the same.

According to him, the objective world does not exist independently of and separately from the Brahman, as one worldly object does from another, e.g. a jar from a piece of cloth. For, such a view is against the texts which speak of the identity of the two (Tadananyatva). Nor are they so thoroughly identical that one is merely an illusion and the other is the basis from which it arises, just as are the illusory silver and the mother-of-pearl, from which the illusion of silver arises. For, such a view militates against other texts which talk of the difference of the Brahman or Śiva from the objective world ; because of the difference of the inherent qualities of the two. And Duality-cum-non-duality is illogical, as has already been stated.

It has to be carefully noted that here Śrīkaṇṭha is denouncing Bhedābheda of a particular type. The view that he rejects

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1. Srikam. Bh., Vol. II, 31.

is the one, according to which Bhedābheda means that identity and difference are on the same level and that they co-exist and have the same importance, much as the two objects, which are related by a conjunctive particle. The rejected view is the one, according to which the compound word "Bhedābheda" is to be split up as "Bhedaśca abhedaśca", as a co-ordinative compound (Dvandva samāsa). It seems to be similar to the one, propounded by Nimbārka[1].

In contrast to the Bhedābheda, as presented above, he propounds Viśiṣṭādvaita. He asserts that the relation between the objective world and the Brahman or Ṣiva is similar to that which we find between a body and a soul; or between a quality and a substance, in which it inheres ; the one is subordinate to the other. They are identical much as are a jar and the clay, of which it is made ; or a substance and a quality ; because of the material causal relation or the relation of inherence. Identity means the non-existence of one without the other. For, jar does not exist without clay ; nor does lotus exist without a perceptible colour.

He rejects extreme Monism, extreme Dualism, Dualism cum-Monism and also the view that holds it difficult to assert definitely either Monism or Dualism. He asserts that the two,— the true knowledge of one of which is not possible without that of the other; or one of which cannot exist without the other,— are related as substance and attribute. And such is the case with the Brahman and the empirical multiplicity. Therefore, the latter is related to the former as an attribute. For, according to him, the multiplicity has its being potentially in the power (Ṣakti) of the Brahman ; the empirical multiplicity is nothing but a gross form of what exists in a subtle form in the power of the Brahman, much as does a tree in a seed. Hence because the power that gives rise to the multiplicity, cannot exist without Brahman and because the knowledge of Brahman is not possible without the power, much as is not that of fire without heat ; therefore, the power is an attribute of the Brahman, and accordingly the empirical multiplicity also, which is potentially in His power and does not exist independently of Him even when it assumes gross form, is His attribute. Hence Śrīkaṇṭha asserts that his theory of qualified Monism is in perfect accord with the scriptural texts, which speak of both identity and difference. The texts, which speak of the identity, refer to the fact that empirical multiplicity has no being independently of Him; and those which talk of the difference refer to the

1. I. I. Ph, 430.

fundamental difference between the Lord on the one hand and the multiplicity of limited subjects and objects on the other. For, the Lord is free, but subjects and objects are not free (Asvatantra) : and the latter two are different from each other also : one is the experiencer but the other is only the object of experience[1].

It may, however, be pointed out here that the word "Bhedābheda" as it occurs in the Śaivāgamas, implies all that is intended to be signified by the word "Viśiṣṭādvaita". But to get this implication, the compound word has to be split up, not as a co-ordinative compound (Dvandva samāsa), but as a determinative compound (Tatpuruṣa samāsa) as "Bhedaviśiṣṭaḥ abhedaḥ". In fact , if we cast a glance at the analogies, by means of which Śrīkaṇṭha attempts to bring out the exact nature of relation between the Brahman or Śiva and the empirical multiplicity, and compare them with those which are found in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, the Pāśupata Sūtra and the commentaries on them from the Bhedābheda point of view, we find them to be almost the same. The reader can satisfy himself on this point by referring to the preceding section on the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system.

BRAHMAN OR ŚIVA

The Ultimate Reality, the Brahman or Śiva, is free from temporal, spatial and formal limitations and, therefore, is incomparably "Great". He possesses the highest power (Parama Śakti) which is responsible for the rise of the entire empirical multiplicity, including both the sentient and the insentient. The objective world is nothing but the gross form of what lies in a subtle state in His power. The multiplicity is real and not a mere illusion: it is related to Him as a quality is to a substance, through His power. The multiplicity is within Him ; He is, therefore, not limited by anything that is external to Him and yet is real as He is. He is different from the multiplicity and the constituents of the multiplicity have differences from one another ; but all this is within the Śiva himself. He has difference within Himself[2]: but He is not different from anything that is different from Him and yet has reality similar to His, just as a jar is from a piece of cloth. Nor is He different from anything that differs from Him as one cow does from another. For, there is nothing that is different from Him in either of the two ways. He is called "Brahman" because He is what the word signifies. He is Brahman, because He is Great, as stated just

1. Srikam. Bh., Vol. II, 32-4.
2. Srikam. Bh., Vol. I, 68-70.

above (Bṛhattvāt). He is also Brahman, because He is responsible for the grossification of what lies in Him in subtle state, at the time of creation ; and also because the Greatness, which the individual self attains at liberation, is due to Him (Bramhaṇatvāt)[1].

It is only to indicate that all that is necessary to use the word Brahman for Śiva, is in Śiva, that so great a personality as Puṣpadanta, the King of Gandharvas, in his Mahimna Stotra refers to Him in eight words, which stand for His essential attributes ; (1) Bhava, (2) Śarva, (3) Śiva, (4) Paśupati, (5) Parameśvara, (6) Mahādeva, (7)Rudra, (8) Śambhu. He is called : (1) "Bhava" because He is the origin of the universe : this idea is found in Taittirīya Āraṇyaka "Bhavodbhavāya" (2) Śaṅkara, because He always does good ; the creation and dissolution are only for the good of the souls in bondage : (3) Śiva, because He has all the good attributes : (4) Śarva, because He annihilates the universe at the time of dissolution : (5) Paśupati, because He controls the souls in bondage much as a hunter does the dogs, whom he holds by chains: (6) Parameśvara, because He lords over the universe : (7) Mahādeva, because He rests in His own transcendental Bliss : (8) Rudra, because He frees the bound from the chain of the transmigratory existence. Thus, these attributes define the ultimate Reality both subjectively and objectively. Subjectively He is good and Blissful ; and objectively He is the cause of creation, maintenance, annihilation, obscuration and grace (Pañcakṛtya) and is all—pervasive. He is the object of contemplation etc., as presented unanimously by all the sacred texts, including both, the Vedic and the Āgamic[2].

Though the determinate knowledge of the Brahman or Śiva, such as can completely grasp Him exactly like an object on the palm, is not possible : yet He admits of definition. Though He cannot be defined exhaustively as "this and of such and such definite nature" ; yet definition of Him in terms of differentiation from known things is possible. In fact, no definition exhaustively presents all the attributes of the object defined. It simply presents the main attributes so as to enable us to know the object under definition as distinct from other known things. Thus, through the grasp of His attributes as presented by the scripture, He is known as distinct from other objects of knowledge[3].

The unity of Brahman or Śiva is the unity similar to that of the aesthetic experience. Just as the aesthetic experience is a unitary experience, because of the harmonious unification

1. Srikam Bh., Vol. I, 69.
2. Srikam. Bh., Vol. I, 70.
3. Srikam. Bh., Vol. I, 96.

of all the contents ; so Śiva is a unity because all that is within Him forms a unity similar to that which is formed by the various ingredients of "Pānaka Rasa"[1]. He is, therefore, not pure unity, but unity in multiplicity. He is not without attribute (Nirviśeṣa)[2]. For, the power to produce gross multiplicity is as natural to Him as heat is to fire. He is the material as well as the efficient cause: because of the possession of the Power, in which the entire multiplicity has its being in a subtle form; and because He directs this power in the production of the gross multiplicity.

The objective world with all its multiplicity is not different from Şiva; exactly as foam, waves and bubbles etc. are not different from the ocean. This, however, does not mean that Şiva changes or evolves. For, the evolution is not in Şiva but in the power (Şakti)[3] that is stirred to action by His will. But how can Şiva be maintained to be changeless when His power, which is identical with and non-different from Him, is admitted to evolve ? In reply to this question, the Viśiṣṭādvaita Şaivaism asserts that identity and non-difference can be talked of only when there is the duality of that which is identified and that with which it is identified: and similarly non-difference can be only when there is that which differs and that from which it differs. Therefore, in this context, non-difference does not mean absolute unity ; nor does difference mean absolute diversity. But non-difference means the inseparable existence, similar to that of a jar and its perceptible colour: and similarly difference means separate existence as an object of a separate cognitive activity. Thus, the power of Şiva is different from Him; though it is identical also with Him at the same time. Hence the change in the power does not mean that Şiva changes. The power is related to Şiva exactly as are the rays to the Moon[4].

Even in the state of universal annihilation, in which Sun and Moon, time and space as limiting conditions, and name and form completely disappear; the individual selves and the material cause (Paśu and Pāśa) do not cease to exist as such. They simply get beyond name and form, and as such have their being in the power of the Lord[5]. At the time of creation, therefore, He has not to depend upon anything that is external to Him, as clay is to potter. He is, therefore, both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. He paints the picture of the universe on the wall of His power of will[6].

1. Srikam. Bh. Vol. I, 115.
2. Srikam. Bh. Vol. I, 124-5.
3. Srikam. Bh. Vol. I, 300.
4. Srikam. Bh. Vol. I, (Comm) 300.
5. Srikam. Bh Vol. I, 340.
6. Srikam. Bh. Vol. I, 345

He is merciful. His creative activity is prompted by mercy that He has for the souls in bondage. The diversity that we find in the objective world is not due to His caprice merely. He is guided in the production of the diversity by the purpose of giving diverse opportunities to the souls in bondage to enable them to experience the fruits of their accumulated effects of pious and sinful deeds and thus to get freedom from the bondage of Karma. He, therefore, cannot be said to be cruel because of the creation of deformed, ugly and painful, because in so doing He is prompted by the Karmas of the individuals[1].

THE INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT OR PAŞU

Paśu is the second of the three primary categories. He is essentially sentient but has three beginningless impurities. (1) Paśutva (2) Karma and (3) Māyā. On account of the first he identifies himself with body, vital air and intellect etc., and, therefore, is subjected to varying experiences, befitting his action, in different bodies, which he gets and has to leave, according to his Karma[2]. He is capable of bearing boundless hardship and suffering. He is not free (Asvatantra). He is eternal and not a product of Şiva. All the texts, which talk of his origin from Şiva or present him to be related to Şiva[3] as sparks to fire, refer only to the rise of name and form as related to him.

He is a knower (Jñātā) in himself i.e. independently of any external condition. The quality "to know" is inherent in him[4]. In fact, his powers of knowledge and action are unlimited, but appear to be limited because of the beginningless impurities and, therefore, when the impurities are removed, his inherent powers of knowledge and action become manifest and he attains similarity with Şiva (Şivasāmya). But in the state of bondage he is an experiencer of pleasure and pain, because of relation with empirical "Manas" (Prākṛtamanaḥ sambandhāt).

He is atomic and not pervasive, because he exits from and enters into the body and even goes to the higher worlds. Though atomic, he pervades the whole body with his quality "to know" and, therefore, experiences all affections, wheresoever they may be in the whole body, much as the light of a lamp spreads over, "pervades" an object and illumines it. The quality of knowing is different from him, much as smell

1. Srikam. Bh Vol. II, 46-7.
2. Srikam. Bh. Vol. I, 89-90.
3. Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 140.
4. Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 142.

is different from earth[1]. Therefore, when a text talks of the individual self as knowledge (Jñāna), it means to point it out as the chief quality of him.

He is also doer (Kartā)[2]. For, only such an admission can justify the existence of the injunctive and prohibitive texts. His being a doer is also implied by such texts as talk of his adopting the means. In fact, the conception of the internal senses as means of knowledge implies the existence of a doer, who makes use of them, and denies that Prakṛti (Buddhi) is the doer.

The relation between Pati or Śiva and the individual subjects is conceived on the analogy of relation between a king and his dependents. The individual souls act according to the maturity of the effect of the deeds, done in the past, (Karmaparipākavaśena)[3], but not without the consent of the Lord. He (the Lord) is the prompter of the individuals to action in accordance with the Karma of each. This, however, does not mean that the textual injunctions and prohibitions do not relate to the individual. For, just as a child, lifting a heavy piece of wood with the help of powerful persons, can be commanded to act or not to act in a certain way, so also can be the individual, though he is not independent in his action.

The individual subject is not identical with the universal Self, as the Vedāntin holds that the Universal Self appears as individual because of the limitations, exactly as the universal ether (Ākāśa) appears as limited because of the limitation of an object such as a jar, wherein it is. Both the sentients and the insentients, in their totality constitute as if it were the body of Śiva. Therefore, they are His parts (Aṁśa). And the texts, such as "that thou art" (Tattvamasi)[4], do not mean absolute identity, but identity in difference. They talk of identity because of the relation of the pervading and the pervaded between them; exactly as we talk of a piece of wood, that is pervaded by fire, as fire. The individual, atomic in himself, is connected with a subtle body in transmigrating from one gross body to another[5].

IMPURITIES OR MALAS

The Śaiva Viśiṣṭādvaita generally follows the philosophical technique of the Śaiva Dualism. Accordingly it admits three impurities: (1) Mala (Paśutva) (2) Karma and (3) Māyā[6]. That

1. Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 146-7
2. Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 152-3.
3. Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 156-7.
4. Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 158-9.
5. Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 196-7.
6. Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 142.

he admits the first, which is variously called Mala, Āṇavamala or Paśutvamala, and the characteristic function of which is to conceal the powers of knowledge and action, which inherently belong to the individual subject, is abundantly clear from Śrīkaṇṭha's own statement :

"Malatirohita svajñāna karaṇatayā"
(Srikam. Bh. Vol. I, 340). Similarly the other two impurities are directly admitted in "Anādi karmanigaḍena baddhaḥ tatphala bhogānukūla māyāmaya" etc. (Srikam. Bh. Vol. I, 351). And if we follow his commentator, Appayya Dīkṣita, we come to the conclusion that Śrīkaṇṭha's conception of Mala is the same as that of the Śaiva Dualism. It is substantial in its nature : it is similar to blackness in copper and it is removed by His Grace. Not only this. He admits the fourth impurity (Mala) also, which is technically called "Tirodhāna"[1]. But he does not count it amongst the primary impurities, because, as Appayya Dīkṣita points out, it is really the power of the Lord and is spoken of as Pāśa in the secondary sense, because of its being responsible for the individuality of the individual[2].

LIBERATION OR MOKṢA

The Viśiṣṭādvaita Śaivaism recognises the importance of forty rituals, ceremonies and sacrifices, recognised by the Brahmanism, in the attainment of liberation, in so far as they free the individual from sins and so make him fit for following the path to liberation[3]. But it asserts that ultimately it is due to His Grace; and that study of the texts and attendance at the lectures on the essential nature of Śiva, the rational conviction that He is as the texts present, and the inner visualisation of Him through complete self-surrender to Him, win His Grace. He is the just Lord and graces the deserving only. The Grace removes the impurity, called simply "Mala" or Paśutvamala or Āṇavamala, and therefore, the inherent qualities of unsurpassed knowledge and bliss, which are similar to those of Him, become manifest[4].

The textual problem that arises in this context is : "If the object, to which self-surrender is to be made, is Śiva only, how can Indra talk of himself as an object, through self-surrender to which the liberation can be attained ?" And the reply is that Indra talks of himself as such an object, not as Indra, but as Śiva, with whom he is one, with whom he has attained identity, exactly

1. Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 145.
2. Srikam. Bh. Vol. I, (Comm) 567-8.
3. Srikam. Bh. Vol. I, 40.
4. Srikam. Bh. Vol. I, 91-2.

as the various constituents of an aesthetic object do with the basic mental state which art primarily presents[1].

INFLUENCE OF AESTHETICS

It is important to keep the implication of the analogy of aesthetic object, or to be more specific, Rasa as it figures in the consciousness of an aesthete, to get at the implication of "Sāmyamokṣa", the similarity with the Ultimate, Ṣiva, which is realised at the liberation. This system arose at the time when the problem of aesthetics was being discussed in all its aspects. The two aspects, the influence of which is reflected on this system are : (1) the theory of suggestible meaning and (2) the view on the relation of the constituents of the aesthetic object as it figures in the consciousness of a deindividualised or universalised aesthete. According to the competent authorities, like Ānanda Vardhana and Abhinavagupta, the suggestible meaning is not objective but subjective : it is due, not to the objective cognition, but to the subjective realisation: it is due to the latent becoming patent ; it is due to becoming manifest of what lies hidden within. Both the Dualistic and Qualified Monistic schools of Ṣaivaism, accepted this view, and accordingly maintained that, at liberation, the powers of unlimited knowledge and action, which are inherent in the individual subject, but lie hidden by the impurities, become manifest (Abhivyakta) when the last impurity (Paśutvamala) is removed by His Grace.

This is one important point on which both, the Dualistic and the Qualified Monistic, schools of Ṣaivaism differ from the Lakulīśa Pāśupata, according to which the perfect powers of knowledge and action pass on to the individual from the Universal (Saṅkrānti).

Similarly in regard to the objective aspect of the aesthetic experience, it was asserted that it consists, not in the Sthāyin or basic emotion as such, as isolated from the situation, mimetic changes and transient emotion (Vibhāva, Anubhāva and Vyabhicāribhāva) ; but in the harmonious unification of all these so that there arises an objective unity, which is very different from that which can arise from a mere juxtaposition of them, unity which is responsible for a very different experience from that which each one separately or all of them taken together, but not harmoniously unified, can give rise to. It was also asserted that this unity is not pure and absolute unity, in which the constituents completely lose themselves ; and that they have their being with such a similarity with the basic or central fact that it

1. Srikam. Bh. Vol. I, 287-8.

needs a separate and concentrated mental activity to become aware of them as such. The objective aspect of aesthetic experience was thus recognised to be identity in difference or unity in multiplicity. Under the influence of such an idea, the qualified Ṣaiva Monism admits the identity of the deindividualised individual with the Universal in respect of the qualities of knowledge and action ; but at the same time it admits difference in the substance. Hence it talks of the Liberation as attainment or manifestation of similarity with Ṣiva (Ṣivasāmya). The freedom from impurity, called Paśutva mala, is the most necessary condition of such Liberation. (Nirañjanaḥ paramaṁ sāmyam upaiti" (Srikam. Bh. Vol. I, 409).

The Viśiṣṭādvaita Ṣaivaism asserts that even at liberation the deindividualised individual has a separate existence from Brahman or Ṣiva ; that the liberated does not have the consciousness of the empirical multiplicity and that he sees nothing but Brahman, with whom the entire multiplicity is unified[1].

THE NATURE OF IDENTIFICATION AT LIBERATION

The Viśiṣṭādvaita Ṣaivaism admits that Parama Ṣiva is beyond everything and is different from Paśu even when he is liberated[2]. The question, therefore, arises : "How can the identity of the individual and the Universal, implied by such texts as "That thou art" (Tattvamasi), is to be explained ?" And the reply is that the identity, referred to in the text, implies such identity as is found in the identification of the aesthete with the focus of the situation, the hero, at the emotive level. Just as the aesthete, identifying himself with the hero, does not completely lose himself in the object with which he identifies himself ; because in that case subsequent remembrance of the aesthetic experience would be impossible ; so the individual, contemplating on Ṣiva, gets identified with Him, without losing his own entity. Just as at the emotive level of the aesthetic experience, there is identity with the focus of the situation in respect of emotion ; because the latent emotion becomes patent : so at the mystic level there is the identity of the contemplator and the object of contemplation in respect of the attributes, the powers of knowledge and action and the Bliss ; because the powers, which are inherent in the individual but are hidden by the impurity, called Paśutva, become manifest[3] in consequence of its removal. Just as the deindividualisation of the individual is the necessary

1. Srikam. Bh. Vol. I, 416-7.
2. Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 427-8.
3. Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 481-2

condition of the aesthetic experience ; so is the freedom from impurities for the mystic.

Accordingly, Şrīkaṇṭha asserts that in such texts as "One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman" (Brahmaveda Brahmaiva bhavati) mean that one who knows Brahman becomes like Brahman ; and that the word "eva" therein is used in the sense of "iva"[1]. The text, therefore, he holds, does not mean the loss of the individual in the Universal, similar to the loss of the ether, confined within a jar, in the universal ether, when the jar gets broken. He maintains that similarity always implies difference : and the sacred texts taken together mean that the liberated becomes similar to and not completely one with Brahman or Şiva. For, this is the implication of the admission that the liberated is Brahman in every way, excepting the one, namely, that he cannot create or destroy the universe (Jagadvyāpāravarjam)[2]. Similarity of the liberated with the Brahman consists in having the same experience as that of the Brahman, but not doing what Brahman does (Bhogamātrasāmyaliṅgācca)[3].

The talk of identity of the individual with the Universal and consequent use of the word Brahman or Şiva in reference to the individual is figurative only, just as the use of the word "Lion" for a man. The word "Sāyujya", according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin does not mean "penetrative union" but similarity (Sāmya)[4] only. He maintains that the atomicity of the individual remains in tact, but the light that spreads from the atomic individual, spreads and covers all so that he becomes omniscient, because of the disappearance of the impurity (Paśutva) ; exactly as the light of a lamp spreads and illumines all that is round about it, when the cover, which prevented the spread of the light, is removed[5]. The universal annihilation does not affect the liberated. The liberated is endless. He belongs to the first of the thirty-six categories, "Śiva". He is Şiva, because he is different from both Paśu and Pāśa (Paśupāśa Vilakṣaṇatvam hi śivatvam. Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 504).

1. Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 484.
2. Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 484.
3. Srikam. Bh. Vol. II, 496.
4. Srikam. Bh. Vol II. (Comm) 501.
5. Srikam Bh. Vol. II 493.

(V) THE VIŚEṢĀDVAITA OF ŚRĪPATI

The Viśeṣādvaita system is referred to by various names, Pure Dvaitādvaita, Seśvarādvaita, Śivādvaita, Sarvaśrutisāramata and Bhedābheda, as we have stated earlier. They refer to the central philosophical doctrine from different points of view. It is called Dvaitādvaita ; because it holds that devotion (Bhakti) is the principal means to union (Sāyujya) with the Ultimate Reality, Śiva. Devotion presupposes the reality and separate being of both, the subject and the object ; the devotee and the object of devotion, the worshipper and the object of worship ; the self that surrenders itself and the one to whom it surrenders ; the contemplator and the contemplated. But the end, that is realised through it, is not the one, in which the subject and the object have separate existence ; but the one in which the former becomes one with the latter, exactly as does a river that falls into the ocean becomes one with it. Hence it is called Dvaitādvaita.

It is called "Seśvarādvaita" ; because the first category, according to this system, is "Pati" or "Lord" ; and the conception of the ultimate category is not that it is contentless, empty being, such as does not admit of any definition ; but that it is all-powerful ; that the entire multiplicity of the universe, both the subjective and the objective, has its being within His power, exactly as the multiplicity, that constitutes a tree, is within the seed, from which it springs ; that He is the Lord or Pati, because He has the power, though it is non-different from Him, as the warmth is from fire.

It is called Viśeṣādvaita or Saviśeṣādvaita ; because it is opposed to the Nirviśeṣādvaita of Śaṅkara : it is Saguṇa-Brahmavāda and is opposed to Nirguṇa-Brahmavāda; to the theory that the empirical world is a mere illusion; to the distinction between the practical reality (Vyāvahārika Satya) and the true reality (Paramārtha Satya) ; and to the view that the liberation is negative in its nature.

Śrīpati Paṇḍitārādhya points out the significance of the word "Viśeṣādvaita" as follows[1]:—

> The word "Viśeṣa", which is prefixed to "Advaita", denies that this school presents a kind of Monism: it denies that pure dualism or pure monism can be maintained from every point of view and at

1. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 136.

all levels : it asserts that pure dualism and pure monism are against the fact of experience : it directs the attention to the fact that though the individual subject (Jīva) and the Universal (Ṣiva) are identical, inasmuch as both are essentially sentiency (Cit), yet they are different in so far as the one is atomic and the other is all-pervasive, the one has limited powers of knowledge and action, but the other is omniscient and omnipotent : though logically they are one as genus, yet they belong to different species: the identity and difference between them are of the same nature as we find between the insentient empirical objects, which are identical in respect of their insentiency, but are different in their causal efficiency. He splits up the compound "Viśeṣādvaita" as "Viśca śeṣaśca tayoḥ advaitam" and interprets it as the identity of "Vi", the individual subject, and "Ṣeṣa", the Universal. The word "Viśeṣādvaita" stands for the distinctive feature of this school, which admits that the beginningless and, therefore, natural difference of the individual from the Universal disappears, because of the force of constant contemplation ; that the Jīva becomes Brahman, exactly as a fly becomes a bee, (Bhramarakīṭavat).

It is called Ṣivādvaita ; because it holds that the Ultimate Reality is Ṣiva, the All-inclusive Universal Being, in whom the entire multiplicity of the objective world has its being potentially and springs up from Him effectually at His Will : and because the latent multiplicity, even when it becomes patent, or the subtle, even when it grossifies, is not outside Him.

It is called Sarvaśrutisāramata ; because it asserts that it presents the basic, the central, the essential point of view of all the sacred texts : because it maintains that the consistent and harmonious interpretation of all the apparently conflicting statements, found in the Ṣrutis, is possible in the light of Dualistic-cum-monistic view. It is called Dualism-cum-monism, (Dvaitādvaita); because it holds that Dualism and Monism, though opposed and antagonistic to each other, if they be asserted at the same level and from the same point of view; yet they are thoroughly reconcilable, if they be maintained to belong to different levels and be asserted from different points of view. It points out that everything is unity from one point of view but multiplicity from another : the individual is different from Śiva at the empirical level, but is one with Him, when he merges into Him at

liberation, exactly as a river is different from the ocean, when it is flowing on the plain , but becomes one with it when it falls into the ocean. Monism refers to the causal state, and Dualism refers to the state of effect. The seed is one, but leaves, branches, flowers and fruits, which spring from it, are many. Hence it asserts that Dualism-cum-monism is the only sound philosophy.

It is called Şakti Viśiṣṭādvaita, because the Vīra Şaiva 'declines to accept the statement that in self-consciousness the distinction of matter and form is abolished. For, even in self-consciousness he distinguishes a material and a formal side, a potential and an actual moment. The potential and material moment of the Absolute he terms Şiva ; the actual and formal moment of the Absolute he terms Şakti. He does not visualize an incurable antinomy between Şiva and Şakti, between being and knowing, rather he effects a synthesis by saying that Şakti is the very soul of Şiva, that knowing is inherent in being. He envisages an integral association between Şiva and Şakti.'[1]

The Kriyā Sāra by Nīla Kaṇṭha presents the Şakti Viśiṣṭādvaita[2], accepted by the followers of Vīra Şaivaism. It interprets in verses the Brahma Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa in the light of the Şakti Viśiṣṭādvaita. In doing so it follows the commentary on the Brahma Sūtra by Nīla Kaṇṭha Şivācārya[3], alias Şrīkaṇṭha[4], on the basis of which we have presented the Viśiṣṭādvaita Şaivaism in the preceding section.

VĪRA ŞAIVAISM

The word "Vīra Şaiva" seems to have a historical significance. It refers to the heroic attitude of the followers of Şaivaism, as has already been stated. The word "Vīra" as a part of the name of the Liṅgāyat sect "Vīra Şaiva" is interpreted in other ways also. The Siddhānta Şikhāmaṇi, which contains a dialogue between Reṇuka and Agastya, the two well recognised authorities on Vīra Şaivaism, states the meaning of Vīra as **follows:—**

(1) "Vi" means the knowledge (Vidyā) that the individual subject (Jīva) and Şiva are identical. Those followers of Şaivaism, who find satisfaction in such a knowledge, are "Vīra Şaivas."[5]

(2) "The knowledge that one gets from the study of the Vedānta, is referred to by the word "Vi". "Vīra" is one who finds peace of mind in it."

*1. H. Ph. E. W., 398.
2. K. S., 15.
3. K. S., 39.
*4. S. Sri., 18.
5. S. Si., 30.

The Kriyāsāra gives an additional meaning to the word "Vīra" as follows:—

(3) "Vi" means "doubt" (Vikalpa). "Ra" means "without". "Vīra Ṣaiva" accordingly means "the Ṣaiva faith and philosophy which is free from all doubts"[1].

VĪRA ṢAIVAISM AND ŚĀṄKARA VEDĀNTA

Ṣrīpati Paṇḍitārādhya has attempted to distinguish his Viśeṣādvaita from various other types of monism, such as Ṣuddhādvaita, Buddhādvaita, Ṣuṣkādvaita and Ṣūnyādvaita. Mainly, however, he attempts to draw the attention of the reader to the points of difference between his system and that of the Vedānta, as presented by Ṣaṅkara. He criticises the distinctive features of the Ṣāṅkara Vedānta such as Adhyāsa or superimposition, illusory nature of the objective world (Māyā); and Vyāvahārika satya or the theory that the objective world is only practically real. In fact, according to him, the second section of the chapter III of the Vedānta Sūtra aims at refuting the view that the Ultimate Reality is absolutely beyond the empirical multiplicity; that it is without any quality or attribute; that it is absolute unity without any touch of multiplicity and, therefore, all the experiences which we have in the states of wakefulness, dream, deep-sleep and fainting fit, are illusory[2].

CRITICISM OF THE THEORY OF SUPERIMPOSITION (ADHYĀSA)

The Ṣāṅkara Vedānta admits that the Brahman is without any attribute or quality and that the entire phenomenal world, including both the sentient and the insentient, is nothing more than illusion (Māyā), which is due to superimposition (Adhyāsa) which also in itself is due to beginningless ignorance (Anādi Avidyā). Brahman alone is real. All else is a mere appearance. Brahman appears as the world because of the Avidyā, which superimposes the world on it, exactly as a rope appears as a snake, because of the superimposition of the latter on the former, on account of the defect in the sense of sight, through which it is seen. The world, therefore, is an illusion, much as snake is, as stated above: because both of them are due to superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another.

In criticising the above view Ṣrīpati Paṇḍitārādhya points out that superimposition presupposes the residual traces of the knowledge of what is superimposed. But, according to the Ṣāṅkara Vedānta there is nothing truly existing apart from the Brahman.

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1. K. S., 3. 2. Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 313.,

It also presupposes a spatial difference: the two, (I) that which is superimposed; and (II) that on which it is superimposed, must be at different points of space: the snake must exist truly at a particular point of space, different from that of rope, to make the superimposition possible. But there is no spatial point at which the Brahman is not. To say that the former superimpositions are the causes of the later ones, is to commit the fallacy of argumentum- ad-infinitum (Anavasthā). Moreover, such a statement is against the sacred texts, which talk of the causal relation between the Brahman and the world.

The Śāṅkara Vedānta holds that the Brahman is not an object of knowledge. But if so, asks Śrīpati, how can there be the possibility of superimposition of the world on Brahman. For, superimposition is always on what is objective. And to say that superimposition does not have objective reference, is to admit that illusion arises without any basis (Niradhiṣṭhāna bhrama Prasaṅgaḥ)[1].

CRITICISM OF THE PRACTICALLY REAL (VYĀVAHĀRIKA SATYA)

It has been shown in the preceding section that illusion is difficult to account for, in accordance with the strict monistic view. But even if all the objections against it, as stated before, were waived and its possibility be admitted ; the difficulty of accounting for the practical life remains unsurmountable, if we admit the entire world to be nothing more than illusion. For, illusion has no practical value ; the water of mirage cannot quench the thirst. The Śāṅkara Vedānta, therefore, admits 'real' (Satya) to be of three types; (1) Pāramārthika; (2) Vyāvahārika, and (3) Prātibhāsika. The first is the obsolutely real. And the Brahman alone is such. The second is practically real. The entire phenomenal world, including God or Īśvara, the creator, the individual souls and all that is objective, is such. And the third is illusively real. Mirage and the snake that appears, due to the defective sight etc. when only a rope is before the percipient, are such.

In regard to the practically real Śrīpati raises the following three questions :—

Does it mean (1) that the thing, which is only practically real, is such as does not persist through futurity. (Kālāntarānavasthāyitva) or

(2) that it is such as is different from both 'being' and 'not-being' ; or

(3) that it is such as cannot be spoken of either as 'being' or as 'not-being' ?

1, Sri. Bh,, Vol, II, 31,

The first position does not present any distinctive view of the Śāṅkara Vedānta. For many systems, including the Viśeṣādvaita of Śrīpati, admit the transitory nature of the world. But the admission by the Śāṅkara Vedānta that nothing else than the Brahman persists through all times and that even 'nature' (Prakṛti) is only practically real is against the sacred texts, which present Prakṛti to be eternal[1].

The second position is untenable[2]. For, the distinction can be drawn from that only, the existence of which is well defined and equally well recognised. But the Śāṅkara Vedānta does not recognise 'being' and 'not being' as distinct and different from what it presents as practically real. Similar argument can be advanced against the third position also. Śrīpati's arguments against the view of the 'Practically real' are very subtle, abstruse and difficult, and, therefore, need more space than we can give in this "Outline".

CRITICISM OF THE ILLUSORY NATURE OF THE WORLD

Śrīpati speaks of Śaṅkara, as a Bauddha in the guise of a Vedāntin, (Pracchanna Bauddha). He calls Śāṅkara Vedānta "Nirviśeṣādvaitamata" because it holds all the three, God, world and individual subjects, to be illusory. He holds that a system like that of Śaṅkara is refuted by Bādarāyaṇa in the "Abhāvādhikaraṇa" of the Vedānta Sūtra. He asks : "Does the negation (Abhāva) of God, world and individual subjects, mean that they have no being whatsoever, like the horns of a hare and the son of a barren woman ; or that they are illusory or unreal like the multiplicity that is experienced in a dream ? He asserts that the negation of the first type is against the fact of experience. For, we actually perceive the objective multiplicity at the empirical level and find it effective : but the horns of a hare are neither perceptible nor effective. The individual subject also is distinctly experienced at the time of the rise of the phenomenon of knowledge as distinct from the object and the means. To hold, therefore, that knowledge (Jñāna) alone is, without the distinction of the subject, the object and the means, is to make one's self an object of ridicule[3]. And God also is the object of religious or mystic experience. The absolute negation of the objective world and God, therefore, is untenable.

Nor can the objective world be represented to be illusory (*Mithyā*) like a dream. For, the objective world of the wakeful

1. Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 64.
2. Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 65.
3. Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 225-6.

state is very different from what we see in dream. The latter is contradicted by the wakeful experience, inasmuch as we do not find what we experience in dream, when we wake up. But the objects which we experience in the wakeful state are found even after dream. Further, the pious and sinful acts, performed in dream, do not result in merit or demerit to the dreaming individual. But those, done in the wakeful state, do. Hence the denial of reality to the empirical world, on the basis of the supposed similarity with the dream-world, is illogical. It is, therefore, wrong to assert that the experiences of the wakeful state are without real objective references, just like those in dream. Moreover, if all knowledge be admitted to be without objective reference (Jñānānām arthaśūnyatve)[1], the point that the Vedāntin desires to prove, cannot be proved. For, the Advaita Vedāntin attempts to prove the existence of the Brahman by inference. But inference also is a kind of knowledge and, therefore, cannot refer to what is truly existent.

But the Advaita Vedāntin may say that the true existence of the objective world is denied simply because it is contradicted by the mystic experience (Brahma jñāna bādhyatvam). To this, Śripati replies that non-experience of the objective world does not necessarily mean negation or contradiction of its existence : it does not mean that the objective world does not truly exist. For, non-experience of it is due to the rise of the subject beyond the level of objective affection. The non-experience of objectivity at the mystic level is similar to its non-experience at the level of deep dreamless sleep.

Nor can the Nirviśeṣādvaita Vedāntin prove the existence of the Nirviśeṣa Brahman on the basis of the sacred texts. For, they also are means of knowledge. And the Advaitin admits that the means of knowledge have no reference to true object. The Brahman, therefore, as proved with the help of Śruti, will also be nothing but an illusion. And everything excepting the Brahman, being illusory, the sacred texts themselves will have to be admitted to be as such and, therefore, cannot prove the Brahman to be non-illusory and real[2].

CRITICISM OF THE THEORY OF REFLECTION

There is a difference of opinion amongst the Advaita Vedāntins in regard to the conception of God and that of individual subject. According to one section, both God and individual soul are mere reflections of a single universal sentiency, which is the reflected (Caitanyamātram Bimbam)[3].

1. Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 227.
2. Sri Bh., Vol. II, 227.
3. V. Pari. 183.

The sentiency, reflected in the Māyā, the universal nescience, is God. But the same sentiency, reflected in the inner sense (Antaḥkaraṇa) is the individual soul. The difference between God and soul is quantitative, just like the difference between the reflection of the sun in a tank and that in a cup. The former is all-pervasive, because that in which the sentiency is reflected, namely, the universal nescience or Māyā is all-pervasive. But the soul is limited, because the inner sense, wherein the sentiency is reflected, is so.

This view Śrīpati criticises as follows :—

Any view, that is propounded, must be in consonance with the fact of experience, if it is to command general acceptance. The view, however, that God and soul are mere reflections of a single universal sentiency, is against the fact of experience and, therefore, cannot be accepted. For, that only which is perceptible casts reflection and that alone receives reflection which definitely exists. But neither the Brahman is perceptible nor does the Māyā definitely exist. The talk of reflection of ether (Ākāśa) in tank, has no other basis than illusion. Further, the reflection is necessarily at a spatial point where the reflected is not. But Brahman is all-pervasive. Therefore, its reflection is not possible. In "Guhām praviṣṭāvātmānau hi taddarśanāt" (Ch. I. Sec. 2 Sūtra II) Jīva and Brahman are spoken of as occupying the same space. Does it not contradict the theory of reflection ? How can the reflection and the reflected be at the same place ? The destruction of that where the reflection is, means the destruction of the reflection. Will not, therefore, the destruction of the Māyā at the liberation mean the destruction of Jīva ? The theory, therefore, that Jīva is a mere reflection of the Brahman, is untenable.

CRITICISM OF THE VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA

Śrīpati Paṇḍitārādhya begins his criticism of the Viśiṣṭādvaita by pointing out that the position of those who propound qualified non-dualism is self-contradictory[1]. For, the word qualified implies duality of that which qualifies and that which is qualified, of the substance and the attribute, of the possessor of the qualification and the qualification itself. Further, the term "qualified" seems to be indefinable and, therefore, to signify what is illusory. Does the term signify the attribute, the substance and their relation, or something that is different from them all ? In the former case the question will arise : "Does it stand for a mere collection of substance, attribute and their relation, exactly as does "rod-man-relation" (Daṇḍa

1. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 71.

purusasambandhāḥ) ?" If so, it means that it does not stand for the "qualified". For, the awareness of a mere collection, is not the awareness of the "qualified": nor is it the awareness of non-duality. In the latter case, that is, if the term "qualified" stands for something different from the triad of substance, attribute and their relation; it is difficult to establish that the Highest Self (Paramātman) is the Qualified Non-duality (Viśiṣṭādvaita)[1]. For, in the case of "Man with a rod" (Daṇḍin), we do not admit anything different from rod, man and their relation. And it is difficult to understand what is the "attribute". For, an attribute cannot be said to be that which arouses the idea of elimination (Vyāvṛttibuddhi janaka) : because such an idea is also aroused by what is known to be a substance.

But let us find out what is the substance, what is the attribute and what is the exact nature of relation between the two when the word "Viśiṣṭādvaita" is used for a system of Philosophy. We cannot say that the soul is the attribute, and the Highest Self is the substance. For, that means the admission that there is only one atomic soul. But if the souls, the attributes, are admitted to be many, it will be difficult to establish oneness of the Highest Self, that has them as its attributes : because difference of the attribute means the difference of the substance also. For instance, it is difficult to assert that a personality, which has many attributes, is one to the extent that reference to one of them implies reference to all of them. For, in that case, even when only one attribute is referred to, reference to all of them would be supposed to be implied. Therefore, reference to only one of them, because the personality has only one of them, would mean reference to all. Hence the personality, which has been known to possess many attributes, would be understood to have all of them even when it has only one and as such has been referred to.

Moreover, the relation between the Highest Self and the souls has to be defined, before we can talk of them as substance and attribute. It cannot be said to be inherence (Samavāya) ; because they exist in isolation from each other. Nor can it be said to be mere 'contact' (Saṁyoga) ; because, if it be said to be pervasive (Vyāpyavṛtti) it would mean the admission of identity of the two ; and the partial contact (Avyāpyavṛtti saṁyoga) is not possible between them, because both of them are without parts. As for the "Svarūpasambandha", it is not logical and, therefore, is not generally admitted. And even if it be admitted,

1. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 72.

being a relation and, therefore, dependent on the two, which are related, it contradicts non-duality. Hence on the basis of this relation also "Viśiṣṭādvaita" is contradiction in terms[1].

Śrīpati refers to the great exponent of the Śaiva Viśiṣṭādvaita, Śrīkaṇṭha. He distinctly refutes the latter's conception of liberation (Mokṣa) as attainment of similarity with Śiva[2] and asserts in opposition to him that the liberation is the union with Śiva (Sāyujya).

BHEDĀBHEDAVĀDA OF ŚRĪPATI

Śripati follows the authority of the twenty-eight Śaivāgamas[3], which were collectively called "Siddhānta" by the Dualist Śaivas. He differs from Abhinavagupta, in maintaining that all of them present the Ultimate Reality to be unity in multiplicity and asserts that both, unity and multiplicity, are equally real. He does not twist the passages referring to unity so as to make them yield the dualistic meaning, as do the Siddhānta Dualists. He admits the three primary categories ; Pati, Paśu and Pāśa[4]. He also admits three types of bondage (Pāśa): Mala, Karma and Māyā[5]. But very often he seems to emphasise the importance of Māyā so much that he seems to think that all of them are essentially Māyā[6] (Malatrayātmakamāyā pāśa). He attempts to show that the conception of the primary Śaiva categories is not only in consonance with the teaching of the Vedas, but also is propounded therein[7].

And just like the Siddhānta Śaiva, he accepts the thirty-six categories also, from another point of view, as has already been stated. He refers to Bṛddhajāvālopaniṣad and quotes from it to show that thirty-six categories, admitted by him, are referred to there. It is interesting to note that the categories, referred to in the passage that he quotes, are slightly different from those admitted by the Siddhānta Dualists. It says that the first five, Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara and Śuddhavidyā, are pure category. The next seven, Māyā, Kāla, Niyati, Kalā, Vidyā, Rāga and Puruṣa, are pure-cum-impure (Śuddhāśuddha). The remaining twenty-four are impure (Aśuddha). Of these twenty-four, the first is Prakṛti, which is accepted in common with the Sāṅkhya.

1. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 72.
2. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 200.
3. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 8.
4. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 4.
5. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 6.
6. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 5.
7. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 94.

The next three are different from those of every other system. The systems, which admit Prakṛti, generally accept Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra and Manas, as three of the twenty-four categories. But here the three Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (Prakṛterguṇatrayam)[1] are stated instead. The remaining are the four groups of subtle and gross elements and of senses (Indriya) of perception and of action.

He refutes the monistic theories of superimposition (Adhyāsa), illusion (Mithyā) and reflection, as discussed earlier. He is a Realist. He admits the reality of the objective world and definitely denies that it is a mere illusion. He believes in the theory of evolution and asserts that multiplicity is real and eternal, because it always exists. Though it may not always exist in a gross form, yet that does not mean its non-existence. For, even then it exists potentially in the power (Ṣakti) of the Lord, much as the various parts of a tree exist in a seed. He asserts that unity and multiplicity are the two states of the same reality. Unity is the unevolved state and the multiplicity is the evolved. Hence Bhedābheda or Dvaitādvaita is the only sound philosophy.

The unevolved state, which is the state of unity, is not pure unity but the unity of the two, the Lord and His power, Ṣiva and Ṣakti. The one is the efficient cause and the other is the material cause. But the former is one with the latter ; the relation between them is that of identity (Tādātmya), similar to the one that is between magnet and its power to draw iron or between fire and its power to burn.

BHEDĀBHEDA AND LIBERATION

Ṣrīpati admits the difference between soul (Jīva) and Brahman in so far as the former is the worshipper, has spatial limitation and possesses limited knowledge ; but the latter is the object of worship, all-pervasive and omniscient. He also admits that the aforesaid limitations of the soul are beginningless and natural (Svābhāvika). But he asserts that soul gets freedom from these natural differences and limitations and becomes one with the Brahman, exactly as does a river with the ocean into which it falls. He holds (1) that even the beginningless qualities and limitations disappear and (2) that what comes into being (Āgantuka) is not necessarily transient. For instance, we find that a fly of natural birth changes its inborn nature

1. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 168.

and becomes a bee, and rain water, getting into a mother-of-pearl, becomes pearl. Thus, he concludes that there is beginningless difference between soul and Brahman: but at liberation there is the union of the two. Therefore, Bhedābheda is the only sound philosophy[1].

SACRED TEXTS AND BHEDĀBHEDA

Śrīpati admits that there are sacred texts, which totally deny all multiplicity; but he also asserts that that is no justification to hold that those texts, which talk of the difference between soul and Brahman, are to be taken to present the difference as merely due to the limiting conditions and, therefore, are to be interpreted as referring to the difference between them secondarily only (Aupacārika). According to him, the texts which deny multiplicity and present Brahman as free from all qualities and attributes, refer to Brahman as 'It' is before the creation of multiplicity; and similarly those texts which talk of multiplicity of the objective world and the difference between Jīva and Brahman refer to the created multiplicity. Of course, the multiplicity is present in the power (Śakti) of Brahman even before creation; but the power and the possesser of it are admitted to be identical[2].

It is, he points out, inconsistent with the admission of the authority of the Veda to stick to either pure monism or pure dualism. For, in the Veda, there are passages, propounding both. The acceptance of pure monism would mean the refusal of the authoritativeness of the passages which present dualistic view and vice versa[3]. To reject the Bhedābhedavāda on the ground that it involves contradiction, is illogical. For[4], the admission of the opposite attributes or qualities in one and the same thing is common to many systems of thought. Does not the Sāṅkhya admit the Sattva and the Tamas, which are opposed to each other like light and darkness, to be the constituents of Prakṛti ? Does not the Vaiśeṣika admit the first four elements, earth, air, water and fire, to be both eternal and transient ? Do not piety and sin coexist in humanity ? Is not glow-worm light and not-light at the same time ? Do not light and darkness coexist in the evening ? Does the Veda present only one means to liberation, namely knowledge (Jñāna): or does it present the additional two also, namely, action and devotion (Karma and

1. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 71.
2. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 135.
3. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 174.
4. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 175.

Upāsanā)[1] ? If the Veda presents the latter two also, where is the room for them in extreme monism ?

We find that the admission of the opposite attributes in one and the same thing in its different states, is common to most of the systems. Thus, subtlety and grossness are attributed to Prakṛti in its unevolved and evolved states respectively. The theory of Bhedābheda, therefore, cannot be represented to be illogical. For, Brahman is spoken of as one in its causal or unevolved state, and as many in its evolved state. Further, if we admit Brahman to be the material cause of the world, the relation between the two can be nothing but of the nature of identity in difference; because such is the relation between clay and jar. If we are to admit any relation between Brahman and its power, it can be nothing but of the nature of identity in difference : because such is the relation between fire and its power to burn. Thus, from every point of view Bhedābheda is the only sound philosophy.

BRAHMAN, PARA ŚIVA OR PATI

The words, Brahman, Para Śiva and Pati, are used by Śrīpati as synonyms. Brahman or Pati is the first primary category. It is beyond the thirty-six categories, admitted by this system. It is called Para Śiva to distinguish it from Śiva, the first of the thirty-six categories. It naturally possesses innumerable and inexhaustible powers. It is both the efficient and the material cause of the world. It controls the remaining two primary categories, Paśu and Pāśa. It is responsible for the being of the bound and the liberated, the subtle and the gross, and the sentient and the insentient. It is the substratum of the innumerable auspicious qualities such as reality, sentiency and eternality etc. It is definable (Saviśeṣa) but not indefinable (Nirviśeṣa). Definability does not necessarily mean limitedness. For, even the negative definition, such as is implied by the texts "It is not this" (Neti neti) is after all a definition, in so far as it marks out the Brahman, referred to therein, from every other thing, which belongs to the same or even different genus (Sajātīya Vijātīya) at the empirical level. But the positive definition is not lacking. In fact, Bādarāyaṇa, in his Brahma Sūtra, gives such a definition and by doing so he refutes the view that Brahman is indefinable.

Para Śiva is the creator, maintainer, annihilator and obscurer of and doer of grace to the entire world, consisting of both

1. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 177.

the sentient and the insentient[1]. It is spoken of as free from all attributes (Nirguṇa)when its power is inoperative, but as possessed of attributes, when its power is operative[2]. It is the abode of everything, including heaven and earth etc. It is the ultimate goal that is reached by human soul when it gets freedom from the bondages. It is related to the individual soul at the empirical level exactly as soul is to body; but still it remains unaffected by pleasant or painful experiences, exactly as ether remains unaffected by the qualities of the things, to which it is related[3]. It is eternally free and is not subjected to any experience that is the effect of an action (Karma).

The entire objective world, including both, the sentient and the insentient, is within Para Śiva, exactly as all the leaves and fruits etc. are within the seed from which they spring. The Vedic texts, therefore, which talk of not-being of the world, refer only to the absence of the gross form before creation or evolution. Just as a Yogin withdraws vital air etc. at the time of concentration (Samādhi) and lets them off to function when he descends to the empirical level, so Para Śiva withdraws the world within at the time of annihilation and spreads it out at the time of creation. The world is not an illusion; it is real[4]; it has its potential being in the power (Śakti) of the Lord even at the time of the universal annihilation; it is non-different from Him much as the tree is from the seed from which it springs.

Para Śiva is free (Svatantra). He, therefore, can rise above all forms and also assume forms. Even when He assumes a body he remains unaffected by pleasure and pain, because the body is causal and not a product of action (Karma). He bestows grace much as Gods do favour on the devotee. He frees the souls from their natural impurities and unites them with Himself. The souls have beginningless difference from Him, but ultimately become one with Him as do the rivers with the ocean[5]. The variety of pleasant and painful situations, in which individual souls are put at the time of creation, is due, not to Him but to Karma, which constitutes a beginningless impurity of each soul. He, therefore, cannot be spoken of as cruel and partial, because of His creating the objects, to which the experiences of the individuals are related[6].

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1. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 29.
2. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 59.
3. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 194.
4. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 198.
5. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 202-3.
6. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 208.

The aforesaid is the objective definition of Para Śiva or Brahman. This is how the sacred texts and logic make us understand Him. It is the Taṭastha lakṣaṇa. In Himself He is pure being, pure sentiency and pure bliss. This is what mysticism presents Him to be. This represents the ultimate experience of the liberated.

PAŚU, JĪVA OR INDIVIDUAL SOUL

Paśu is the second primary category. It is beginningless and has beginningless impurities, Mala, Karma and Māyā. It identifies itself with body, vital air and intellect etc. and there fore, is subjected to varying experiences in different bodies, which it gets according to its Karma or past action[1]. It is categorically different from Para Śiva[2]. It is not a mere reflection of Brahman. For, we find at the empirical level that the reflection lacks sentiency and the essential quality of that which casts it, For instance, the reflections of man, deer, Sun and Moon are neither sentient nor have the qualities of those which cast them. It is naturally sentient[3] and also naturally different from Brahman. The difference of Jīva from Brahman is not mere conditional. For, the sacred texts present the Brahman to be (1) the object of worship, knowledge and contemplation: and (2) the goal, which the individual soul has to reach and realise. Further, if we admit the difference of Jīva from Brahman to be due to the conditions only the question arises: "Does Brahman know the soul as nothing but itself, at the time when it is in great distress and suffering, because of the conditions or does not?" If not, Brahman ceases to be omniscient. But if it knows, it is inexplicable why does it allow the souls, which it knows to be nothing but itself, to remain in suffering and does not free them immediately. The difference between the two is, therefore, similar to that between genus and species. The soul is essentially sentiency just as is Brahman and,therefore, belongs to the same genus as Brahman, much as do iron, copper and gold to the same genus, metal. But it is different from Brahman, much as iron is from gold[4]. This difference alone can explain various types of Liberation (mukti), such as attainment (1) of the world of Brahman (Sālokya) (2) of the proximity to Brahman (Sāmīpya)[5], (3) of the attributes of Brahman (Sāmya) and (4) of union with Brahman (Sāyujya).

1. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 4.
2. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 114.
3. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 190.
4. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 199.
5. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 201.

It is atomic[1] in size and not all-pervasive. For, the sacred texts talk of its flight from the body and its movement from one world to another. Though atomic yet it does the act of knowing the affections all over the body exactly as the sandal paste, though it is just on the forehead, yet it does the act of producing cooling sensation all over the body: or just as light, though it is just at a particular place in the room, yet illumines the whole of it[2]. And the knowledge (Jñāna) is a quality of soul, exactly as smell is that of the earth[3]. It is a part of Brahman, exactly as a spark is that of the fire[4]. It is, therefore, not absolutely identical nor is essentially different from Brahman.

LIBERATION OR MOKṢA

The individual soul has three beginningless impurities (Mala) or bondages (Pāśa), Mala, Karma and Māyā. The liberation consists in the everlasting freedom from these bondages and consequent union with Para Śiva[5]. It is a complete union similar to that of rivers with the ocean. It means complete transformation of personality similar to that of a fly into a 'bee' (Bhṛṅgī). It is the ultimate goal of humanity. It is realised through successive stages (Kramamukti). It is not a mere discovery of what already exists within, but is unknown because of ignorance. It is the attainment of what is outside. There are different ways of attaining it. They are meant for different types of soul, according to the difference in the capacity. Thus, the path of devotion leads the devotees to the attainment of similarity, in respect of the attributes, with the object of devotion through Sālokya and Sāmīpya[6]. Similarly the path of knowledge leads to union with Para Śiva[7], similar to that of a river with the ocean. Different paths have to be followed in succession.

The soul that attains the final union with Brahman, which is possible both in the life time and after the separation from body, is characterised by total absence of the consciousness of all objectivity. There is no doubt about it that the soul, that attains final union with Brahman, while it is connected with the body, has separate existence in so far as it is associated with internal sense (Antaḥkaraṇa). But this separateness is without any sepa-

1. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 263.
2. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 264-5.
3. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 265.
4. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 276.
5. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 5.
6. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 201.
7. Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 132.

rate knowledge. The inner sense of the liberated experiences nothing but Brahman in its varying affections. The soul that attains liberation during life time is like the flame of camphor in the bright light of the Sun. It is all light; it is nothing but consciousness of Brahman[1]. But after the fall of the body even this formal separateness disappears. It is attained through His Grace[2].

SIX WAYS TO UNION (ṢAḌADHVA) AND SIX FORMS OF GRACE (ṢAḌVIDHAŚAKTIPĀTA)

Vīra Śaivaism seems to think in terms of number six, exactly as Kashmir Śaivaism thinks in terms of number three. The latter is definitely called Trika. But the former has not been given any such name as Ṣaṭka. It recognises six paths to final union, one leading to the other. They are technically called (1) Varṇa, (2) Pada, (3) Mantra, (4) Kalā, (5) Bhuvana, (6) Tattva[3]. It recognises six forms of Grace also.

(1) Maheśvaratattvāvirbhāva, the intellectual awareness or grasp of the Lord as eternal and transcendental bliss. It is got through hearing the sacred texts, contemplation on them and visualisation of their meaning.

(2) Sadāśiva tattva sākṣātkāra, the realisation of the third category, technically called Sadāśiva. It is a spiritual level, at which the objectivity and subjectivity, "I" and "This", free from all individual elements, shine equally. It may be pointed out here that Śrīpati very often uses the word Sadāśiva for Para Śiva, who is beyond categories. For instance, in the course of his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra, chapter I, Pāda I, Sūtra 21, he uses the word "Sadāśiva" for the "being" (Puruṣa), who is within the Sun and says that it is no other than Para Śiva[4]. It is due to the removal of the veil of ignorance and consequent coming to light of pure Sattva.

(3) Śivaśaktisaṁyoga, the contact with the power of the Lord. It is due to the practice of Yoga, as given in the Śaivāgama, and is technically called Śivayoga. This contact takes place in Brahma-randhra. It is consequent on breaking of six circles (ṣaṭcakra), because of the passage of Prāṇa through Suṣumṇā to Brahma-randhra.

1 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 138.
2 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 202.
3 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 95.
4 Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 73.

(4) Sarva-bhuvana-gamana Parokṣadarśana, the capacity to go to all worlds and to see the imperceptible. It is got when the teacher, who has realised the Ultimate Reality, abandons his own body and enters into that of the pupil, because he wants to do great favour to the disciple; clears up all the Nāḍis and thus enables the Kuṇḍalinī to move through seven circles (Saptacakra).

(5) Aṇimādyaiśvarya, the attainment of the powers to become atomic or all-pervasive etc. It is due to the union of the two vital airs, Prāṇa and Apāna. It is consequent on the attainment of the auspicious power (Kalyāṇa vibhūti) which is nothing but a part of the Universal Consciousness (Citkalāmaya) and illumines the mid-passage, Suṣumṇā.

(6) Unmanyavasthāprāpti, the attainment of the transcendental state, which is the level of indeterminacy, because the Manas does not function, or rather is dissolved here. It is due to the realisation of Para Śiva, who is distinct from both knowledge and ignorance, who transcends all, is eternally free from all impurities, is changeless, has no parts and is the abode of all exactly as the ether is of the empirical things. It is beyond the state, in which the individual has his being in the Universal, as all-light and completely free from darkness of ignorance, like a steady flame of camphor in the bright sunshine. It is characterised by complete absence of knowledge of all that is internal or external, includiug body, senses, Manas and vital air etc.[1]

SIX SECTIONS OF THE SACRED TEXT (ṢAṬSTHALA)

Vīra Śaivaism follows the Twenty-eight Śaivāgamas, beginning with the Kāmika and ending with the Vātula. The characteristic doctrines of Vīra Śaivaism are found in the later Āgamas of this set[2]. This probably refers to the Eighteen Āgamas which, according to Abhinavagupta, present Bhedābheda. The followers of Vīra Śaivaism are divided into six sub-sects, according as they follow the authority of one or the other of these six sections (Sthala) of the sacred text and practise the discipline given therein, according to their qualifications. These six sections of the sacred text are known as (1) Bhaktasthala, (2) Māheśvarasthala, (3) Prasādisthala, (4) Prāṇaliṅgisthala, (5) Śaraṇasthala and (6) Aikyasthala[3].

Each of these sections has a number of sub-sections, which are called by different names. They are forty-four and are dealt

1. Sri. Bh., Vol. II, 316
2. S. Si, 29
3. Sri. Bh., Vol. II 316. and S. Si. 31.

with in the Siddhānta Śikhāmaṇi, a collection of dialogues between Reṇuka and Agastya. In the same text, the various kinds of Liṅgas, the modes of worship and contemplation also are given in detail: and Śrīpati also refers to such Liṅgas in Sri. Bh. Vol. II, 95, 96, 105, 106 etc.

(VI) ADVAITA ŞAIVAISM OF NANDIKEŚVARA

The available material on this system, is vary scanty. We have just one small work, consisting of twenty-six verses and a brief commentary on it, to which we have referred earlier. But it is a very important work inasmuch as it states the fundamentals of the monistic Śaiva Philosophy, as incorporated in the first fourteen aphorisms of Pāṇini's grammar, according to the interpretation of Nandikeśvara.

At the end of each of these fourteen aphorisms there is a consonant. Nandikeśvara holds that such a consonant stands for a predicate, exactly as Pāṇini holds that it is for the formation of a technical term such as "Aṇ" (Pratyāhāra).

THE IMPORTANCE OF NANDIKEŞVARA ŞAIVAISM

If we accept the view that Nandikeśvara was a contemporary of Pāṇini, because of the persisting tradition and indirect reference to his view by Patañjali, the system, presented by Nandikeśvara, is very important indeed. For, it is then the earliest voluntaristic Philosophy, which was subsequently developed by Lakulīśa in his Pāśupata Sūtra, in the light of Dualism-cum-non-dualism, and by the thinkers of Kashmir, such as Somānanda, Kallaṭa, Utpala, Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja etc., in the light of monism. In fact, the very brief statements about the philosophical principles in the Nandikeśvara Kāśikā, have meaning, only when they are studied in the light of what Kashmir thinkers have said on allied topics.

The fact that the system, presented by Nandikeśvara, is very similar to, if not identical with what is now known as Monistic Kashmir Şaivaism, becomes evident if we compare the benedictory verse at the beginning of the Spanda Kārikā with the one at the beginning of the commentary by Upamanyu on the Nandikeśvara Kāśikā. These two verses not only present the same philosophic thought but also present it in almost identical expressions.

Yasyonmeṣanimeṣābhyām Jagataḥ pralayodayau.

S. K. 3.

Yasyonmeṣanimeṣābhyām Vyaktāvyaktam idam jagat.

N. K, 1.

THE MAIN TENDENCIES OF THE SYSTEM

(1) Nandikeśvara Şaivaism has mystic tendency. This tendency may be said to be predominant. For, the circumstances, which were responsible for coming to light of this system, were mystic. The sages practised austerity for mystic light. As an act of grace to them, Şiva appeared mystically and taught them that the Reality is beyond all categories; that it is the self, the "I" or "Aham", the all-transcending; that it is all-graceful, the Grace being to it what body is to soul; and that it is the transcendental witness of everything[1].

Here we find three fundamentals of mysticism: (1) the Reality as it is finally realised; the final and everlasting experience that a mystic aims at attaining through mystic life and practices; (2) the Reality as it appears to a mystic in a mystic vision; and (3) the faith, with which and in which a mystic lives. The all-transcending nature of the mystic Reality, the appearance of this Reality in a mystic form in a mystic vision and faith in His Grace are the fundamental pre-suppositions of mysticism.

(2) We also find the voluntaristic tendency in Nandikeśvara Şaivaism in the context of its metaphysics. Every mystic system has its metaphysical theory also. But the Reality as it is presented in the context of mysticism is generally slightly different from the Reality as it is postulated in the metaphysical context. The former is beyond all categories and, therefore, is indefinable unless we take the indefinability itself to be a definition. The latter, however, is spoken of as cause, source or manifester of everything. But the mystic Reality is not essentially different from the metaphysical. For, the Ultimate is admitted to be both transcendental and immanent.

Plotinus, for instance, on the one hand, speaks of the One as so transcendent that it is beyond the reach of mind and speech; it cannot be presented even in terms of the highest category; it is realisable only in mystic ecstacy. On the other hand, he represents the One as the source and goal of everything, from whom all oppositions and diversities emanate.

Similarly Nandikeśvara also, in the course of his interpretation of the first aphorism of the Māheśvara Sūtras, speaks of the metaphysical Reality, which is identified with the first letter "A", as Brahman[2], which is free from all Guṇas, is present in

1. N. K. 15. | 2. N. K. 3—6.

everything and in all forms of speech, Paśyantī etc. and is the source or origin, not only of all letters, but also of the entire universe, including many different worlds. This Brahman becomes or manifests itself as the Universe through its power, technically called "Citkalā" or "Cit-śakti", and, therefore, is called "Īśvara". The letters "I" and "U" in the aphorism signify the "Power" (Citkalā) and the "Lord" respectively.

There is an interesting point, worth noting in the commentary on the verse No. 3, on which the statement, made in the preceding paragraph, is based.

The word "Citkalā" is interpreted as "Māyā". It has, therefore, to be made clear here that the word "Māyā" in this context does not have the meaning that it has in the Vedānta Philosophy, i.e. the principle of ignorance and illusion, which cannot be presented as either "being" or "not-being". For, in the system of Nandikeśvara, there is no such category as Māyā, distinct from Śakti, as in other Śaiva systems. No doubt it admits thirty-six categories, but they are slightly different from those of other Śaiva systems, as we shall show. The question, therefore, arises: what does "Māyā" mean ? And the answer is that it means what Vimarśa means in the monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir. It means "Free Will" (Svātantrya). For, this system admits that the universe owes its being to His Will[1].

That the word "Citkalā", which is interpreted as "Māyā" by the commentator, means what is stated above is borne out by another fact. That is, Nandikeśvara talks of "A" the Brahman, as "Prakāśa"[2], as distinct from "I", the Citkalā, and also of the inseparable relation between the two. The principle, represented by "I", is said to be the cause, in so far as it is 'the potentiality' 'the power' the Śakti, to which everything owes its being. But 'Śakti' is so only in relation to Śiva, Brahman, Prakāśa or "A"[3]. And we know that the monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir, which talks of the first category as "Prakāśa" and of the second as "Vimarśa", uses the words "Citi" and "svātantrya" as synonymous with Vimarśa[4]. The word 'Citkalā', therefore, seems to mean Vimarśa or free Will.

Nandikeśvara himself uses the word "Māyā", in the sense of "Manovṛtti", the activity of the mind, manifested by the

1. N. K. 7.
2. N. K. 4.
3. N. K. 6.
4. Bh., Vol. I, 250.

Lord, and the relation of this with the Lord is spoken of as the same (Samāśritya)[1] as that which He has with Citkalā in bringing the universe into being. It may be pointed out here that in this context the commentator uses the words "Māyā", "I" and "Citkalā" as synonymous; and that Nandikeśvara himself propounds the voluntaristic world-view and presents it in almost the same words as those used by Kṣemarāja in his Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya, as has been stated in the Historical section. Therefore, there is little doubt about the synonymity of Citkalā with Svātantrya and about the voluntaristic tendency of the system of Nandikeśvara.

MONISM OF NANDIKEŚVARA

We have talked of the relation between Brahman and Śakti or Citkalā. Does not the admission of the two ultimate metaphysical principles mean Dualism ? The reply to this question is given in the course of the interpretation of the second aphorism "Ṛ L K." The Brahman is the Mind. And the Māyā is the activity, which it manifests. The Brahman, being active, being in relation with its activity, which is its own outflow, brings the world into being. The active has no being in isolation from the activity. The two are inseparable, much as are the Moon and her rays, or a word and its meaning[2].

Nandikeśvara seems to advocate the type of monism which is the characteristic of the Philosophy of Grammar. He identifies the Brahman, the "A", with Parā, as presented by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, under the influence of the Śaivāgama. He talks of Parā as pure Jñapti, or sentiency (Jñaptimātra)[3]. The word Jñapti seems to be used as a synonym of "Citi". For, Patañjali, a near successor of Nandikeśvara, in his Yogasūtra, in presenting the self[4], uses the words "Citi" and "Dṛśi", in stating its essential nature. And Utpala and Abhinavagupta have interpreted it to show that Patañjali's conception of the Self is the same as that of monistic Kashmir Śaivaism and that it implies voluntarism.

If we accept this view, namely, that 'Jñapti' stands for "Citi" and presents the essential nature of the Self, the word "Citkalā", the meaning of which we tried to settle earlier, gets a significance, which explains the use of the analogy of the Moon and her

1. N. K. 7.
2. N. K. 7.
3. N. K. 6.
4. Bh. Vol. I, 245.

rays to bring out non-difference between Brahman and Citkalā. If Brahman or Self is 'Citi', the power of Brahman, which is responsible for the being of the whole universe, is spoken of as 'Citkalā', because it is an aspect of Brahman and, therefore, non-different from it, exactly as the ray of the Moon is an aspect of her and is non-different from her.

The monistic view, presented on the basis of aphorism "Ṛ L K", implies that the relation between Brahman and its power is the same as between Ṛ and L. We know that, according to the grammarian, there is the relation of identity between the two, Ṛ and Ḷ, similar to that between one "A" and another (Ṛ L varṇayormithaḥ sāvarṇyam vācyam)[1]. Nandikeśvara Śaivaism, therefore, is a monistic system, because it admits the identity of the mind and its potentiality and activity, of Śiva and Śakti, or Brahman and Citkalā.

THE THEORY OF MANIFESTATION

The relation between the Brahman and the universe is not that of the creator and the created. The world does not exist apart from the Brahman as does a jar from a potter, who makes it. It is, on the contrary, like that of thought and the thinking subject. The world is nothing but the thought of Brahman. It is external manifestation of what is potentially within. It is essentially identical with Brahman, much as thought is with the thinking subject. Similarly the transcendental Reality (Nirguṇa) and the immanent (Saguṇa)[2] are identical. For, the latter is a manifestation of the former. All the categories are the manifestations of the Brahman.[3]

THE CATEGORIES

Nandikeśvara admits thirty-six categories and holds that Para Śiva is beyond the categories. They may be stated as follows:—

1. Śiva 2. Śakti 3. Īśvara: 4—28. twenty-five categories of the Sāṅkhya system[4]: 29—33. five vital airs, Prāṇa etc. : 34—36. three Guṇas, Sattva etc.

It is interesting to note that Kashmir Śaivaism also admits thirty-six categories with some modifications, which may be stated as follows:—

1 S. K., 6.
2 N. K., (Comm.), 9.
3 N. K., 9.
4 N. K., 14-15.

(1) The first three categories are common to both the Nandikeśvara Şaivaism and the Kashmir Şaivaism, excepting that in between Şakti and Īśvara Kashmir Şaivaism recognises another category, called Sadāśiva.

(2) Twenty-five categories, accepted by the Sāṅkhya, are accepted by both. In this case Abhinavagupta points out the difference in the conception of these categories from those of the Sāṅkhya, though the same names are retained.

(3) Kashmir Śaivaism does not recognise five vital airs as separate categories. Instead it admits the five limiting conditions of individual self, technically called Kalā, Niyati, Rāga, Vidyā and Kāla, as distinct categories.

(4) Kashmir Śaivaism does not recognise Sattva, Rajas and Tamas as distinct categories. Instead, it accepts Sadāśiva, Vidyā and Māyā.

(5) Both hold that Paramaśiva is beyond the categories. This view has fully been stated by Abhinavagupta in the very first verse of prayer in the I. P. V.

(VII) RASEŚVARA ŚAIVAISM

Raseśvara system is more a science than a School of Philosophy. It does not propound any new metaphysical, ethical or epistemic theory. But still it is included amongst the systems of philosophy, even by such a great authority as Mādhava in his Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, because it is concerned with a way to final emancipation (Mukti). In fact, Mādhava[1] himself begins with referring to the acceptance by this system of the essential identity of the individual self with the Lord, in common with some other Śaiva systems.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THE RASEŚVARA SYSTEM

Although Mādhava represents this to be a Śaiva system, yet it would be a mistake to think that the discovery of different methods of processing and purifying mercury so as to make it efficacious in giving perdurable body to the user of it, was exclusively made by the followers of Śaivaism only. No doubt the Śaivas made the largest number of discoveries, but others also made substantial contributions to the mercurial science. In some of the available works, which are collections of researches on mercury, we find references to the contributors to this science, other than the Śaivas. Thus, Rasopaniṣad, which aims at giving the essence of the practices, prevalent in different schools, mentions, besides Vātula, which is one of the recognised Śaivāgamas, such schools as Prābhrata, Brāhma, Vaiṣṇava, Aindra, Śāṅkara, Śaukra and Bṛhaspati Mata[2]. And Mādhava himself refers to the admission of the perdurable body by the followers of Vaiṣṇavaism, such as Garbhaśrīkānta Miśra[3], who admits that the body of Narasiṁha is perdurable and that it was actually seen as such by Sanaka etc.

The Bauddhas also made substantial contributions to it. Nāgārjuna, as we have stated earlier, is said to have gone abroad, brought mercury from there, processed and purified it so as to make it capable of converting iron into gold. He is also mentioned in the list of the persons, who became Siddhas in consequence of the use of the purified mercury. He is also referred

1 S. D. S., 202.
2 R. U., 2.
3 S. D. S., 208.

to as an original contributor to the mercurial science among twenty-seven such persons by Vāgbhaṭa in his Rasa Ratna Samuccaya[1].

THE PERSISTING TRADITION

The tradition of the mercurial science seems to have persisted for centuries. In the list of the authoritative contributors, in addition to the names, unknown to the history of Sanskrit literature, there are names of the well known persons also. And there is sufficient evidence to justify the identification of the persons, referred to therein, with the historical. Such two names are (1) Nāgārjuna (Circa 120 A. D.) and (2) Bhagavad Govindapāda (780 A. D.). The research on mercury, therefore, seems to have been carried on for about six hundred years. The results of these researches are contained in the large number of books, available even now on the subject.

Some of these works admit of arrangement in an historical order. The original material on the subject is found mainly in the Śaiva Āgamas or Tantras; and subsequent works are mostly based on them. In some of the Tantras, there is a mere reference to the processing and purifying of mercury. For instance, in the Rudra Yāmala Tantra, which is primarily concerned with the Yogic practices, as related to different Cakras, there is nothing more than a mere reference to the mercurial science (Pārada Sādhana)[2]. Such references seem to be referred to in the Rasārṇava[3], which is a very authoritative work on the Raseśvara system, because Mādhava quotes from it mostly.

It may be pointed out here that the Rasārṇava, as we have it in the printed edition, is fairly authoritative and seems to be a faithful copy of the text, as Mādhava had it before him. All the five quotations from the Rasārṇava, occurring on pages 202, 203, 204, 205-6 and 208, in the Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, are found in the Rasārṇava (Chowkhamba Edition) on pages 4, 2, 3, 161-2 and 4 respectively.

Similarly Rasopaniṣad, a work on Rasa, consisting of Eighteen Chapters, is simply a digest of a bigger work, called Rasa Mahodadhi, consisting of thirty Chapters. It refers to Nāgārjuna[4] as a great authority. And Vāgbhaṭa in his Rasa Ratna Samuccaya[5] distinctly refers to it as the first of those works, on

1 R. R.S., 2.
2 R. Y., 7.
3 R. A., 1-2
4 R. U., 76.
5 R. R. S. 291.

which his digest on Rasa is based. He quotes from the Rasahṛdaya also. The verses, quoted from this work in the Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha "Iti Dhana" (203) and "Bhrūyuga" (209), are found in the Rasa Ratna Samuccaya on pages 7 and 10 respectively.

THE VALUE OF THE RASA TRADITION

The persistence of the tradition of processing and purifying mercury in various ways for different purposes, and its association with great names in the history of Sanskrit literature, such as Nāgārjuna and Bhagavad Govinda Pāda, should compel us to think seriously of the subject. Not only is there vast literature on the subject, but also there are references to Siddhas, which the mercurial science aimed at producing and actually produced, in the standard works in Sanskrit Literature. The Ratnāvalī of Harṣa (600 A. D.) and the Mṛcchakaṭika of Śūdraka, who probably belonged to the beginning of Christian era, refer to Siddha and his powers. Kallaṭa and Somānanda are well known Siddhas amongst Kashmir Śaiva philosophers, Bhagavad Govinda Pāda, the teacher of Śaṅkarācārya, was a recognised Siddha.

But there is a prejudice against the authenticity and correctness of the statements, which are found in the books in Sanskrit, particularly when they deal with the scientific subjects; and more so if they belong to the Tāntric literature. No doubt the Tāntric literature, even when dealing with a scientific subject, such as Chemistry, is not free from the influence of religion and mixes up religion with science and talks of things, which to a person familiar with the modern Chemistry, sound ridiculous: for instance, acquisition of a body, that is free from death and aging and conversion of iron into gold. But assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Tāntric literature lacks the spirit of the science of today and contains extremely exaggerated statements about the powers of the chemical processes and preparations, of which it talks; are we justified in ignoring and neglecting it ?

India had a culture, long before the period, to which cultural history of any of the advanced western nations, which have developed various sciences to the modern extent, could be traced. She knew of the chemicals. She had her Chemistry, Metallography, Metallurgy, Mineralogy and Medical system, etc. If, therefore, we want to know, what Indian genius did on these subjects in the distant past, the only source, that we can refer to is the Tāntric. And approaching the Tāntric literature

from the point of view of the modern sciences, we find enough material therein, as has been testified by the researches of Prof. P. C. Ray, recorded in his Hindu Chemistry.

The religious element that we find mixed up with the treatment of a scientific subject, is nothing but the reflection of the main tendency of the period, during which Tantras were written. And the exaggerated statements about the powers of chemical processes and preparations, even if they be accepted to be such, can well point to the ideals of Chemistry and other sciences. And it is interesting to learn that Russian scientists, like O. B. Lepeshinskaya, are carrying on researches with a view to discover something for "prolonging man's life span". It would, therefore, be of great historical value and may be of some practical also, to know what writers in India have said on such a problem.

THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECT OF THE RASEŚVARA SYSTEM

The Raseśvara system presents the crowning phases of the Indian system of medicine, called Āyurveda. Among the eight well recognised branches of Āyurveda, medicine, surgery and midwifery etc., Rasāyana is well known. The Raseśvara system presents an advance on the earlier conception of Rasāyana. According to Caraka[1], Rasāyana was efficacious in prolonging life, strengthening memory etc. and restoring youth. But the Raseśvara system holds that mercury (Rasendra) processed and purified, in accordance with the ways and means, stated in the authoritative texts on the system, is capable of giving immortality (Amaratva) to the user[2].

The Raseśvara system maintains that alchemy is an effective science. It asserts that mercury, processed and purified in the manner, given in the literature on the system, if mixed with an other metal, such as iron, copper, silver and tin etc. in proportion of one thousandth of the total weight of the other metal, converts it into gold[3]. It gives information about everything that is necessary for such a processing and purification of mercury. It states the medicines, metals and mechanical contrivences, necessary for the said purpose. It gives colour, taste and smell and other details to identify the herbs. It states the characteristics of the places, where they can be found.

It holds that metals can be given any colour, that the original natural colour of any metal can be changed, and states the ways

1 Car. 376
2 R. A. 6.
3 R. U. 14, (36, 39, 47.)

and means of doing so[1]. It classifies vegetables, plants and trees on the basis of their metallic content[2]. It states the characteristics of the regions where mines of different metals exist[3] and the ways and means of purifying metals.

It claims to give very correct ways and means of processing and purifying mercury, which if and when used, makes the body of the user such as can walk on water, can go thousands of miles without feeling fatigued, as cannot be bound and restrained by iron chains, cannot be cut or pierced by any weapon and cannot be burnt by fire ; as can fly in the air, can talk to gods in heaven and can come back to earth[4].

RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF THE RASEŚVARA SYSTEM

According to this system, there is no antagonism or opposition between science and religion : they go hand in hand. There are certain religious practices to be maintained and certain religious rites to be performed in order to attain success in processing and purifying mercury so as to get freedom from death, diseases and old age through its use. The internal repetition of a certain set of symbolic sounds (Mantrajapa)[5], the spiritual initiation[6] and worship of the phallic form of Śiva, made up of mercury (Rasaliṅga)[7] are all necessary. And finally success in the undertaking depends upon His Grace[8]. It recognises caste system and admits that birth in a higher caste, which means life in a certain atmosphere, makes a man better fitted to follow this system; but it holds that birth in a lower caste is no barrier; that a Śūdra can follow this system as well as can a Brāhmaṇa[9]. It asserts the importance of the teacher, emphasises the necessity of devotion to him and warns against the dangers of doing the practical side without the supervision of the teacher[10].

1 R. U. 32.
2 R. U. 192.
3 R, U. 188.
4 R. U. 106.
5 R. A. 116.
6 R. A. 10.
7 R. A. 11.
8 R. A. 3.
9 R. A 8.
10 R. A. 6.

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECT OF THE RASEṢVARA SYSTEM

The system of philosophy, on which the mercurial science is based, is different from that which serves as the basis of the medical science as presented by Caraka. The origin of Āyurveda, as a science, which aims at preserving the health of the healthy and curing the diseases of the suffering, is traced to the Atharva Veda[1]. But the philosophy, on which the science was based in the early stages, as we find in Caraka Saṁhitā, was a mixture of the principles of the Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta, with slight modifications. Thus, we find the acceptance of the Vaiśeṣika categories, universal, particular, substance, quality, action and inherence by Caraka in the very first Chapter[2]. The three means of right knowledge, perception, inference and verbal testimony are admitted, though apart from them, reason (Yukti) also is acknowledged as a valid means[3]. The theory of perception is identical with that of the Vaiśeṣika. Three types of inference, as found in the Nyāya, are admitted[4].

Caraka follows the Sāṅkhya in presenting the twenty-four constituents of Puruṣa. But here he identifies Puruṣa with Prakṛti, for the simple reason that both are Avyakta[5]. In presenting Puruṣa in the light of the Vaiśeṣika, however, he talks of Puruṣa as a configuration of six, i.e. five elements, ether etc., with the principle of sentiency (Cetanā) as the sixth.[6] He talks of the principle of sentiency (Cetanā) also as a 'Dhātu'. He holds that Puruṣa is of two types: (1) the one that is a mere configuration, as stated above; and (2) the other, which is a mere principle of sentiency (Jñaḥ) and as such is beginningless, causeless and eternal; it has objective knowledge, only when it is associated with the means of knowledge[7]. It is pervasive (Vibhu)[8].

He asserts that knowledge and action and fruition of the latter, as well as pleasure, pain, ignorance, birth and death are related to Puruṣa, which is of the nature of a configuration, as has been stated above. The relation of Puruṣa, as pure sentiency, with other Tattvas, is due to predominance of Rajas and Tamas. When, therefore, because of the predominance of pure Sattva,

1 Car. 186.
2 Car. 9—13.
3 Car. 70.
4 Car. 71.
5 Car. 288.
6 Car. 287.
7 Car. 292.
8 Car. 293.

they are cast aside (Nirākṛta)[1], the man is on the sure way to liberation. He states the means to purify Sattva, which, when purified, shines like the sun, free from dust, cloud and mist, or like a lamp in a breezeless place[2]. Consequently true knowledge (Satya Buddhi)[3] arises, the veil of ignorance is torn, the mind withdraws from the external objects and rests on the Self or Ātman, the Reality is grasped and the liberation, the eternal peace, is attained[4]. The liberated sees no difference between himself and the objective world.

ŚAIVA DUALISM AS THE BASIS OF RASEŚVARA SYSTEM

The Raseśvara system does not follow the technique of the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika or the Vedānta. It adopts the technique of the dualistic Śaivaism. We have not so far been able to trace a text, in which the philosophy of the system as such has been dealt with; nor do we find in the available literature any section that can give a clear idea of the fundamentals of the Raseśvara as a system of philosophy. We can, however, get a glimpse of the system from stray philosophical references and they clearly demonstrate that it is a Śaiva system.

Thus, in the Rasārṇava, we find references to 'Śaktipāta' and "Pāśa[5]". Īśa and Sadāśiva also are mentioned[6]. Rasa Bhairava, as an object of contemplation, is presented in the same terms, as those in which Śiva is presented; that is, an embodiment of Sadyojāta, Vāmadeva, Aghora, Īśāna and Tatpuruṣa[7]. It also talks of Bindu, Nāda, Śakti, Unmana and Paramavyoma, and presents the following as higher than the preceding in the order, stated above. It speaks of the liberation as attainment of similarity with Śiva[8].

In the context of metaphysics, it presents Maheśvara, the Highest Lord, as omniscient and omnipotent; essentially subtle (Sūkṣmarūpa) and free from all impurities (Nirañjana). Here we find the Dualistic tendency mixed up with the Voluntaristic. The Highest Lord is represented to create and annihilate

1 Car. 290.
2 Car. 327.
3 Car. 328.
4 Car. 328.
5 R. A. 3.
6 R. A. 133.
7 R. A. 16-7.
8 R. A. 169.

everything by His will[1]. The entire universe springs from Him, has its being in Him and is essentially identical with Him[2].

The individual self, as has been stated earlier, is admitted to be essentially identical with the supreme[3]. It has innate impurities[4] and can get freedom from them through His Grace. It can acquire an immortal and unaging body, made up of mercury and mica, through the use of the said metals, processed and purified in accordance with the directions, given in the texts. It can attain liberation in the very life time on the earth and have the supernatural powers, referred to earlier.

LIBERATION IN LIFE (JĪVANMUKTI)

This system holds, as has been shown earlier, that through the use of the processed and refined mercury an unaging, non-decaying or immortal and divine body can be acquired: that this body is made up of pure mercury and mica and as such is different from that which is made up of flesh, blood and bones: that the acquisition of the former does not mean the loss and destruction of the latter: on the contrary, when the mercurial divine body is got, the physical body itself, which is the abode of the divine, becomes so strong that there is no fear of accidental death[5].

Accordingly it holds that the liberation in life (Jīvanmukti) is the consciousness or awareness of identity of the soul, which is within the unaging and immortal body, with Ṣiva (Ajarāmara dehasya Ṣiva tādātmya Vedanam)[6].

It is very sceptic about the liberation after death, which is promised by some schools of thought. It says that there is no direct evidence to convince us that the liberation after death does certainly take place, so that we can follow the path, pointed out by these systems, without any doubt in our minds about the attainment of the objective. It condemns 'Vāmamārga' as a way to liberation. It is antagonistic to "Aghorapantha"[7].

Accordingly it shows a way to acquiring an unaging and immortal body, the presence of which within the physical body frees it from aging, diseases and accidental death, and enables

1 R. A. 117.
2 R. A. 1.
3 S. D. S. 202.
4 R A. 3.
5 S. D. S. (Comm) 203.
6 R. A. 2.
7 R. A. 2.

the soul to realise similarity with the Brahman in the life time. The liberation of such a soul is directly perceptible, because the body, wherein it is, is entirely free from accidental death, diseases and old age, cannot be cut by weapons, knows no obstruction of any kind, can freely go to other worlds and come back.

If we take different texts together we find that it admits gradual liberation (Kramamukti). Thus, the first stage seems to be the liberation in life (Jīvanmukti). Here there is awareness of qualitative identity of the individual in the perdurable body with the Brahman. Here the duality of the individual and the Universal persists, much as does the distinction between the actor on the stage and the imaginary hero, with which he identifies himself. A soul that has a mercurial body is free to realise perfect identity with Śiva in respect of all attributes[1], at its own will[2].

It also says that the soul that has a mercurial body goes to the world of Śiva at the end of universal annihilation (Pralayānte)[3]. Thus, it seems to talk of the type of liberation, which is technically called "Sālokya". It admits three stages of liberation or three types of liberation ; (1) Jīvanmukti, (2) Sālokya and (3) Śivatā(gamana). It holds that the mercurial body of the Siddha dissolves just where the divine bodies of the gods do[4]. The final stage of liberation, according to this system, is the attainment of similarity with Śiva[5]. It is, therefore, a dualistic system.

THE MEANS TO LIBERATION IN LIFE (JĪVANMUKTI)

It admits that true knowledge is the means to final emancipation; but it asserts that such a knowledge is not possible without the practice of Yoga, the control over breath. The successful practice of Yoga, however, needs a healthy and perdurable body. Such a body can be got through the use of "Rasendra" only. Hence Rasendra is the basic means to liberation; because Yoga, without which true Knowledge is not possible, depends upon it.

1 R. A. 169.
2 R. A. 107.
3 R. A. 165.
4 R. A. 174.
5 R. A. 164.

(VIII) MONISTIC ŚAIVAISM OF KASHMIR AS PRESENTED IN THE IŚVARA PRATYABHIJÑĀ VIMARŚINĪ

THE monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir has already been presented in detail in the Second part of Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study, and summarily in the History of Philosophy Eastern and Western in Chapter XV (B) and in the introduction to the Bhāskarī vol. II. Here, therefore, an attempt is made to present this system on the lines of its presentation in the Iśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī so as to enable the reader to follow the Translation easily. The Translation covers the original work of Utpalācārya, the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, and a commentary on it, the Vimarśinī, by Abhinavagupta.

AUTHOR'S MOTIVE AND POINT OF VIEW

According to the learned philosophical tradition, the essential qualification of a teacher or author was not the learning so much as the realisation within himself of the Reality which he propounded. Utpalācārya's Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, the view that the means to the realisation of the Highest Reality is the recognition, found a large following, because he had himself realised the Reality before he started to speak on it. He had come to the stage of the Self-realisation at which the motive is purely objective and not in the least subjective. He undertook the work, not for any gain or advantage to himself but simply for the good of mankind in general. All this is stated in the very first verse. And Abhinavagupta in the course of the commentary on it discusses the doctrines of devotion, Bhakti or Dāsya, and of Grace or Anugraha. He shows that the point of view of the author is logical. For, the book presents the theory of Recognition in the form of a syllogism, including five terms : (i) Proposition ; (ii) Reason ; (iii) Examples; (iv) Application ; and (v) Conclusion.

THE INTRODUCTION

Utpalācārya is very modern in his form of presentation. He puts in an *Introduction* in the beginning . And the purpose of it is nothing but to give a summary-view of the system so as to enable the reader to follow with greater ease what is presented in the body of the book. He holds (i) that the Ultimate Metaphysical Principle, the Maheśvara,

is omniscient and omnipotent; He is free and, therefore, He does not depend upon anything external to Him to bring the entire universe into being; the universe is nothing but His idea or thought and, therefore, arises in Him, much as do the limited thoughts in the limited souls: it is simply a limited manifestation (Ābhāsa) of the Universal Mind: (ii) that He is the self-luminous and self-sufficient presupposition of all thoughts and acts, much as logically the universal is that of the individual : the means of right knowledge, therefore, do not apply to Him, because He is their presupposition, much as the flame is of the spreading rays: (iii) that He is not objective but purely subjective: all individual subjects are essentially identical with Him as self-luminocity and self-consciousness, and have no being separately from and independently of Him; therefore, in reality there is no independent subject to which He may be related as an object: (iv) that the means to the realisation of the Ultimate is not knowledge or cognition (Jñāna) but *Recognition* (Pratyabhijñā): it is related to, not the unknown but the known : it is a new way to the realisation of the Ultimate metaphysical Reality, the Maheśvara. The realisation consists, not in the actualisation of the potential; nor in the attainment of something new, nor in knowing what was unknown before; but in penetrating through the veil, that makes the Maheśvara appear as the individual, of which every one is immediately aware, and in recognising the Maheśvara in the individual. He holds that the individual is essentially free ; freedom is the inner being of the individual. But it is hidden by the veil of ignorance. The ignorance has to be removed to recognise it, to realise it as identical with the Reality.

BUDDHISM AND MONISTIC ŚAIVAISM OF KASHMIR

The relation between Buddhism and Monistic Śaivaism seems to be similar to that between Empiricism of Hume and Transcendental Philosophy of Kant to some extent. The Monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir is concerned with the Buddhistic view of the soul, not as it was propounded by Buddha himself. For, Buddha, according to Nāgārjuna, in his commentary on the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, sometimes taught that the Ātman exists, and at other times he taught that the Ātman does not exist. "When he preached that the Ātman exists and is to be the receiver of misery or happiness in the successive lives as the reward of its own Karma, his object was to save men from falling into the heresy of nihilism (Ucchedavāda). When he taught that there is no Ātman in the sense of a creator or a perceiver or an abso-

lutely free agent, apart from the conventional name given to the aggregate of the five Skandhas, his object was to save men from falling into the opposite heresy of eternalism (Ṣāśvatavāda)".

The Monistic Ṣaivaism of Kashmir takes into account the Bauddha view of the soul as presented by Nāgasena etc., who dismiss the immortal soul as an illegitimate abstraction ; who affirm the negative position of non-existence of soul ; who hold that self is nothing but a stream of ideas ; who in the manner of Hume argue that we do not find anywhere in our experience anything answering to the conception of permanent self; and that the so called self is nothing but a series of varying cognitions, determinate or indeterminate, which belong to no permanent subject, because such a subject is not a fact of experience. And it attempts to prove, like Kant, that the position of the Bauddha, who denies permanent subject, like Hume, is untenable, because synthesis, which is an essential feature of all determinate cognitions, cannot be explained without a permanent subject.

Omniscient and omnipotent God is admitted by all theistic systems. But such a conception of God is generally based on Dualism, the recognition of the matter as comparatively independent of and separate from the Mind or God. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika are theistic systems and, as has already been stated, they represent earlier Śaiva theism: because Kaṇāda was a Pāśupata and Gautama was a Ṣaiva. The Bauddha, who denied the existence of permanent individual subject naturally criticised the conception of omniscient and omnipotent God. And the monistic Ṣaivaism replies to this criticism, not on the dualistic hypothesis, but on the monistic. It interprets 'omnipotent' and 'omniscient' in a way different from that in which these words were interpreted earlier.

Utpalācārya and Abhinavagupta present the Bauddha objections against permanent subject and omniscient and omnipotent God in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā and the Vimarśinī, Adhi. I, Āh. 2. And in the rest of the Adhikāra I, and in the whole of the Adhikāra II, they reply to the Bauddha objections in detail. The first two Adhikāras form the major portion of the book. The remaining two Adhikāras, the Āgamādhikāra and the Tattva Saṅgrahādhikāra, discuss the categories of the system and give a summary of it respectively.

BAUDDHA OBJECTIONS AGAINST ŚAIVAISM

The Bauddha does not admit permanent subject, individual or universal; nor knower as distinct from knowledge; nor action as something different from the series of momentary beings,

which can be perceived directly or inferred ; nor any relation other than the causal. Accordingly he criticises the Śaiva conception of the omniscient and omnipotent God. For, omniscience presupposes knowledge as something distinct from the one to whom it is related and who, because of this relation, is called knower (Jñātā) : similarly omnipotence presupposes action as something different from the one to whom it is related and who, in consequence of this relation, is called doer (Kartā). He, like Hume, points out that however closely we observe and analyse our experiences, we do not discover the experiencer as distinct from the experiences. Nor is the knowing subject a necessary assumption to account for the phenomenon of remembrance. For, it can be accounted for in terms of the residual traces of the past experiences. As regards the I-consciousness, the Bauddha asserts that it refers to different constituents of the ever changing personality, such as body, feeling and intellect, according as the I-consciousness is related to various experiences such as "I am fat"; "I am happy" or "I understand this". He, therefore, holds that permanent subject or knower is an illogical abstraction.

And permanent doer or Kartā also is an equally illogical assumption. For, there is no action apart from a series of momentary beings at different spatial points in a temporal order. For instance, if we analyse the action, to which we refer when we say "Devadatta goes", we find nothing more than the body of Devadatta at different spatial points in a temporal order. But the body of Devadatta is not the same throughout the time during which it is seen at different spatial points. It is momentary, according to the Bauddha. Hence, the Bauddha talks of "series of momentary beings". Therefore, permanent doer or Kartā also is an illogical assumption. And if conception of individual knower and doer is illogical, the illogicality of the conception of the omniscient and omnipotent God automatically follows.

THE REPLY OF THE MONISTIC ṢAIVAISM OF KASHMIR

The Monistic Ṣaivaism of Kashmir agrees with the Buddhism in denying the distinction between the knower or subject and the knowledge, such as is admitted by the Vaiśeṣika, namely, that the subject is the substance wherein the knowledge inheres as a quality. But it asserts that permanent subject is necessary to account for remembrance and that remembrance cannot be explained in terms of mere residual traces as the Bauddha holds. Its approach to the problem of remembrance is psychological. It analyses remembrance and shows that the charac-

teristic nature of remembrance, which is expressed by the word "that" cannot be explained in terms of the residual traces only of the past experience.

This assertion is based on the view of the monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir: (1) that knowledge (Jñāna) is self-luminous; (2) that one knowledge cannot be the object of another. In remembrance we are aware not only of the object of a past experience but also of the experience that we had in relation to that object. And remembrance is recognised to be similar to the past experience in respect of having the object of a past experience as its object. Now the residual traces can explain the relation of remembrance to the object of a past experience, but they cannot account for the relation of the remembrance to the past experience. For, the past experience cannot appear as an object of remembrance, because luminosity of every cognition is self-confined and, therefore, one cognition cannot become an object of another; and the Bauddha does not admit permanent subject, different from the cognition, which can synthetize various experiences. Further, even the awareness of similarity of remembrance with the past experience is not possible, because every cognition is momentary and there is no subject, according to the Bauddha, which can hold together the two experiences to make the consciousness of similarity possible.

But remembrance is an important factor in practical life. All our activities to acquire or to shun a particular object are determined by remembrance. We strive for an object, because we know it to be a source of pleasure through remembrance of the past experience, because of the synthetic activity of a permanent subject, which holds various experiences together and relates them in various ways. Even the determinate knowledge of an object, which is the presupposition of all practical moves, depends upon memory and synthesis of various percepts.

But because synthesis of experiences is not possible on the basis of the Bauddha philosophy of momentariness of subject, Utpalācārya, therefore, asserts :—

"Thus, all human transactions, originating from unification of various kinds of cognitions, which mutually differ and cannot become one another's object, will come to an end."

"If there be not one great Lord, who is essentially self-luminous, holds within all the innumerable forms of the universe and possesses the powers of cognition, remembrance and differentiation."

EPISTEMIC BASIS OF THE ŚAIVA METAPHYSICS

The approach of the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī to the problem of metaphysics is very interesting inasmuch as it shows that the metaphysical principle, presented in it, is the presupposition of every phenomenon of knowledge and that the practical life is possible only on the basis of the monistic Śaiva metaphysics. It synthetizes Realism and Idealism and presents a metaphysical theory, which is technically called "Ābhāsavāda" (Realistic Idealism). It points out how the explanations of the phenomena of knowledge of different kinds, as given by other schools of thought, such as various schools of Buddhism, the Sāṅkhya, and the Mīmāṁsā etc. are unsatisfactory.

It denies the essential difference between mind and matter, thought and thing, or subject and object. It rejects the dualistic explanation of the phenomena of knowledge on similar grounds as those advanced by the subjectivists such as the Vijñānavādin in the East and Berkeley in the West. It rejects subjectivism also, because the subjectivist hypothesis completely shuts up every individual subject in his own world and thus fails to explain the common objective world, wherein the individuals can co-operate in a common undertaking. It also rejects pure Idealistic Monism which holds the world to be mere illusion.

It denies the essential difference between the individual mind or subject and the Universal. Its conception of the Universal Mind is based upon an acute analysis of the individual mind. Knowledge (Jñāna), remembrance and differentiation are the distinctive functions of individual mind. They, therefore, are attributed to the Universal Mind also; because the individual and the universal are identical not only in essence but in functions also ; and because without the admission of such functions of the Universal Mind the phenomenon of determinate knowledge cannot be explained. The reason may be stated as follows:—

The explanations of the phenomenon of knowledge, as given by the dualists and pluralists are unsatisfactory, because they present an insurmountable difficulty in bridging the gulf that divides the self from the not-self. If the subject and the object are completely cut off from each other, have exclusive and independent existence , and are of opposite nature, like light and darkness (Tamaḥprakāśavad viruddhadharmiṇoḥ. Ś. Bh.) how can there be any connection between the two, which is so very necessary for the production of the phenomenon of knowledge.

The meeting of the self and the not-self, in this case, seems to be as difficult as that of the two logs which are carried by two different currents, which separately lose themselves in the sands. The Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, therefore, declares that the All-inclusive Universal Mind is the logical necessity to account for the phenomena of knowledge.

THE ALL-INCLUSIVE UNIVERSAL MIND AND ITS OMNISCIENCE

The Monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir is a synthesis of the realistic , idealistic, voluntaristic and mystic tendencies. Accordingly it admits that the Universal Mind has two aspects, transcendental (Viśvottīrṇa) and immanent (Viśvamaya). It presents the Universal Mind as transcendental in the context of mysticism, and as immanent in the context of metaphysics, which primarily aims at explaining the practical life. It admits the Universal Mind to be not conscious but consciousness itself, not free but freedom itself (Prakāśa vimarśamaya). (This point has been dealt with in Abhinavagupta pp. 199-207.) Its theory of emanation of the whole universe, including subject, object and means of knowledge, reminds us of the philosophy of Plotinus. The universe can be in the state of identity with or of difference from the Universal Mind. And emanation is nothing but the manifestation of what is identical with itself as separate from itself; but the manifested, even in the state of separateness from the Mind, is no less within the Mind than in the state of identity, exactly as our thoughts are within ourselves even when they are objectified. The universe has no existence independently of the Mind exactly as the dream has no being independently of the dreaming subject. The world-process is the process within the Mind. The phenomena of knowledge, related to the individual, are the phenomena in the Universal Mind, exactly as thoughts, feelings and cognitions of different types, which the individuals figuring in the dream have, are in the dreaming subject. Just as it is the dreaming subject that knows, remembers and differentiates in the figures which appear to do so in dream, so it is the Universal Mind that does so in all individual minds. Hence in the context of Metaphysics, which aims at explaining the phenomena of determinate knowledge, on which practical life depends, the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī speaks of the Universal Mind as expressing its "freedom" (Svātantrya) in the forms of the powers of knowledge (Jñāna) remembrance (Smṛti) and differentiation (Apohana) which consist in uniting and separating the Ābhāsas so as to give rise to such subjects and objects etc. as are necessary for the rise of aforesaid

phenomena. These topics are fully discussed in the Jñānādhikāra Āhnika IV, V and VI respectively. All-inclusiveness and Freedom are dealt with successively in Āhnikas VII and VIII.

Thus, omniscience of the Universal Mind consists not in objectively knowing everything that exists independently of and separately from it, but in freedom to manifest and to unite the Ābhāsas so as to give rise to all that is necessary for the rise of the phenomena of knowledge. The Universal Mind is omniscient, because all phenomena of knowledge emerge from and merge back into it exactly as dream does from and back into the dreaming individual.

OMNIPOTENCE (KRIYĀŚAKTI) OF THE LORD AND PHENOMENON OF ACTION

The distinction between body and mind is undeniable and so is that between thought or knowledge and action. Thus, the recognition of distinction between omniscience and omnipotence is natural. But omnipotence, if it is the power or capacity to do everything, includes the power to bring about all that is necessary for the phenomena of knowledge. This is admitted in the very beginning of the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā. In fact, the word "Kartari" with which the book begins is just to indicate this.

The phenomena of knowledge and action are similar in so far as both presuppose the existence of subject, object and means. But action can be viewed more objectively than knowledge. And the Bauddha, who is the chief opponent of the Monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir, viewed the action purely objectively and so criticised the conception of 'doer' (Kartā) and of the Omnipotent God.

THE BAUDDHA CONCEPTION OF ACTION

The Bauddha conception of action and its difference from that of the Monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir have been discussed in the two introductions to the two earlier volumes of the Bhāskarī. The Bauddha views the action objectively or empirically and asserts that it is only a definite mental construct, which is based upon the observed series of spatial points at which a particular body of man, animal or anything else is seen in a temporal succession ; and that no 'doer' apart from the body is seen and, therefore, the admission of a permanent 'doer' (Kartā) is baseless. The following are the points which he emphasises against the Śaiva:-

(I) Action is a series; it is characterised by succession and, therefore, is multiple. Hence it cannot be spoken of as one. For, unity is the opposite of multiplicity and, therefore, cannot co-exist with multiplicity. Accordingly it is illogical to say that action is one and serial or successive also at the same time . (II) Unity of action cannot be asserted on the ground that it resides in one, has one substratum; because there is no experience of a substratum, different from the momentary beings, which constitute the series. The momentary beings (Kṣaṇas) alone, coming in succession, are experienced. (III) Even if, for the sake of argument, a substratum be accepted, how can it, being affected by the various constituents of the series, characterised by temporal, spatial and formal differences, be spoken of as one? (IV) Recognition of the body, that is found at various places in a temporal order, as the same is not sufficient to establish its identity and unity. For, it is due to similarity of the body of the preceding moment with that of the following, just as in the case of the flame of a lamp; because though a layman thinks that the same flame persists through successive moments, yet really it does not: it is replaced in successive moments by other flames, into which the oil, that is drawn by the wick to the spatial point of the going out flame, is converted. (V) Action is not real (Satya) because it is made up of a series, the members of which are held up together in the order of priority and posteriority by the determinative activity of the mind. For, whatever is determinately grasped is not real: the real is momentary and indeterminate.

THE ŚAIVA CONCEPTION OF ACTION

The monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir, as has already been stated, is a synthesis of the realistic, idealistic, voluntaristic and mystic tendencies. The Śaiva conception of action is, therefore, based, not upon the observation of its external objective aspect only, but also on the subjective grasp and analysis of the internal subjective aspect. It approaches the problem of action not only from the point of view of empiricism but also from that of voluntarism. Accordingly while it accepts the serial and, therefore, multiple nature of the action as an observable external phenomenon, it points out the subjective and internal aspect as well. It asserts that the appearance of a particular body at successive points of space in temporal order, which we empirically observe and call action, is only an expression of the will of the individual. This assertion is based upon the fact of experience. We experience within some kind of internal stir (Āntara spandana) before the commencement of the series, which constitutes the

external aspect of the action. The worldly action, therefore, is a unity, because of oneness of the will, of which it is an expression, and the will is one because of the oneness of the purpose that it aims at. Thus, action, taken in both of its aspects, is unity in multiplicity : the unity is internal and subjective and multiplicity is external and objective. The Ṣaiva disagrees with the Bauddha in holding that the action, as discussed just above, is real, because our experience of it, both subjective and objective, remains uncontradicted by any subsequent experience and because it has the causal efficiency of bringing about the realisation of the purpose, aimed at.

The word "Kriyā" (Action) is used in the texts on the Monistic Ṣaiva philosophy of Kashmir, not only in the sense of the empirical action, but also in that of the metaphysical power of action (Kriyā Ṣakti). And the latter is the basis of the Ṣaiva conception of the omnipotence of the Lord. The Bauddha criticism of the omnipotence was based upon the conception of action as serial, as seen from the empirical point of view. He denied the permanent subject, agent, doer or Kartā, to whom the action is related, simply for the reason that it is not an empirical fact. And the Ṣaiva reply to it is based upon the idealistic, voluntaristic and epistemic points of view, as is presented in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī. The establishment of the permanent subject, both individual and universal, is the central problem of the book, in opposition to the denial of it by the Bauddha from the empirical point of view. The Ṣaiva points out that the empirical point of view does not give us the whole truth, but only an aspect of it ; that it fails, particularly if it is mixed up with the theory of momentariness, to explain satisfactorily the phenomena of knowledge ; that it means the denial of all ethical values, because permanent subject that enjoys or suffers the fruits of action in future is the presupposition of ethics and that it means atheism.

The dualism of mind and matter or subject and object, without their essential identity and common substratum, cannot account for the relation between the subject and the object, nor can a momentary subject, whatever it be, account for the synthesis of percepts into a concept. The permanent subject, therefore, is an epistemic necessity and, therefore, a practical necessity also, because action presupposes knowledge of the thing towards which the activity is to be directed and also remembrance of the past experiences of it or of something similar to it, to determine the nature of the activity.

If, therefore, dualism and empiricism are to be rejected, and the abstract monism, that looks upon the whole universe as mere illusion, is unsatisfactory, because, according to extreme monism, there is nothing apart from the Mind on the basis of which illusion can arise, the Realistic Idealism or, to put it in Hegelian term, Concrete Monism as opposed to Abstract Monism appears to be a fair alternative to account for the phenomena of knowledge and practical life. But even concrete monism of the Hegelian type, which admits the Ultimate metaphysical principle to be purely rational, fails to explain the irrational, the existence of which cannot be denied. The ultimate metaphysical principle, therefore, has to be admitted to be 'Free' (Svatantra). Svātantryavāda, therefore, seems to be the only sound philosophy. This "Svātantrya" is the philosophic doctrine, which the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī presents.

Therefore, when it talks of the omnipotence of the Lord (Sarvakriyā sva tantra) it does not mean that the Lord has perfect freedom of action in regard to what exists separately from and more or less independently of Him and what would continue to exist even if He were not there, as the God of the dualists has in regard to the matter and the world that is created out of it. On the contrary, it means that the universe is the concretisation or manifestation of the free Universal Mind or Will ; that the universe has no existence separately from and independently of the Mind; that the relation between the Mind and the universe is similar to that between a mirror and the reflections which are cast on it; that the difference between the Mind and the mirror is that the affections of the latter are due to external objects, but those of the former are due to its own Freedom. Thus, the objection of the Bauddha: "How can the doer, in spite of his relation with action, which is serial in its nature, be spoken of as one ?" is answered in the very beginning of the Kriyādhikāra by asserting that just as the unity of mirror remains in tact in spite of affection by reflections of different kinds, so the unity of the Universal Mind or the Lord remains unaffected in spite of the appearance of the multiplicity of the universe in it.

Kriyāśakti is responsible for the manifestation of temporal and spatial orders and, therefore, it is free from the temporal and spatial limitation. The temporal and spatial orders shine in relation to the individual mind only. To the universal Mind the whole universe shines as identical with itself. In the context of Kriyāśakti some important philosophical problems such as that of the "Relation" including the relation of the subject and the object and of the cause and

the effect, are discussed. Here the characteristic doctrine of the system, technically called "Ābhāsavāda", is presented in detail: the three means of knowledge, perception, inference and scriptural authority, are discussed and the distinctive feature of the Śaiva theory of inference is pointed out: the essential nature of 'being' (Sattva) and that of 'Not-being' are stated and the distinction of these conceptions from those of the other schools is drawn: and in conclusion it is said: "Icchaiva hetutā Kartṛtā Kriyā".

THE LAST TWO ADHIKĀRAS

In the Āgamādhikāra, besides the presentation of the thirty-six categories, admitted by this system, the characteristic features of different types of 'subject' (Pramātṛ) and different levels of experience, at which these characteristics become clear, are described. The last Adhikāra, called "Tattva Saṅgraha" gives an illuminating summary of the system, discusses the essential nature of the three qualities, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas and concludes with a clear presentation of 'Recognition' (Pratyabhijñā) which constitutes a part of the title of the book "Īśvara Pratyabhijñā."

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ĪŚVARA PRATYABHIJÑĀ VIMARŚINĪ

JÑĀNĀDHIKĀRA

—:o:—

ĀHNIKA I

(1) I bow to that Absolute, which is unity of Paramaśiva and Śakti; the Unity, which from its ultimate state, first of all manifests the Pure Ego 'I' and then, through its will, divides its power into two; the Ultimate State, which, being without any manifestation, is self-contained and is responsible for Creation and Dissolution through the play and suspension respectively of its Power.

(2—4) Having been taught by Lakṣmaṇagupta, I, Abhinavagupta, grand-disciple of him, who wrote the flawless work, called Īśvarapratyabhijñā, am writing this brief commentary on his (Utpala's) work: the work which is a representation of the system of Somānanda, a gem in the family of Tryambaka, and is a means to the attainment of the purely subjective supreme human goal.

(5) Of this work, the author himself has given the substance in the Vṛtti and exposition in the Ṭīkā. I, therefore, in order to elucidate the concept of Recognition to people of slow understanding, shall fully explain the contents of the work as follows:--

(6) May this exposition be helpful to all people of slow understanding, or to some of keen understanding, but if to none, at least to myself.

Desiring to bring about in others the identification with the Highest Reality, the power of which he had himself realised within, and thinking that it could safely be brought about if he starts with referring to his own identification, the author, with a view to make others fit for the same, states the object. Here (in this verse) the statement of the object occupies a subordinate position to (the statement of) the realisation of identity with the highest aspect of the Ultimate :—

(1) "Having somehow realised my identity with the Supreme and wishing to render service to humanity, I am establishing 'Self-Recognition' which is a means of attaining all that is of value."

In this system, salutation means 'surrender' consisting in the dedication of body, speech and mind exclusively to Him. A wise man ought to make that surrender only if he realises the superiority of the object of his devotion to all others. Otherwise if he, unaware of any justification, bows to that which is not the supreme, he would fall in the category of ordinary men, as has been said :—

"Persons, affected by limited knowledge and attachment, do not reach the Supreme Deity."

In so far as he is impelled by the limited powers of knowledge, will and action, which are the creations of Māyā, he is still in bondage. But he might also be considered to be superior to others, because he has already passed some of the stages : as has been said by the illustrious Vidyāpati:—

"How can there arise the desire to praise any Boon-giver other than you, even through lower delusion, in him, who sees your glory unimpaired through the natural means of knowledge."

We shall deal with this topic in the Āgamakāṇḍa. Therefore, in any salutation a clear consciousness of superiority of the deity to others should be accepted as essential.

The All-Inclusive Universal Consciousness is spontaneously realised by him, on whom the higher Grace of God has fallen, and personal effort plays no part in it. For, all that being essentially a manifestation of Māyā, the principle of obscuration and, therefore, unilluminative like darkness, cannot be a means to the knowledge of the pure light, which is beyond Māyā and, therefore, is the opposite of the manifestation. The pure light, as presented above, should, however, be clearly apprehended by calling to mind some such word as 'Jayati' which stands for all-surpassing greatness, with a view to bringing it before one's own as well as other people's consciousness by means of inner visualisation and an outer expression respectively. Therefore, when a word, expressive of salutation, is used the meaning of 'Jayati' should be considered to be implied in it. Even while uttering the word 'jaya', if a person does not surrender himself to Him, who is possessed of Supreme Greatness, and remains indifferent to Him, he does a great disservice to himself. Therefore, (when 'jaya' is used) surrender, which is involved in the visualisation of Supreme Greatness, must be understood to be implied. Accordingly, when either 'jaya' or 'namaskāra' is used, the other should be necessarily considered to be implied. The same thing holds good of 'Vandana', 'Namana', 'Smaraṇa' and Pradhyāna etc.,

because their real meaning is nothing more than the feeling of surrender, coupled with the visualisation of the supremacy of the Supreme. Here, however, the author has adopted such a method that both these ideas are conveyed by means of direct expression. This will be made clear in the course of the explanation of the meanings of the words.

Reference by means of a conventional expression is reasonable, because it is good for all; indeed it goes straight, appeals, to the heart of everybody; an implied meaning, on the other hand, (appeals) only to that of some, because all cannot get at the implied meaning, which the power of visualisation (Pratibhā) alone arouses. And consciousness of the word which is devoid of 'meaning', is no consciousness at all. This will become clear in the sequel. With this idea in mind the author has followed this method of salutation, without the use of a well known word, such as 'Jaya' and 'Namas' etc.

In this world whatever enters into consciousness is a mere manifestation of the Self, the Ultimate Reality to be defined later. Amongst the manifested, the causal relation, such as exists between the means and the end and so on, is also real, because all this is a fact of consciousness and the reality of what enters into consciousness cannot be denied. This is what Bhatta Divākaravatsa has stated in his Vivekāñjana in the verses beginning with :—

"The objects shine"

and ending in :—

"It does not cease to be by a mere emphatic denial."

In the practical world, however, this causal relation often appears to be indirect, because of the appearance of the limited self, due to the multiplicity of the manifested, which is essentially the infinite group of powers, which are invariably within the Supreme Creative Power, characterized by Perfect Will. That indirect causality will be proved to be a manifestation of Māyā. It is of innumerable kinds, due to the innumerable subdivisions of the sentient and the insentient. It is this which is responsible for the relation between the creator and the created and the object and means of knowledge as we perceive in ordinary life.

Where, however, the unlimited light of Self, possessed of All-Transcending Power, which is nothing but the essential nature of the Pure Self, is the Cause, and there is no intervention of the limited self, a manifestation of Māyā, there the causality

is conceived to be that of the Supreme. This is called "Grace" the fifth and the last act of the Supreme Power, which leads to the attainment of the highest human goal. For, Perfect Freedom is due to that alone. As for the liberation taught by other systems, it will be said later that it is partial and not complete and, therefore, an illusory one. The Grace is the other causal relation: the Grace, which cannot be clearly conceived, because it is different from the well-known causal relation, established by invariable concomitance and logical discontinuance in ordinary life; the Grace, the essential nature of which is revealed by the liberation, which sometimes occurs ; the miraculous nature of which is due to the operation of the Supreme Creative Power, characterised by the bringing about of the impossible; and which cannot be attained merely by hundreds of longings for the removal of the beginningless dark veil, which hides the true nature of the Self. And it (the Grace) is referred to as such by the word 'Katham' together with the suggestive particle 'Cit'. The word "Kathañcit" means "somehow" by devotion, which is inspired by the Lord Himself, to the teacher who has identified himself with the Lord. As has been said :—

"The Union is very difficult to attain."

In the word 'āsādya' 'ā' means 'from all sides' i.e. completely', and sādayitvā (Sādya) means, 'having made it fully fit for realisation' by one's own self. Thus, because of his having known the knowable, his competence to present the system for others is shown. Otherwise, he would have been a mere deceiver. By means of the past time (which is expressed by 'lyap') immediate sequence is intended to be implied here. Otherwise the highest stage of identification having been reached and the affections of the impurities of Māyā having been destroyed, how could there remain the possibility of imparting instruction to others?

There do exist powerful deities within the sphere of Māyā, such as Viṣṇu, Viriñca etc. Further, there are beings partly pure, namely, Mantra, Mantreśa, and Mantra Maheśa, who are within the sphere of Mahāmāyā, beyond the Māyā; and finally, there are pure beings Sadāśiva etc. But Maheśvara is that glorious One, by the sparks of whose Power they have attained Godhead and whose essential nature is perfect Freedom, consisting in unbroken self-luminosity and self-consciousness (Ānanda). By speaking of identity with 'Him' the author indicates that establishing of His Recognition is of very great consequence. The word 'Dāsya' means a state of the 'devotee'

to whom the Lord gives all that is desired. By means of this word, the author represents himself to be the recipient of the perfect Power of Will, which is not different from the Highest Lord himself. The word 'Janasya' means 'of whatever that is born'. Thus, he means to point out that there is no restriction of any kind in regard to the right to follow this system. Whosoever realises the true nature of the Self, attains the highest goal, because self-realisation is the highest goal and that cannot be impeded by anything which is regarded as an impediment. For, whatever is realised is realised. It has been said :—

"Here no beginning is futile; nor is there any impediment. Even a little of this spiritual attainment saves a man from great fear."

My great-grand-teacher also has said in his Śivadṛṣṭi:—

"Once, one gets the unshakable knowledge of the Omnipresence of Śiva, through the means of right knowledge, scripture, or preceptorial instruction, the instruments of knowledge and meditation, become perfectly useless. For, once gold is known as such, are the instruments necessary to reveal its genuineness? At all times, the certainty is due to a firm belief, as in the case of one's parents etc."

The word 'janasya' means, of one who is constantly troubled by births and deaths. By this word, he declares the transmigrating souls to be deserving of help, because of their being objects of compassion. *The word 'api' indicates his identity with the Supreme and precludes the possibility of any other motive in him than the good of others; because he has attained perfection. The good of others is also really a motive, because the definition of motive applies to it. There is no divine curse that only one's own good can become a motive and not that of others. Even one's own good, if it does not come within the definition, is not a motive at all. That which is fixed upon as the main object of attainment and, therefore, urges one on to action, is motive (Prayojana). Hence the founder of the Nyāya system in order to show that, even according to Dualism, the motive of God in creating the world etc. is the good of others, has defined 'motive' as follows :—

"Motive is that, aiming at which man acts."

*According to Bhāskara the translation would be as follows:— The word 'api' indicates the author's identification with the persons to be helped and, therefore completely precludes the possibility of any other motive in him.

By means of the present participial affix (Śatṛ) in 'icchan' he points out that the object aimed at is the cause of action. We shall show that the will-power as it gradually grows, develops into the power of action. The word 'Upa' means 'near'. Therefore, the aim here is to bring the ordinary mortal nearer the state of the Highest Reality. Therefore, it is that he used the word 'all' (samasta). Once the state of the Highest Reality is reached, all attainable things, which merely flow from it, are automatically attained, just as all the gems are, when the mountain of gems, called 'Rohaṇa', is acquired. To one who has missed the Highest Reality, namely, the Self, other attainments are useless. By one who has attained that Highest Reality, there is nothing else to be desired. As the author himself has stated :—

"Those who are rich in the wealth of devotion have nothing left to be desired. To those who are poor in it, what is the use of a quest for other things?"

Thus, by taking 'samasta' etc., as a genitive compound, the purpose has been stated: but, by taking it as an attributive compound, the means is indicated:— "That Recognition of the Ultimate, in which (yasyām) the clear consciousness (Samavāpti) of the essential nature (sampat) of the external and internal objects, both existing and non-existing, such as 'blue' and 'pleasure' etc. (Samasta) is the cause (hetu)." Indeed, it is taught in this system that the attainment of the true self is possible only through an investigation of the ultimate source of the knowledge of 'blue' and 'pleasure' etc. which so distinctly affect the consciousness. As has been stated elsewhere :—

"The ultimate end of all objective consciousness, 'this', is its merging in the Self. The consciousness 'I am that' stands for it."

In the same context it is further stated :—

"Ahambhāva has been declared to be the merging of the object in the subject. The same is called the rest (viśrānti) the perfect Freedom, the supreme causal agency and supreme creative power, because it involves the disappearance of all desires".

By this, all apprehension that the means is difficult to adopt, has been set aside. He will state at the end of the work:—

"This new path is smooth" (4-1-16).

"Tasya" means 'of Maheśvara'. '*Recognition*' means shining (Jñā-jñāna) as facing oneself (ābhimukhyena) of what was forgotten. "Pratīpam" implies that it is not that the consciousness

as the object & the subject become one.

of the Self has never before been a fact of experience, because it always shines; but that, as will be explained later, through His own power, it appears as though cut off, or limited. Recognition consists in the unification of what appeared once with what appears now, as in the judgment "This is the same Caitra". It is a cognition, which refers to an object, which is directly present. It is reached through unification of experiences. In ordinary life, in such statements as "So and so has been made to be recognised by the king" recognition means cognition, consisting in unification of experiences at the time of the subsequent apprehension of one who was known before, either in general terms or in particular, as the son of so and so, of such and such description and qualities. In the present context also the knowledge of the Lord as possessed of Supreme Power, having been got through the well known Purāṇas, Siddhānta, Āgama and inference etc., and the immediate apprehension of one's own self being always there, recognition arises through the unification of the two experiences in the form : "Certainly I am that very Lord". "I shall establish that Recognition". In 'Upapādayāmi' the root with prefix (upapad-upapatti) means potential existence. The causal affix means that potentiality being there, I, through my causal agency, bring it into play. Indeed, there is the potentiality of recognition, because the Self is ever shining. Bringing about is no more than the removal of the influence of Māyā, which is considered to be a force of obscuration. The active voice has been used in 'upapādayāmi' because in the bringing about of recognition, the distinction between oneself and others being absent (in the agent), there is no possibility of the agent's being affected by any purpose etc.

The following is the prose-order of this stanza : —

"Having somehow got union with the Highest, which is the cause of the attainment of all that is attainable, and desiring the benefit of ordinary mortals by helping them in getting union with the Highest Reality, which is the means of attaining all that is attainable, through somehow bringing about His recognition, I establish His Recognition which is the means of attainment of all that is attainable."

In the word 'āsādya' when it is used in the construction a second time, there are two causal affixes (ṇic).

The writer of the Vṛtti has not taken the trouble of giving such a detailed explanation, because his object was simply to state the implication. This is what has been said : —

"(In the Vṛtti) which is intended to explain briefly what is obscure in the aphorisms."

The writer of the Ṭīkā also, being concerned with the exposition of the Vṛtti only, has not touched this point. We have, however, explained it in detail, because our attempt is to give a full exposition of the aphorism. This holds good everywhere.

Thus, in this verse, the subject-matter, the object, its object and the object of the latter, the statement of the qualification of the person, for whom this system is meant, the preceptorial line and the relation are shown. By dissolving the compound as an instrumental attributive, the means to a spiritual path has been determined. The objective world, (represented by 'blue' 'pleasure' etc.) constitutes the entire possession, and is at first the cause of sin and merit etc., the root cause of transmigration. By this Śāstra the same is made to be recognised as the sure means to spiritual path. Thus, the author who, at the end of the work, refers to his power of accomplishing what is difficult by the words "New Path" (4.1.16), has indicated that the statement of means is the subject-matter of the work. That is why he will begin another stanza with the words :—

"Thus, of the insentient" (1.1.4.)

The object is the knowledge of the means of recognition; the object of the object is the recognition itself, the object of the latter is the exclusive consciousness of the Ultimate Reality, which is all that is attainable. There is nothing beyond it, because even a fraction of it is the ultimate goal of all goals. This is what I have myself said in a Stotra :—

"O Lord! the ultimate aim of all worldly or religious acts is the identification with you. Those who seek some other end in this unification also, will ever remain in a state of ignorance."

He will himself say later on in a hemistich.

"Therefore, setting foot on that." (4. 1. 16.)

By the word 'of the ordinary mortal' (janasya) the person, for whom the system is meant, is indicated, as he will say in conclusion : —

"Always concentrating on this" (4. 2. 1.)

By the word 'somehow' (kathañcit) the preceptorial line is shown; as he will say : —

"As the great teacher has said in his work, the Śivadṛṣṭi." (4.2.1.)

This stanza, because it puts together all that is to be said about 'recognition' is a summary statement of the subject-matter

and authorial undertaking. The mid-portion of the work states the reasons etc., and the last verse:—

"Thus I have shown" etc. (4. 1. 16.)

is the conclusion. Thus, this work, which presents the subject-matter in a syllogistic form including five terms has the instruction of others as its object. The idea of the author that in the creations of Māyā, the point of view of the Naiyāyika is the right one, will become clear in such statement as "Action, Relation, Generality." (2. 2. 1.)

This is the substance of the work.

Just as a good man, familiar with the lord of the land, brings about the approach of an ordinary mortal, endowed with the qualities of a servant, to the lord and reveals the lord as possessed of the group of qualities such as approachability to the ordinary mortal: so the author, who has realised the Supreme, being a good man, brings about the recognition of the Supreme by the ordinary man. This much meaning is conveyed by the dissolution of 'Tatpratyabhijñā' as the genitive determinative compound "His Recognition".

At the time of hearing this stanza the identity of the pupils with the Ultimate takes place through understanding of this śloka. That is as follows:— On hearing the word "of the ordinary mortal (janasya)" the meaning of the treatise on the system is reflected in the consciousness of the deserving disciple, as a reflection on the mirror; not when he takes it indifferently, but when the third person of the various tenses 'loṭ', 'liṅ' etc. appeals to him as the first person, as follows:—

"We are the persons, who are troubled by birth and death and have various kinds of attachments. This teacher, desiring our benefit, having realised his identity with the Supreme, establishes His Recognition, which is the means of attaining all that is attainable and, therefore, we have as good as attained His Recognition of the above nature."

Otherwise, there would be no difference between the meanings understood by the deserving and the undeserving.

When the meaning of the sentence 'Persons, desiring health, should use the yellow myrobalan' or 'You should use the yellow myrobalan' appears in the consciousness of the deserving as "Let us use etc.", that is the second stage. But the second stage will be reached only by him, who imagines himself to be free from the limitations of time, as he really is, who believes that the third stage, namely, the use of the yellow myrobalan, is the

attainment of the end, which is really reached only in the fourth stage; and whose knowledge is free from all limitations and, therefore, beautiful, because of his having realised perfection within himself. Others are undeserving; because they are really indifferent, and, therefore, are not of this nature. This will suffice; because it is a digression and rather abstruse. Thus, the point is established. By means of this śloka, the approach of the disciples to the Lord is brought about, and the object etc. are stated. (1)

"We always praise that Śiva, whose initial Creative Stir (param spandanam) is the beginning of the manifestation of the innumerable variety of objects."

Well, first of all, Īśvara has to be proved.

What is meant by proving (Siddhi)? It cannot mean 'bringing into being', because He is eternal. Even those who prove the existence of the Supreme do not bring Him into being. But if you mean by the word 'proving' 'revealing', it is of no use in the case of Him who is of unlimited light, because proving consists in throwing light by means of right knowledge.

How do you know that His light is unlimited? For, we do not see His light in ordinary objects like 'blue' and 'pleasure'. Still less we do so in deep sleep and unconsciousness, where the wordly objects do not appear at all. Even if the Supreme be self-shining, why is it that the cognitive activity of the subject in reference to Him is useless? With this objection in mind, the author says :—

(i) "Which sentient being can prove or disprove the Supreme Lord, who is essentially Omnipotent, omniscient and eternal ?"

The Universe being merely His manifestation, who, by what means of knowledge, regarding what kind of Lord can advance proof or disproof, leading to the knowledge of His being or not-being ? If you say "The subject" what is that? Is it the insentient body etc. or something different from them, called by some such word as 'self' ? And is that too essentially self-shining or not? If it be the insentient body etc., how can that, not being self-shining, make something else shine? The self also, if it be not self-shining, would naturally be insentient and, therefore, no better than the former. If it be essentially self-shining; (the question will arise) "What is the essential nature of its self-shining?" If it shines merely in the form of unchanging pure consciousness, then the differentiation of cognitions and the putting together of the differentiated by internal unification,

will not be possible. Therefore, it has to be admitted that it shines as free self-shining entity. Shining as such, what kind of Lord will it prove or disprove? If it be one that knows and acts i.e. possesses the powers of knowledge and action, the subject itself being such, how is the Lord different from it? It cannot be argued that the subject is neither omniscient nor omnipotent; because, the 'meaning' of the word 'omni' (Sarva) does not imply any difference in the essential nature of the powers of action and knowledge. For, even according to the dualistic system, the knowledge, desire and action of the Lord, being eternal, are not affected i.e. added to, in any way by the objects, which are not their causes. If it be said that the objectivity of an object consists in being made to shine (by the subject), we will reply that what is essentially not-light cannot be made to shine. But if the object be held to be of the nature of light, then it is light in every way. Thus the ultimate truth being that the light shines, what would be the essential distinction between all-knowing and one who knows little. The same question as to whether it is self-shining or not may be raised in regard to the means of right knowledge and in the case of the proving (siddhi) itself also. Therefore, assuming the form of what is ordinarily known as the object, the Self itself shines, free from all limitations. It shines even to one who is in deep sleep (I) because otherwise, the remembrance of it would be impossible, (II) because the light is eternal, as there is nothing to limit it: and (III) because it shines to other subjects. As for the difference of subjects from one another, which is due to Prakāśa itself, it will be represented to be a manifestation of Māyā.

He (The Lord) is free. And it will be explained that His Freedom is manifold and consists in bringing about diversity in unity and unity in diversity by internal unification. The word Kartari' has been put first, because this represents His omnipotential ultimate nature, which consists in 'Ānanda', "Freedom". To point out an aspect of that very Freedom, the word 'jñatari' has been used later. It will be explained later that action is essentially an offshoot of knowledge. Therefore, the words 'kartari' and 'jñatari' in the text mean the same thing as "the one who is perfectly free in all actions, and is omnipotent". This very Freedom constitutes the essential nature of consciousness (Saṁvid). It will be stated later that if it be referred to by the word 'Saṁvit', then that would mean that it is an object of determinate knowledge and, therefore, objective and created, and as such it is not the ultimate Reality. The use of the nominative forms 'Kartā' 'Jñātā' and 'Maheśvara', would involve

the same difficulty. Therefore, an effort had to be made as far as possible, to avoid the taint of degradation consisting in bringing it down to the state of objectivity. Therefore, reference has been made in a case, expressive of an accomplished state because, at the time of instruction, it is impossible to avoid objectivity in every way.

By the word 'Svātmani' which means 'in his own unchanging nature', there is a refutation of the insentient self, accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas etc. 'Ādisiddhe' means 'of the unlimited light'. The Supreme Creative Power implied by the word 'maheśvare' consists in manifesting oneself as omniscient and omnipotent on account of having unlimited light. The word 'Ajaḍātmā' implies : "Let the Vaiśeṣikas etc., according to whom self is really insentient, try to prove the Lord. And let the Sāṅkhya disprove Him. For, the Sāṅkhya also in holding the cognition, (jañāna) the nature of which is to illumine objects, to be a quality of the Buddhi, really declares the Self to be insentient. And an insentient self, which can hardly shine itself independently, cannot, like a stone, prove or disprove anything." Nor can one, according to whom the self is sentient, do this. For, how would he, being an Ajaḍātmavādin, prove the Self? The reason may be stated as follows:—

If the Self, as conceived by him, appears to him as new, it would mean that it did not shine before, and if it did not shine before, it comes to be insentient. And how would he, being an Ajaḍātmavādin, disprove ? For, if it does not shine, it is insentient and it has already been said that neither the insentient nor the sentient can do it (i.e. prove or disprove Maheśvara). Therefore, the light of the external object is non-different from the light of the Self. It has no truly independent existence. And the Self is nothing but light. Therefore, just as there is no activity of a causal agent in relation to Maheśvara, so there is neither that of the means of right knowledge; because He is eternal and self-shining. (1)

But if neither the causal agent nor the means of right knowledge can be operative in relation to Maheśvara, what is then the nature of the activity which is referred to in the statement "I shall help in bringing about His recognition "? To this objection the author replies as follows:—

(2) **"But the help in bringing about the recognition of Self is nothing but bringing to notice the powers of Self, which, though known, yet is not fully realised, because its powers are obscured by the veil of Māyā."**

There is no doubt about it that the Self, which is omnipotent, manifests itself. It is free in its manifestation; therefore, there is no form in which it does not manifest itself. It shines in forms, which are self-luminous, as well as those which lack luminosity. While manifesting itself as self-luminous it manifests itself as either wholly self-luminous or as partly so. In manifesting itself as partly self-luminous, it manifests itself either as distinct from the rest (e.g. jiva) or as identical with them (e.g. Mantramaheśa). It also manifests itself as distinct from some (e.g. Vidyeśvara) or as identical with some (e.g. Vijñānākala) or as including within itself all the forms, mentioned above. Thus there are seven forms.

Of these the first is insentient (jaḍa) and the last is the Absolute (Paramaśiva). But those which come in between these two are the limited sentient beings (jīvas). That very power of the Great Lord, which is responsible for obscuration, and is called Māyā, partly obscures the Self, which is ever self-luminous. Self, therefore, is not fully visualised, is not realised in all its aspects, and consequently it has no causal efficiency, such as it shows when it is fully realised. Hence, in order to arouse the consciousness of perfection of Self, the way to recognition, which has been explained already (in the 1st verse), is being shown. How? By exposing to view the perfect powers of knowledge and action, which are known to belong to the Lord. For, that which can be brought about by full conviction cannot be produced unless that conviction itself is produced. Accordingly the author gives an illustration :—"By those various entreaties" etc.

The crux of the whole discussion may be stated as follows:—

The act of bringing about recognition of the Lord, is not the act of causal agent, nor that of one who makes things known. It is simply the removal of the ignorance. For, the efficiency of the means of right knowledge, on which the practical life depends, consists in that much only. For instance, the statement, "this, that lies in front, is a jar, because it is directly perceived" does not make the jar known. For, it is already known; because otherwise, the reason (because it is directly perceived) would be non-existent in the minor term. It simply removes the ignorance. Both, the ignorance and its removal, are simply manifestations of the Lord and nothing more. This has already been stated and shall also be asserted later on. (2)

Here one may ask: among the multiple objects of experience, whose power is revealed and to whom? For, there is no difference of opinion on this that insentients do not possess the power of knowledge. And the power of action also, which owes

its being to freedom, is impossible in them, because they have lost their freedom. It is for this reason that some maintain that in statements such as "Chariot is going" the use of the verb "go" is due to transference of epithet (upacāra). The position, therefore, that the power is revealed to the insentients is not at all reasonable. But if it be said that both have reference to the sentient living beings, then the hope to establish that Maheśvara is the Self of all becomes still more distant. Having raised this question, the author replies as follows:—

(3) **"The being of the insentient depends entirely on the sentient; and (the powers of) knowledge and action are the very life of the sentient beings."**

The word "Tathāhi" indicates the commencement of the argument. It means "look here". Others hold that the word 'Tathā' indicates what is to be proved and the word "hi" stands for the reason. It means that the statement of major term has the support of reason. Or the word 'Tathāhi' means that all that has been said is right, in view of the reasons, which are going to be stated in the book, which is, as yet, only in the mind of the author and is tried to be brought before the mind's eye

It is to be admitted that the multiplicity of the objects of world is as it is determinately apprehended; because the being, (Astitva), which depends on the light of consciousness (Prakāśa), shines on the basis of determinate cognition, which refers to objects of experience. For, otherwise what will be the reply if some one were to ask:—"Why is it that what has not been determinately apprehended is neither blue nor yellow, neither of the nature of 'being' nor that of 'not-being'?" Therefore, a thing is as it is determinately apprehended, for as long a time as it remains uncontradicted. Hence it is that it will be asserted in the sequel, in the verse: "Action, relation and universal" that substance, action and relation which involve temporal and spatial order, are real; because, every one of them shines in a separate determinate cognition.

Therefore, the whole of this vast universe, can be divided into (i) insentient and (ii) sentient, if we take a summary view of it. Of these also, the insentients, as objects of determinate cognition, have no independent being. For, objectivity to cognition is not their inherent quality, because in that case they will cease to be insentient. The insentients, though they are essentially of the nature of consciousness (Cinmayatvepi); yet they are reduced to the state of insentiency by the power of the Lord, called Māyā. They, therefore, have their being only as related to and dependent

upon sentient subject, as is testified by perceptual judgements such as "the blue shines to me" and "the blue is the object of my knowledge." Hence the insentients have no separate independent being. This is what the author himself has said in the following verse:—

"Thus, these insentients, which are as good as non-existent in themselves, have their being only in relation to Light of consciousness (Prakāśa). Light of consciousness alone has independent being and shines as both self and not-self."

That alone has independent being which shines independently of others. And because the so-called insentient is nothing independently of the Light of consciousness, therefore, the view that the power of insentients is revealed to insentients is baseless. As regards those which are known to be sentients as distinct from the insentients, their bodies, vital airs, group of eight (Puryaṣṭaka) and nihility (Śūnya) are insentient. Therefore, we cannot attribute powers of knowledge and action to them. Hence only that, on the background of which alone the so-called existing things, such as jar, body, vital air and pleasure and their not-being, shine, is sentient and true. And although apparently it appears to be multiple, yet its multiplicity is due to the limiting conditions, constituted by body etc., which are essentially insentient. Hence its multiplicity is unreal, because it involves logical fallacy, called "Anyonyāśraya". For, variety of the sentients is due to variety of the insentients, and the difference of the insentients is due to that of the sentients e. g. "this is his body" and "this is his object of knowledge". The variety of particular objects such as blue and yellow; as it shines on the background of subject, so it has multiplicity only. What of that? Therefore, it is established that all the individual subjects are really one and that subject is characterised by life. And life consists in doing the act of living in the form of knowing and acting. For, only he is said to be living who knows and acts. Therefore, the individual subject is to be looked upon as Lord (because he possesses the powers of knowledge and action) like the Lord, of whom we know from Purāṇa and Itihāsa. Even if He be not known as such from the Purāṇic tradition, He has to be admitted as such. For, lordliness (aiśvarya) is essentially nothing more than the possession of powers of knowledge and action, in relation to all objects, because it is dependent on that much only. The basis of this admission is the knowledge of invariable concomitance of the two, acquired from such instances as acknowledged king etc. e.g. "He, who has freedom of knowing and acting in a particular

field, is the lord of it, like a king" : because it is against the essential nature of one who is not lord to have freedom of knowledge and action. And it is the self which knows and acts in all fields. Therefore, this doctrine of recognition is proved.

The two transcendental categories: (I) Sadāśiva and (II) Īśvara, are nothing more than powers of knowledge and action respectively, before the rise of gross distinction between them and their objects, Vidyā and Kalā are due to the rise of general distinction between them and their objects. Similarly the group of powers of sense-organs and organs of action is due to the rise of specific distinction. At the time of imparting instruction there is the consciousness of distinction between the insentient as lifeless and the sentient as living, but there is no consciousness of Saṁvit (in its essential nature, as one which manifests itself in all forms). Hence the word "jīvatām" in the text stands for the sentient subjects. (3)

But it may be asked: how do you establish the existence of powers of knowledge and action (in the individual subject) which alone can justify the attribution of possession of lordliness to him? To answer this question the author says : —

(4) **" Of these (the power of) knowledge is self-established ; and so also is (the power of) action. The latter, when associated with a particular body, is perceptible to other limited perceivers. From that the presence of (the power of) knowledge in others is guessed."**

All the three forms of cognition:(I) I know (II) I knew (III) I shall know, shine on the background of self-luminous self-consciousness only. There is nothing more to be discussed about it. For, if the self were not shining, the whole world would be nothing but mass of darkness, or it would not be even that. Even (the Statement of) a child conveys the idea of self-luminosity of self. This is what is asserted in : —

"Through what means of knowledge can the knower be known."

If we deny self-shining nature to subject, there remains no room for question and answer. In the cognitive experience such as "I know" there is consciousness (not only of self-luminous self but) of association with a stir (Spanda) also. It is because of this stir that self is admitted to be of sentient nature, as distinct from the qualities such as white etc., which are extremely

insentient. This stir is technically called "Vimarśa". It is the power of action. This is what has been asserted by our great-grand-teacher, Somānanda : —

"At the time of cognition of jar etc. the subjective stir in relation to jar is action."

Therefore, internal power of action, like that of cognition, is self-established and self-shining. That very internal power of action, because of its inherent power, enters into body, through vital air and 'the group of eight', and being of stirring nature in itself, becomes directly perceptible as physical action in the sphere of Māyā. That physical action, when seen in another person's body, logically makes us guess (the presence of) the power of knowledge (jñāna) which is its essential nature. And the light of consciousness (jñāna) does not shine as "this". For, "thisness" is negation of knowledge (ajñāna). And a thing that is cognised in the form of something else cannot be said to be truly cognised. But the fact that the light of consciousness shines, cannot be denied. And that which shines is the essential nature of the subject. Hence the light of consciousness, which is associated with another person at the empirical level, is non-different from the light of consciousness of the cognising subject. The otherness is due to the limiting conditions of it. And if we proceed to think rationally, we discover that the limiting condition itself is non-different from Self. Hence, from the philosophical point of view, all the subjects are One. That One alone is. This is asserted in the following :—

"It is one and the same Self that shines as one's own self as well as selves of others."

Therefore, all knowledge, whether it be in Sadāśiva or in a worm, is the knowledge of one knower. Hence the omniscience of the subject is established as a conclusion from the premises. The same can be asserted in regard to the action of the subject. This is, what has been asserted by our great-grand-teacher in his Śivadṛṣṭi : —

"Jar (is one with myself at the time of my desire to know and therefore) knows as one with myself. And I am one with jar in knowing. Sadāśiva knows as myself. And I know as Sadāśiva. Śiva alone shines, knowing himself through the multiplicity of objects."etc.

The word 'is guessed' (Ūhyate) indicates that the power of knowledge is not an object of any means of right knowledge. Otherwise he would have used the word "is inferred" (Anumīyate)

Thus, those, who have not been altogether blinded by (the fall of dust of) discourse of logicians to this path, enter into Him when they realise through the above dialectic the identity of the individual self and the universal and merge everything, such as jar , body, vital air and pleasure and even their not-being, in Him. Therefore, this is introduction (upodghāta), because, like a chisel, it is instrumental in bringing out the distinctive features of the rise (Utkarṣa), due to recognition. This much alone is the purpose of this book.

It (the first Āhnika) can be spoken of as an introduction for the reason that through brief presentation of the system, it removes ignorance about what is primarily to be presented in the book; or the root 'Han' may be taken to mean 'to know', because it means to go; and, therefore, it may be called introduction, because through this the purpert of the book is known. Some, however, hold that the meaning of 'Han' 'to go' is limited to going to women. Thus, through undisturbed contemplation on the meaning of the above four verses Paramaśiva is attained. The Chapter ends (4).

Here ends the first, the introductory, chapter of the jñānādhikāra (section dealing with the power of knowledge) in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, written by illustrious teacher, Abhinavagupta, who was a pupil of illustrious teacher, Lakṣmaṇagupta, who himself was a pupil of illustrious teacher, Utpaladeva. (1)

ĀHNIKA II

We bow to that Śiva who, having manifested the diversity of the universe as the *prima facie* view, leads it up to unity, the real view.

The ultimate Reality, conceived by this system, is made quite clear if the opposite views are first postulated and then refuted. As Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa has said :—

"Homage to the Deity, which at first creates the illusion for those who are deluded in the world and then dispels it, and which at first conceals the unitary bliss of pure Self-Consciousness and then reveals it."

Here the author, wishing to reveal the Reality after having dispelled the illusion of those who deny both the Self and God, presents the illusion in eleven verses, beginning with "Nanu svalakṣaṇābhāsam" and ending in "Tena kartāpi kalpitaḥ". In the first two verses, the being of the eternal Self, as conceived by those who maintain the direct perceptibility of the self, is denied, because it is not perceived as such. In the next three verses the position of those who maintain the inferability of the self is refuted, on the ground that the unification of experiences, involved in remembrance, can be explained in terms of the residual traces and, therefore, is not sufficient for the inference of the self. In the next one, the inference, that through the qualities, like knowledge etc., the substratum can be inferred, is refuted. Having thus refuted the self, the next two verses make it clear that the conception of 'knowledge' as distinct from the self, as held by other opponents (Vaiśeṣika) as well as the Sāṅkhya conception of it, do not stand to reason. This is done only to refute the view that the Ultimate is Omnipotent and Omniscient, because of the possession of powers of knowledge and action. In the next one, it is declared that action as such has no external existence anywhere. Having refuted the arguments in support of it, he states the arguments against it. Then in the next verse, he denies the existence of relation on the ground that there is no proof in support of it. Then in the next verse, he gives the argument against it. The last verse states the Buddhistic theory that there is no eternal Self nor are knowledge and action its characteristics. This is the summary of the *prima facie* view.

Now the meaning of the text is being explained.

(1-2) "The objector says—"Indeterminate cognition has no variety. But the determinate cognition, which admits of linguistic expression, is of many kinds. Neither belongs to an eternal

experiencer, because none such is experienced. The I—consciousness has reference only to the body etc."

"Nanu" means objection. It has been stated that the self which is essentially consciousness, is permanent. But that is not right. For, such an eternal self-luminous self is not experienced. It is as follows:—

Cognitions (jñāna) alone shine, associated with different times, objects and forms, such as indeterminate cognition of jar, determinate cognition of it, recognition of it, remembrance of it and imagination of it. Indeterminate knowledge of 'blue' is that in which the characteristics of the object of knowledge are cognised as common to nothing else,(Svalakṣaṇābhāsam jñānam). "Sva" means not applicable to others, i.e., self-confined. "Lakṣaṇa" consists of limitations of time, space and form. Ābhāsa means light of the object facing the subject. Thus, indeterminate knowledge is that extrovert light of consciousness, wherein 'svalakṣaṇa' as defined above, shines. Its essential nature does not change in spite of the change in the object. For, there is no cause to bring about any variety in its nature. In the case of determinate knowledge, expression is the cause of variety; but that is absent here. For, expression is not an attribute of the object, the 'blue'; nor is it perceived by the eye. Therefore, it is something which was known before and is to be remembered now. In the absence of the revival of the residual trace, there is no remembrance. The revival is due to the determinate perception of the object. Therefore, at the time of the indeterminate perception of object, there is no remembrance of the expression.

Determinate knowledge is different from it. For, all determinate knowledge springs from the indeterminate directly or indirectly. The word "param" means "of a different nature". The object of determinate knowledge is a thing, which is characterised by a universal. "Svalakṣaṇa" is extremely self-confined. Hence, there is no possibility of the use of conventional expression in regard to indeterminate cognition; because whether it be acquired through the observations of the transactions of the elders or through teaching, it involves elaborate determinate knowledge. Even if it be used, it would serve no useful purpose, because it cannot be applied to another object and, therefore, cannot be used in practical life.

Determinate knowledge is of many kinds, because it is invariably associated with expression, which is nothing more than inner speech. Expression is of many kinds : "this, that, that is

this, it may be this, this or this etc.". It (the expression) does not belong to the object ; on the contrary, it gives variety of forms to cognition. Hence determinate knowledge is of various kinds. Thus, the chain of indeterminate and determinate cognitions is self-shining.

It may be so. But the view that the substratum of these cognitions is also self-shining is not sound: because both these types of cognition, the determinate and the indeterminate, are not related to any cogniser different from themselves. If we accept the theory of the existence of the external object, they may be spoken of as related to the perceptible. The reason is this:—The cogniser is admitted to be essentially of the nature of consciousness. This implies that it is self-shining. As such, it should be cognisable. But there is no consciousness of it in either of these two types of cognition. It cannot be maintained that this negative reasoning is invalid, because the self does shine, as in the following:—"I know, I am certain, I remember this". In all these forms of cognition the persisting "I" shines as persisting through all of them. It is distinct from the direct apprehension and remembrance etc., which represent the meanings of the roots "Vid" etc., as also from the thing which is the object of cognitive activity such as "this". Who says it shines? For, "to shine" is indeterminacy, but the self-consciousness is a form of determinate knowledge, because it is associated with the expression 'I'. Even then it may be asked : "What does this word 'I' determine"? does it determine the chain of physical consciousness, because the 'I-consciousness' is associated with it, as in 'I am thin' : or does it determine the chain of feelings, because of the experience "I am happy, etc.?" For, the possessive affix refers to the chain only and nothing outside. This has been asserted (in kārikā) in "Even the self-consciousness refers to the body". By the word 'etc.' (ādi) feeling is implied. Surely, the "I" determines it (body etc.) as a chain, because the 'I-consciousness' is affected by the residual traces, due to the past experiences of the different similar moments in the chain. "This" (eṣā) means that which is not denied by us, because it is implied in the statement;—"Determinate knowledge is associated with expressions". The crux may be stated as follows:—

The I—consciousness itself is not the self, because it is a determinate cognition and it is transitory in its nature. There is nothing different from body etc. which is referred to by this "I-consciousness". And even if there be, it would be objective in its nature. Thus no self, different from the cognition and the

object thereof, is established. This is the implication of the word "api". Therefore, there is no self, different from the cognition and its object, because it is not experienced as it should be (1—2).

Now the upholder of the self takes recourse to inference.

(3) **"If the experiencing self were not permanent, how can there be the rise of memory, which so closely resembles direct perception, and is consequent on the destruction of the direct experience ?"**

It is immaterial whether the object of remembrance persists or does not, at the time of recollection. But there is no difference of opinion on this point that the experience does not persist. And remembrance closely follows the direct perception. It is as follows :—

In remembrance the object does not shine indeterminately; nor is there any determinative activity related to it; nor do the object and the experience shine separately like two fingures; nor does the object shine as qualified by the experience, as does the man by the stick; because then the judgment would be 'this'.

In memory, the direct experience shines predominantly. But as (the light of) the object is an essential constituent of the experience, so that object invariably shines in the experience. If, however, the experience be destroyed in every way, how can remembrance, in which the chief element is the former experience, have objective reference through it? All worldly transactions depend on memory. Its being cannot, therefore, be denied. It is , therefore, indicative of the existence of something after the destruction of experience. And that something is the experiencer, the essential nature of which is to experience. That is the permanent experiencing self. This is the whole basis of the proof of the existence of the self. More than this has not been mentioned by the author here in order that the statement of the *prima facie* view may not end here; because subsequently he wants to say something more, that remains. The implication of 'how can there be' (katham bhavet) may be stated as follows:—

The object can in no way be responsible for memory. And the experience has been destroyed. The rise of memory, therefore, would be out of the question. In the absence of it there would be no determinate knowledge, which depends upon the memory of the conventional expression. In the absence of the determinate knowledge, people would be no better than the blind, the deaf and the dumb, and would perish without being able to cry for help. (3)

The cause, as distinct from the effect, has to be so conceived as to be efficient to bring about the effect. The self is not such (as can account for remembrance). The object is surely remembered and that is through the shining of the direct experience. It has been said that the direct experience is gone. Therefore, even if there be something like self, what of that ? One might as well say that ether (Ākāśa) also exists. If it be said: "It (memory) is to be accounted for, not by the mere self, but the residual traces also play a part in it". Well then, let that alone be admitted. What is the use of this (self) ? This is presented in the following verse:—

(4) **"Even if there be a self, the direct experience being destroyed, how could there be memory of things, experienced through that? But if it be said that memory also refers to the same as does the direct experience."**

In the remembrance of the seen, i.e. objects of direct experience, the direct experience is the means of its relation to the object. And that experience is lost, though the self may persist. For, if that be not lost, the object would continuously shine as "this". Therefore, there would be no remembrance. How can, therefore, the (admission of) Experiencer explain it?

"Tatpadā" is an attributive compound. It means: the object of remembrance, the remembered, is the same as that of direct experience. "Sā" stands for remembrance. (4)

The objection, "How can memory claim to have the same object as that of some other cognition?", is answered as follows:--

(5) **"Because the rise of memory is due to the residual traces of the former direct experience."**

(Reply to the above). **"If it be so, why then admit the useless permanent self ?"**

The direct experience produces a befitting residual trace and this residual trace (Saṁskāra) is responsible for the restoration of the former condition (of the subject) as in the case of the branch of a tree forced down, or the birch-bark, kept rolled up for long and then spread out. Therefore, in the present case also, the residual trace, will make the memory conform to the former experience. Thus the object of the direct experience becomes the object of memory.

If so, what is the use of the self? For, just as carrying of a useless thing means unnecessary trouble, so the admission of permanent self means unnecessary and troublesome speculation. All worldly transactions can be accounted for in terms of residual traces. (5)

The objection:—But the substratum of the residual trace has to be stated. For, the residual trace is a quality and, therefore, needs a substratum. That substratum itself is the self (Ātmā). To this objection the author replies as follows:—

(6) "Though the residual traces be admitted to be different from self, yet, there being no change in the essential nature of self (due to residual traces), remembrance has to be admitted to be due to residual trace. Hence the separate rememberer is a mere supposition just like the doer."

If in consequence of the rise of residual trace some change takes place in the self, that change being in the self itself, it cannot be maintained to be eternal. But if it be asserted that the self remains unaffected (by the residual trace), then it is useless for the self. If (following the Vaiśeṣika) the residual trace be admitted to be a particularity of self, then it means that self is not different from other changing things; that residual traces arise in sentient self and that it is transient. For, the (admission of) residual trace implies that it is distinct from direct experience and that it indirectly produces a peculiar effect, called remembrance. But if it be asserted that Viśeṣa (as admitted by the Vaiśeṣika) is distinct from self. What is it then to self ? And we shall combat the view of independent being of relation. The same may be asserted about cognition, pleasure, desire, aversion, effort, merit and demerit.

The crux is this:—

Therefore, even if we admit the attributes to be distinct from self, there being no change in the essential nature of self in spite of their presence, self cannot be said to remember, because its original unremembering and unaffectable nature is intact. Therefore, memory can be established on the basis of residual traces only. And the rememberer, who figures in judgment: "I remember," is identical with either the physical or the cognitional chain. Hence it is like perceiver. For, it has been stated in an earlier verse that the "I—Consciousness" refers to body etc. Thus, all arguments, based on perception and inference, in support of the existence of self, have been refuted. And some arguments against it have been hinted at: (I) If self is affected by qualities, it ceases to be eternal: (II) Otherwise (if it retains its original nature in spite of affection by qualities) the admission of affection is meaningless. This is asserted in the following:—

"If it (self) be like skin it is transcient. If it be like ether (kha) it is as good as nought. For, ether is unaffected by heat and shower. Their effect is on skin only" (6).

Thus, after refuting (the existence of) self, in order to refute its possession of powers, the opponent examines omniscience as follows:—

(7) "And if (power of) cognition be admitted to be self-manifest (citsvarūpa) then is it transient like self ? But if it be insentient, how can it illumine or make manifest the objects?"

Here the objector admits the view of the exponent, thinking that thus he will be able to strengthen his own position by pointing out the logical defects in it. Those, who admit the self, prove its eternality as follows:—

The so called time, becoming an attribute of what is characterised by "thisness", delimits it and makes it transient through this delimitation. But the self is sentient and, therefore, is not experienced as "this". Hence it is not delimited by the attribute (of time). For, the substance-attribute-relation depends upon a unifier; and there is no such unifier in the case of the self-shining self.

He who maintains the position, just stated, may be asked the following questions:—

The (power of) cognition also is admitted to be self-shining. The same logic, therefore, applies to it also. Why is then (the power of) cognition not eternal? Further, there is no relation between two eternals. For, there is no other relation than the causal, (as will be shown soon). Therefore, the position that the self possesses the power of knowledge falls to the ground. But if cognition be not admitted to be self-shining, it will not be able to illumine the objects. For, cognition illumines the objects by taking them into its own self-luminosity. Therefore, if it be devoid of self-luminosity in itself, just like any object, it will not be able to illumine any object.(7).

Now the author puts forth, as *prima facie* view, the theory of the Sāṅkhya, that cognition, though insentient in itself, illumines the external object, as follows:—

(8) "If it be said that Buddhi assumes the sentiency of the self, exactly as it does the form of external object."

In our practical life we say " I know the object." Such a statement really means "the object is manifest to me". But manifestedness or luminosity cannot be asserted to be the essential nature of the object. For, then it would be manifest either to all or to none, and thus all would be either all-knowing or perfectly ignorant. Nor can the luminosity be supposed to have come to object from elsewhere. For, in that case also there

will be the same flaw. Therefore, it has to be admitted that this luminosity belongs to some other Tattva.

To the question: "How even on that supposition does the object become luminous?" the reply is that the object is reflected in that Tattva. That Tattva is capable of receiving reflection; because the quality of Sattva predominates in it. However, it cannot receive reflections of all simultaneously, because it is enveloped by the quality of Tamas. But this Tamas is partly removed by Rajas. Hence it receives the reflection of some object only. That Tattva is technically called "Buddhi" and cognition (jñāna) is nothing but the reflection of external object (on Buddhi). It is a form of Buddhi. It is a peculiar modification (of Buddhi), different from that of milk into curd, which is responsible for substitution of the former name (Buddhi) by another (jñāna). Thus, Buddhi assumes the form of external object.

But both 'Prakṛti' and 'Buddhi' are insentient because Sattva etc. (which constitute them) being essentially of the nature of pleasure, pain and ignorance, are objects of experience. Hence Buddhi lacks self-luminosity, like a mirror. An experiencer, therefore, which is different from Buddhi, has to be admitted, because it does not stand to reason to admit Buddhi, which is an object of experience and, therefore, without luminosity, to be an experiencer, which is its opposite and is characterised by self-luminosity. The experiencer, therefore, has to be essentially different from it. The essential nature of the experiencer is self-luminosity. For, how can the objectivity, which is of an opposite nature and lacks self-luminosity, be possibly supposed to be the essential nature of the experiencer. And if he were the illuminator of the objective world simply because of his self-luminosity, then the entire objective world should shine simultaneously and there should be no distinction between the cognition of jar and that of cloth and, therefore, confusion should reign supreme in the world. The experiencer, however, is different from the reflection, the thing that casts it and the Buddhi Tattva, on which it is cast, and is unrelated to them. How can he then illumine the object? Therefore, (it has to be admitted that) Buddhi itself, because of its crystalline purity, receives the reflection of the self-luminous self also. Thus, the objects become manifest to self-luminous subject (reflected in Buddhi) when he comes in touch with external object, which also is reflected on the Buddhi Tattva, on which his own luminosity is reflected, because it (Buddhi) is capable of receiving the reflection

of subjective luminosity. This is the explanation of the practical life. Thus, cognition, though insentient in itself, because it is non-different from the insentient Buddhi, illumines the object, because it is in contact with the reflection of self-luminous subject. This is an unreasonable supposition that self-luminous subject casts its reflection on Buddhi. For, we see that one thing casts its reflection on another, which is similar in quality and is more crystalline than that which is reflected ; for instance, form of a jar is reflected in a perceptible mirror. But the difference between the subject and the Buddhi is very great and Buddhi is not more crystalline than the subject. The word 'Atha' implies that this much will do.

But even the theory of reflection does not answer the objection (against permanent subject). The author demonstrates this as follows:—

(The following is the last part of verse no. 8).

"Thus, the Buddhi shall have to be admitted to be sentient. For, in that which is insentient there cannot be the capacity of making others manifest."

If, in consequence of the contact with the reflection of the sentient, that, on which the self-luminous subject is reflected, does not itself become sentient, the reflection will serve no purpose. For, the mirror, on which the heap of fire is reflected, cannot burn anything. But if you say that, on which reflection falls, becomes essentially the same as the original luminosity, then the latter is non-different from Buddhi. Thus, Buddhi becomes identical with the original luminosity. The opponent, however, had propounded the theory of reflection for fear of the error of attributing an opposite quality (sentiency) to Buddhi. It is, therefore, that (attributed opposite quality) which manifests its power of effulgent light. Why then not assume the Buddhi to be sentient (cinmayī) ; what is the use of assuming separate existence of Puruṣa ? Thus, if Buddhi assumes the form of the object, reflection of which falls on it: this view is then exactly what the Vijñāna-Vādin holds. But if any body were to question: Why does it assume the form of the object?" the reply is 'because of the already existing chain of causation (i.e. the revival of the previous beginningless Vāsanā)."

Thus, if Buddhi itself be admitted to be sentient, its eternality will naturally follow. But if even the sentient is not eternal, then there is no eternal self, which may be represented to possess the cognitive power. Therefore, jñāna alone is. Its essential

nature is to make the objects manifest. It is of different types, such as determinate knowledge and the remembrance. This explains all worldly transactions. This is the gain, accruing from the refutation of unwelcome conclusion (that follows from the assumption of the Sāṅkhya theory as correct). This is the substance of the preceding two verses : "And if cognition (jñāna) be admitted to be sentient," etc. (8).

Having examined the cognition (jñāna) the author now begins to examine 'action'.

(9) "Action also is nothing else than the presence of such external things as body etc., at various places etc. For, nothing else is perceived."

In the perceptible movement, which, at the empirical level. is referred to as "He goes", "He moves", "He falls" etc., we find nothing more than a certain form, such as that of Devadatta, which was at first at a place in the house, but subsequently is found at another place outside it. We do not perceive anything more than this which may be called action. Similarly in the experience "Devadatta sits for a day" the form of Devadatta, which was associated with the morning time, is experienced as connected with another unit of time. In the experience "milk changes" that which was experienced as sweet and liquid, is experienced as sour and solid. Thus, the thing (the chain of momentary beings) itself appears associated with different times, places and forms. In spite of these differences (in associated space and time) recognition of the thing as the same is due to similarity ; for instance, we recognise a person to be the same even when there is difference in body, hair and nail. When there are spatial and formal differences, the temporal difference is bound to be. Similarly when there are spatial and temporal differences (the formal difference is bound to be.). Although all differences, temporal, spatial or formal are included in the formal, because space is nothing but form, and temporal difference also involves the formal; yet from practical point of view they differ from one another. Therefore, the Bauddhas speak of them separately. This is the substance (of the verse).

Thus, 'action' is not directly perceived anywhere, and because there is no direct perception, therefore, we cannot infer it either. For, inference depends upon the former (direct perception). And the effect, such as reaching the village etc., is nondifferent from the succeeding momentary existence of a particular time, thing and form etc. Therefore, it (kriyā) cannot be assumed for the reason that the effect is not possible without it.

Thus, the statement: "it is known through neither of the two means of right knowledge, direct perception and inference" asserts the absence of arguments to justify the assumption of "action" (Kriyā). Now he states also the reason to refute it:—

(The following is the last part of verse no. 9.)

"The view that it (action) is one and successive and belongs to one (agent) is also not sound."

The priority or the posteriority of moments is due to their unification by determinate cognition. Nothing in itself is prior or posterior. Each thing is only itself (has no priority or posteriority in itself). Therefore, the characteristic feature of action, which consists in succession, the chain of the prior and the posterior, which is due to determinate cognition, does not refer to what is real. Every one of them (links of the chain) is distinct from the rest. How then can action be represented to be one? Moreover, succession necessarily involves diversity. For, if there be no diversity there can be no succession either. Unity is opposite of diversity. How can then action be conceived as successive and one? Nor can it be said that it is one because of its residing in one. For, there is no experience of the substratum different from the moments. The moments alone, coming in succession, are experienced. Moreover, how can the substratum, being affected by various moments of action, characterised by temporal, spatial and formal differences, be spoken of as one? Hence recognition, which is due to similarity, as expressed in: "It is the same Devadatta, who has reached the village "is not sufficient to establish real unity (of Devadatta) (9).

Having thus examined both, the power of action and that of cognition, he now proceeds to refute the relation, by which they are related to the 'Being' and which alone can establish Him to be omniscient and omnipotent, by showing that there is no reason in support of it.

(10) **"Only this much is perceived that certain things being existent other things come into being. There is no other relation than that of cause and effect."**

The pilloret comes into existence when the clay is already there, and so small Śiva—like form (Śivika) must be preceded by the pilloret and so on till the jar comes into being. In this case we perceive only momentary existences (of the various stages

of clay in making a jar) and nothing more such as relation is directly perceived or inferred. Thus, all that has been said in connection with action, can be repeated in this connection also. The same is the way of refuting all kinds of relations such as that of the container and the contained etc. For, after the separate momentary existences of bowl and jujube fruit, there is the rise of a distinct momentary existence, characterised by absence of intervening space between the bowl and fruit of jujube. And regular precedence and succession of two things is distinctly spoken of as relation of cause and effect in practical life.

But there is no such relation of cause and effect between knowledge or action and the self. For, the latter cannot be spoken of as the effect of the former. Because the knowledge is the effect of the things necessary for its rise and because there is no separate thing called action, there is, therefore, no connection of self with either knowledge or action. Hence it cannot be represented to be doer or knower. (10)

Having thus refuted the arguments in support of relation, the author now advances the argument against it, in general as well as in special terms.

(11) (**"There is nothing like relation (Sambandha) apart from momentary existences;) because that which exists in two must have multiplicity of forms. The accomplished (Siddha), however, needs none : nor is it related to another by relation of dependence. Therefore, the relation of the self with action as its agent is a mere supposition."**

Relation, as generally defined, is nothing else than the interconnection of two things, which are mutually connected. It is a unity. But how is that possible ? For, what is present in the entirety of its being at one place, cannot also be present at another, because that involves change in form. Thus, conjunction, inherence and other relations, dependent upon them, should be considered to have been refuted.

And the relation of dependence among the sentients and, through transference, among the insentients, of which we talk in our practical life, is also not possible, because what is accomplished (Siddha) cannot be said to be dependent, because of the very fact of its being accomplished. But what is not so, and, therefore, has no individuality, cannot at all be said to have any dependence. The same can be said in regard to the relation, called Apekṣā. Moreover, how can the two forms be united ? For, two cannot

become one; but if they do so, how can then there be any relation; (because they have become one and the relation requires two to unite)? Therefore, just as knower is a mere supposition and not real, so is the doer also. This is the *prima facie* view. The chapter ends. (11) From the beginning 16.

Here ends the Second Chapter, called the exposition of the *prima facie* view, in the "jñānādhikāra", in the Pratyabhijñāsūtra Vimarśinī, written by illustrious teacher Abhinavagupta. (2)

We bow to that Śiva, without whom no experience is possible and who is essentially ever-shining and unaffected Consciousness.

In the *prima facie* view (stated in the preceding Āhnika) it was held that remembrance is possible from mere residual trace ("Yato hi pūrvānubhava saṁskārāt smṛti saṁbhavaḥ"). To refute this the author puts in the following seven Ślokas beginning with "Satyam" and ending in "jñānasmṛtyapohana-śaktimān". The criticism of action and relation will be answered in the second book, entitled Kriyādhikāra. The refutation of the conception of cognition (Jñāna), as different from self, as admitted by the Kāṇāda and the Sāṅkhya systems, is in full agreement with the view of the author. Therefore, it is a refutation of a different type.

The first two verses prove that though remembrance may be admitted to be due to residual trace, yet it cannot illumine the former direct cognition, because luminosity of every cognition is self-confined. Then in the next two verses having raised the question whether remembrance is illusory knowledge and answered it, in the third verse, by the way, he removes the misapprehension that all determinate cognitions are illusory. Then he states in a verse that, remembrance being impossible even if there be residual trace, the practical life will come to an end. In the next verse he shows how it is possible on the basis of his theory. This is the summary. Now begins the explanation of the text.

(1) "True, but the knowledge, called remembrance, though it arises out of the residual trace of the former experience, yet, being self—confined, it cannot make the former experience known."

By the use of the word 'true' he has indicated:—"there is much in the statement of the *prima facie* view that has to be accepted by me." But what is not acceptable is going to be refuted. This is what he indicates by the use of the word "Kintu" (but), which indicates the difference. Here, in the case of remembrance, the point to be established is not the shining (consciousness) of the sense-object, which is possible from the residual trace; but the point which requires explanation is "How, without the illumination of the (former) experience, we can have that form of remembrance, which is represented by the word 'that', and how without such a remembrance can there be various practical moves, which are dependent upon desire ? For, the effort for getting a thing, is always consequent upon the ascertainment of the thing as the means of pleasure, through the experience."

Here the residual trace of the former experience, explains how remembrance, though not caused by any external object, yet has that (object) as its object. This serves no useful purpose, because this remembrance, as knowledge, being self-manifest and self-confined, cannot illumine another (knowledge), namely, the former experience, as it does the object. (1)

But it may be urged that the remembrance, because of its having originated from residual trace, has the former experience also as its object. To this the author replies.

(2) "Experience is self-luminous. It cannot be the object of any other experience, just as the experience of colour cannot be an object of experience of taste. The fact that remembrance arises from residual trace simply makes it similar to direct experience (in respect of having the same object). But that cannot make the consciousness of similarity possible (in remembrance)."

Here the word "dṛk" means 'cognition' (experience). It is different from the insentient, inasmuch as it is essentially self-manifest in its nature. Therefore, the insentient has to be spoken of as different from the sentient. Hence cognition is self-manifest i. e. the manifestedness is its never-failing quality; or its essential quality is to make itself alone manifest. Even if there be external objects, still the luminosity (of Jñāna), as falling or reflected on the forms of external objects, cannot be rightly maintained to be the essential nature of cognition (Jñāna). For, self-luminosity of cognition consists in making itself so manifest as to make others also manifest (and not in casting its light on another and shining in another).

But will not the direct experience, being self-manifest in itself, shine in remembrance? "No", he says, because one cognition is not to be made manifest by another. For, if one cognition were to shine in another it would cease to be self-manifest. This is the chief characteristic of the self-manifest (that it shines in itself). If it be accepted that cognition shines in itself, then there being no connection with any other in so far as it does not shine in another, how can the use of the locative which depends upon the relation (of the container and the contained) be justifiable in regard to it?

Because of this (that one cognition does not shine in another) it is that by the cognition of colour the cognition of taste is not made manifest. For, if one cognition were to make another manifest, taste also would be virtually perceived by the eye.

But if the direct experience does not shine in remembrance, what then is the purpose served by residual trace? Of course there is no cognition of colour from the residual trace of taste. How can then this objection stand? Therefore, residual trace itself will remove the objection, raised by you.

No, because the knowledge, called remembrance, has arisen from a later cognition, (the cognition of a similar object) as associated with the residual trace, left by former experience; therefore, it may be similar to it (in point of having the same thing for its object as was that of the first experience) just as the position of a branch, left after having been drawn, becomes similar to what it was before. But it is not right to suppose that whatever is produced by residual trace (of former experience) that is essentially a manifester of that experience. Moreover, how can there be the consciousness of similarity? For, neither direct experience nor remembrance produces consciousness of similarity. They do not shine in each other. Therefore, the consciousness of points of similarity, present in both, is impossible: and there is nothing else capable of knowing both. Thus, residual trace can make objective reference possible in remembrance, but it cannot make the direct experience an object of remembrance, nor can it arouse the consciousness that the object of remembrance is the object of former experience. This is undeniable. (2).

But your objection will stand only if direct experience be admitted really to shine in remembrance and through it its object also. The fact, however, is that remembrance, being of the nature of determinate knowledge, seems to grasp the experience and its object, though in reality they do not shine. It is, therefore, of the nature of an illusion. Your objection, therefore, can not stand. This is what the author states as the *prima facie* view.

(3) **"Well then, although remembrance does not have the direct experience or its object as its own object, yet, because there is determinate consciousness of both, the experience and its object, therefore, it is erroneously thought to be resting on (or related to) them."**

Though neither the former direct experience nor its object is the object of remembrance, yet there is the determinate consciousness of both, because remembrance is erroneous in its nature.

This he refutes as follows:—

(The following is the last part of verse no. 3)

"This lacks consistency (or is strange)". (3)

Here he puts forth the argument in support of the above view in the following verse:—

(4) "(If it is an error) how can the essential nature of remembrance be in it? And how can error be the basis of the worldly transactions related to objects? Moreover, why should it be supposed to depend upon residual trace, left by former experience?"

The essential nature of remembrance is the shining of the object in it exactly in the manner in which it shone in direct experience. But if it does not shine in the same manner, distinctive feature of remembrance will be lost. Moreover, in an error it is either the non-existing (asat) (according to the view of Asat-Khyātivādin) or the particular form that self assumes, (because of Vāsanā, according to Ātma-Khyātivādin) that shines. The error therefore, does not grasp any object. For, the object does not shine in it. Thus, the object is not made so manifest by error as to become an object of action in practical life. The essence of Vyavaasthāpanā (right knowledge?) is such a manifestation of an object as can be useful in practical life. After the remembrance of an object, there arises desire for it, and action towards it follows. This will be impossible (if remembrance be simply an error and, therefore, unable to make the object manifest). Moreover, if the object does not shine, its mere origin from the residual trace cannot serve any purpose. For, its dependence upon residual trace is assumed only to explain its similarity with the direct experience. But there is no similarity whatsoever of the direct experience, whose characteristic feature is the manifestation of objects, with the error, called remembrance, which does not in any way touch i. e. has no relation with, the external object. (4)

But if it be said that there is similarity of remembrance with direct experience, inasmuch as both, the experience and its object, are determinately apprehended by it and, therefore, in order to explain this partial similarity, the assumption of residual trace is necessary. Well. What do you mean by "determinately apprehended"? If you mean 'manifested' then it (remembrance) ceases to be of erroneous nature; but if thereby is meant "not manifested" then again, the object not having been made manifest, the use of the word 'similarity' is meaningless in this connection. To prove this the author says the following:—

(5) "The remembrance, being erroneous in its nature and, therefore, not self-shining, will not make the objects manifest. Even though it be accepted to be self-luminous, yet, its self-luminosity being confined to illumining itself and what is pictured up there, it would not explain practical attitude towards external objects."

Remembrance or any other so called erroneous knowledge, is not erroneous in its self-luminous aspect of illumining itself, because it is never contradicted. Erroneousness is confined to what is pictured up there. For, though the pictured up is nothing but a form of self itself, yet it is not apprehended as such: on the contrary, it is apprehended as object. Hence remembrance is an error in respect of its object. And because remembrance or any other type of error has no true reference to external object and does not say anything about it,it is,therefore, not luminous in relation to that object, just as knowledge of jar is not in relation to cloth. And because that, which is not self-luminous, has nothing to do with external object, therefore, practical life, related to external object (which is based on remembrance) would disappear.

If, however, on the basis of its self-luminous aspect, or its determinate form, it be said to be self-luminous, still because remembrance in its self-luminosity is confined to itself and what is pictured up there, and because it cannot refer to external object even in name, how can it explain the determinate manifestation of and the practical attitude towards the object (which is based upon it)? (5).

Thus, even though there be residual trace, yet the remembrance is in no way possible. And, therefore, all cognitions will be without mutual connection. This is what has been said in the preceding five verses. The author now connects it with the point under discussion:—

(6) "Thus, all human transactions, which originate from unification of various kinds of cognitions, which mutually differ and cannot become one another's object, will come to an end."

Practical life of humanity depends upon unification of cognitions of all types, i.e. upon their (cognitions) figuring in remembrance as related to the same objects as those to which they were originally related. It is as follows:—

All transactions depend upon remembrance. For instance, the very first (the most important kind of cognition) the direct perception (pratyakṣa.jñāna) is not possible without the conscious unification of the former and the latter states of self. And this is made possible by remembrance alone. For, if the object of direct perception be not related to the subject, direct perception would cease to be so. Similar would be the case, (it has to be admitted) with pleasure etc. also. And rejecting, accepting, actuating, promising or admitting and other similar transactions (are all due to remembrance and therefore) are based upon remembrance. Thus, all human transactions, which are due to unification of

cognitions with one another, would come to nought, if the view of the opponent be accepted. But if some one were to ask: "How"? The author gives a reply by means of adjuncts (Anyonyabhinnānām, and Aparasparavedinām). The cognitions are different from one another. The indeterminate knowledge is different from the determinate knowledge, limited by present time, and that also is different from remembrance. Therefore, these cognitions make their objects alone manifest, and, in respect of the objects of other cognitions, are like insentient dumb and deaf or both and cannot make them manifest. (6).

Thus, there cannot be determinate unification either of cognitions as such or their objects. Nor can one cognition shine as an object of another. Nor is there any fourth cause of relation of cognitions, which may bring about their unification. Therefore, all transactions would come to nought. And these transactions cannot get destroyed simply because of your desired curse. "Let them be destroyed." But because they have existence, therefore, it is necessary that an effort should to be made to explain this. But even the Creator cannot do this unless the method, accepted by us, be followed. This, the author clarifies as follows:—

(7) "If there be not one great Lord, who is essentially self-luminous, holds within all the innumerable forms of the universe and possesses the powers of cognition, remembrance and differentiation".

Of course nobody denies that the self (Saṁvid) shines. But if that self be self-confined(be resting within itself), how can it make the objects shine (manifest)? But if the objects also be admitted to be essentially self-shining, then, they also being self-confined, the distinction between the perceiver and the perceived will be lost. Therefore, the Buddhist also, desiring to represent Saṁvid (Vijñāna) to be the illuminator of the object, has to admit that the object also is included within Saṁvid itself. But if that manifester of the object be changing every moment (as the Buddhists hold) the remembrance will not be possible. Therefore, Saṁvid is only one, and as such it includes the whole of the objective world within itself. This also he has to admit much against his will. Still this Saṁvid, because it contains the whole universe within itself, therefore, will shine with the whole universe either manifest or otherwise, because such is its nature. But it is not so. Therefore, it follows that Saṁvid makes some objects manifest as separate from itself out of the mass of objects, which lie merged in it, as identical with it. This is called power of knowledge.

This very Saṁvid, the self-luminous principle, when made as if it were different from itself by what has emerged (out of

universal Saṁvid), is called ever renewing cognition, because of the reflection of the externally manifested external objects on it, due to its being extrovert. But still because these new cognitions rise and disappear, the same impossibility of transactions follows. Therefore, (it is to be admitted that) the self-luminous principle, which became extrovert at the time of grasping an external object, has its introvert (Antarmukha) self-luminosity intact even at a subsequent time. And this (introvert self-luminosity) becomes aware of its having become extrovert in relation to a particular object and, therefore, is called the power of remembrance. And that which directly cognises or remembers a new object is identical with universal self-luminous principle. Hence the universal is ever perfect and in reality there is nothing new, directly cognised or remembered.

And then, as a matter of course this also has to be admitted that whatever is made manifest, is separate from Saṁvid, so is one Saṁvid from another, and so also is one object of knowledge from another; and that this (separation) however, is not really possible. Hence it is called mere appearance, because all that is created is mere appearance (Ābhāsa). And the separation (differentiation) is so called because it cuts the differentiated off on all sides (from the rest). That power, therefore, which is responsible for manifestation of one thing as distinct from the rest, is called the power of differentiation (Apo- hana Śakti).

All the worldly transactions depend upon this triad of powers. It is due to the triad of powers of that Glorious One that there is the manifestation of limited perceivers, Caitra and Maitra etc., who are naturally limited in their direct experience, remembrance and definite knowledge. It is He, who directly experiences, remembers and determinately cognises through the various limited subjects. This is what the teacher has said in the following lines:—

"Although practical approach to the objective world (apparently) depends on the individual subject, limited by vital power (prāṇa) and the constituents of subtle body (Puryaṣṭaka) yet (in reality) it depends upon the universal Self."

And innumerable is the variety of ways in which these powers of knowledge etc. are manifested. This capacity of manifestation is the power of freedom (Svātantrya). This is called independent and perfect great power, when it is compared with the powers of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra, who are its creations. And this is sentient in its nature "Cidvapuḥ". Thus, it follows-

that He is omnipresent. And because He is different from the insentient, characterised by being of one fixed form, therefore, He is spoken of as Great Lord, characterised by the possession of powers of knowledge etc.

If this be not admitted, nothing will be manifest. This is the unwelcome consequence. But because the objects are manifest, therefore, it has to be admitted. This is the opposite conclusion. "The practical life of humanity will come to an end if it be not so", this is the connection of the present verse with the previous. The word 'Cet' implies the opposite conclusion. (7) The Chapter ends. From the beginning 23.

Here ends the third chapter, called the refutation of the philosophy of the opponent, in the Jñānādhikāra in the Pratyabhi jñāsūtravimarśinī, written by illustrious teacher, Abhinavagupta(3).

ĀHNIKA IV

We bow to that Şiva, who strings in a regular order the multitude of gems, the objects, which lie heaped up in the treasury of His heart, on the string of remembrance.

Thus, it has been shown that remembrance is preceded by direct perception and that both of them depend upon the power of differentiation (Apohana Śakti). This has been pointed out to be the only possible way of accounting for the facts of experience. Now, according to the introductory statement, remembrance has to be dealt with in order to support the opposite conclusion, which follows from the unwelcome consequence (of the Critic's position). For, the introductory statement (in the last chapter) was: "True, but the cognition, called remembrance".

There may not be the possibility of the rise of remembrance from mere residual trace, but it has to be explained: how will the power of the Lord, as admitted by you, make it possible? In order to answer this objection the following eight verses, beginning with "Because that experiencer of the former object" and ending in "The objects shine in the experiencer" are given.

It is asserted in the first verse that remembrance is possible on the exponent's assumption. The second verse states that remembrance has the power to illumine the particular object of the former direct experience. In the third it is stated that remembrance enters into the direct experience and its object so as to become one with them. The fourth shows how remembrance does not illumine the former direct experience as an object. The fifth corroborates the statement, made in the fourth, by asserting that in the experience of the other's experience by a Yogin, the other's experience does not figure separately as an object. In the sixth the counter assertion, that remembrance does have the direct experience as its separate object, is shown to be based on an imaginary analysis and, therefore, baseless. In the seventh it is shown by the way that even in the determinate cognition there is unification with the former direct experience. In the eighth it is asserted that remembrance, its object and its subject rest on one Sentient Principle and so, by the way, do perception, its object and its subject. This is the summary. Now the verses will be explained in due order.

(1) "That knower of the object of former experience, being present at the time of subsequent memory and determinately experiencing as 'that', is said to remember, because he is free."

The knower of the formerly experienced object, the introvert sentiency or consciousness, has continuous existence till the time of remembrance also; because he, who is of the nature of pure Saṁvid, is free from the limiting attribute of time. That the object is present within the experience as one with it, is of course self-established fact.

The point to be thought over is this: "Is it that (in remembrance) the Self-luminous principle (Saṁvedana), which is free from the limitation of time, and all the objects, which are within it, are experienced as self-luminous?" If so, there should be the experience of universal "I" as holding the entire objective world within itself. But if there be the experience of the objects as "this" and, therefore, as distinct from the Self-luminous principle, there are two alternatives:—

(1) If the objectivity (idantā) rests on "I" then, it being the state, known as Sadāśiva, consciousness would be "I am this". (2) But if it does not rest on "I", then the consciousness must be 'this'. And because there is the consciousness of novelty, therefore, it would be direct experience and not remembrance. With this objection in mind the author says "free" (Svairī). It means one whose nature it is to employ, without fail, his means for the accomplishment of the end; or he, who employs himself in his work without requiring any other prompter. Therefore, because of his freedom he has the consciousness "that". And the essential nature of the experience "that" is that it is not the experience of the pure subject "I", which is entirely free from limitation of time, nor is it that of something which is altogether different from the subject (i.e. pure object), but that of the object, (i) which formerly, at the time of direct experience, was differentiated from the universal Self; because of its association with the individual subject, limited by time and place of the former perception, and, therefore, was not merged in "I", (ii) which in that very condition was separately placed, wrapped up in darkness as if it were, and (iii) which is referred to by the word "residual trace". When, therefore, that cover of darkness is removed from the object, it shines as before, as differentiated from the subject.

But why does it not then shine as "this", as it did before? It does not so shine, because it shines as associated with the body, time and place of the first perception, because of which it was differentiated from the universal subject, "Aham". And for this very reason it is that the consciousness of its shining at the present time of remembrance does not altogether disappear. There is, therefore, consciousness of the time of the past direct

experience, 'associated' with the present time of remembrance. The latter predominates.

Thus, it is said that the experience "that" is the embodiment of two contrary experiences of the former and of the later times. And thus, that highest Lord alone remembers. His remembrance is nothing else than His assuming the form of limited subject, such as is fit to be affected by time and Kalā etc. and is necessary for the consciousness of this kind. Thus, remembrance is unity in multiplicity; because it is due to Māyā and Vidyā. And, therefore, it is that those, who are well versed in the Āgamas, hold that remembrance, when animated by Mantra etc. is like Cintāmaṇi, capable of giving all Siddhis, as follows:—

"Remembrance itself, assuming the form of contemplation, exposes your glory as Cintāmaṇi does the wealth." This will do.

The compound ending in Tṛn, (Pūrvānubhūtārthopalabdhā) specially indicates (i) that the direct experience is related to time through its object; (ii) that it rests on the object; and (iii) that both the experience and its object rest on the subject, both, as one with and separate from it; because the compound is of the type of Ekārthībhāva. We shall explain that such a compound conveys the idea of unity in multiplicity. (1)

The following verses explain this very remembrance. Here if anybody were to say (i) that remembrance is determinate knowledge ("Vikalpa jñānam"); the object, therefore, cannot be made manifest by it; because the determinate knowledge does not touch the object; and (ii) that the direct experience, by which it was made manifest, is now no more: therefore, the direct experience cannot be made manifest by remembrance: firstly, because one knowledge cannot make another manifest: and secondly, because it has no existence at the time of remembrance. Hence, there being no manifestation of the object, it again follows that the consciousness "I remember this" is simply an illusion. The following is the reply to him:—

(2) "Experiencing the object that was made manifest before (at the time of past direct experience), even at a subsequent time, the subject has to be admitted to be capable of manifesting the particular either as jar as such or as possessed of the entire group of attributes."

It has to be admitted that in definite remembrance there is a clear consciousness of the object; otherwise it will be no better than the state of deep sleep or that of unconsciousness. Therefore, in view of the fact that there is a clear consciousness of the

object (in remembrance), it has, as a matter of course, to be admitted that the object shines in it. For, if the object of knowledge be not shining, the mental reaction (Adhyavasāya) will be as good as blind. And this shining of the object is neither altogether associated with or dissociated from the time of the first experience. For, in both the cases there is the danger that the consciousness would assume the form "this". Therefore, the consciousness of time of the past experience, as associated with the object of former direct experience, is necessary in relation to the object of remembrance; because it (time) determines the object and also because (in remembrance) there is emphasis on the object of former direct experience. Similarly the consciousness of time, associated with body and vitality (Prāṇa) of the rememberer is necessary in relation to the subjective aspect; because in remembrance there is equal emphasis on the time of the present experience. The essential nature of the object is mere "Ābhāsa" i.e. the object is nothing but a mere limited manifestation, because the means of right knowledge operate on each limited manifestation. This very limited manifestation (e.g. jar), being connected with other manifestations (e.g. gold or any other metal of which the jar is made), becomes clearly manifest like the co-extending rays of thousand lamps. But even when there is no connection with other limited manifestations, the manifestation is still limited, because of its connection with the manifestation of time. That the power of the time is the only differentiator will be explained later on.

Thus, the manifestation of jar is determined, because it is related to the manifestation of time, associated with the manifestation of the body (of jar) at the time of former perception.

Remembrance often refers to an isolated 'ābhāsa' (in this case it is not very clear). But it becomes perfectly clear, when its object is mixed up with other manifestations (which are its attributes). Even when it is perfectly clear, its association with the former time is not broken; because remembrance is an experience, the object of which is not common to other subjects. But that object of remembrance, which shines in common to many individual subjects, as is the case with the object of remembrance of a Yogin, is a Creation of Yogin. In the case of the talk with Brahman, (the spiritualists admit that through concentration, the object, the deity, appears in a physical form) the manifestation is new. In this case, the chain of remembrance of the essential nature of Brahman etc., as known through other means of right knowledge, such as Āgama etc., is simply a means. The use of the injunctive

Liṅ in 'Bhāsayet' indicates infallibility. It is not that it does not make the object shine; on the contrary, it does certainly make it shine. "In its time" (Svakāle) means "at the time of remembrance". By the word "cognising" (Āmṛśan) the present time, associated with the subjective aspect of remembrance, is indicated. By "determinate object of former experience" (Pūrvābhāsitam Svalakṣaṇam) the past time, associated with the object of knowledge in isolation, has been indicated as responsible for the delimitation of jar as such. This is the chief characteristic of remembrance. Its clearness depends upon the intensity of desire. This is what the word "Atha" indicates. The same is asserted by the word "in its entirety" (Akhilātmanā) i.e. in a form unified with all attributes.(2).

But if thus the object, limited by the time of its first experience, shines apart from the subject in remembrance, then it should shine as "this". For, shining as "this" is nothing else than shining with limitation. To remove this objection the author says as follows:—

(3) "If the object shines apart from remembrance, it would be improper to say that it shines as the object of remembrance. Therefore, the various cognitions, associated with different times, have to be admitted to be unified. And here is that subject (of remembrance)."

If that object were to shine apart from remembrance as something external, it would not be shining as being remembered i.e. it would cease to be the object of remembrance; rather, it would become the object of perception. But if any body were to ask: how then the particular is said to shine at all? The reply is: it does not shine now, but it shone before, and then it did shine externally.

But if any body were to ask "what happens now" (at the time of remembrance)?, we would say: "determinate cognition". But if the objector were to say that thus it follows that shining of object and its determinate cognition belong to different times, (the one to the time of remembrance and the other to that of perception) (the reply is) "What of that"? (The objector:—) Because they are interdependent, both would, therefore, be as good as nothing (because one will have been destroyed long before the other's coming into existence). (The reply:) Not so. No doubt, the Buddhist, according to whom there is no other reality than different momentary cognitions, cannot satisfactorily reply to this objection. But, according to our system of philosophy, the subject introvertly determines

(Vimr̥śati) the various cognitions, which are not dissociated from the times of their rise, by unifying them into one whole. Thus, the former experience shines objectively as associated with past time: and the subjective reaction to it (Vimarśa) shines as associated with the present time, the limiting condition of the introvert subject. The distinction of the cog niser from mere cognition (Vedana) lies in this that he is free in uniting or separating the various cognitions according to his will. It is in this that his power as 'doer' (Kartr̥tva) consists. The unification, as expressed in "I experienced" or "that jar", is non-different from the unifier. This is what is indicated by the concord between 'the unification' and 'that knower' (i.e. the unification is the same as the subject). By means of the expressions "it is that" the subject, who was concealed as if it were, has been brought to clear light as "this". Thus, by the statement, smacking of wonder, recognition has been indicated. This is what the author himself has asserted in the following:—

"I have brought to clear light the essential nature of the subject, which was soiled by those who talked all kinds of irrelevant things about it and who denied their own experience, after silencing them by means of clear arguments". (3).

But if the former experience itself is the externally manifested light of the object of remembrance, why not then say simply that the experience is the object of remembrance?. What is the use of this strange unification ? To remove this doubt the author says as follows:—

(4) "It is not so. For, the former experience does not shine separately in remembrance as 'this', like an object. But it shines as 'I experienced before', because the experience shines only because of its resting on the subject."

The illustrations are of two kinds, positive and negative. Just as 'before' i.e. at the time of direct experience, the former objects, jar etc., shone separately as "this", so, at the time of remembrance, the former experience does not shine apart from remembrance. And just as, at the time of remembrance, the object does not shine separately from remembrance as "this"; because at the time of remembrance there is no external manifestation; so, for that very reason, the former experience also does not shine apart from remembrance. How do both shine then? They shine as "I experienced". If anybody were to ask: "What do you mean by this?" The reply is as follows:—

The self is essentially the "I-consciousness". It is introvert in both the experiences, the former and the latter. As the self-

luminous nature of the former experience, shines only as resting on the self, so the jar also, which is merged in that, shines as if it were self-luminous. Both the object and the perception rest on the self. There is a recognised view "Root and personal termination together tell the meaning of the personal termination", i.e. the meaning of root merges in that of personal termination. The perception, therefore, is merged in the "I", the cogniser, who is implied by the number of personal termination; or who possesses the number of personal termination; and so is the object also through that (perception). It (object) does not shine independently. For this very reason the object is not separately mentioned (in the verse). But jar etc. do not (directly) rest on the subject at the time of perception. And because the former perception does not shine separately as an object (in remembrance) for the reason, stated in the second half of the verse, therefore, the unification of cognitions has to be admitted (in remembrance). This is the connection of the present verse with the preceding. The word 'Prāk' is connected with another word than that with which it comes in the text; because the aorist (luṅ) tense (of Anvabhūvam) indicates the past. Similar is the connection of "Aham", because the first person, (in which Anvabhūvam is used) implies "I". The word 'Ārohaṇam' is to be interpreted as both, having causal affix and without it. (4).

But who says that direct experience does not shine apart from the rememberer? But if it be said that it does not shine separately, exactly in the manner in which the jar does, then we say "what of that"? For, the jar also does not shine separately exactly in the manner of perception. Can it be said, therefore, that it does not shine separately? Both of them, of course, shine separately, according to their individual nature. This is a common point in both cases. Accordingly, it has been admitted that just as the past future and subtle etc. become manifest in the knowledge of a Yogin, so does the Citta also of another person, as in the following:—

"Through concentration on an affected state of mind, one gets the power of knowing the minds of others".

Here the word "Citta" means Sattva (Buddhi), modified by the form of an external object. Otherwise what would be the sense in saying that it is known through concentration and why should there be any question about its relation with object, as in the following:—

"And that is without any relation with object".

Therefore, just as the experience of another becomes the object of Yogin's experience, so let one's own knowledge also be the object.

To this objection he replies by saying that the illustration itself is non-existent (Asiddha). This is what he shows by that portion of the following verse which ends in "Bhānti" (shine). And accepting the illustration to exist, by the rest of the verse, he shows the unsuitability of the illustration to the present case, inasmuch as the point of similarity is lacking here:—

(5) "Even in the particular kind of knowledge of Yogins, the experiences of others do not shine as such. They rather shine as one with their own Samvid. But even if they be supposed to shine as objects, (that also would not affect our position)."

In this different kind of knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of another's knowledge by Yogins through meditation, the knowledge of another person does not shine as an object. That is as follows:—

According to the Buddhists, the knowledge (Vijñāna) is self-luminous in its essential nature. Now if this be the object of another knowledge, then its real nature of shining as self-luminous and not as the object of another knowledge, will be contradicted.

According to the Sāṅkhya system, the 'Upalabdhi' is nothing else than the reflection of Puruṣa: and he belongs to the category of the unknowable. How then can he be the object of knowledge?

According to the Vaiśeṣika system also, the knowledge inheres in the self as identical with it. How then can this knowledge be cognised by the mind (Manas) that is within the body (of the cogniser)? But if one were to say "by entering into another body", then it (mind) will naturally take that body to be its own (for, it, being Aṇu, cannot be connected with both the bodies) and in connection with that then will rise the idea of egoity "Aham". Hence all distinction between one's own self and that of the other will disappear. The Vaiśeṣika view that the self can be known through inference only, lacks all support of reason. It has already been said that the view that one knowledge is the object of another, leads to argumentum ad infinitum.

Therefore, it has to be admitted that a Yogin knows the cognition of another person in so far as he is aware of jar and pleasure etc. as related to the self, limited by another's body. In this cognition (of another's cognition) the internal objects such as pleasure etc. and the external, like jar etc., shines as "this";

but the light of consciousness, being self-luminous, shines as "Aham" ("I") only. Thus, a Yogin, in whom the consciousness of distinction of himself from others persists, because of the continuity of the impression of 'thisness' associated with the body and vital air etc. of another person, which he formerly looked upon as a subject (Pramātā), attributes the objectivity of the body etc. to the pure subjective aspect "Aham" and, therefore, erroneously thinks that knowledge to be the knowledge of another. But a Yogin, who has risen above the idea of duality, seeing all as one with himself, realises that the duality is his own creation. Thus, cognition is not the object of knowledge of a Yogin. (Therefore one knowledge cannot be the object of another).

And even if we admit that the knowledge of another person becomes an object of that of a Yogin, our position will not be affected; because there is no similarity between the perception as it figures in the remembrance and another's knowledge as it figures in that of a Yogin. It is as follows:—

In the case of Yogin's knowledge of another's experience, the latter shines as associated with another, as "he experiences", and not as associated with his own self, as "I experience". But in the case of remembrance, it (the experience) shines as resting on "I", free from all taint of objectivity. Hence it has rightly been said that because experience does not shine apart from the experiencer, therefore, there is unification of cognitions of different times and that is the knower (5).

But if it be admitted that perception does not shine as an object in remembrance, because of its resting on the subject (Ahantā), (we would point out that) there is another type of experience, in which we find a cognition cognising a perception as "this" (e.g. "I had that perception"); or which (parāmarśāntaram) clearly shows the perception as resting on the external objects like jar, which are rightly experienced as objects. Why then do not we make use of that analogy? To this objection the author replies as follows:—

(6) "This particular form of remembrance 'I had that experience', in which perception seems to shine apart from remembrance as its object, is simply an analysis of the remembrance 'I saw'."

Such is not the cognition of the people in general. For, they do not think that perception shines apart from remembrance as its object, as "I had that experience". Even if we admit that in the case of certain persons, who claim to be great analysts, the remembrance assumes the form "I had that expe-

rience", our position is not affected. For, all that is simply an elaboration of "I remember". It is an elaboration, based upon analysis, similar to that of a word into imaginary parts, such as root and affix etc., in order to explain its meaning to others.

That analyst also, if he be conscious of the original experience "I remember" as the basis of the analysed form of it, as stated above, then he also does not cognise perception as an object; rather, he simply assumes separate objective existence of the perception, as in case of "the head of Rāhu". Otherwise, just as (remembrance) "that jar" refers to something, which was the object of a former perception, so in the case of(remembrance) "that knowledge" also there would arise the necessity of another former experience. For, by the use of the pronoun 'that' it is intended to be indicated that the jar or the experience is the one that has been the object of former experience; otherwise only "experience" (instead of "that experience") would have been used. But that would mean "I experienced cognition by means of cognition", and there also the case being the same, (there being the necessity of another experience) argumentum ad infinitum would follow.

But what is the original undisputed form of remembrance? I say "was seen by me". But does not this mean that seeing rested on the lotus-like face of the wife and so on and not on the self; because the past passive participial affix, which requires reference of the action to the object, would not otherwise be possible ? The person who says so apparently does not himself understand what he says. Here the act of seeing is dependent upon the subject; because the object is to be reached by the action of the subject. And, therefore, in "King is shown the servants" the act of seeing is said to be resting on the subject. Even the Mīmāṁsakas admit that "seeing" the essential nature of which is knowledge, and which is a form of Bhāvanā, depends upon the subject (i.e. Ātman). The only difference between this philosophy and ourselves on this point is that, according to the Mīmāṁsā, becoming manifest is the quality of the object, technically called dṛṣṭatā, and consciousness (Saṁvid) is different from this and it is not free. The use of the word "by me" (Mayā) conveys the idea that knowledge is dependent upon the subject. Therefore, the two statements "I experienced" and "it was experienced by me" mean the same thing; the difference lies in words only.

Others put the words in a different prose order as follows: "I had that experience" and "Was seen by me" these forms of

remembrance, are mere analysed forms of the original form of remembrance "I experienced". The word "api" is used in the sense of "and " (6).

But even though a thing may be perceived indeterminately, yet so long as there is no determinate perception, there is no particular remembrance of it possible, as in the case of the straw and leaves etc. seen on the way. Therefore, it has to be thought over whether at the time of determinate knowledge the indeterminate, which shone before, does shine as "this" or not. To clear this doubt he says as follows:—

(7) "Whether the form of determinate knowledge be "I see this" or "this is jar", it implies that the indeterminate cognition rests on the subject as one with it."

Here the indeterminate cognition as it is in itself (at one time) so it must always be. Now this indeterminate cognition, at the time when it arises is self-luminous and, therefore, rightly it should shine as essentially "Aham" or "I". Therefore, discussion on the determinate knowledge, which follows it, is of no help anywhere; or it may be so; but the point to be emphasised is that the determinate knowledge also is so (self-luminous). This is the implication of the word (Api) "also".

Now the thing, which forms the object of determinate knowledge, following close upon the indeterminate one, is cognised in two ways: (i) Through perceptual experience, related to the present time as "I see this". Here the pronoun "this" indicates that the activity of indeterminate perception appears to be the object of determinate perception as it were. (ii) This (determinate cognition) may also assume the form, expressible without the use of the first personal pronoun "I", as in "this is jar". Here the objectivity, as it were, of indeterminate perception is indicated by the word 'this' (Ayam).

Here in the last, "this is jar", there is not even so much as a separate reference to indeterminate cognition. Therefore, the question of its being considered as "this" (i.e. the object of another knowledge) does not arise. Hence it naturally follows that here it (cognition) is apprehended as "I". For, if it be not admitted to be apprehended as "I", determinate cognition being possible even in a person who closes the eyes, (soon after the contact with the object) how could the Mental reaction, which rests on clearly manifest object, which is being directly perceived, be possible. In the case of the former (Aham idam paśyāmi), although there is apprehension of cognition, yet, being merged in and resting on the subject it is conceived as self-luminous.

Thus, the determinate knowledge also does not show that one cognition can be known by another.

Here the word 'Avasā' means determinate knowledge; and 'Samavetam' means not separate. 'Avasātari' means in the free introvert basis of self-consciousness, which is essentially self-luminous. "Darśanam" means indeterminate experience. This implies determinate knowledge and remembrance also; because this is the only right thing that can be said in regard to the view that one knowledge is the object of another. For, in all forms of cognition; "I determinately know" "I remember" "known by me" "remembered by me", the cognition is found invariably dependent upon the self. Therefore, the determinate cognition etc. are the powers of the Self, because they rest in the latter. Thus, it has been proved that Self has the powers of perception, remembrance and differentiation. (7).

The following is the summary statement of the conclusion from what has been said above:—

(8) "Because that experiencer or perceiver has various cognitions: 'I see' 'I saw' 'this' 'that', therefore, it is clear, that both, the knower (body etc.) and the known (jar etc.) ,in their distinctive nature, shine in the subject."

Here the word "Tat" is used in the sense of "therefore" and indicates that what has been said before has to be taken as the reason (for the following conclusion). It has been said before that perception does not shine as separate from remembrance, (in remembrance) as does the object, and that the power of remembrance belongs to the Lord. The following, therefore, is a settled fact:—

It has been stated that remembrance includes the perception within itself. The perception, however, has two forms, because of the difference in intellectual reaction: (i) Sometimes perception of the object is preceded by self-consciousness. In this case, of course, there is predominance of self-consciousness or will, as in "seen by me". (ii) At other times he primarily perceives the object. In this case there is no will, but the object forcibly presents itself to the consciousness all of a sudden, or the subject is swayed by the idea of the causal efficiency (of the object) as in the case of "this". In this case also there is determinate self-consciousness. For, otherwise object will not shine.

Accordingly the forms of perception are two; so are those of remembrance also. Thus, with one sub-division of each form (according to the two forms of perception) remembrance is of

four kinds. Recognition also, which is the unification of the past and the present experiences, is included in the six forms of knowledge. But because of the different forms of perception and remembrance, the recognition has eight forms. These being subdivided into two each, according as the past or present experience predominates, it has sixteen forms.

Thus, there are twenty-two forms of cognition. In these the object of cognition is not outside the light of subject. For, otherwise it would not be manifest. But this object also is to be admitted as separate from the light. For, otherwise how can it be called the object ? But how can one and the same thing, at one and the same time be said to be separated from the 'light' and yet to be in the light? Therefore, naturally there has to be supposed something, the essential characteristic of which is the limited light, as the subject, because of which this mass of (real) objects, being separate from the 'limited light', may be separate from one another also. For, if they be non-different from the 'true light', how can the mutual difference among them be possible ? Though this assumed (separate) 'light' is a part of the objective and different from the real subject, yet, even when it is still in the condition of an object, it is conceived as "I", as if it were free from all limitations. It shall be called Māyā pramātā in "In body, in mind" (1-6-4). And it is spoken of as experiencer. Thus, this simultaneous manifestation of the pair of perceiver and perceived in His mirror-like Self, as not altogether different from His essential self-luminous nature, constitutes His being as the doer of the act of perception and that of remembrance. This is the essential feature of the lord's power of perception and of remembrance. This is the implied meaning. The following is the literal meaning:—

The Self-luminous subject determinately cognises as "seen by me" and "this". From such determinate cognitions it is evident that phenomena such as 'jar' etc. and "body" etc., when unified as object and subject respectively, shine in pure Self-luminous subject. The same is made evident from the determinate cognitions such as "seen" and "this", which the individual self-luminous subject has. And because of this He is said to remember.

Here the power of perception also is discussed by the way, in order to support the view, which has been already expressed, that remembrance depends upon the perception. The substitution of personal termination by present participial affix implies that the word, to which it is added, stands for the charac-

teristic. The word "Api" means "and". The word "artha" stands for what has been objectively manifested as separate from the universal Self-luminous principle. The word "Grāhaka" means "limited subject", who belongs to the sphere of Māyā and, therefore, is of impure self-luminosity. Here the chapter ends. (8). The number of verses explained so far is thirty-one.

Here ends the fourth chapter, called the presentation of the power of remembrance, in the jñānādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Sūtra Vimarśinī, written by great teacher Abhinavagupta. (4).

ĀHNIKA V

We bow to that Śiva, who always illumines by his power of knowledge, the lamp, the multiplicity of objects, which lies merged within Himself, the great cave.

Thus, the essential nature of the power of remembrance has been presented. Now the author explains in detail the essential nature of the power of perception, on which remembrance depends, in twenty-one verses, beginning with "which shine as present" and ending in "shines in order". In the first verse he summarily states the essential nature of the power of knowledge. In the next two verses he asserts that 'luminosity' (Prakāśa) is the essential nature of the objects. Then after presenting in the next two verses, as a prima facie view that the existence of external objects has been firmly established by refutation of "residual trace", as admitted by the subjectivist Bauddha, in the next verse he shows that there is no harm even if it be not admitted. Then in one he explains the essential nature of the object, according to his system, and refutes the view that the existence of the external object is proved by direct perception. In the next two he refutes their inferability also. Then in a verse he shows that the objects surely have their existence as mere ideas in Self-luminous universal Self. Then in the following four verses he asserts, on the basis of experience, scriptural authority, logic and examination of essential nature, that self-consciousness is the very life of self-luminosity, which constitutes the essential nature of the subject. Then in three verses he asserts that "free conscious will" itself manifests that which is purely an object and that which, though an object, yet retains the essential nature of the subject. Hence "free conscious will" has to be logically admitted to be the supreme. Then in one verse he says that the difference of knowledge and knower presupposes that the light of consciousness (Prakāśa) is their essential nature. Then in two verses he says that just as in the case of knower so in that of knowledge also, which is of two types, indeterminate and determinate, "free conscious will" is the very life. Then in conclusion, in one verse, he supports the distinction between the knower and the knowledge, which was adversely criticised in the course of the statement of prima facie view. This is the summary of the chapter. Now the meaning of each verse is going to be discussed.

There is no doubt about it that indeterminate knowledge is the very life of remembrance and determinate knowledge etc. Now, if the objects shine separately, i.e. as separate or different

from Saṁvid, in indeterminate experience, then the same should be the case in remembrance and determinate knowledge also. But if otherwise, then in the latter also they should not shine separately. Therefore, the power of perception, which is a form of the power of knowledge, should be discussed. With this idea in mind the author says as follows:—

(1) "The external shining (as separate from the perceiver) of the objects, which are directly perceptible, can be logically possible only on the supposition of their being present within (the Self)."

The shining of objects,—which are directly, clearly, cognised as "this", as separate from the individual subject, because of their having been separated from the individual subjects, beginning with Śūnya and ending with body, which are creations of Māyā,-is logically possible only if they be admitted to be within the true subject, who is essentially pure self-luminosity; i.e. if they still retain their essential identity with the universal subject. Hence it follows that the Supreme Lord's power of knowledge consists in manifesting the object, which still retains its identity with the Universal subject, as separate from the created limited subject. (1).

The following are the reasons in support of the above view, which has been asserted to be based on reason :—

(2) "If the object be not one with light (of thought or consciousness) it would remain non-manifest even (at the rise of knowledge) as it was before. And the subjective light is not essentially different from the objective. The light (of thought or consciousness) is the very essence of thing."

If luminosity of an object, such as blue etc., be identical with it and not different from and transcending it, then the object should be manifest to all; this we talk of as a mere possibility: or it should be manifest to none: or, in reality, it should be blue only in itself. For, of the two independent things one cannot be logically spoken of as resting on the other. Or it may not be either blue or not-blue in itself. For, without the help of light (of thought) no positive statement about anything is possible. The same may be said about luminosity also i. e it should be manifest to all or none; or it may be self-confined; or it may not be even in itself. Thus blindness of all would follow.

[But how can you say, says the Buddhist, that the object would remain the same (devoid of light) even at the rise of knowledge, as it was before; because] at the

time of rise of knowledge, the momentary object,—which has become luminous, because of its association with other momentary existences, namely, those of senses and physical light etc.,—is distinct from the previous one. But in that case also (if we admit the Buddhist theory to be correct) the same difficulty i.e. its becoming manifest to all or to none will follow. The same is the objection against the Prakaṭatāvāda (of Kumārila, according to which, knowledge is an action, which is to be inferred from its result: and the result is nothing else than that which is known as manifestedness, which is a quality of the objects). For, if the light be said to belong to or rest on the object in every way, then it would be difficult to explain why does it shine only in touch with the (limited) perceiver, (to that perceiver alone who is in touch with it and not to all) on account of which the statement "It shines to me" is made.

It cannot be said that that perceiver, whose senses etc. are responsible for bringing about the manifestedness of jar, is the cause of manifestedness of the object, exactly as seed is that of sprout (and, therefore, it will shine in relation with him alone). For, the being of sprout as such does not depend upon the seed (after it has been caused).

Therefore, if the object be not essentially of the nature of light, it would be as non-manifest at the time of rise of knowledge as it was before.

But how can you say that the object would remain the same both before and after the rise of the knowledge, because the knowledge itself is of the nature of light of the object? This view would have been accepted if it had the support of reason. But how can the knowledge, which is different from the object, be connected with the latter? If the distinctive feature of knowledge be the shining of object (in it), the identity of the object and knowledge would follow, because knowledge (thought) is said to be the essential nature of the object. And if the thought (knowledge) be the essential nature of the object, then, thought being the very life of object, the aforesaid objection will stand. But if the essential nature of knowledge be said to be that it makes the object manifest, then also the meaning being "It makes the object shine", the same objection will arise.

I have discussed the meaning of the root and the causal affix, while refuting dualism. Therefore, for information on this point, that portion should be referred to. Hence it is an impossible statement that the separate light is connected with the object. From the above discussion, therefore, it follows that the

essential nature of the object is light and that it is non-different from the "Light" (prakāśa).

If this light be different in the case of each different object, their unification will not be possible; because both of them would be self-confined. This point has already been discussed in Śloka: "the practical life of humanity will come to an end". Therefore, Light is only one. The same has been shown by repetition: "the light cannot be different (from the object)"(2).

There are other objections even if the knowledge be admitted to be essentially the manifester of the object, as something different from it (the object). The author now states them:—

(3) "If the light (of thought) be different from the object and homogeneous in itself, then confusion of one object with another would follow. Therefore, the object, that is made manifest, is not different from light. For, what is not light cannot be said to exist."

If light of consciousness be something other than the object and, therefore, different from it, then in itself, being pure light of consciousness, it is one (i.e. has no variety). That is as follows:—

If in the statements "the knowledge of Nīla" and "the knowledge of Pīta" the aspects, Nīla and Pīta, are to be considered to be the very essential aspects of knowledge, then they cease to be different from knowledge, and consequently it would mean the abandonment of the theory of difference. But if they be represented to be the objects, let us then see how can that be possible. For, the difference between Nila and Pita is to be known through the light (of consciousness), but how that very light, through which Nila is known only as Nila, Pīta also can be known only as such, (the light of consciousness being the same in both the cases). It cannot be said that the difference is due to the fact that one is caused by blue and the other by yellow or that it forms one whole with blue or yellow. For, this statement can be made only when the difference between one thing and the other has been established; but that is exactly the thing that we are discussing. Nor can it be said that the light (of consciousness) is of the form of Nīla, because the latter is reflected in it. For, the other (i.e. Bimba) is not manifest (in itself simultaneously with and independently of that on which it is supposed to cast its shadow). But if the object be admitted to be non-different (i.e. the object also be admitted to be shining) then that would mean abandonment of the theory of difference (Bhedavāda). Similarly, if we accept the theory that the difference in know-

ledge is due to difference in the means etc., how can the knowledge, caused by multiplicity of objects, such as blue etc., in one, who is at the peak of a mountain, be clear in the case of one and indistinct in case of another object, because the light of consciousness is one and the same? (This is the criticism of the Bauddha view that Vijñāna (saṁvedana) is formless. Nirākāratveca saṁvedanasya I. P. V. V., Vol. III 79-80). So also in the case of remembrance, the residual trace having been revived by the perception of one thing, (out of many which were perceived together) the consciousness of all should forcibly follow. Thus there will be great confusion.

But if one were to say "Let there be the objects only; what is the use of admitting the existence of light which causes so great confusion?" The author says in reply that what is not light cannot be said to have existence at all. For, if (any one were to say that) 'blue' in itself is yellow or nothing, what would be the flaw in it? This is what the author himself has said elsewhere:—

"Thus these insentient objects are as good as non-existent in themselves. They are manifestations of the light of Self, which alone shines both as the subject and the object".

Therefore, the object can exist only if it be 'light'. And it can be 'light' only if the same 'light', which appears in the form of cloth, be admitted to appear in the form of jar also. Hence the 'light' is established to be of all forms.(3)

"Such is the power of that one 'light' that it can manifest the multifarious objects of the universe, some as cause and others as effect in the fixed order or even in contravention of it." This is what has to be proved to the opponent. And it is proved if other causes, to explain the variety in consciousness, which in itself has none, are rejected. (The following are some of the causes, admitted by opponents, to explain the variety in consciousness):—

(According to the Bāhyārthānumeyavādin) the cause of successive changes in the light, which is really one, is the reflection. The blue etc., which is similar to this reflection, is the external object. Although that is only inferable, yet because there is the direct perception "this is nila" as also because all the worldly transactions, connected with Pramāṇa, are dependent upon determinate cognition, it is spoken of as perceptible.

This theory of the Buddhist, who believes in the existence of the inferable external world, the author puts forth as a prima facie view:—

(4-5) "The light (of consciousness) (Bodha), being without diver sity in itself, cannot be the cause of variety in manifestation (in determinate cognition). Therefore, this (variety in manifestation), being without any perceptible cause, leads to the inference of the external. The revival of variety in Vāsanā cannot be represented to be the cause. For, there is no answer to the question "what is the cause of revival of variety in the revived Vāsanā ?"

(According to the Vijñānavāda) the light of consciousness (Bodha) has no variety. In reality it is pure light. For, if the 'blue' etc. be different from light of consciousness then they, in their essential nature, being different from 'light' (i.e. being of the nature of darkness), would not at all shine. But if it be supposed that to shine as blue is its nature, then how Pīta would shine ? (because it is different from Nīla). And even if it be supposed that its nature is to shine in succession as Nila and Pīta etc., then the consciousness of self as free from affection of external objects, in the state of deep sleep will not be possible. Therefore, light is light only. It has no form that is different from it in any way. "Light has no variety". This light, which has no variety, cannot be represented to be the cause of different manifestations, such as Nila at one time and Pīta at another, because there cannot be diversity in the effect, if it be not present in the cause. Therefore, the variety of manifestation of Nīla and Pīta etc., being without any perceptible cause, leads to the inference of the external, which is responsible for the reflection that appears in the light of consciousness (Vijñāna). The inferred is, of course, similar to the reflection it casts. It has diversity corresponding to the reflections, falling on light of consciousness (Vijñāna) in due succession, and is in every way different from it (light of consciousness). This is the possibility according to him who believes in the separate existence of the external objects. This is not a mere possibility but it borders on certainty. That is as follows:—

The reason that has been given to account for difference in perception, namely, the revival of the residual traces, is not sound; because Vāsanā is nothing else than the residual traces of impressions. It is responsible for remembrance. But here we have to look for the cause of difference in direct experiences, (to which difference in Vāsanā may be considered to be due, because of which there is consequent difference in perception, due to the

revival of Vāsanā, according to the Vijñānavādin). Or let us accept (the Vijñānavādin's conceptions of Vāsanā and its Prabodha, namely,) that Vāsanā is nothing else than the power of the light of consciousness (jñāna), capable of making the (supposed) external objects manifest; that Prabodha is its state of preparedness to do its work, and also that diversity in the objective aspects of experiences is due to revival. Our objection to this also is as follows :—

Although in regard to those objects, which are within the light of consciousness (jñāna), it can be said that their shining (existence: Sattvam:) (Sattā) is unreal, yet that which is the cause of these manifestations has to be accepted to be real. For, nothing, the chief characteristic of which is that it is without any capacity, can have, as its essential nature, the capacity to accomplish something.

Under these circumstances, if these vāsanās, which are represented to be the cause of objective manifestation, are admitted to be different from light of consciousness and to have got real existence, then this Vijñānavāda also is but Bāhyārthavāda, but in different words. But if these Vāsanās also are represented to have only imaginary existence, then, as such they cannot be represented to be the causes of different perceptions. But if it be said: they are the causes only in that aspect in which they are real, then their real aspect is only pure knowledge (Vijñāna) and that has no diversity. Therefore, diversity in the effect (diversity in the worldly object) cannot be explained. Thus, there being no essential diversity in Vāsanās what hope can there be of there being any variety in their revival.

Or let there be different Vāsanās. But there being nothing different from the light of consciousness (Bodha) truly existant such as time and space etc., which can be represented to be revivers of different Vāsanās and, therefore, there being no variety and so there being only one revival, all things should shine simultaneously.

The view, that other (objective) cognitions, which are within the chain of self-luminous self-consciousness, are the various causes of revival of different residual traces, is not sound, because all differences, whether in respect of pleasure or pain or Nīla and Pīta or former and later time or place, are essentially of the nature of light of consciousness (Vijñāna) and Vijñāna is in reality nothing else than "Light" itself; therefore, there being no possibility of difference in their essential nature there is no possibility of difference in cognitions.

Even in the case of other lights of consciousness (Bodhas) in the form of the other subjects which are called other chains, the impossibility of difference is common. For, in the case of those other chains of lights of consciousness also, thin or fat body, vital air, breathing in or out, qualities of the intellect, pleasure or pain, which are thought to belong to others, are really one with that light of consciousness, which is looked upon as inferer. We, therefore, fail to understand "what then remains which can be represented to be another."

If it were said that it is the light of consciousness (Bodha) which is present in what is called another chain, we would reply that the existence of that not having been established by any means of right knowledge, it is as good as nought. And even if it be established to exist as object, it would be insentient (jaḍa). And even so it would be nothing more than light of consciousness (jñāna) in its essential nature, like body etc. For, if it be admitted to be nothing more than the light of self-consciousness, it would not be known to another (jñāna or light of consciousness).

(The Vijñānavādin might attempt to prove the existence of another subject as follows :—)

"In ourselves we have experienced that such an activity as that of speaking is invariably preceded by desire to speak, as its necessary cause. Therefore, we infer that in the case of another person, such as Caitra, also such an activity must be preceded by similar desire. (So when we hear another person speak we know by inference that his speech also must have been preceded by desire.) But we know from our own experience that that desire is not in the chain, which we call ours. Thus it is clear that desire is another's and, therefore, that chain, to which that desire belongs, is another's". To this the reply is as follows:—

The experience of speech in the inferer is in two ways : (I) at the time of acquiring the idea of invariable concomitance, the experience is related to the subject as "I speak" : but (II) at the time of inference it is related to the object, as "This (man) speaks". Hence the idea of invariable concomitance is related to something else than that (i.e. to a different type of reason from that) which is directly experienced. How can then the latter be the reason for inference ? The cause of experience "this man speaks" being unknown, how can the inference of another's desire from it be possible ? Further, how can the experience "This man speaks" which is related to the object, the other subject, be admitted by the inferer to be the effect

of another's desire, which is intended to be inferred ? For, the effect of the desire (of which the inferer has the experience) is "I speak"; and that is related to the subject. It is not right to admit that the effect of what is essentially subjective, is objective in its essential nature; because we have no means of knowing such causal relation: for, it is not established by any means of right knowledge that the subjective cause produces objective effect, such as "this man speaks". The experience "this man speaks" depends upon establishing the existence of another subject and the existence of the latter depends upon the former; the argument, therefore, has the fallacy of inter-dependence of the two terms. It is not universally true that the effect of the subjective is the objective ; because there are exceptions. Nor is the rise of another subject necessarily due to the determinate will (anusandhāna) "let another subject also come into being" of the inferer. For, even when one is, the other is not, and vice versa. Further, the determinate will "let another subject come into being" which is supposed to be the cause of another subject, cannot be known to have any causal relation with another subject unless the otherness be established. Hence there can be no idea of invariable concomitance between the two.

And if other subjects are different from one another, the objects also, which shine as resting on them, would be necessarily different, because the recognised view is that the objective aspect of consciousness is not essentially different from the subjective. Hence all the subjects being not related to the same object, the co-operation of many subjects, which is based on their relation to the same object, should be out of question. Thus, people, unattached to one another, should be as if under the influence of spirits. And if the other subject, which is being inferred, be different from that which is taken to be inferer, then, of course, there can be the possibility that the object of cognition is different from the light of consciousness (Bodha). But then the law "the knowledge and its object are one ; because of their invariable concomitance", being not universally valid, what harm have blue etc. done that their separate existence is not tolerated. Therefore, the separate existence of different subjects is to be considered as not established. But if it is to be considered as established, then all the objective ideas (ābhāsas), which are within different subjects, would simultaneously bring about the revival of residual traces, which are responsible for difference in the objects of cognitions. For, there is no reason why only a particular residual trace should be revived. Therefore, even if other sub-

jects be admitted to exist, the difference of objects such as blue etc. from one another cannot be established (for, difference is due to their appearance in consciousness in an order of succession).

Thus, the difference in the residual traces as well as in the causes, responsible for their revival, cannot be shown to be consistent with reason. Therefore, this is established that light of consciousness (Bodha) has no variety in itself. And because it cannot reasonably be supposed to be the cause of the inexplicable diversity that appears in it, therefore, we have to admit the possibility of the inferable external object. "If Bāhyārthavādin were to say this". This is the meaning of these two verses. The word "Cet" indicates that the statement contained in them is simply a *prima facie* view. Thus the supposition of Bāhyārthavādin is presented to be a strong *prima facie* view.(4-5)

Now to weaken the supposition, he says the following :—

(6)"May be, but all transactions being possible on the basis of those various manifestations, what is the use of admitting the external, in support of the existence of which there are no reasons?"

When "Syādetat" is taken to mean admission of possibility of what has been said before, then the word "Kintu" is to be admitted to be understood here. And so the rest of the verse is to be interpreted as putting forth another possibility, which makes the former supposition weak. But if we do not accept the view that "Kintu" is understood here, then 'Syādetat' has to be taken in the sense of absence of conflict between the supposition, referred to above, and another which is being stated in this verse.

What have you got to do with the supposition of existence of external thing, which is difficult to maintain ? For, all the worldly transactions can be well explained by the subjective affections (ābhāsas) which are accepted by you : and no transaction is possible with what is always a matter of inference only. What is, therefore, the use of believing in the existence of the external, which lacks the support of reason ? As for the reason against it, the chief one is that if we believe in the existence of external things as different from light of consciousness, it will be impossible to establish even by inference that they shine (or are manifest). And additional reasons against it are: (I) The existence of Avayavin in Avayava is not possible i.e. the Avayavin cannot be said to be inherently (by relation of Samavāya) connected with Avayava. (II) Samavāya (relation of inherence) cannot be established. (III) There

is this unwelcome consequence also that it (Avayavin) will have opposite attributes such as motion and motionlessness, cover and exposure, redness and the opposite of it and spatial divisions etc. Even according to the view (of the Aṇusañcaya bāhyavādin Bauddha) that the external object is nothing more than a collection of atoms, the atoms alone exist. For, the collection is not an independent entity. And if they enter into union i.e. get conjoined closely without leaving any space between themselves, then the atoms shall have to be supposed to be having parts, facing each one of the six quarters : for, otherwise, if, for instance, there be placed six atoms on different angles of a hexagon, then (union taking place) if at that very place of the central atom, where one atom has got connected with it, the others also were to be connected, only oneness of atom will be the outcome. If, therefore, it is to be supposed that different atoms get connected with different parts of the central atom, then the conclusion of its having got parts is inevitable. But if it be said that that part only of the atom, with which another gets connected, is real, we would again advance the same argument (to refute it). Therefore, in reality there remains nothing external.

Nor can it be said (by the Naiyāyika) that because those which have definite dimention (Mūrta) (i.e. the atoms, constituting a binary) must necessarily be related to a number of spatial points (cannot be having only one place as is supposed by some) and because relation with different spatial points is to be admitted, when two things are related by Saṁyoga, therefore, there is binary substance (dvyaṇuka), the being of which involves two atoms but which is the same in size as atom and has grossness in it : when these three unite, there is a perceptible object. For, this is only Avayavivāda, and this has already been refuted.

Further, in the Vaiśeṣika system the conjunction is admitted to be Avyāpyavṛtti i.e. it partly inheres in the thing. But how can this partial inherence be possible in the case of atom which has got no parts? If it be said that conjunction inheres only in that which is its substratum: I would ask, what then remains that it cannot pervade? This is an additional argument against the Vaiśeṣika theory. Therefore, we have not taken pain to state it at length. This point has been very elaborately dealt with in the Prajñālaṅkāra by Ācārya Śaṅkaranandana. (6)

But destructive reason is futile when the reverse of what it seeks to prove is established as certain by another proof. For, that very strong proof proves the invalidity of the des-

tructive reason. And we have already given the reason in support of our theory that external object exists as the cause of the effect (reflection) in the verse: "Those accidental affections".

To this the author replies as follows:—

(7) **"That Lord, whose essential nature is sentiency, externally manifests, like a Yogin, all the objects which are within Him, according to His free will, without (requiring) any material cause."**

Here although in dream, remembrance, kingdom of mind and imagination etc., variety of 'manifestations', the blue etc. is possible without any external cause, yet the variety of 'manifestation' perceptible in those states or conditions, because of its impermanency, uncommonness to all perceivers and also because of its possibly being due to the residual traces, left by former experience, can be considered to be unreal. But in the case of the various creations of city and army etc. by the simple will of a yogin, there is no possibility of representing them to be due to different material causes, such as clay, wood, semen and blood etc., so well known to us. It cannot be said that the omnipresent atoms, brought together by the will of yogin, bring about the desired thing. For, the reason, why this explanation is given, is only to show that the creation of Yogin also is due to the cause, which, in its essential nature, is non-different from that which we find responsible for ordinary every day creation. But this is not an established fact that the jar is the outcome of atoms alone directly. It is, on the contrary, not without the intervening stages of Kapāla etc. that jar comes into existence; and then also it is dependent upon subsidiary causes; for instance, the movement of hands and feet, connection with certain fixed time, place, possession of religious merit and excellence of training and practice . Thus, there being so many things necessary (in the creation of jar), if a Yogin can produce only by first acquiring all that is necessary for the creation of the desired object, he would be no better than potter himself. Therefore, if the Yogin's Creation has after all to be without well known causes, why then think of atoms etc. as the material cause, which it is impossible to maintain.

Therefore, it may be admitted that such is the spiritual power of a Yogin that it makes the objects, which are nothing else than various manifestations of his spiritual power, manifest. Therefore, it is possible that the universal consciousness (Saṁvid), whose power of freedom is acknowledged,

by virtue of its peculiar will, the chief characteristic of which is freedom from obstruction, manifests these objects of the world, which are present within as one with it, objectively as this i.e. as external to vital air, intellect and body, to which limited power of consciousness is given. Therefore, why not admit freedom of the sentient Self in the manifestation of the multifarious objects of the world, which has the support of experience ? Why feel the weariness, due to search for another cause ?

The significance of the word "eva" is that all opponents have to accept the determinate illumination (Vyavasthāpanā) of the objects as the chief characteristic of consciousness (Saṁvid) because, as has already been said , it is self-established (needs no proof). Its sentiency is its power of freedom, which is here indicated by the word "deva". What is then the use of unnecessary search for another cause ? Because, there is this possibility that the Lord makes all manifest, what is then the use of believing in the independent existence of the external, which lacks the support of reason. This is the connection of this verse with the previous. (7).

There are two ways in which the external phenomenon can be explained by inference. Well, then (I) should we follow the analogy of jar etc. reflected in a mirror, in the case of appearance of variety of reflection in the light of consciousness (Jñāna) and suppose some external objects as the causes of variety, different from the mirror of Vijñāna (II) or follow the illustration of Yogin and represent the power of freedom of Saṁvid to be the only cause. This is doubtful. Therefore, the author refutes the possibility of inference of external objects, in the following two verses :—

(8-9) "According to none, inference is possible of things which have not been directly perceived. As for the senses, they have of course been cognised, because of the cognition of things such as seed etc., which are of the nature of cause."

"The object that is outside the light of consciousness has never shone in any way. Therefore, its existence cannot be established even by inference."

Because of the arguments, stated in the preceding verses, the external objects do not shine as the objects of perceptions (Refer to Sautrāntika view 4—5). For, what is after all perception ? Is it not only this "Nīla shines" ? But it is non-different from self-manifest light of consciousness (Saṁvid). It is nothing more. Not only this ; but this external cannot be established by inference also. This is the force of "Api".

Here the inference cannot apply. And even if it does, it cannot establish the existence of external things. This is what is tried to be proved by these two verses.

What is inference ? Is it not (a kind of) determinate knowledge ? But all determinate cognitions are due to direct experience. This is well known. Therefore, nobody can say that inference can operate in relation to those things, which have never been the objects of direct experience. But if you say that the above statement holds good in the case of inference concerning those things which have been the objects of direct perception ; but it cannot be true in those cases in which inference is applied to the things, of which there has been only generic perception (Sāmānyatodṛṣṭe) as in the case of inference of senses, because of the perception of the objects : our reply is as follows :—

It is admitted that in the case of inference, based on generic perception also, the inferred object is to be of the same type as the one which was object of determinate cognition. The determinate cognition (inference), however, does not come into touch with senses etc. as possessed of any particular form, but simply as some cause of perception. Now this characteristic, namely, the causality, is of course directly perceived. For instance, in "Seed is the cause of sprout" and "thread is the cause of cloth" the relation of cause and effect is to be ascertained with the help of perception and non-perception.

Of the two (means of right knowledge) the perception operates on each limited manifestation separately ; because the mental reaction (Vimarśa), which is nothing but determinative cognitive activity, refers to object, for which a single expression stands; and because the means of indeterminate cognition follows the same line as does that of the determinate one. This point will be asserted as follows:—

"The uncontradicted cognition refers to the object, for which a single expression stands".

It shall be proved later that "Ābhāsa" as such is 'universal'. As for Anupalambha, that also is essentially nothing more than the perception of another thing and depends upon the Ābhāsa as such.

Therefore, in the case of cognition of causal relation between seed and sprout, there has already been generic cognition of causal relation, i.e. that which necessarily presupposes something for its own being is the effect of the presupposed. For, in the case of every jar its having a cause as such in the form of clay etc. shines. (8)

It is contradictory to say that that which is outside the light of consciousness and is in itself different from the light, shines. And in the case of that which does not shine, the inference, which is of the nature of determinate knowledge, does not operate. In the case of the statement, "out of the village" or "out of the house" that which is out, is not meant to be different in nature from village or house : for, in that case the road, garden, tank, ditch and scale etc. shall have to be considered as different in their essential nature from village or house. In all such cases "out" (Bāhya) simply means "near" . Therefore, in "out of the village" and "out of light" there is only similarity of words and not of meanings. Thus, even according to those (Bauddhas) who hold that the thing does not shine in determinate cognition, the use of inference is not justifiable in the case of the external.

As for ourselves, we have already stated our view in the verse "If the determinate cognition be error" that determinative activity of cognition also has its object, that shines. Therefore, if the external objects, blue etc. are not illuminated by the light of inference, which is a determinate cognition, then it cannot be represented to be inferred at all. But if it be admitted to be illuminated, then, according to rule "which is not light cannot be brought to light" it shall have to be admitted to be "light" in its essential nature. It is not external.

Therefore, all the arguments, which are adduced to establish the external, prove, on the contrary, the internality of the so called external. Therefore, the author uses the words "in any way" i.e. whether perceptibly or inferably, the external, which is not light, never shone. It is consequently established that the sentient Lord Himself is the manifester. (9)

It has been said that He manifests externally what is present within. But how do you establish the presence of all within Him ? To this the author replies as follows :—

(10)"The mass of the so called objects shines only as resting within the Lord. For, if it be not so there will be no possibility of the rise of will, which is a kind of determinate consciousness."

Even when things are manifest externally their internality does not get broken. For, internality is nothing else than "oneness with the (highest) subject". This shall be stated later on. And this oneness of things with the subject is always there, because that which is not one with light, and, therefore, does not shine, is nothing. But externality consists in "this" consciousness where rightly there should be "I" consciousness. Thus, according to this system, resting within is nothing else than con-

sciousness of the objective as "I" and not as "this", a form which befits the sentient (Cit). Such a consciousness of the objects, Nila etc., there is. We cannot say 'it is not'. For, in that case the consciousness "Let me make a jar", which is called desire in relation to the act, about to be done, on the part of potter, for instance, not being restricted or limited by the object of desire, why should it not have reference to cloth ? Thus, confusion in transactions should follow. But if one were to say that in the case of desire also, the jar, having been created (in imagination) at the very time of desire, has become its object, then we would say that that creation (in imagination) in the case of sentient being is not reasonable without a preceding desire. This point shall be explained later on in "Such a desire of one who desires to sit is causality." If, therefore, another desire also were to be assumed, the question will again be "is that associated with object or not" ? and so on *ad-infinitum.* But if it be said that it is associated with an object, then the object is identical with self ; but if not, why then the desire to create on the part of a potter should not refer to cloth ? If there also immediate imaginary creation be supposed, then again *argumentum ad-infinitum* would be the result. Therefore, it has to be admitted that the whole of this mass of external things is ever shining in the sentient Self as "I" ; and that universal consciousness (Saṁvid), in a certain order or even without it, manifests them externally in multifarious forms, because of its omnipotence, the chief characteristic of which is freedom. The manifestation of subject precedes that of the object.

In this variety of manifestations also, Saṁvid makes the perceivers one in relation to certain manifestations, i.e. it makes the spectators one in relation to the dance of a heavy hipped dancing woman. For, they become one in relation to that particular manifestation (dance) only. Their identity, however, is not complete because the idea of difference , associated with body, vital air, intellect and pleasure etc. which constitute parts (of universal manifestation) still persists. Therefore, the Highest Lord by uniting the perceivers or separating them manifests the universe in diverse ways such as creation and destruction etc. This is what the perceptor has said:—

"I bow to that lord who always diverts himself in creation, ever rests in pleasure of maintenance and is ever satisfied with the food of three worlds."

And Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa also has similarly said:—

"All praise to the indescribable, tireless, and unborn One, who remains indeterminate even though by His determinate

countless imaginings He is ever creating all the three worlds."

Therefore, it is established that the objects are within the subject. For, otherwise there would be no possibility of desire for them (10).

But desire implies determinacy and how is that possible in the Lord , who is of the nature of pure consciousness, which is free from all determinacy (avikalpa)? To this the author replies as follows:—

(11) **"Freedom is the very nature of the light of consciousness. For, otherwise, though reflection of the external objects be falling upon it, yet it would be no better than insentient crystal etc."**

Here if both the light of consciousness or Prakāśa and what is different from it i.e. not-self-manifest, e.g. jar etc., exist in mutual isolation and rest within themselves, it would be impossible to point one out as sentient as distinct from the other, which is insentient, as in the case of jar and cloth (independently of the light of consciousness). But if it were to be said that the light is sentient ; because it is connected with object ; (the reply is that if mere relation with something be sufficient to call a thing sentient) why then not call clay also sentient because of its connection with jar ? But if it is not only connection with the objects but also making them manifest, (that constitutes sentiency), then it follows that light of consciousness is manifest as object. For, it is not reasonable to hold that one who is essentially different from the other is the manifester of it. But if jar, though different in its nature from light of consciousness be supposed to be the cause of light (i.e. its shining as related to jar) then the light also being the cause of (manifestation of) jar (as such) the jar also shall have to be admitted to be sentient. But if the light of consciousness is to be supposed to be sentient because jar, though it is different from light of consciousness, yet it casts its reflection on the light, bearing which light is called light of jar: then crystal, water and mirror also, being similar, shall have to be admitted to be sentient. But if it were said that as crystal etc. are not able to feel consciousness of their being affected with reflection, so they are insentient; then it follows that consciousness of being affected which is the very life of sentiency, the essential nature of which is freedom in respect of withdrawing within and spreading out, is natural to Prakāśa. This is what is known as perfect independence, the chief characteristic of which is resting within one's own self. For, when the consciousness "I alone, who am essentially light, am shining" rises then Saṁvid considers itself to be the

knower, the known and the means of knowledge and does not require any other, the so called external thing (for having such consciousness). But so far as crystal etc. are concerned, even when reflection is falling on them, to be known as such they require a subject, different from them and, therefore, because of their being devoid of consciousness, they are insentient.

All things, both before and after their separate manifestation, are in reality sentient, because they rest in self-consciousness; because they are one with self-consciousness, which is the essential nature of the subject.

This is what has been said in the following verses :—

"The fruition (culminating point) of the distinct determinate cognition "this" consists in its resting on what constitutes its essential nature; and that is the determinate consciousness "I am that."

The middle state only, which is characterised by "this" and in which both the former and the later states are not apprehended, is the sphere of Māyā, the saṁsāra of the ignorant. Therefore, it is established that sentient freedom is the only essential characteristic of the Lord. (11)

It is not that we alone have represented the sentient freedom to be the chief characteristic of Saṁvid ; other Āgamas also have done the same. To show this the author says the following :—

(12) **"Because the self is distinct from the insentient; therefore, it is spoken of as sentiency (Caitanya), the implied sense of which is the sentient activity or freedom in respect of conscious activity."**

Because free consciousness (Vimarśa) is the chief characteristic of Self ; therefore, with a view to represent it as such, the Self, though a substance and substratum of attributes, is put in the same case as that of sentiency (caitanya), though the latter stands for an attribute, in the Śivasūtra "Caitanyamātmā" by the glorious one. The word 'sentiency' (caitanya) stands for any word, which means the essential characteristic (of self). For, the teacher (Patañjali), in (I) "the power of sentiency is unchanging" (II) "that is the perfect isolation (Kaivalya) of consciousness (Dṛśi) (Y.S.2-25)" and (III) "the subject is nothing more than consciousness" (Y.S.2-20), has put the Self in the same case as that of the word, which stands for the essential nature. The substance is that, resting on which everything shines and is desired for practical purposes. Therefore, if you

do not get angry (I would say that) the entire mass of categories, elements, objects and worlds shines as such only resting on the universal consciousness (Saṁvid): and because this mass, including the categories, such as quality, action etc., essential nature and such other categories as are the substrata, rests on that (Saṁvid) which is the most important of all substances ; therefore, that (Saṁvid) alone is the true substance.

The word "Caitanya" is formed by adding the (Taddhita) affix, expressive of the state of being, (ṣyañ), which indicates relation, to the word "Cetana", formed by adding Kṛdanta affix (Lyuṭ), expressive of the sense of doer.

Therefore, by the word "Caitanya" sentiency has been prominently represented to be the most essential nature of Saṁvid, which is the substratum of the mass of innumerable qualities As relation is always experienced as resting on the two, which are related, and as one of the related, the substance, is referred to by the original form (Cetana) ; so the affix 'ṣyañ', which indicates that the essential nature (Dharma) , namely, the consciousness, as an activity , is related, brings to light the remaining (of the two which are related, namely, consciousness, as an activity). And activity in consciousness is nothing more than the agential activity i.e. freedom in uniting, separating and holding together. It consists in not being self-confined, like the insentient ; in having as its essential nature unlimited light; in perfect independence of others. And this freedom constitutes the point of distinction of the Self from the insentients, which are devoid of power of freedom to conjoin and disjoin. Having that (power of freedom) in his mind as all-surpassing and most prominent, in order to indicate the subordination of other attributes and superiority of free consciousness, the author instead of saying "Self is sentient" says "Self is sentiency". "Citkriyā-citikartṛtā-tātparyeṇa" is one compound. For, the rule "Every quarter of a verse should be self-contained" is applicable to poetry only and not to philosophy. Or they may be taken separately as follows :—

The act of consciousness or the characteristic feature of the agent in the act of consciousness is spoken of as self. This is an interpretation which is not found anywhere. (12)

But just as 'light' and 'not-light' are in themselves so; (because they are indeterminate) and, therefore, when the word 'light' is used it does not necessarily indicate that (what is referred to by)it is distinct from insentient: so free-consciousness, sentiency or (Vimarśa) and not-free-consciousness or insentiency also are in themselves so. Therefore, they (the words

representing them) also cannot necessarily mean any distinction between the sentient and the insentient. With this objection in mind, the author says the following:-

(13) **"Self-consciousness is the very self of sentiency. It is Parā speech, (vāk) which ever shines independently. It is the freedom (Svātantrya). It is the supreme power of the transcendental self."**

The root "Citi" in "Cetayati" (which we find when we split up the word 'Cetana' as Cetayati iti cetanaḥ) means the act of consciousness which has self-reference, characterised by self-experience, as its essential nature. This is as follows:—

Jar is not manifest in itself i.e. is not conscious of itself; and because it does not shine in itself i. e. because it does not shine freely or independently, therefore, it is said to be insentient. But Caitra, because he has the power of various kinds of feeling and activity, shines in himself as "I" i. e. he is conscious of himself; he, therefore, shines in himself as different from that limited manifestation, which can be referred to as "this", in so far as he is affected by innumerable manifestations such as Nīla, Pīta, pleasure, pain and their absence. Therefore, it is said that Caitra is sentient. Thus, it is wrong to say that both, free-consciousness and not-free-consciousness, have their mutually exclusive independent existence in themselves. For, Vimarśa, free consciousness, is all powerful, identifies itself with others, denies itself, merges both into one (as in Sadāśiva State) and denies both, which have been merged into one. Such is its essential nature. And self-consciousness or Pratyavamarśa also in its essential nature is no other than the inner speech. This speech is independent of indicatory signs and is essentially unbroken self-experience, free from objective relation: it is like inward shaking of head; it is the very life of the indicatory sounds "a" etc. , which are used as indicatory signs in the sphere of Māyā. It is the background of other determinate cognitions such as "this is jar" and "I am Caitra" etc. This is called "parā" because of its perfection. It is "Vāk" because of its speaking of (referring to) the universe by means of inner sound in determinate apprehension. Therefore, as sentient, resting in itself and perfectly independent, it is always manifest, without an interruption, as "I". This Highest Lord's principal power of freedom, is spoken of as His 'Aiśvarya', independence of others or omnipotence. Higher and lower (parāparā vāk) is in the state of Paśyanti at the Sadāśiva level; because in it, though the consciousness

of the external, which is to be referred to as "this" and which depends upon the obscuration of the real nature of Self, just arises, yet it rests on self-consciousness. And the lower (aparā Vāk) is in those in whom the element of "this" is predominent and who are possessed of power within the pale of Māyā, such as Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Indra etc. But their power is due to the favour of the Highest Lord. Therefore, in reality, the independence of others is nothing else than supreme bliss (ānanda), omnipotence, freedom and sentiency. Therefore, it has rightly been said:—

"He is different from the insentient". (13).

It has been shown even in principal Āgamas (that the most distinguishing characteristic of the light of consciousness is sentiency). This is what the author says:-

(14). "**It is the imperceptible eternal stir (sphurattā). It is the absolute being i. e. perfectly free in respect of all acts of being. It is beyond the limitations of time and place. This, being the essence of all, is spoken of as the resting place of the Highest Lord.**"

A question is often raised, "Why is it that jar exists but not the sky-flower?" In reply to this question people say: "Jar is, because it is manifest to me, but the other is not". Now, if manifestedness be identical with the very being of jar, it should be manifest to all or to none. Therefore, what is the meaning of "jar is manifest to me"? It means jar has entered my self-consciousness or sphuraṇa, (Sanskrit synonym for which is 'Spandana') the seeming vibration. Now Spanda means slight motion, and here slightness lies in its appearing to vibrate while it actually does not: because though the essential nature of the light of consciousness is not to change at all, yet it appears to be changing as it were, having as it were variety of manifestations. This is what the following quotations say:-

" The self (Ātmā) itself, which is essentially restful light of consciousness, appearing to vibrate (Sphuran) in all objects, is Śiva, the operation of whose will is free from obstruction, and whose powers of knowledge and action are ever active".

"The transcendental motion (Spanda) stands clear before a Yogin, who concentrates on the state of freedom from affection, which is attained (without any effort) at the time when he is extremely angry, excessively joyous, at a loss to know what to do or is running for life". (Sp. 22)

" For a clear grasp of the essential nature of the transcendental motion" (Sp. 20). And

" The flow of the (special) transcendental movement, the qualities (Sattva, Rajas and Tamas)" etc. (Sp. 19).

In ordinary life also a person, though changing in many ways, yet, if he does not change his real nature, is spoken of as grave i. e. of little flutter.

The word "Sattā" means the essential nature of the agent in the act of being i. e. freedom in all actions. It is great, because it pervades even the sky-flower. It is not limited by time or space: for, it is their creator. The reason is that only that which shines at the same level can serve as an attribute, as bangles do in the case of Caitra. But time and space do not shine at the same level with free-consciousness (Vimarśa). The former shine as "this" but the latter shines as "I". Thus, it is above time and space; it is, therefore, all-pervading and eternal. But it is also in touch with all times and places; because it is their creator. For this reason also it is called omnipresent and eternal.
This is what the following quotations say:-

"The transcendental being (Mahāsattā), the great goddess, is called the life of the universe".

"Sāram" (substance) i. e. that which is the most important aspect of Saṁvid, is this power of free consciousness. It is also responsible for distinction of subject from object, both of which are essentially light (of consciousness). This is exactly what has been said in Sāraśāstra.

"That which is the essence of this world is the transcendental power, "Mālinī".

By "that this" (saiṣā) recognition of the power is implied. "Hṛdaya" means main stay or resting place. And, according to formerly established theory, the insentients rest in the sentient and the latter rests in the light of consciousness, with which it is one; and the place of rest of this also is the power, the free-consciousness. Therefore, in different authoritative texts the same is spoken of as the resting place of the universe, which ultimately rests in Parama Śiva, the highest abode of all. For, the heart, the resting place, (Hṛdaya) of all is Mantra, which, in its essence, is nothing but free-consciousness, which also is simply the power of the transcendental

speech (parā vāk). The following statements have been made in the Āgamas just because of this:—

"Without Mantras there will be no sound nor meaning nor the grasp of the light of consciousness" and

"Having attained the state of Mātṛs (Brāhmī etc.)"

The same has been asserted by glorious Bhartṛhari also :—

"There is no such cognition as is not accompanied by speech. All experiences at the time when we have them, are as it were penetrated by speech."

"If the eternal identity of thought and speech were to come to an end, cognition would not be cognition, because it is that identity which brings determinacy into cognition."

"This speech, as presented above, is the consciousness of the transmigrating being. It is both internal and external. In the absence of it a transmigrating being is seen unconscious like wood and wall". And so on.

Thus (by showing that his theory is supported by others also) the author has justified the use of (plural in) "Viduḥ".

The Bauddhas also, who hold that validity of cognition depends upon the intellectual reaction (Adhyavasāya), have almost accepted this theory, because the most essential nature of the intellectual reaction is (inner) speech (14).

To the question : "Why so much prominence is being given to this power of free-consciousness, in spite of the fact that Parama Śiva has got innumerable other powers ?" the author replies :—

(15-16)"Therefore, it is that He manifests Himself as objects of knowledge. The object has no separate existence : for, in that case, because of His having to look up to them for help, His freedom would be lost."

"As the Self is without a second and is perfectly free, so by means of mere will (Saṅkalpaḥ icchārūpaḥ), He creates Īśa etc. who are full of power of freedom, and makes them objects of meditation etc. in ordinary life."

The power of action, the essence of which is omnipotence, includes all powers. And this is of the nature of free consciousness (Vimarśa). Therefore, it is rightly given prominence. This is the substance of the reply. The following is the word-meaning :—

The Highest Lord, whose essential nature is light (of consciousness), manifests Himself as the objects of knowledge, though in reality He is subject only and, therefore, not the object of knowledge. This is what is established as the only

possibility; because by means of strong inferential proofs in support of this possibility, it has been shown that there is no other possibility. And this He does, because of His Freedom, the distinctive feature of which is the power of free-consciousness. Because He is Self-conscious, and because the world lies within Him, therefore, He manifests Himself as blue etc. But how can there be this very possibility that He manifests Himself as object? Reply is that the object cannot have its existence apart or separate from the light of consciousness. The particle 'tu' implies emphasis. In support of this some arguments have already been given; more are given below :—

If the object of knowledge be separate or different from the universal subject, the intentness of the Subject on object, of which we know from our own experience, will not be possible; because that intentness on the object, which is different from it, means His (Subject's) dependence upon the latter. And dependence is quite opposite of freedom. Freedom lies in not seeking external help ; and that is the chief characteristic of Self. Therefore, if Self be seeking the help of another, it would cease to be Self. And not-self, being insentient, there can be no possibility of its seeking any help. This is the unwelcome conclusion. Therefore, from this opposite conclusion it follows that Self does not seek external help, and consequently, being free; it manifests its own Self as object of knowledge (15).

He creates not only external objects of perception such as blue etc., but others also, in which the characteristic nature of doer and power of freedom are markedly present, and makes them objects of meditation and worship etc. This also is possible only if what has been stated in the previous verse be accepted as true. This is the connection of this verse with previous one.

But is there no self-contradiction in saying that the object is created and yet it is full of power of freedom ? Reply is that that Self, which is without a second and is pure light of consciousness (Saṁvid), is perfectly free. Therefore, what has been asserted above is reasonable. The word "freedom" (Svātantrya) implies unobstructed freedom in creating that which in the sphere of Māyā seems extremely difficult.

"Because of this alone" (ata eva) refers to the essential nature of the power of free-consciousness. Therefore, there is no repetition. Or there is another construction possible, namely, "because of this freedom alone" (ata eve svātantryāt). The two words, thus, refer to the same thing and are connected

with both the verses. The author illustrates the point as follows :—

Although we do not know any instance of creation of that which is full of power of freedom, as we know that of blue etc., yet, because to meditator or worshipper in his meditation on the Lord, the glorious, the Self, the eternal, the omnipresent or the free etc., the object of worship or meditation or observation appears as distinct ; it is, therefore, created. But it is not other than Īśvara, because in that case there would remain no difference between meditation on Īśvara and on Anīśvara. But that is not the case. For, the effects of two meditations are different. Therefore, both the kinds of objects, one full of power of freedom and the other devoid of it, are non-different from Self and are manifested by the Lord by virtue of His power of free-consciousness. Therefore, that is the chief power. (16)

But the following question may be raised here:—The objects shine as distinct from one another, because of the light of universal consciousness. The essence, however, of that light of universal consciousness (prakāśa) is free-consciousness or Vimarśa. Hence because free-consciousness is non-different (from light of consciousness), therefore, the only thing that we can rightly say is "that is that" only i.e. prakāśa and Vimarśa are identical. But in our determinate subjective reflection, such as that on Īśvara or Self etc., the created is thought as "this" ; but the "freedom" is thought as "I". The created , therefore, not being of the nature of self-consciousness, how can it be represented to be not devoid of power of freedom? To answer this the author says as follows :—

(17) **"The universal Self-consciousness and Īśvara etc. do not become different from one another simply because of difference in the forms of judgment related to them. For, the judgments related to the created ultimately rest on the universal Self-consciousness just as the consciousness of meaning of a noun, derived from a root, rests on the consciousness of the action, represented by personal termination."**

The affix, expressive of state (tal), is used here in the sense of essential nature. The word 'etc.',(ādi) implies Self and Īśvara etc. The word 'personal termination' (tiṅ) implies all affixes which stand for action. The word 'action' (karma) is used to imply power (Śakti) which is not of the nature of substance. Hence the meaning of the verse is as follows:—

The universal consciousness assumes the form "I" and also other innumerable forms such as "Lord" "Subject" "Self" or "Śiva" etc. And although these are apparently different from

one another, yet it is wrong to suppose that there is any real difference between that Self which is Creator and is of the nature of self-consciousness, and that which is created and is conceived as "Īśvara" etc. ; because even the consciousness "Īśvara" rests on Him whose nature is to lord, the most essential characteristic of whom is the capacity to do and to know : and because the capacity to know etc. (jñātṛtva) consists in freedom i.e. independence of others i.e. possession of unlimited power of knowledge ; and unlimitedness of knowledge lies in its resting on "I" as "I know" "I do" : therefore, the things, created by this Lord, or Self, are to be (ultimately) conceived only as "I". Or the word "Sṛṣṭeḥ" may be taken as ending in the ablative case, expressive of the causal relation. (It will then mean) because the Lord, in His creation of Īśa etc. by will, creates what is capable of self-consciousness. In the word "mṛśya" the affix (ya) is expressive of capability. The Meanings, such as action (kriyā), relation subsisting between a noun and a verb, conjunction, option etc., which in truth are nothing more than thoughts, expressed by the use of personal termination, instrumental case and particles "ca" and "vā" etc. respectively, even though they may be given substantive forms by presenting them in such words as "pāka" "kartā" "samuccaya" and "vikalpa", yet they rest on the original thoughts, presentable in such words as "pacati" "caitreṇa" "ca" and "vā". For, otherwise they (meanings) will not be grasped. Similar is the case here. The idea, stated above, may be elaborated as follows :—

The word "parāmarśa" means the point of rest (in the thought-process). And it is only the culminating point that is truly so. And that is nothing else than self-consciousness. The point of rest, that comes in the middle, is like the root (shade) of a tree in going to a village. And that (point of rest, which comes in the middle) is spoken of as created in relation to the culminating point. Hence there is no contradiction. The argument, stated above, proves that blue etc., though they constitute the middle points (in the process of thought) yet, because they ultimately rest on the original thought, "the I", the self-consciousness, they, therefore, are identical with self-consciousness. Even the consciousness "I know this blue" is in reality nothing more than "I shine". This is what has been asserted in the following :—

"Of the consciousness "this" etc.

And because a layman finds false satisfaction in the determinate cognition of blue etc., because it serves his practical purpose,

therefore, blue etc. have been spoken of as devoid of "freedom". But in the case of the self, even a layman does not consider the thought-process complete nor the purpose attained, unless he comes to rest on the original thought. Hence the self has been spoken of as not devoid of "freedom" even when it is created. (17)

But if all thoughts in reality rest in one pure "I-consciousness", how can it be said that direct cognition and remembrance etc. are His powers ; that cognition has such varieties as doubt and certainty etc.; and that the material objects such as blue etc. are of various kinds ? To answer this objection the author says:—

(18) **"The same free universal self-consciousness, having as its place of rest the objects of sense-perception, which are separated from perceiver by the power of freedom** (Māyā) **of the Lord, is called by different names such as perception, imagination and ascertainment etc."**

The manifestation, which cannot reasonably be explained is called Māyā. Therefore, the entire mass of objective manifestations, separated from light of consciousness, is Māyā. The power of freedom of the universal consciousness in objective manifestations is itself "Māyā Şakti".

That very universal consciousness, whose essential nature is self-consciousness and which is nothing else than the transcendental speech (Parā Vāk), having the objects,—which are separated from the subject and one another by the power of Māyā, and which are to be known through senses, which also are separated from the subject, each other and sense-objects by the same power of Māyā, —as its places of rest, is called perception, imagination and ascertainment. By the use of the word 'Etc'. (Ādi) doubt and remembrance etc. are meant to be added. Thus (I) perception (jñāna) is the same light of consciousness (Saṁvid) when it is limited by senses, which perceive only what is clear, and by clearly manifested external object. The same light of consciousness (Saṁvid), being limited by mind (Manas) and the object, which is not clear, is called (II) imagination. Saṁvid, being limited by intellect (Buddhi) and the object in all its completeness or entirety, is called (III) ascertainment (adhyavasāya.)

The diversity of objects and of internal and external senses, which does not appear to be consistent with reason, because the objects are essentially identical with the universal consciousness is manifested by the universal consciousness, because it rests on

diversity, and because diversity does not rest on unity as in the case of Sadāśiva and Īśvara. And because (in the sphere of Māyā) variety constitutes the culminating point, therefore, perception and imagination etc. are represented to be powers of that unifier, the universal free consciousness (Saṁvid), whose oneness with its essential nature always is intact. Accordingly, variety of cognitions such as doubt etc. and difference of blue and yellow etc. also has been talked of. Thus there remains no objection. (18)

But although determinacy as distinctive nature of the sentient power is not open to any objection in imagination and remembrance etc., which belong to the sphere of determinate knowledge, yet how can it be maintained to be so in relation to the indeterminate experience, the chief feature of which is immediacy. For, determinate consciousness (pratyavamarśa) consists in using certain fixed word for the thing perceived. This depends upon remembrance of indicatory word : that on revival of residual traces and that also on similar (previous) perception. Thus, how can, at the time of first moment of experience, the application of certain fixed word to the thing perceived be possible ? To remove this wrong idea the author says :—

(19)"At the time of indeterminate experience also there is determinate consciousness (the essence of which is application of indicatory sign). For, how otherwise will there be the possibility of running etc. if there be no determinate consciousness (though in a subtle form)".

In the indeterminate experience also there is the association with the inner speech which is the essential characteristic of the Self and which is similar to indication by fingure etc. For, otherwise a child, on seeing a transaction for the first time, would get no knowledge. A child hears the word, spoken by another person, through a regular succession of indeterminate cognitions; he sees that object before (in regard to which the word, he has just heard, has been used) : and then he sees the place without the thing. Now on hearing "bring the jar or "carry it" how can the consciousness arise in the heart of child that the particular thing is the meaning of a particular word, namely, this is the meaning of the word "jar" ; this is the meaning of the word "bring" ; and this is the meaning of the word "carry". For, the consciousness, that this particular object is the meaning of this particular word, depends upon unification. And unification is determinate cognitive activity.

But if any one were to say that knowledge of the child (on hearing a certain word, used for the first time) is due to remem-

brance of indicatory words, associated with the objects of experience of former birth, we reply as follows:—

That word, (in terms of which the knowledge of a child is tried to be explained) because at the time of acquisition of its conventional meaning in the past birth, it was determinately cognised as an object, as "this", has to be admitted to have shone as separate from the subject and to have rested on the subject, identified with intellect (Buddhi-pramātā). For, only as such, it could be expressive.

If then intellective subject (Buddhi pramātā) were admitted to shine in its essential nature as that on which the word rests, the word would have to be admitted to be an important aspect of the subject. Let it be granted that colour etc. as objects, are not essentially of the nature of speech (Abhilāpa). But, just as, though the object is not essentially of the nature of pleasure, yet the intellect-subject (Vijñāna) shines as blissful ; so intellect-subject will have to be admitted to shine as identical with the word that rests on it, (at the time of acquisition of convention by the child). According to this system, however, the object also is essentially of the nature of transcendental speech, because it is essentially of the nature of free-consciousness (Vimarśamaya). Even the state of senselessness and so forth, if it be not of the nature of determinate cognition, its possibility would in reality be matter of swearing only ; because there would be no determinate activity of the subject in it, and consequently there will be no subsequent recollection of it.

But if the determinative activity be supposed to arise there as related to some form, what else (would be the consequence than that) there can be no senselessness which is characterised by absence of all mental activity. Hence it follows that even in the case of senselessness there is subtle determinative activity. All words are capable of expressing all meanings. But at the time of acquisition of convention, a particular word is unified with a particular meaning. That is as follows:—

At the sight of an object in front, a child naturally apprehends it determinately, either subjectively as "I" or objectively as "this". On it either the word "fair complexioned" or "cow" is superimposed. That word also, because of continued use, becomes one with the subject (pramātṛ). Of the two, one is further superimposed upon as "white" and the other as "bull". This is the essential nature of convention.

From the above arguments it is clear that in the indeterminate experience there is an element of determinacy. The idea con-

veyed by the word "Api" is that even indeterminate cognition really ends in definite consciousness "I see". That this definite consciousness is an aspect of perception as a function (Pratyakṣa) *is* the view of even the Naiyāyika. And function can never be different from one to whom it belongs ; because the former is the essential nature of the latter.

Or let the indeterminate cognition be admitted to be momentory in its nature, but there is no doubt about it that therein also there is definite consciousness. For, if it be not there, then a person, going hurriedly with one aim, or uttering letters rapidly, or reading a book of hymns rapidly, should not reach, utter or read the desired. That is as follows:—

How can reaching the desired place be possible unless there be determinate consciousness, the essential aspects of which are unification and separation ; such as knowledge of the place, desire to step, stepping, consciousness of the foot having been placed on the right place, desire to leave, consciousness of another place, and also desire to step on it etc. ? Similar should be considered to be the case with speaking and reading rapidly etc. In the last two cases there is contact of tongue with various places of articulation. Here (in the above cases of reading etc.) hurry consists in the absence of clear determinate knowledge, which follows the indeterminate. Therefore, there must be subtle determinate consçiousness, consisting in subtle idea of indicatory sign (word). For, gross determinacy is nothing else than expansion into clear and definite shape of the subtle idea in the form of the indicatory word. For instance, expansion or clarification of "this" is "jar" "white" etc. and of that also is "of the shape of big belly with a bottom" and "with quality of whiteness inherent in it". The root "Dhāvu" according to the text, means to go or to clean. But in the present context it means to run, because of its own expressive power (independently of any prefix). (19)

May be that subtle determinate consciousness is present even in the indeterminate in the cases, cited above. But in other cases the determinacy of consciousness is apparent, because of its grossness. In such cases indicatory word shines separately like other external objects, blue etc. e.g. "this is Nīla". How can this (indicatory word) be represented as one with essential nature of indeterminacy ? For, determinate consciousness is, according to you, non-different from indicatory word, and that, (indicatory word) even in the state of Māyā, wherein difference is clearly manifest, is held by you as not having separate

existence from indeterminacy. How can this be acceptable? With this objection in mind the author says the following:—

(20) **"The determinacy, (Adhyavasā) which is expressed as "this is jar", is the power of the Highest Lord, beyond name and form. It always shines as (one with Him) "I" and never as "this".**

Who said that the gross audible indicatory sound is identical with free-consciousness (Vimarśa), which is the very life of light of consciousness ? That gross sound also shines separately as other objects. (Our view about this Vimarśa is that) Determinacy, which determinately cognises words and objects, characterised by name and form as non-different, as, "that is this" is the power of the Highest Lord, called "Vimarśa". It always shines as unlimited "I" and never as limited "this". For, if it were to shine as limited, being dependent upon another, there will arise the necessity of another and that being supposed to shine as limited, there will be required still another. Thus, it will lead to argumentum-ad-infinitum. Therefore, the external objects, being without anything to rest upon, would not shine at all. Therefore, no Vimarśa is separate from Prakāśa. The gender of the word "adhyavasā" is feminine. It is formed by adding affix "aṇ" in accordance with the rule "Ātaścopasarge" (Pan. 3-2-16). (20)

If all cognitions rest on I—consciousness, then it means that they do not touch the objective level. Therefore, as association with time and space is possible of that only which is of the nature of object of knowledge and not of the knower, so, there being no connection with time or space, how can various cognitions, which are experienced as coming in succession one after the other, either in relation to space or certain aspects of the subject etc., be explained ? And if there be no order of succession, there will in reality be only one cognition. How then would it be justifiable to say, as you have said, that Lord is full of powers of cognition and remembrance etc. ? To this the author replies and concludes the discussion :—

(21) **"It is only because of the affection by temporal and spatial limitation of the variety of objects that cognition, remembrance and intellectual reaction (adhyavasāya) etc. appear to be successive."**

True, the universal consciousness (Saṁvid) has no order or succession. But it has, by virtue of its power, manifested separately various objects of knowledge. And these shine in it, casting their reflections as on a mirror. Therefore, because of the spatial limitation, such as distance and proximity and

extendedness and unextendedness, constituted by variety of forms; and temporal limitation, such as slow or quick succession, constituted by variety of forms involved in action of these objects, there appear to be parts of cognition and remembrance and intellectual reaction, though they have no parts. And because of the parts, which shine, there appears to be succession of parts in each of them as well as in their mutual relation. Although temporal succession alone is clearly perceptible in cognitions and not the spatial ; yet, as the cognition of mountain seems to be big and that of jujube fruit small to a layman, so the author has referred to spatial succession also. Therefore, the succession in cognition, which is perceptible, due to the successive reflections of the external objects, is not unreal, because nothing that shines is so. Therefore, it was right to say "cognitions etc. are the powers of the Lord."

By the verse "Because of the power of the Lord, the "Māyā" difference in forms of cognitions was explained. And by this verse the difference in temporal and spatial limitations is explained. This is the difference (between the subject-matter of this verse from that of the earlier). The chapter ends (21).

Here ends the fifth chapter, called the presentation of the power of cognition, in jñānādhikāra in the commentary on the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Sūtra by great teacher Abhinavagupta. (5)

ĀHNIKA VI

We bow to that Şiva, who, because of his free will, creates variety of forms, by separately manifesting the objects, which in the state of identity with His Self are like one solid mass, by means of His power of differentiation, which is like a chisel.

Thus, the powers of knowledge and remembrance have been explained. Now the power of differentiation (Apohana-Śakti), which is the helper of both, is going to be discussed at length in eleven verses beginning with "The universal self-consciousness, which is the essential nature of the light of consciousness" and ending in "Are established to belong to all living beings."

The first verse shows that the distinctive feature of the universal self-consciousness is indeterminacy. The next verse asserts that in pure self-consciousness, the activity of differentiation is impossible. The verse after that says that such Self-consciousness has been established on rational basis in this system only. The next two verses admit that the impure self-consciousness is determinacy. In the next verse it is shown that unification also is determinacy. The following verse asserts that the creative activity of the Highest Lord consists in the unification etc., as presented above. Then in one verse the conclusion that all objective manifestations have their being in the universal consciousness, which is under discussion, is stated. Then in the following two verses it is stated that the same objective manifestation appears in a variety of ways in the direct cognition and remembrance. The last verse says that what has been stated above is useful in recognising the identity of the individual self with the Lord. This is the substance of the chapter. Now begins the explanation of the text.

In the preceding chapter it has been said "the essentia nature of light of consciousness is free-consciousness (Vimarśa) 1-5-11" And Viamarśa has been related to subtle speech. This logically implies that the pure lord or universal consciousness is of the nature of determinacy (Vikalpa) ; because it is related to speech. This is not a welcome implication, because determinacy arises only in the world, which is of the nature of Māyā. With this objection in his mind, the author says :—

(1) "The (universal) I-consciousness, though it is the very life of the light of consciousness and is embodied in the transcendental speech, is not determinacy, because determinacy is certainty, which implies two."

The (universal) I-consciousness,—which rests on freedom, the chief characteristic of which is perfect independence of others; which is of the nature of inner consciousness and is without any break,—is the very life, i.e. the most essential characteristic of the light of consciousness, which is of the nature of pure Saṁvid and is not soiled by association with body etc. This cannot be determinacy. He shows reason to justify the supposition that it is determinacy, namely, "Even though it is embodied in speech."

By the word 'speech' (Vāk) is meant that sound, which is of the nature of inner speech, is one with Saṁvid, ever shines within and is different from that sound, which is of the nature of an object and as such can be perceived through sense of hearing. Speech (Vāk) is so called, because it speaks of the object by superimposing itself on the object through unification, namely "that is this". But if it is embodied in speech why then is it not determinacy ? Reply is ; because in it the characteristic of determinacy (Vikalpa) is absent. That is as follows :—

Determinacy is the act of constructing many images (in consequence of contact with one object) and then differentiating the object of cognition from all else, which it was at first doubted to be. The variety (involved in determinacy) is due to the fact that on sense-contact with fire there arises the idea of possibility of not-fire ; it is superimposed (on fire at first) and then rejected. Thus, it implies both fire and not-fire. Therefore, in determinacy, there is always differentiation of what the object of cognition is from what it is not. (1)

The same point is further elaborated as follows :—

(2) "There is the possibility of appearance (at the same place) of both jar and not-jar, which are essentially different from each other. But there is nothing which has similarity with the light of consciousness and which, though different from it, yet shines."

There is the possibility of presence at that very place, where we see a jar, of something which is altogether different from jar, say, cloth, which also occupies places admittedly fit for it, gives rise to cognition and has been (may have been) brought there by a fixed set of causes. Therefore, there being the possibility of appearance of both jar and cloth (at the place where jar alone is present) there is room for superimposition. When there is superimposition of a thing of different nature (on jar) then alone there is room for the power of differentiation (Apohana) to function in refuting what is superimposed. Therefore, the ascertainment "this is jar" has the distinctive feature of deter-

minacy, which depends upon the operation of the power of differentiation (Apohana). Here Liṅ Lakāra is used in the sense of possibility.

But that which can possibly be superimposed on the light of consciousness, cannot be not-light. For, superimposition is always of something that belongs to the same category. And the 'not-light' has never been found to have the causal efficiency of the light of consciousness. For, the very fact that it is superimposed or is thought to be possible, would mean that it is not not-light. Therefore, there is nothing like 'not-light', similar to the light of consciousness, which may be on a par with the latter and whereon the power of differentiation (Apohana) can function. As there is no 'not-light', so what can be refuted ? Even if 'non-light' be supposed to shine or exist (then it is no 'not-light") rather that is also light of consciousness. Nor has light of consciousness any temporal, spatial or formal differences so as to make it possible to differentiate one light of consciousness from the other.

Here the word "Hi" means : because it is so (i.e. because there is nothing similar to the light of consciousness) and consequently because there are not two ; therefore, the differentiation being impossible, it (Ahampratyavamarśa) cannot be represented to be of the nature of Vikalpa. Therefore, in the case of pure Saṁvid, which is free-consciousness itself, the "I—consciousness" is the "self-consciousness (Pratyavamarśa) only and not determinate cognition (Vikalpa). (2)

Here it may be asked : how can the determinate perception of jar, which arises on the basis of the indeterminate perception, negate not-jar ? For, nobody has mentioned even its name. And how can the residual trace of not-jar arise on perception of jar ? (The reply is) True. But this is a question which has to be put to the Buddhist and not to us. The reason is as follows :—

(3) "The certainty about "this" that the subject, in whom both "this" and "not-this" shine, feels, because he rejects not-this, is spoken of as the determinate cognition "this is jar."

According to this system, the subject is different from means of cognition. He is perfectly free in the sphere of cognitions. He is a free agent, because he is responsible for unification and differentiation of cognitions. This has been proved. And all the objects shine within that subject. These objects are essentially of the nature of pure consciousness only, and shine as one with the subject, exactly in the manner in which a city

shines in a mirror. This also has been stated. Thus, both the images, of "this" i.e. 'jar' and of 'not-this' i.e. "not-jar" are present within the subject. Therefore, in the state of indeterminacy, jar is one with pure consciousness and, like the latter, it is omniform and perfect. Hence it can be of no use in practical life. Therefore, the Subject, while manifesting the activity of Māyā, splits this perfect being i.e. manifests it as delimited. Through that (manifestation of activity of Māyā) he differentiates jar from not-jar, self and cloth etc. The differentiation consists in negation. And we speak of certainty about the jar "this is jar and nothing else" on the basis of that very differentiation only, the chief characteristic of which is negation. For, the meaning of the word "eva" is the negation of all other things, which can possibly exist (at that place). This determinacy (Vikalpa) is so called because it cuts a thing off on all sides (from everything else). The implication of the word "hi" is "because it is so", therefore, it is rightly said that determinacy depends upon two. But by means of the statement of two facts in the preceding verses two reasons have been successively stated (in support of the two assertions in verse no. 1). Therefore, as determinacy is such, so I—consciousness is pure freeconsciousness and not determinacy (Vikalpa). This is the central meaning in the long sentence, that extends over three verses. By the Bauddhas also the differentiation is represented to be an act of the subject. For, in the verse "Ekaḥ Pratyavamarśākhyaḥ" etc. they use the words "prapattā" and "svayam". But how can they support this assertion ? Let us stop here. (3)

But why cannot I—consciousness be represented to be determinacy inasmuch as in this also jar etc., which are not—I have to be negated ? With this objection in his mind the author says:—

(4-5) "The I-consciousness,—which shines as a distinct subject, because the universal consciousness has obscured itself through its power of obscuration (Māyā) and shines distinctly within (the limitations of) body, intellect (Buddhi) vital air or the supposed voidness,—is determinacy (Vikalpa) ; because of its differentiation from others. Determinacy (Vikalpa) owes its being to the awareness of another thing, which is of opposite nature."

The I—consciousness is of two kinds, one is pure and the other is due to Māyā. Pure is that which rests on pure Saṁvid which is non-different from the universe, or on that pure self, in which the whole universe is reflected. Impure is that which rests on body etc. which are objective. Thus, in relation to

pure self-consciousness there is nothing of opposite nature possible, which has to be negated ; because jar etc. also being essentially of the nature of consciousness and, therefore, of not opposite nature, have not to be negated. Thus, there being nothing to be differentiated from the Self, there is no possibility of determinacy in pure self-consciousness. But the impure self-consciousness, —which rests on body etc., which are of the nature of an object, and exist separately from other bodies and jars etc.,—is undoubtedly a determinacy. This is the substance. The word-meaning is as follows :—

'Principle of consciousness' (cittattva) means that which is of the nature of pure light. 'Giving up' (Hitvā) means that though it is still there, yet having thrown into the background through the influence of Māyā. 'In the differentiated' (bhinne) means 'in the body etc.'. That determinate consciousness "I who am fat" which is due to the wrong notion that I who am body etc. am the perceiver of the external objects blue etc. is really determinacy (Vikalpa). It is not pure self-consciousness. The reason may be stated as follows :—

"Para" means another i.e. body and jar etc. which are of opposite nature, i.e. of equal status and opposite because they (self and not-self) are mutually exclusive. The limited self-consciousness is determinacy, because the consciousness "I am fat and not thin, nor identical with jar etc.", arises from cognition, which is characterised by superimposition of what is of opposite nature and depends upon the negation of 'not-that'. The obscuration of pure Saṁvid is the cause of difference of body etc. And the cause of obscuration of that pure Saṁvid is that power which is called Māyā. It is the power of freedom of the Highest Lord. It is freedom to bring about the obscuration of unity, which is of the nature of illusion. It is simply His will to conceal Himself. And the obscuration of the real nature of Saṁvid consists in wrongly considering body etc., which are still of the nature of object and, therefore, different from the subject, to be the subject, without any reason for it.

Accordingly, the Cārvākas, who represent those who wrongly suppose the body to be the self, hold that body, with consciousness as its attribute, is self. Thus, according to them, body is the chief thing, because such is the idea of women, children and the ignorant.

Some followers of the Vedānta, who are better than the Cārvākas, maintain that body is transient, because certain new qualities (colour etc.) arise in it and change on account

of its subjection to heat. And because they find that without the presence of the vital air (Prāṇa) in the body, hundreds of deformities enter into it, they hold that vital air, which is responsible for feelings of hunger and thirst, is the self. Those who are wiser still, such as the followers of Kaṇāda etc., seeing that vital air also, being transient, cannot possibly remember, hold that Buddhi, which is the substratum of knowledge and pleasure etc., is the self.

Others, holding Buddhi also to be a lower principle inasmuch as it appears as an object at the time of spiritual intuition, represent the subject to be above the entire mass of knowables, essentially of the class of the unknowable and similar to ether (nabha) in respect of voidness and yet different from ether, which is one of the five elements. This is the view of the Sāṅkhya etc., who believe in Śūnya-Brahman.

The implication of the word "imagined" (kalpite) is that as soon as the objective nature of body etc. is realised, another subject which is nothing more than void (Śūnya) is imagined. The same being the case with this also, another Śūnya is supposed and so on; because so long as duality persists the chain of suppositions does not break. This, however, does not mean infinite regress. For, all, body and intellect etc., possess the essential nature of subject, just because of the presence in them of the power of real light of consciousness, but not independently. Thus, the conception of body as the subject is mere egoism (ahaṅkāra). Śūnya (as subject) is nothing more than universal consciousness in a limited form; just as not-being or absence of jar (ghaṭābhāva) is nothing more than limited piece of (bare) land. Intellect, vital air and body etc. (as subjects) are nothing more than the universal consciousness, affected by the reflections of objects, after it has assumed limitation. These subjects constitute the various levels in the gradual spiritual ascent of Yogins. They are called by different names in different Āgamas, such as jāgrat etc. or Piṇḍastha etc.

The obscuration shall be explained later as follows: —

"The sentiency or consciousness, which is associated with the limited subject such as Śūnya etc., which are in themselves insentient, but in which the element of freedom predominates because it is revived by 'Kalā', is limited and occupies a subordinate position."

Therefore, it is established that impure I-consciousness is determinacy. (5)

Each of the two types of self-consciousness is again subdivisible into two, according as it is of the nature of direct experience or of unification. Pure Self-consciousness (of the nature of direct experience) is "Aham" or "I" in the Śiva stage. And it is of the nature of unification 'I am this' in the state of Sadā-Śiva.

Impure self-consciousness also is similarly of two types: (I) that which is of the nature of direct experience "I am fat" and (II) that which is of the nature of unification "I who was fat, am now thin": or "I, who was a child, am now young or old" etc.

It has been established that Vikalpa is not possible in the case of pure Self-consciousness. The impure self-consciousness, which is of the nature of direct experience, has already been demonstrated to be of the nature of determinate knowledge. In the case of the impure self-consciousness, which is of the nature of unification, there being consciousness of unity, some one might consider it to be an indeterminate cognition. It is, therefore, to remove his ignorance that the author says as follows:—

(6) **"Connecting of the determinate present stage with the previous one, which is due to the revival of impressions, (in the case of the limited subject, who has definite temporal, spatial and formal limitations), is also a determinacy (Vikalpa), because it is related to (body etc.,) shining separately as limited."**

Body etc. is to be taken over from the previous verse. In the case of the body etc., —the characteristic of which is determinacy and which appear at a certain time, with temporal, spatial and formal limitations, —the unification (of the present) with the previous manifestation (Avabhāsa) such as the body of childhood e.g. "I, who was a child, am today a young man" is determinate knowledge and not pure self-consciousness. Here the use of the word "Ādi" implies unification with the coming stage also i.e. "shall grow old". Here the adjunct of body etc. (Bhinnāvabhāsini) is given as the reason (in support of the above statement), namely, "because, even at the time of unifying the two stages, the body shines separately". For, if this unifying of the two stages be accompanied with the consciousness of its all round perfection i.e. its freedom from all limitations, then it would be Sadāśiva stage and consciousness would assume the form "I am this". Who can say that determinate consciousness is possible in this case ; because in this unification there is no consciousness of separation.?

But how is this unification possible in the case of separate limited subject ? Reply is, "because of impression" i.e. because

of remembrance, due to the revival of impressions, caused by former experiences. In the case of the subject as vital air, this unification of two stages is based on feelings of strength and weakness. In the case of Buddhi as a subject, it is based on varying degrees of knowledge and pleasure etc. And in the case of void (Śūnya) it depends on the consciousness of its extensiveness and inextensiveness. This also is Vikalpa.

Similarly in the case of unification of two stages of a jar also "this is that very jar" determinacy has to be admitted. But, as in all these unifications the power of knowledge (Vidyāśakti) flashes predominantly, like lightning, therefore, these are admitted by teachers to be the first steps in getting contact with the Supreme. (6)

The body etc. (as subjects), are not the objects of higher and higher subjects so that the shining of a particular object of knowledge will not be possible without shining of the subject of that; and the latter will not be possible without the light of another higher subject, and that too will not shine without the light of another still and so on *ad-infinitum*. Rather the fact is that the statement that the pure light of consciousness illumines the whole universe, implies, as has already been stated, that the Lord is never without the powers of Creation etc. This is what the author proves as follows:—

(7) "Therefore, even in practical life, the Lord, because of His free will, enters into body etc. and manifests externally the mass of objects, which shines within Him."

The assertion, that has been made in the verse "In body and intellect" etc., can be thus justified. How ? If in the practical life, which is the sphere of Māyā, the Lord Himself, who is in reality pure light, be supposed to make the mass of objects, that shines within Him as "I", externally manifest as "this" by entering into body and vital air etc., i.e. manifesting Himself primarily as a limited subject in body and vital air etc., by means of his free will, which is nothing more than the power of Māyā. Otherwise there will be infinite regress. The Lin Lakāra (in Bhāsayet) implies "reason". The words "Api" and "Eva" are to be connected with other words than those with which they are found connected in the verse. The word "tat" stands for "reason". Because of the statement, that has just been made, the following is established. What is that ? the Possibility—that even in Practical life i.e. in sale and purchase, in witnessing a performance and in giving an exposition, the Lord Himself, identifying Himself with the bodies and vital airs etc. of Caitra and Maitra etc., manifests

externally, as separate from each other, that which shines within Him, without breaking its internality—is established. The 'Liṅ Lakāra' (in 'Bhāsayet') means possibility. At one particular time He (I) brings about identity (identifies Himself) with particular subject (body etc.); (2) terminates identity with another; (3) produces continuance of the subject as the percipient of jar etc; (4) imposes obscuration by obscuring the perfection, which is the essential nature ; and (5) bestows favour by bestowing perfection in so far as He makes the identity (of subjects) shine in relation to limited manifestation (aesthetic object). Thus, not only in great creations, great continuances, great annihilations, obscurations due to wrath, and favours in the form of initiation and spiritual insight, does the Lord perform five functions, but always, in practical life also. This has been asserted in the following verses:—

"We bow to that Lord, whose diversion is creation, who has repose in the pleasure of continuance and who is ever satisfied with the food of all the three worlds."

"We bow to that one eternal being, who retains his indeterminacy even though He is at every moment ceaselessly creating the three worlds by hundreds of determinate thoughts" etc. and

"When you freely manifest the individuals within yourself." (7)

Now there remains no doubt about this that the objects shine within (the universal Self). What is then the use of thinking about other causes (of the objective world.) This is the point in hand which has to be established. To establish it reason has been given that without it (i.e. the shining of objects within) determinate consciousness in the form of desire would be impossible. And by the way, the real nature of self-consciousness and determinate knowledge (Vikalpa) has been explained. Now in order to set the minds of the pupils at rest, he concludes by explaining the point in hand as follows :—

(8) "Thus, there is no doubt about it that the objects shine within the universal subject in remembrance, determinate knowledge, which depends upon the differentiation, and in indeterminate cognition."

Because the Highest Lord Himself is really the subject even at the time when body etc. are wrongly thought to be subjects, therefore, it is established that in remembrance, in determinate knowledge, the essence of which is differentiation, and in indeterminate experience, the shining (of the object) within i.e. shining as resting in the light of consciousness, is established; there is no doubt about it.

If body etc. were in reality the subjects then the talk that jar etc. are present within body, vital air, intellect or void (Śūnya) would be meaningless ; because the body etc. stand apart from jar etc. But the real light of consciousness is omnipotent. It is, therefore, established, without any effort, that the entire universe is within it. (8)

But if the objects, which shine within, are externally manifested in all cases i.e. in remembrance and in direct experience etc., what difference then there is between manifestation that takes place in perception and that in remembrance ? This difference cannot be denied, because there is clearness in one case and lack thereof in the other. To answer this he says as follows :—

(9) "In perception, in which the objects are externally manifest, the manifestation is due to Svātantrya, but in remembrance etc. it is due to the residual traces of the former experience."

In the direct perception, "this is Nila" which makes what was shining within externally manifest, the external shining of the objects, which are within the Self, is due to freedom (Svātantrya) and not, as in the case of remembrance, due to the impressions, caused by another perception. In remembrance, imagination and determinate cognitions, following on the back of direct perception, the objects blue etc., which lie within the subject and are externally manifested, are not due to freedom, but to the impressions, created by former experiences.

Now residual trace is nothing else than continued existence of the experience, in another time also. As this continually existing experience is associated with the limited manifestation, blue etc., so remembrance etc. also, being one with the limited manifestation, blue etc., shine as such. And for this reason it is that the limited manifestation (the object of remembrance) which is not possible at the time of remembrance, is associated with the time of its former experience (e.g. that jar). Thus it shall be declared that remembrance etc. are in themselves without any object and that their objects are only the objects of perception. It is in this that indistinctness of the object in remembrance etc. lies. Thus it is clear that there is difference in manifestation (Ābhāsa) in perception and in remembrance. External manifestation of the object, which shines within, without intervention of another (the residual trace), is perfect clearness. And manifestation, with the intervention of residual traces, because of its not having taken place at that very time, is indistinctness. (9)

But from this theory it will follow that shining of objects externally, in all forms of knowledge, excepting the direct perception, which is due to the operation of senses, is not without the intervention of residual of traces. With this objection in his mind the author points out how to divide them :—

(10) "In determinate cognition, which is free in its working, because it can manifest anything in any order in the mirror of the Buddhi, the external manifestation is due to freedom."

The determinate cognition in the form of imagination or volition etc., which is due to mental distraction and is independent of direct perception, is free in its working i.e. does not require any external prompting in its rise and termination. The external manifestation of blue etc. which shine within this, is due to freedom i.e. depends upon nothing else. For instance, the determinate cognition (the imagination) manifests externally on the background of the internal organ, the clear mirror of Buddhi, an elephant, which is present within the subject, and which was never seen before as possessed of white colour, two trunks and hundred tusks, just at that very time. (10)

As a result of this discussion on variety of manifestations, which was entered into, by the way, in the course of arguments to prove that the objects shine within the subject, the principal point, the recognition of the Lord in self, which is here intended to be specially treated, is automatically, without any effort, established.

(11) "For this very reason, i.e. because of the capacity to manifest in imagination all that is desired, the powers of knowledge and action of all living beings are clearly established."

(1) This very picturing up in imagination, of all that is desired, and (2) this objective grasp of the pictured up, —though it has never been the object of experience, because it has no existence in the objective world, which has been explained, by the way,—establishes this also that to all, who are endowed with life, whether he be a worm or Brahmā, the power of knowledge, consisting in objective grasp and that of action, consisting in picturing up, are natural. In the kingdom, which is a creation of mind, there is no possibility of any dependence upon the already existing separate creation, brought into being by God. Therefore, one's own power of action and that of knowledge, which are characterised by freedom in knowing and doing, have to be clearly recognised. The use of singular in "Sarvasya"

indicates that all are essentially one with the Lord. The chapter ends (11). The number of verses from the beginning up to this point is sixty-three.

Here ends the sixth chapter, called the presentation of the power of differentiation, in jñānādhikāra in the Iśvara Pratyabhijñā Sūtra Vimarśinī, written by illustrious teacher Abhinavagupta. (6)

ĀHNIKA VII

We bow to that Śiva, because of resting on whom, as the only place of rest, the innumerable powers, produce various effects, just as gems do the variegated light.

Thus, the real nature of powers of remembrance etc. has fully been described so far. And the essential nature of the subject also has been described here only to prove that they (remembrance etc.) are powers. As powers cannot exist independently, therefore, it is going to be proved that the substratum (the resting place, the basis) of those powers is one. And that is the Highest Lord, because He is free to bring about the union or separation of those powers. He is not simply an insentient substratum, as the fire is of powers to burn and to cook. Both these points were hinted at in a previous verse: "If there be no Lord, holding the endless universe within". This should now be thoroughly discussed and established.

In order to establish one basis, another chapter, consisting of fourteen verses, beginning with "And that this light" and ending in "Practical life is experienced" is begun.

Of these the first verse states briefly the essential nature of the one basis. The next two verses state reasons, both positive and negative, namely, that the practical life is possible only if there be one basis and not otherwise. Then the essential nature of practical life is presented in terms of causal relation in one verse, of remembrance in another and of differentiation between truth and falsehood in eight verses. The last verse states the conclusion. This is the summary of the chapter. Now the meaning of each verse is going to be explained.

It has been stated in the last verse of the preceding chapter, "it is established that all the living beings have the powers of knowledge and action". But how is that? And what is that which is different from knowledge etc. and can possess them? For, the Kaṇādic conception of their substratum has already been refuted in "Therefore, even when the qualities change" etc. To answer this question the author gives a clear idea of what that One is, according to this system.

(1) "And this consciousness of the object, i. e. the consciousness, which shines affected by a succession of variety of objects, is nothing but the great Lord, the Subject, who is essentially the eternal and unchanging light of consciousness."

Although in the experience "jar shines" the light of consciousness is related to object : yet it (the light of consciousness) does not belong to it (the object) as its own essential nature (Svakam Vapuḥ) : on the contrary, it is the light of consciousness itself which shines as object; because the object always shines on the background of subject e.g. "shines to me".

The same idea is found expressed in the Veda:—"All shine after Him, who is ever shining. All this shines with His light".

Here present participial affix 'Śatṛ' indicates His ever shining nature. And the use of accusative case, the peculiar significance of which in this particular case is Lakṣaṇa, indicates the relation of knower and the object of knowledge (between Tam and Sarvam). This relation is a product of His power of creation, which owes its being to His power of freedom. And the succession, which is experienced externally, has been shown to be due to His picturing up of the objects.

The light of consciousness,—which is affected, as mirror is by reflection, by temporal and spatial order, characterised by simultaneity or succession of objects, manifested by the powers of time and space, which are nothing more than the power of freedom of the great Lord, about whom we shall talk soon, —has already been discussed in an earlier verse "Only different objects" etc. And this (light of consciousness) is self-luminous and is, therefore, manifest to all. In reality it is introvert. And because it is ultimately nothing more than pure light and there is no variety in it, therefore, it is without succession. This very light of consciousness is the great Lord, whose essential nature is "consciousness", which is beyond the temporal and spatial limitations. He is called the subject inasmuch as He is pure light of self-consciousness. He is full of power of freedom, which expresses itself in various ways, such as unifying, differentiating and relating to the subject the mass of knowledge, consisting of determinate cognitions in innumerable forms, referring as "this" and "this" to every objective manifestation, which shines within the mass of means of knowledge, which are nothing more than the extrovert light of consciousness. Thus, the correct description of light of consciousness is that it is the "I", the resting place of both,(I) indeterminate cognition of jar as an external object and (II) inner determinate cognition, "this is jar", which

assumes the form of jar, which was the content of former indeterminate cognition. (1)

He states positive reasons to prove what has been asserted above, as follows : —

(2) **"The mutual connection of the objects is possible, if they have their being (facing one another) in the subject, through (the channels of) various definite cognitions."**

It is said that the objects shine distinctly only as resting on consciousness (Saṁvid); but this shining is not possible if they were to be supposed to be resting on the varying cognitive (Pramātmaka) consciousness (Saṁvid) (such as the vijñāna of the Bauddhas). If the objects, such as blue and pleasure etc., be resting (facing one another) in the ocean of universal Self-consciousness, which is essentially the subject, having been carried to it through various determiṇate perceptions, which are comparable to currents of rivers, then alone their mutual relationship can be explained. The meaning of the word "Jñāteya" is the state of relations (jñāti). The reason why the word "Jñāteya" is used for relations is that they know one another. It also means the act of relations, which is nothing else than the mutual assistance. In the present context, however, the word is used in the sense of unification, in order to show that the insentients cannot get unified themselves. (2)

Now he is going to advance negative argument to assert the same.

(3) **"How can otherwise mutual connection of the objects, which are related to different temporal and spatial orders and are self-confined, be possible? For, it (connection) depends upon their shining simultaneously."**

What connection can there be amongst insentient objects, their indeterminate experiences, determinate cognitions and ascertainments, which remain confined to their respective temporal and spatial orders and are self-confined i.e. are cut off from one another ? This means that no connection is possible. For, this connection can be established only if they shine simultaneously and are unified in one time, place or form. It is possible in no other way. For, straw and grass etc., borne by currents, which lose themselves separately (in sands) at different places, never meet.

There is difference in temporal and spatial relations of the objects because of their diversity. Therefore, the word "Simultaneous" (Sakṛt) is used to indicate the idea of elimination of such difference. (3)

But what is this Samanvaya? To answer this question, he describes the most comprehensive relation of cause and effect, as follows:—

(4) "As perceptions and non-perceptions are confined to their respective spheres, which are exclusively their own and are different from the rest; the establishment of the relation of cause and effect, therefore, depends upon oneness of the subject."

It has been asserted (by some schools) that the causal relation between fire and smoke is established by means of five i.e. two perceptions and three non-perceptions. When (1) a person perceives fire, (2) he does not see smoke, then (3) he directly perceives smoke. If (4) he does not see fire, (5) he does not find smoke also. But how can this be? For, the perception of fire does not bring into being that of smoke in any way; because the perception of fire brings about the perception of only that which is characterised by brilliance and is different from smoke; and because it rests on that separate part alone which has its special characteristic. It does not touch the object of another perception nor does it enter into what constitutes the essential feature of another perception. Here the word "Pāti" is used in two different senses "to make known" and "to rest". It stands for two words, (the one derived from the root 'Pat' with causal affix and the other without it.)

The same has to be said with regard to the remaining four, non-perception of smoke etc. Therefore, just as "fire" "absence of smoke" "smoke" "absence of fire" and "absence of smoke" these five, when perceived by different persons, cannot give an idea of any relation of cause and effect between fire and smoke so they cannot arouse the idea of relation, when they are perceived by the so called the same perceiver. And the determinate cognition also, which makes known something which is different from the indeterminately cognised, is not valid. (Hence the causal relation cannot be said to be explicable in terms of Vikalpa.)

But, according to our system, when through five channels of perception and non-perception those five things enter into one sea, then coming together they are manifested by the subject through his power of freedom, as unified with and dependent upon each other, but not otherwise, (unrelated) like jar and cloth. The single manifestation of interdependence is the relation of cause and effect. Therefore, according to us, everything is all right. (4)

But cannot the power of remembrance bring together the effects of various perceptions and non-perceptions? Reply

has already been stated, namely, that remembrance also operates only on what has been the object of perception and is of the nature of unification of different perceptions. Therefore, remembrance itself is not possible without one subject. This he shows in the following verse:—

(5) "The same self-consciousness, which makes itself shine in remembrance, is the illuminator of the former perception also and no other."

In remembrance, the object, which has already been perceived, shines. Here the object is simply remembered: it does not shine as new. That which shines in remembrance, is the former perception itself. But because the perception itself is of the nature of knowledge and not an object, it cannot, therefore, be the object of another knowledge, because one knowledge cannot be the object of another: on the contrary, it is self-luminous. Further, if it (being momentary) has no existence at the time of remembrance, how can it shine (so as to become the object of remembrance)? And even if it be supposed to be existing, then also these two cognitions, remembrance and perception, are different from each other. Therefore, remembrance will never be possible. Hence remembrance is possible in the following manner:—

The self-consciousness in remembrance is the same as that in perception. There is nothing else than self-consciousness, whether it be perception or inference, which can make remembrance possible. Therefore, it is established that that self-consciousness, which has continued existence, without any break, between the time of perception and that of remembrance, is the essence of the subject. "What has been experienced by one cannot be remembered by another" was the argument, which was advanced before in connection with remembrance to establish the existence of the subject. But now the same has been done in a different manner; i.e. by showing the identity of self-consciousness in both. (5)

But the opponent may say:"Let us admit the validity of determinate cognitions in the spheres, other than that of direct perception, (Anubhava) also. For, invalidity is due to contradiction. And how can we talk of invalidity of any determinate cognition when there is no contradiction?" With this objection in mind, the author shows at great length how this relation of contraries, which is the very life of all wordly transactions, inasmuch as it enables us to differentiate the real from the unreal, is also not possible without the existence of one subject:—

(6) "The relation of contraries (Bādhyabādhakabhāva) is possible only as a result of resting of all cognitions, which resting in themselves separately cannot be annullers of one another, in one (permanent) subject."

"Rightness of a thing depends upon there being nothing to prove the contrary". (This is the maxim of the Naiyāyikas.) The relation of contraries, therefore, has to be proved. But how will that also be possible (if there be no permanent subject)? This is the significance of the word "Api".

(What does the statement "this is mother-of-pearl and not silver" mean?) It cannot mean annulment of silver by mother-of-pearl: for, we do not see such a thing being done. Nor can it mean refutation of perception of silver by that of mother-of-pearl, because two perceptions, resting on their separate objects, or resting separately in themselves, cannot refute each other. Nor can it be said that their contrariness (Virodha) consists in mutual exclusion: for, then all cognitions being such, it would be impossible to know which annuls and which is annulled: and thus all distinction between right and wrong will be lost. Here the negative 'a' (in 'avirodhinām') has to be used in two different constructions. What has been stated means as follows:—

If cognition (of silver) is itself destroyed what then has another cognition (the knowledge of mother-of-pearl) done to it? For, the other cognition, having no existence at the time of cognition of silver, cannot possibly annul the object of the latter. Nor can the cognition "there is no silver", which refers to the absence of silver, annul the object of cognition of silver. If it be said that one (succeeding) cognition destroys another (preceding): this being true of all cognitions, how can only some cognition be said to be annulable?

This is possible only if cognition of silver as well as that of mother-of-pearl rest on one self-consciousness. The point may be elaborated as follows:—

When these cognitions rest in one subject, all of them do not rest in the same way, but differently; this is a fact of experience. For instance, two cognitions "blue" and "lotus", resting in the subject, rest as mutually connected as adjective and substantive; similarly "jar" and "cloth" (rest in the subject) as exclusive of each other. But in the case of "this is mother-of-pearl" or "this is not silver" the consciousness "this is not silver" rests in the subject as destroying the previous consciousness "this is silver" and consequently stopping any action that follows the right knowledge.

Thus, different relative positions of cognitions to one another in the case of the relation of cause and effect etc. have been fixed by the subject, because of his freedom. This (fixing of relative position) is not possible for the objects of knowledge to do, (because they are insentient). This proves that Pramātṛ, subject, is free in the sphere of cognitions.

Thus, because the former cognition (of silver in mother-of-pearl) stands definitely annulled (by the cognition of mother-of-pearl) in one subject, the relation of contraries, therefore, is possible in practical life. As the same Lord manifests those relations also through His freedom as He does other external objects, therefore, they are also real. (6)

Here the author states the view of the opponent with the object of refuting it later on :—

(7) "But if you say that just as the consciousness of the absence of jar on the ground is nothing else than consciousness of bareness of the ground ; so certainty about mother-of-pearl is nothing but the consciousness of invalidity of perception of silver."

The cognition "this is mother-of-pearl", being self-luminous and being related to the subject as an object, is experienced as identical with validity. For, (the Bauddha) maxim is that definite cognition limits itself, (cuts itself off, i.e. it is well defined.) Now definite or determinate cognition of "this" is invariably concomitant with the differentiation from "not this". Thus representing the cognition of "silver" which is essentially nothing more than cognition of not-mother-of-pearl to be incorrect means the same thing as representing the cognition of mother-of-pearl to be identical with valid knowledge. It is not a new theory that the cognition of one thing means consciousness of absence of another. For, it is well known that consciousness of bareness of the ground is the same as the consciousness of absence of jar on it. Thus, annulability of the cognition of silver is the realisation of its invalidity. Therefore, if the opponent were to say that the relation of the contraries can thus be accounted for, and that accordingly oneness of the subject is unnecessary. (7)

In order to explain, by the way, the real basis, on which all transactions, connected with non-existence, are possible, he proves the illustration, given in the system of the opponent, to be faulty.

(8) "What has been stated is not right. For, from mere knowledge of the ground, its (ground's) being a separate entity from jar may be established, but certainly it cannot establish the absence

or non-existence of jar (on the ground) which is capable of being perceived."

The illustration that has been given is not to the point. The reasons are as follows:—

We talk of two types of non-existence in our practical life. The one is 'Tādātmyābhāva' i.e., non-existence of a thing as identical with that wherein it is said to be non-existing e.g. "the ground (Bhūtala) is not jar". The other is Vyatirekābhāva i.e. non- existence, which denies separate possible existence of a thing at a particular time and place. "Here on this ground there is no jar."

In the case of the first of these, transaction is based simply on the knowledge of the bare ground. In this case, the optical perception is of no use, (i.e. is not responsible for the idea of non-existence). Therefore, the implication is that there is the non-existence of the relation of identity even with that, the direct perception of which is not possible, for instance that of a Piśāca, because of his peculiar nature, or that of sound, which is not perceptible, because of the absence of the entire set of causes, a fact which is known definitely because of the non-perception of anything that can be object of hearing (e.g. the sound which is audible when we close our ears and which would have been perceptible if the set of causes had been present). Thus, when a person says "the ground is not jar" he means it is neither anything else such as sound or Piśāca. But when direct perception is admittedly responsible for the idea of non-existence, as in the case of "Vyatirekābhāva", there such is not the case. (8)

But if anybody were to ask: why ? Reply is, because in that case its scope would become too wide. This is what he shows in the following lines :—

(9) **"The ground is always separate from (i.e. not identical with) other things ; because all objects have their separate and self-confined existence. How then is it that knowledge of the ground is the cause of consciousness of absence or non-existence of other things at one time and not at another ?"**

Even when there is a jar (on the ground) the purity of the ground is not marred, because different objects do not get mixed together (i.e. have separate existence). How then is it that even at the time when there is a jar (on the ground) we do not say as we would do if there were really no jar, e.g. "there is no jar here on the ground"? "Its knowledge" (tajjñānam) i.e. the knowledge of the bare ground "sometimes" (jātu) i.e. only under

certain conditions, such as that of actual absence of jar, and not always, establishes non-existence of a separate jar. How is that possible ? Thus, "Vyatirekābhāva" (according to the opponent's theory) should imply the absence of even Piśāca). (9)

But how is it then that we consistently talk of Vyatirekābhāva in practical life only under certain conditions? How is this to be explained? With this objection in mind the author shows the way of accounting for it, which was unknown to his predecessors.

(10) "**But the mass of light (in the case of one who can see), or touch, warm or soft, in the case of a blind man, is perceptible on the ground. That would establish non-identity of his cognition with that of a jar.**"

According to this system, the existence of one thing means non-existence of another. This is what we know from the experience of ordinary every day life. This way of knowing the non-existence, (as pointed out by experience) has not to be left. The relation of existence (of one thing) with non-existence (of another) is the same as that of two things which stand in relation of container and the contained. Therefore,whatever different from jar is seen on the ground, it may be a piece of stone or mass of light etc., which is perceived by means of eyes, is in ordinary life spoken of as "not-being of jar on the ground" or "there is no jar on the ground". And whenever there is no optical perception, as when the eyes are closed or there is very thick darkness, then also, the subject, who experiences touch, which is different from hard, which belongs to jar, such as soft, hot, or cold or neither, speaks of that (touch) in practical life as non-existence of jar, because touch of air must necessarily always be everywhere. This is the substance of the verse. The word meaning is as follows:—

The word 'but' (Kintu) implies picturing up of the objection in order to state one's own view. What is the correct view in this case? The reply to it is: "there" (tatra) i.e., on the ground 'the mass of light' is undoubtedly the object of cognition. To the blind there is hot touch etc.;"of that" (tasya) i.e. of the mass of light or of touch; 'its own knowledge' (Svajñānam) i.e., the knowledge that refers to it as distinct from another, such as jar etc., that (svajñānam) which is the subject; 'of that' (tasya) i.e. of the light etc.; "identity with not-jar" (Aghaṭarūpatām) i.e. identity with not-being of jar; "there" (tatra) i.e. on the ground: establishes. The implication of Liṅ Lakāra is that it is possible. Here Liṅ is in accordance with the rule: "Liṅ. is also used to imply possibility" (Pa.Su. 3-3-172).

A person, who is aware of the possible existence of the entire set of things, necessary for hearing, such as his sense of hearing

etc., because he hears the feeble sound, caused by working of the vital air within, and who hears that sound only as related to his own auditory cognition, denies another sound as "there is no other sound here". Similarly if his attention be fixed on the most subtle interior sound, he experiences not-being of the feeble sound (of vital air). And not-being of flavour, smell and touch also is experienced by him only who experiences the flavour of saliva, the smell of the interior of organ of smell, called 'Tripuṭikā' or the touch of the body. For, without the perception of one out of many things, which can be the objects of the same kind of perception, there can be no certainty about the means of perception being intact. This is unexceptionable. It is not right to hold that the contact with a thing, which is an object of the same kind of perception (as the one, not-being of which is to be asserted), is unnecessary for certainty about the means of perception being intact; because we cannot say that the means of knowledge is not intact just after the time when we have realised it to be intact through the recent experiences of various objects. For, the person, who desires to find out not-being of a particular object, is found using the sense-organ, through which it can be perceived. (10)

But from this view it will follow that we can talk of non-existence of even the imperceptible Piśāca, as Vyatirekābhāva; because just as the mass of light is different from jar, so it is from Piśāca. With this objection in his mind, the author says the following:—

(11) "Just as Piśāca, though different from light, yet can be within light itself, because he is imperceptible, so his existence within the ground cannot totally be denied."

Although mass of light is different from Piśāca and itself it is negation of Piśāca, yet it cannot be said that there is no Piśāca here. For, the jar cannot have its existence within the mass of light, because in its presence mass of light will break. Therefore, it is established "there is no jar". But Piśāca is of such a nature that even though he may be present within the light or the ground, yet the compactness of neither is disturbed. Therefore, there being the possibility of his existence within the light, his separate existence cannot be denied. Similarly in things possessing colour, there being the possibility of taste etc., the latter cannot be denied. Although Piśāca is not-light, is different from light, yet just as there is the possibility of his being within the ground unseen, so there is the possibility of his being within the mass of light also. Hence, although the identity of Piśāca with the ground is denied, yet his being within the ground is not denied in every way. How can, therefore, that

practical life proceed on earth, which depends upon not-being of Piśāca within it. This is the meaning of the verse. (11)

Thus, having shown by the way the real nature of the idea of not-being in practical life, the author makes use of it in the present context, as follows:—

(12) "Thus the ascertainment 'this is mother-of-pearl' may mean not-being (of the cognition) of silver. But it cannot prove the knowledge of silver, got on a former occasion, to be false."

Just as though the consciousness of light means the consciousness of not-being of jar, yet perception of light does not affect the former perception of jar in any way; so the perception of mother-of-pearl, means not-being of cognition of silver. This is the possibility. Just as perception of jar is the consciousness of validity of the knowledge of jar, so not-being of the perception of cloth is the consciousness of validity of the same; but this does not prove the former knowledge of cloth to be false. All this is a representation of various aspects of perception of jar. This does not affect another former perception in any way.

Similarly the consciousness "This is mother-of-pearl" or "It is not silver" may shine in itself as "I am valid in relation to mother-of-pearl and not-being of silver, but not in relation to silver". But this does not affect former perception of silver in any way. How then can silver, grasped by a former perception, be proved to be false? (12)

But the word "this" refers to the same object as that which was the basis of valid knowledge of silver and now is that of "mother-of-pearl" or "not silver". Therefore, from this we infer that the former perception of "silver" was invalid. For, it is not possible that two valid, though contrary, cognitions may refer to the same object. Therefore, this relation of contraries in practical life is due to inference. With this objection in his mind the author says :—

(13) "The relation of contraries cannot be maintained to be based either on perception or on inference; for, the minor term is non-existent. But it can be rightly maintained to be due to one subject, because it is proved to be so by personal experience."

The relation of contraries cannot be explained either in terms of direct perception or in those of inference, because the minor term itself is non-existent. Here the word "Api" implies the non-existence of reason and invariable concomitance.

The word "Api" is to be connected with both (dharmyasiddheḥ and anumānataḥ). When both the minor term (Dharmin) and the reason, are beyond all doubts and the invariable concomitance of reason with what is tried to be established is remembered,

the inference operates to prove that what is tried to be established is really present in minor term.

In the case in hand, the former cognition of silver being the minor term, the point to be established is its invalidity, and perception of mother-of-pearl or consciousness "It is not silver" or the objectivity to that perception, which belongs to the object, is represented to be the reason. This is not right, because at the time of perception of mother-of-pearl the former cognition of silver has no existence (because cognitions are momentary). Nor is the perception of mother-of-pearl a characteristic feature of cognition of silver (as smoke is of fire): and inferential knowledge is not possible from that which is not the special characteristic of the minor term. Therefore, this is also not right to represent the remembered cognition of silver to be the minor term.

But if some one were to say "We are trying to establish that mother-of-pearl is not the object of cognition of silver; because it is the object of perception of mother-of-pearl." I shall ask him "Are you drawing this inference at the time of perception of mother-of-pearl?" If so, it is nothing more than establishing the already established. But if before the perception of mother-of-pearl, then the inference would be defective inasmuch as its reason would be futile (Bādhita hetvābhāsa); because the reverse of what it seeks to prove is already established by cognition of silver which has just taken place. Moreover (in the absence of permanent subject) who would acquire the idea of invariable concomitance viz. where there is one cognition at present there another cognition cannot be? If the opponent were to say by another inference, then I would repeat the same question and this would lead to argumentum-ad-infinitum.

The above discussion refutes the objection of the opponent; "How could two cognitions be possible in reference to one object?" For, who would have the consciousness of two cognitions having the same object, because it has been asserted that the cognitions rest in themselves and in their objects? Thus the relation of contraries cannot be asserted to be based on inference also. Nor is the inferential process experienced to intervene in the rise of the consciousness of the relation of contraries. For, as our own experience tells us, it rises quickly. Therefore, for the same reason, the relation of contraries cannot also be denied.

Thus, after showing the impossibility of relation of contraries, according to the opponent's theory, he now concludes the discussion on the point in hand by asserting that the relation of contraries arises, according to his system, from the fact that all

cognitions rest in one subject. It is consistent with reason if it be admitted to spring from one subject. We have already explained that it is he (the permanent subject) who organises the cognitions in that manner. This being the real explanation (of the relation of contraries) if some one talks of the impossibility of practical life without it (anyathānupapatti) as the means of proving it, let him do so. Now every aspect of it can be accounted for. (13)

Not only relations of cause and effect, of remembrance and of contraries, which characterise all the general transactions of ordinary every day life, but the particular transactions also such as purchase and sale, which are impure, and relation of teacher and taught etc., which are pure, depend upon one subject, because transactions depend upon some kind of unification. This is what he shows in the concluding lines:—

(14) "Thus, experience shows that all transactions, whether pure or impure, depend upon the omnipresent Lord, in whom all the objective manifestations, so very different from one another, are reflected."

On account of the nature of both, positive and negative, arguments, given in two verses "Those various" etc., as well as of types of illustrations of practical life, given in other verses, this also has to be admitted that the practical life is experienced as resting on the omnipresent Lord, who is beyond temporal and spatial limitations and who is affected, without undergoing a change in his essential nature, by objects, such as blue and pleasure etc., which are extremely different from one another, i.e. whose very life is diversity, because they are the creations of Māyā, and which are very much like shadows and, therefore, have no existence independently of Him (on whom they are reflected). This means that the direct experience is the strongest proof on this point. And such is the experience of those also, who have been initiated and who practise concentration. And it is because of this experience that their level even in practical life, which is recognised to be the worldly state, is identical with the level of Śiva, which is characterised by the realisation of the essential nature of the subject. This is what has been asserted in "Concentration on relation". The practical life of those, who have not recognised the essential nature of the Self, is impure; but of others it is pure. The Chapter ends. (14) From the beginning 77.

Here ends the seventh chapter, called the presentation of one basis, in the Jñānādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, written by the revered great Śaiva teacher, Utpaladeva, with the commentary, called Vimarśinī, written by illustrious **teacher, Abhinavagupta. (7)**

ĀHNIKA VIII

We bow to that Śiva, who is always self-manifest as great Lord to those who have realised the Ultimate through practical life, which is undisputed, because it is a matter of personal experience.

Thus, after explaining the powers of knowledge, remembrance and differentiation, he has shown how practical life will be impossible unless there be one substratum of all these. By this much (i.e., by means of the preceding Chapter) the use of the word "one" in "If there be not one, holding within" has been justified. This also has been established that all shine within Him and so another statement "holding within the endless forms of the universe" has been substantiated. Now His omnipotence (Māheśvarya), which is nothing more than "Freedom" and which also was referred to there, is to be explained. And that is in the sphere of both, knowledge and action. Accordingly it is of two kinds. Therefore, the lustrous one (Bhagavān) is spoken of as "knower" and "doer". Although in reality there is only one Saṁvid, which is nothing else than pure light of consciousness and free consciousness, yet this difference has been brought about by Himself in order to make others understand (true nature of Śiva). Therefore, although freedom in the act of knowing is identical with power of action, yet "Freedom" should be discussed in the 'book' dealing with knowledge, as it pertains to that. Thus the meaning of the word "knower" (jñātṛ) is fully settled as regards both its root and affix.

Now knowledge is nothing else than I-consciousness, limited by the affection, cast by variety of manifestations, brought about by Himself. And freedom in relation to those manifestations is freedom of power of knowledge. This is what is tried to be established with the following eleven verses, beginning with "Immediate sense-contact" and ending in "Because knowledge and action are pure".

After asserting in one verse that manifestation is of two kinds, (1) dependent upon another manifestation and (2) otherwise i.e., independent; he says in the next verse that 'manifestation' (ābhāsa) is unity only. After stating in two verses that accordingly the 'manifestation' of causal efficiency is also dependent on another 'manifestation', he states, in two verses, the manifestation, in which causal efficiency resides. He then asserts in one verse that internality is the basis of variety in Ābhāsa, which is due to affection of one manifestation by others. Then in two verses he states the essential nature of externality

and its subdivisions. Then in one verse he summarily states the One, who is the substratum of the powers of knowledge etc. In another verse, he states in conclusion the essential nature of the great Lord and refers to the coming Kriyādhikāra. This is the summary of the chapter. The meaning of each verse is now going to be explained.

But if the whole of practical life depends upon the Highest Lord, the well known variety, characterised by distinctness and indistinctness, would not be possible; because that lustrous Lord, on whom all this depends, is one. And we cannot suppose that the practical life has got any reality apart from Him. With this objection in his mind, the author says:—

(1-2) "The 'manifestations' differ only inasmuch as that in some cases they depend upon immediate sense-contact; and in others, as in the case of thick darkness, they do not do so. But there is no difference in the essential nature of the objective 'manifestation' (ābhāsa) (figuring) in determinate cognitions, referring to the past, present or future objects."

Manifestations differ from one another in this much only, (they are dependent on the direct perception in one case and are not so in the other); but there is no difference in the essential nature of the objective manifestation anywhere. This is the substance of both the above verses, if we take them together. An Ābhāsa exists only so long as it shines. In some cases the manifestations are related to, mixed up with, another manifestation, the sense-contact, the external-sense-perception in the form "I see", which takes place just at the time when that manifestation shines. In such cases they are said to be "clear". But in the transaction of a cogniser in the dark, which is indistinct, the manifestations are otherwise (i.e. are not mixed with the then direct perception). That is to say, to the person who is born blind the other manifestation, namely, the external-sense-perception, does not exist at all: and to the person, who has become blind by accident and, therefore, has fallen in the thickest darkness, it has no existence at that time, (time of blindness) but he remembers his former direct perceptions.

There is, therefore, no difference possible in the being, the real nature, of the objective 'manifestations' in any form of determinate cognition, may those cognitions be related to present, past or future objects.

The crux of the whole thing is that in all cognitions: "I see", "determinately apprehend," "imagine," "remember," "do", or "speak of this blue", the manifestation "blue" in its real

nature is the same; and so is the manifestation "I see" which is related to "yellow" etc. also. This idea of clearness or otherwise arises only when the Lord unites the 'manifestations' with or separates them from one another, because of His freedom: i.e. when the manifestation 'blue' is separated from the 'manifestation', 'I imagine' and is joined with the 'manifestation' "I see" it is spoken of as distinct. Thus distinctions in practical life at all times can be accounted for. But when these manifestations are in the Lord Himself, then there is no union with or separation from any other (2).

This explanation may be all right in the case of 'blue' etc., in relation to which external senses operate. But how can the manifestations "pleasure" etc. shine differently, because in relation to them there is no operation of external senses (to explain it)? With this objection in his mind, the author says:—

(3-4) "Although manifestations, such as pleasure etc., or those which are the means thereof, remain always the same; yet they shine differently because they are unified with another manifestation, namely, "past."

"But when the 'manifestations' pleasure etc. are repeatedly and determinately pictured up, they shine as before, because they are unified with the manifestation "clear" or "present."

Although manifestation, "Ābhāsa", (of pleasure etc.) is the same in the case of past or future enjoyment, or its cause, such as garland and sandal etc.; and the same holds good of suffering and its causes, such as serpent or thorn etc. yet, because of its mixing up with the manifestation "it is past" or "it is to come" and separation from the 'manifestation' "I am experiencing", the experiencer does not have the same experience as he had before, namely, "I am happy at present" or "I am unhappy" or "I have acquired the thing necessary for happiness" etc., (though those manifestations, are still there).

But when he constantly and determinately pictures up the objects of pleasure or pain, then, because of association with the cause, namely, the repeated and determinate picturing up of pleasure and its causes, he has the experience "I am happy" in no other way than the one, pointed out by us, namely, union with another manifestation. This is right, because at that time thinker has consciousness of 'pleasure-manifestation' as unified with that of clearness-manifestation (Sphuṭatvābhāsa). Here the word "past" implies "future" also. (4)

But what does all , that has been said to explain the variety of experiences, mean? Does not it mean that external garland

etc. are the causes of pleasure and pain and that pleasure etc., caused by external objects, are the causes of experience "I am happy" etc. It follows from this that in the absence of externality (of garland etc.), pleasure etc., not being caused by the former, will not be the causes of experiences "I am happy" etc. Therefore, if there be no externality (of garland etc.) they cannot at all be represented to exist. How then the statement "there is never any difference in the real nature of manifestations of the objects" be justified? For, (in the latter case) they have no existence. With this objection in his mind, the author says:—

(5) "Externality of manifestations (Ābhāsas) which are of the nature of "being" (Bhāva) or those which are of the nature of "not-being" (Abhāva) is merely an attribute and does not constitute their essential nature, therefore, they ever exist as internal."

Externality is not the essential nature of either the positive or the negative manifestations; e.g. "Here I have pleasure" or "I have no pain"; because the real nature of pleasure does not shine as "externality" but only as "pleasure". Externality is another manifestation. When the Lord, by virtue of His power of freedom, makes it manifest as united with "pleasure", then externality becomes its attribute. Therefore, just as absence of manifestation of "blue" does not affect the real nature of the manifestation "lotus" or the absence of manifestation "king" does not that of "man", so even when manifestation "externality" is absent, manifestation "pleasure", "pain" or "wife" is not affected in any way, because they always exist internally. (5)

The manifestations, such as blue etc., when reflected on the internal organ, the mirror of Buddhi, are internal, inasmuch as they are within internal organ; and they are external; because they shine as separate from the subject as objects of knowledge. And pure externality is simply external perceptibility. In both the conditions (internal as well as external) these manifestations (Ābhāsas) 'blue' etc., exercise their functional power inasmuch as they give rise to knowledge, referring to themselves.

But why do they not exercise their functional capacity in the state of internality, the chief characteristic of which is oneness with the subject? With this objection in his mind, the author says:—

(6) "They do not exercise their functional capacity in the state of internality, which is due to their oneness with the subject. For, the condition of that (exercise of functional power) is the externality, which arises from separateness of manifestations from one another and from the subject."

Because of their internality, due to oneness with the subject, these manifestations do not exercise their functional capacity: because it depends upon their separateness. And because the manifestation 'blue' is separate from the manifestation 'yellow' and because it is also separate from the subject, therefore, it can exercise its functional capacity in relation to that subject. In the state of oneness with the subject, there is no separateness. And exercise of fixed functional capacity depends upon separateness of manifestation. Thus, even when there is the manifestation (Ābhāsa) of externality of the darling, but if there be no manifestation (Ābhāsa) of embrace at the same time, the purpose of being a source of pleasure is not fulfilled. And if there be other manifestations (Ābhāsas) such as "She is far away" then it will, as we know, discharge a function contrary to the previous one i.e. rather than being the cause of pleasure it will be that of pain.

Hence because there is no Ābhāsa of externality at the time of identity with the subject, therefore, there is no functional capacity exercised by the object. The exercise of functional capacity also is a kind of Ābhāsa. And exercising certain functional capacity is not the essential nature of object so that in the absence thereof it may not have its existence also.(6)

But internality of Ābhāsas must get broken at the time of their unification with the manifestation "external"; because it is contradictory. And if so, how can it be said "internals always shine"? To this he replies as follows:—

(7) "As the Ābhāsas are essentially of the nature of consciousness, so they always exist internally. But when they are manifested externally by the Māyā, they exist externally also."

Ābhāsas always have their existence in the light of consciousness of the Universal Subject, whether they be in the state of their internality or externality; because they are essentially of the nature of consciousness. Otherwise they would not shine. This has already been established. But when the power of Māyā, which is nothing but the power of Freedom, operating in manifesting things separately, makes them externally manifest, then, because of the externality (brought about by Māyā) they have both internal and external manifestation. This shining within is not of the opposite nature from shining without (so that when one is there the other cannot be); but it is the background of all manifestations. How then can there be represented to be any contradiction? It has, therefore, rightly been said "Internals always exist".(7)

But it has been said that exercise of functional capacity on the part of an object is possible only when it is external and that externality is perceptibility by means of external senses. But this kind of externality is not possible in the case of what is pictured up by imagination. How can then they exercise any functional capacity? But it is found that Piśāca etc. pictured up by imagination, cause fear. With this objection in mind the author says as follows:—

(8) **"This, that is pictured up in the imagination, is also external, because it shines as separate (from the subject as "this" and not as "I"). Internality consists in oneness with the subject. Separateness from that is externality."**

The wife or thief etc., pictured up in imagination, which is nothing but a kind of determinate cognition, is also external. For, not only that (is external) which is externally perceived; but that also which shines as separate from the subject as "this". And internality is the shining in the subject as "I"."Antar" means near. And nearness requires something, in relation to which it may be asserted. And in the absence of other requisites (of internality), the subject alone is the unexceptionable requisite in all cases. Therefore, it follows that nearness to the subject is oneness with it. That which is different from it (the subject) is external. Therefore, it is but proper that what is pictured up in imagination should also exercise functional capacity. (8)

Jar etc. may be represented to be external, because of the activity of potter etc. (being responsible for their existence); but how can that, which is an object of internal sense, (pleasure etc.) be spoken of as external? With this objection in mind, he says the following:—

(9) **"It is by the will of the Lord that what is pictured up in imagination and pleasure etc. shine externally, exactly as do the objects of sense-perception etc. which are directly perceptible."**

It is because of the will of the Lord, who holds all manifestations within and maintains the whole of the external creation, that what is pictured up within through determinate imagination, such as blue etc., shines as external, as cut off from the (limited) subject; exactly as do the blue (Nīla) etc., which are the object of sense-perception. The shining of the latter type is called "direct perception". It means this that even the activity of a potter is in reality Lord's will, externalising itself in the form of activity in the body, made manifest by Him. It is nothing else. Therefore, just as the objects 'blue' (Nīla) etc. are perceptible to external senses as externally manifest, as separa

from the limited perceiver, because of the Lord's will, though in reality they are within the light (of universal consciousness); so are those, which are known through internal senses. There is no difference between them in this respect.

Love and indifference etc.—(Rati Nirvedādi), which are of the nature of basic and transient emotions respectively (Sıhā-yivyabhicārirūpāḥ), which are very much like pleasure and pain and the essential nature of which has been stated by Bharata etc.,—though they are objects of internal-sense only, yet they shine externally. Although in determinate imaginings it is the freedom of a limited subject that operates, yet, as its being ultimately non-different from the universal consciousness cannot be denied, so in reality that freedom also is of the Lord. This is what the author himself has said elsewhere:—

"Although practical life in relation to external objects is confined to the individual subject, limited by vital air and the group of eight (puryaṣṭaka), yet, in reality, it has its being in the highest self. For, how can the Prāṇapramātā, who is essentially nothing else than the Highest Self, delimit Him (The highest Self)."

But when the imaginary creation springs from spontaneous activity of the mind and involves no desire on the part of limited subject, there the working of the Lord is clear. Therefore, the externality of even the creation of imagination is due to Lord's will. (9)

Now the author states in conclusion the essential nature of the Lord and of oneness, which have already been discussed above.

(10-11) "Therefore, no worldly transaction can be possible without unification of cognitions (Saṁvids). They are unified because of oneness of the light (of consciousness). And that light is the one Subject, this is established."

"And that very one Subject is the Highest Lord, because He is ever free, and because this freedom is identical with the independent powers of knowledge and action of the playful Lord."

From the arguments, which have been stated in the preceding section, it is clear that without the unification of cognitions (Saṁvids) worldly transaction cannot be possible. And because it is possible, therefore, they are unified. And this is not difficult to establish. For, the light that illumines the objects (Viṣayaprakāśa) is itself spoken of as light of consciousness (Saṁvid). And it is due to the affection of light of consciousness by the objects, because of its being extrovert,

that the light which illumines Nila is different and so is that which illumines Pita. Thus, in reality, light of consciousness, being free from limitations of time, place and form, is only one and, therefore, it rests within (as Aham). And that is spoken of as the subject. This is established with reason. (10)

Neither is this Self, the chief characteristic of which is "Light", without self-consciousness, nor are its affections by "blue" etc. unaffected by determinative activity, as the crystal and its affections are; on the contrary, the Subject is ever-self-conscious. His being great Lord consists in His eternal Self-consciousness, unrestrained freedom, perfect independence of others and in being essentially pure bliss. This very freedom, which is identical with self-consciousness, constitutes the pure and ultimately real powers of knowledge and action of the playful Lord. The power of knowledge is essentially the light of consciousness (Prakāśarūpatā) and the power of action is nothing but "Vimarśa", which is essentially freedom, and which has its being in Prakāśa. And freedom (Vimarśa) is the essence of the light of consciousness (Prakāśa). The powers of knowledge and action, therefore, at the transcendental level, are nothing more than free will. At a lower stage, technically called "parāpara" which is the level of Sadāśiva, these powers are identical with the I-consciousness, which is identical with "this-consciousness". At the lowest stage, at the level of Māyā, they are dominated by "thisness". Thus, in every way, the power of knowledge is essentially free will (Vimarśa). For, without the latter the former would sink to the level of insentiency. This has already been asserted. And that free will itself is the power of action. Thus, the author hints at the Kriyādhikāra, which is coming after this. The chapter ends (11). From beginning 89.

Here ends the eighth chapter, called the presentation of the chief characteristics of the Great Lord, in the Jñānādhikāra of the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, written by illustrious great Śaiva teacher Utpaladeva, with the commentary, called Vimarśinī, by illustrious teacher Abhinavagupta.

The Jñānādhikāra ends.

KRIYĀDHIKĀRA

ĀHNIKA I.

May the glorious husband of Gaurī,-who manifests the full river of the power of action, which is the basis of countless waves (of time etc.), between two banks, the individual subjects and objects, through his Free Will, on the extended and clear mirror of his own self,—reveal to us the highest truth.

We bow to that Śiva, resting on whom the power of action, the darling, is able to show wonderful sportive movements of different kinds.

Now in order to establish fully in all its details, the essential nature of "The power of action" another Adhikāra is begun. In the first Āhnika, consisting of eight verses, beginning with "Therefore" and ending in "which is manifested" the author tries to establish that although in reality the power of action in the Highest Lord has no succession, yet, because of its being responsible for the manifestation of succession (in action) in the limited worldly subjects, it is successive also. That is as follows:—

In the first verse, the prima facie view, which has already been stated, is refuted. In the next verse the essential characteristics of the succession and the negation thereof (simultaneity) are differentiated. In the next three verses the essential nature of succession is stated. In the following two verses the spheres of the succession and the absence thereof (simultaneity) are differentiated. In the concluding verse it is shown that in spite of difference in the spheres, both in reality rest in one. This is the summary of the Āhnika. Now the meaning of each verse is going to be explained.

The point, which has already been discussed and which is meant to prove the power of knowledge, having been established, another point, (namely, that He has unlimited power of action) is automatically established. In the following verse the author indicates this as logically settled conclusion of this Adhikāra:—

(1) "By establishing the existence of one Subject, the objection of the opponent, "How can the action, which is successive, be one and belong to one subject?" has been refuted."

The view of the opponent—that there are only different cognitions, direct experience and ascertainment etc., without any separate substratum thereof, that remembrance is due to residual traces and that if cognition be admitted to be insentient (jaḍa) it would not make other external objects manifest: but if it be sentient, then, being free from limitation of time and

place, it would be non-different from Self,—has been refuted: because it has been shown, at some length, how, according to the view of the opponent, various experiences, such as direct cognition etc., will be impossible. This also has been demonstrated how remembrance will not be possible from mere residual traces. And this also has been established that the unlimited light of consciousness is not insentient (jaḍa) and that its appearance as limited is due to the affection of the external objects, manifested by its own power of perfect freedom.

Thus, with the reasons given above, not only all the points, which could be raised against His power of knowledge, have been refuted but also the objections against His power of action have been answered, with these very reasons. This is the implication of the word "Api". And the objection: "How the action, though one, can yet be represented to consist of a series of successive stages, when the substratum is one?" as well as those, contained in the last two verses of the 2nd Āhnika of the Jñānādhikāra (1,2,10-11), namely, "Those being there" and "What rests in two is multiform" have been refuted. For, in the whole of the prima facie view the only point, on which all the objections are based, is that how one can be of diverse forms. And in reply to this point it has been stated that in the case of that, whose essential nature is sentiency, variety of manifestations is possible without contradicting its oneness, as in the case of the mirror. Hence there is no incoherence. Therefore, though this light of consciousness, the underlying reality of all objects, is one, because of its recognition as such, yet, as it assumes variety of conflicting forms, so, they, being unable to shine simultaneously, shine in succession and thus make it one substratum of action. In this way the relation etc. also can be explained. (1)

But the essential nature of action is successiveness and the succession is not possible in the Lord, who is of the nature of pure consciousness and is unaffected by the limitation of time. How then can action be attributed to Him ? To this he replies as follows:—

(2) **"The worldly action can be maintained to be successive, due to the power of time, but not the eternal activity of the Highest Lord, like the Lord Himself."**

"He raises the hand" "He lets it fall" these momentary existences, coming after one another, are successive. Now to those who hold these very momentary existences themselves to be action, as do the followers of Kaṇāda, its successiveness is directly perceptible. But, according to those,—who hold that it is a certain power, present in the hand, which is beyond sense-

perception, is responsible for the awakening of the perceptible activity, is the cause of the perceptible difference of the preceding momentary existence from the following one and is to be known only through inference,—its successiveness is inferable only. But the successiveness of the worldly action is possible because of the particular power of the Highest Lord, the power to manifest the manifestables as cut off from one another, which is known as the "Power of Time". But the power of action, which belongs to the Lord Himself, which is non-different from Him, is eternal and is unaffected by time, cannot possibly be represented to be successive. To represent it as successive is as impossible as to represent the Lord Himself as the same. For, it is said:—

"If the hand be successive, the action in it also would be the same". (2)

It has been said above that time, becoming an attribute, puts the limitation of time upon the object. But what is this so called time? To this he replies as follows:—

(3) "Time in reality is nothing else than the succession, observable in the movement of the sun etc., in birth (janma) of different flowers and in summer and winter."

The manifestations, which are admittedly of fixed limitation, such as those of the sun and the moon, of various flowers of mango, jasmine and Kuṭaja etc., of summer and winter and of intoxication of cuckoo etc., are spoken of as time, with which the manifestations, which are not of fixed limitation, such as reading etc., are put limitations upon (measured); just as gold is with weights. And this particular nature of the sun etc. to appear with certain fixed limitations, is in reality succession, it is nothing else. And this succession itself and nothing else is the time. Here the word "eva" has to be connected in two different ways (i.e. time itself is succession, or succession itself is time). Even the simultaneity of two manifestations is nothing but succession, but only in relation to other manifestations. The consciousness of length and shortness (of time) is also of the nature of succession, because there is difference of manifestations, due to extendedness (vaitatya of succession) or absence thereof. Similarly the ideas of propinquity and remoteness refer to the same, because there is clearness in one case and absence thereof in the other. Thus, variety of manifestations of an individual, such as Devadatta etc., being measured with the movement of the sun etc., as gold is measured with (weighed against) weights, is spoken of as "(Devadatta) goes the whole day." (3)

But let the so called time be the very nature of the thing. What is this power of time? To this he replies:—

(4) **"Succession depends upon difference, the latter on the existence of a certain manifestation and non-existence of another, and the existence of some manifestation and non-existence of another are brought about by the Lord Himself; who manifests the variety of manifestations."**

Here if the time, which consists of a succession, be simply difference in natural constitution, then the four fingures also, being of different natural constitution, would constitute separate points of time. Therefore, the essence of time, is that succession, which is due to such difference as is perceptible in the presence of the red rays and absence of bright mass of light (of the sun) and of which the existence and the non-existence of manifestations are the very life. And the existence and the non-existence of manifestations (Ābhāsas) are not caused by any external cause. This has already been explained in detail. Therefore, that very self, whose essential nature is consciousness and which is known through one's own experience as capable of bringing about various manifestations in dream and in imagination, is the cause of these manifestations also. The Self, manifesting the external objects of the world, such as blue etc., manifests them in innumerable variety: viz. He manifests manifestations such as "Jar" "red" "tall" "hard" as having common basis. And He manifests manifestations such as "Cloth" and "jar" as having different bases, as mutually exclusive, each one as negation of the other. But when He manifests them within Himself they are identical with Him. In such manifestations there is no rise of succession.

But when He manifests one season, Śarat for instance, as totally without the manifestation of another, Hemanta for instance, and **vice versa**, then there is the rise of succession of time. Thus the power of bringing about the last kind of variety of manifestations is the power of time of the Lord.(4)

Now the author further explains His power of bringing about variety of manifestations :—

(5) **"The Lord makes the spatial succession manifest by means of variety of manifestations of bodies (Mūrti vaicitrya) and the temporal succession by means of manifestation of the variety (of forms) in action (Kriyāvaicitrya)."**

Here the word 'Mūrti' means the body of the object; and vaicitrya means variety. Thus, by means of

manifestation of the variety of external bodies such as house, courtyard, market, temple, garden and forest, each of which is different from the rest, the spatial successions such as distant and near, wide and narrow etc. are made manifest by the Lord. But when, because of the strong recognition, the experience, "This is essentially the same hand", arises and though there is no essential change in the body, yet formal differences appear; then the variety of forms, which cannot coexist in the same body, because the forms are contrary to one another, is spoken of as action. He makes the temporal succession manifest, through manifestation of variety of forms, involved in action, limited or unlimited in their nature, as related to one, that is freely constructed in imagination, because the fruition etc. of action are related to it.

The objection: "How can what is essentially the same assume variety of forms?," cannot be raised here, because it is not any object which is so imagined: but it is the universal consciousness (Saṁvid) itself, which shines in that manner. For, its omnipotence consists in its shining in that manner. No law of contradiction can be effective in the case of shining itself. For, the contradiction between pleasure and pain etc. owes its being to shining. And the essential nature of contradiction is the shining of one as negation of another. This is what has been indicated by the word "Api" and "Iśvara".(5)

But from the above statement it follows that the temporal and spatial successions belong to the sphere of the manifested. But the subject is not the manifested. He is manifest to none; rather all are manifest to him. How is it then that temporal and spatial successions are experienced in him as "I was, am and shall be" and "I am sitting in the house, forest or temple". Moreover, what can be far or near or present, past or future to one who is free from limitations of time and space? Therefore, the temporal and spatial orders, which are recognised to be dependent upon the subject, cannot either be spoken of in reference to external objects. For, distance and priority etc. do not belong to them independently of the subject. To justify this he says as follows:—

(6-7) "The variety of manifestations of forms, which is the basis of (the idea of) temporal succession in all things, shines to the limited subject only, such as "Śūnya". It does not shine to the universal subject, whose light is eternal."

"The spatial succession also in things shines to the limited subject only. To the universal subject the objects shine as

identical with itself and, therefore, as beyond all limitations, like the Self itself."

The variety,—which is due to being and not-being of manifestations and which has been represented to be the basis (of the idea) of temporal succession in all the external objects, which are unity in multiplicity,--can shine only to the limited subject Śūnya etc., which are of limited light only (i.e. are not ever-shining). To shine is not the essential nature of the limited subject, Śūnya, because it is insentient like other objects, blue etc. Its shining as a subject consists in the slight stir in the light of consciousness (Saṁvit sphuraṇa). Therefore, when that is absent, as in the case of body as a subject in the state of deep sleep, or as in that of the vital air or Śūnya, as a subject, in the state of senselessness, then the continuity of its shining is broken. Thus, there is temporal succession in the limited subject due to being and not-being of manifestations (Ābhāsa), as in "I am no longer a child: now I am young". And because the empirical subject is identified with the limited I—consciousness, therefore, the temporal succession is evident in it. It is such a subject which is responsible for the appearance of temporal succession in external objects e.g. "I was a boy and a jar also had simultaneous existence with me as such".

There is no temporal succession in the eternal subject, who is essentially consciousness and, therefore, is ever shining, as has been asserted in "The Self is ever shining"; nor is there such a succession even in the object, related to Him. For, they shine as one with Him.

Similarly spatial succession also shines only in the limited subject, body, vital air or Śūnya, as "Here I am sitting". And it shines in the objects also because of their relation to him e.g. "that which is in close proximity is "near" and that which is contrary to it is "far". To the Subject who is perfect and so free from all limitations the objects shine as His very Self "I" and, therefore, they are perfect i.e. free from all limitations. For, such is His real nature. In this verse there is Samuccayopamā. The following line says the same:—

"The eternal subject has no succession. All are perfect in form and in action in every way (in Him)."

Thus, in the course of discussion on action, the temporal succession, being relevant to the subject in hand, has been discussed: and by way of illustration, the spatial succession also has been dealt with by the way. The illustration should be stated before. Therefore, at the time of exposition of variety it is proper to deal with spatial succession first. But in conclusion

the temporal succession, has been first stated, as it is relevant to the subject in hand, and then comes the statement about spatial succession, because it has been dealt with only by the way. (6-7)

But it follows from the above discussion that in the Lord, who is the real subject, action is not possible: because there is no temporal succession in Him, on which action depends. With this objection in his mind, the author says the following:—

(8) "But to manifest the variety of subjects and objects with their characteristic limitations, is the creative power of the Lord, who knows them as such."

According to this system, in reality action is nothing else than the very will of the Lord, which is independent of all the rest, is of the nature of unbroken self-consciousness and is the unchecked power of perfect freedom. This is what will be said in conclusion at the end of this Adhikāra: "Thus the will itself is the cause, the agent and the action".

In the case of ordinary individuals, Caitra and Maitra etc. also, the act (of cooking) is nothing else than the inner desire "let me cook" : and because of this desire it is that even when he is connected with various other movements than those of cooking, such as putting the pot on oven, the consciousness "I cook" remains unbroken. It is the very desire, expressed as "I cook", which manifests itself as the various movements. In that desire in reality there is no succession. Similarly in the case of the Lord also the determinate consciousness in the form of will "Let me Lord over" "Let me shine" "Let me move" and "Let me be self-conscious" is in reality nothing else than I-consciousness in its essential nature and there is nothing like succession in it. (For, the object is one with the Self and has its being in it as its power). This is what is said by the following sentence:— "Let the succession in the form of variety of the subjects and the objects shine". Therefore, there is no succession in this case also.

But when the desire in the form "let me cook", assuming the form of movements, associated with the body, shines as affected by succession, then 'the will of the Lord' as associated with variety of subjects and objects appears as affected with the succession, like a mirror with the current of a flowing river reflected in it. The only difference between the two is that the mirror has no such will, while the Lord has it. Thus, His power of action is represented in two ways: (I) It is the capacity to create action, characterised by succession. (II) It is the capacity to be affected by the action, characterised by succession.

The same has to be said with regard to spatial succession. In the case of spatial succession, some hold that it is His power of consciousness that operates: but in this School, only power of action has been accepted. This is the connected idea of the verse. The word-meaning is as follows:—

The word "tathā" means characterised by difference of the bodies, which is responsible for the rise of spatial succession and by difference (of forms of the same body, involved) in action, which gives rise to temporal succession.

The act of manifesting mutual difference of the limited subjects such as Śūnya etc., characterised by spatial and temporal succession, from one another as well as from the objects of perception; and of the external objects from one another as also from the limited subjects, is the power of Creation, i.e. action, of the Lord. Action is not confined to the limited subject only. And because He, the omniscient, knows all varieties of subjects, objects and actions, as brought about by the power of action: and also because all move and ever have their being in Him, therefore, He is represented to have the power of action.

Although there is no break in His continuous shining and therefore, there is the absence of succession in Him and hence there can be doubt about the possibility of action in Him, yet it can be proved in the aforesaid manner. This is the connection. The chapter ends. (8) From the beginning 97.

Here ends the first chapter, called the presentation of the power of action, in Kriyādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, written by illustrious teacher, Utpaladevapāda, with the commentary, called Vimarśinī, by illustrious teacher, Abhinavagupta pāda. (1)

ĀHNIKA II

We bow to that Śiva, who, through His own free will, creates contradiction and harmony and unity and diversity and who experiences self-consciousness in its true nature.

It has been stated in the previous chapter that the creative power of the Lord is without any limitation or check in its operation . To prove the same, by justifying the existence of such categories as action, relation and universal etc., which cannot be proved, according to the systems, which admit the independent existence of external objective world, the next Āhnika, of seven verses, beginning with "Action, relation and universal" and ending in "therefore, there is no such illusion" is begun.

In the first verse, which is like an aphorism, it is shown that though action etc., which are unity in multiplicity, cannot be accounted for in terms of the school of thought, which maintains that the objective world has independent being; because there is this defect in them that they involve the assumption of possession of opposite qualities by one and the same thing; yet they have to be surely justified. The next verse states the reason in support of them. The third verse states that though they are the objects of indeterminate cognition, yet it is only in the determinate cognition that their characteristics become clear. Fourth and fifth verses discuss the different spheres of unity and multiplicity. In the sixth verse the essential nature of the relation of predicate and subject etc., admitted to be among the relations, hinted at in the introductory verse, is stated. The seventh states their utility in practical life. This is the summary.

From the preceding discussion it follows that creation of every thing by the power of creation of the Lord, whose chief characteristic is to manifest, is nothing else than manifestation, but such manifestation is common to two moons, to the external objects such as blue etc., and also to action, universal and relation etc., which are associated with the external objects. The question, therefore arises that if all are the products of the same creative power, how can we justify their differentiation, in practical life, as real, unreal and real only because of determinate cognition (saṁvṛtisatya) ?

To answer this objection, in order to establish that the assumption of unreality of action etc. is not justifiable and that

two moons etc. are unreal even though they also may be mere manifestations, he says the following : —

(1)"The ideas of action, relation, universal, substance, place and time are not erroneous, because they persist (i. e. because they are not proved to be false at any later stage, as is the case with two moons) as also because they have functional capacity i. e. serve our purpose in every day life. They are based upon unity in multiplicity."

The idea of action as associated with what is different from the principle of sentiency (cittatva), as in the case of agent, object and means of action: e.g. "Caitra is going" "Rice is boiling" and "Fuel is burning", depends upon a limited being such as Caitra etc. which is unity in multiplicity. That is as follows : —

The body of Caitra, though a multiplicity, because of difference in its temporal and spatial relations and forms; yet it still shines as unity, because it is recognised as the same. And action is nothing else than the shining of a thing as the same in the midst of variety of changes. It is real, because the consciousness of it is not proved to be false by future perceptions. But so far as two moons and other similar appearances are concerned; although they appear as such, yet later on their persistency, consisting in continuing to be the objects of operations of external or internal senses for the correct perception, is destroyed by another perception e.g. "there are not two moons." But the persistency of the consciousness"Caitra is going", is not experienced as having been destroyed by any subsequent cognition.

Moreover, although two moons exercise the functional capacity inasmuch as they give rise to pleasure and agitation; yet the perceiver of the couple of moons does not have the experience that the couple of moons has functional capacity of dispelling darkness twice as much as single moon has. On the contrary, he experiences that the functional capacity of even two moons is the same as that of a single. Therefore, the couple does not serve double purpose. But in the case of the act of going, the definite aim is to reach the village. And the utility of the act of going fully accords with the aim, the arrival at the village. Therefore, the idea that is based on action, which is unity in multiplicity, is not erroneous; because it has persistency and utility. The same thing has to be said in regard to others, from relation to time. This will be made clear in the following verses. (1)

But unity and multiformity are contrary to each other. How can then they exist in one and the same thing? This method of demolishing persistency is based on the disproving reason. With this objection in his mind the author says the following :—

(2) **"The introvert reality is a unity. The same, being unified with the manifestations of time, space and essential nature, appears as multiplicity, when it becomes the object of sense-perception."**

When we see Caitra moving, never there arises the idea that he is not moving, as it does in the case of misapprehension of silver in a piece of mother-of-pearl: "This is not silver". And in the case of (false) perception of two moons also, there arises later consciousness, contrary in its nature to the former perception of two moons: "there are not two moons; my perception was caused by some defect in my vision due to darkness".

As regards the objection, "how can one be many (at the same time?)" our reply is (a counter question) "how (what is) cause (at one place; seed in fertile soil for instance) ceases to be so (at another place i. e. in barren ground) ?" But if you say "It is because of difference of the field". We will ask: —who has given this boon that contrariety is no contrariety if there be difference of the field ? But if you say in reply "by our experience." Why then do you not accept the evidence of direct knowledge, which has been given by us in the case of action, "He goes" etc. ?

In the case of unity in multiplicity of action it is not that the difference of sphere of manifestation cannot be put forth (to justify contrariety in its nature). That is as follows : —

Being unmixed with other manifestations it (Caitra as Ābhāsa) shines as one, and accordingly, being perfectly independent of others, it is internal. It shines always as such. (It is that internal aspect of a thing because of the persistence of which the thing is recognised to be the same in spite of all changes.) It is also internal because of its being known through internal sense, which is capable of knowing all that is such (i. e. internal). It is called Tattva, because its real nature never changes. It is also so called because it is capable of expanding itself when connected with other manifestations. And, therefore, it is grasped as one and the same.

The same internal reality, because of its connection with place "here" and "there"; time "now" and "then" and forms "fat" and "lean" etc., and consequently its becoming the object of the external senses, is perceived as many.

(Another interpretation)

It has been stated in 1,5,10 that the objects shine only as resting within the Lord, and, therefore, the universe being within the Lord is one. According to the view that is to be stated in the course of presentation of the essential nature of causal relation; "Causality is nothing but making that, which revolves within, the object of both the internal and external senses"; the same universe, (which shines resting within the Lord as one with Him), because of its connection with different times and places etc. and therefore, its objectivity to senses, is perceived as many. It is one, when it is unmixed with other manifestations, and then it is pure consciousness (cit) and as such is object of only internal sense. But it is many when it is associated with other manifestations and, therefore, shines as something different from Cit and as such becomes the object of both internal and external senses. Thus, the difference of sphere is clear. The unity itself shines as multiplicity, because we recognise it in multiplicity; just as the same thing (seed) shines as both cause and not-cause, or as material and contributory cause. But if you say that the representation of a thing as of contrary natures, as of seed both as cause and not-cause, is only practical and not real; then I would say "In this case also the same thing is spoken of as both, unity and multiplicity, for practical purposes only". As a matter of fact all duality, such as blue and yellow and indeterminate and determinate in the sphere of Māyā, is only practical and not real. Therefore, the contrariety in unity and multiplicity cannot make the reason, advanced to prove the existence of action, faulty. This is the significance of the word "Eva".

"Tatra" means in action etc. The inner reality in action is only unity. The same being the object of perception, because of its association with different places etc., appears as multiplicity. This is the prose order. Or the word 'Tatra' may mean the reality of action having been established. Or it may mean 'out of the two, unity and multiplicity'. The prose order then would be; unity is justifiable in this manner and multiplicity in this. (2)

Even though difference in the spheres of unity and multiplicity be admitted, yet appearance of unity not being possible at the time when multiplicity shines and *vice versa* ; how can a thing be represented to be unity in multiplicity? That is as follows:—

Caitra is perceived in diverse spatial relations by the external senses only. But it has to be noted here that the indetermi-

nate experience, caused by the external senses, does not mix various manifestations (so as to arouse the consciousness of unity in multiplicity). For, it arises from the object, that is directly present before the external senses, and therefore, it does not unify experiences. This is the accepted view. Nor does the determinate, which is the product of mind (Manas), has for its object a thing which is unity in multiplicity. By which cognition can then the grasp of what is both unity and multiplicity be possible ? To remove this doubt from the mind of the opponent the author says as follows:—

(3) "The mind, (Manas) reacting (on what has been received through external senses) produces the mental constructs such as action etc., which rest on unity and multiplicity and are primarily due to the activity of the subject."

According to this system, the subject, who is of the nature of self-consciousness and is like the thread, on which the beads of cognition are strung, is the very life of cognitions. This is what has been explained (in the previous Adhikāra in the 8th Āhnika). He has been proved to be free. As Śiva, He is perfectly free from all impurities. But when He is associated with Māyā and is, therefore, limited, He is called Paśu. He, as Paśu, is clearly manifest at the time of determinate cognition, in which mind is at work; because in the indeterminate experience, which is due to external senses, there is the rise of the states of Sadāśiva and Īśvara.

The subject determines even when he is still in the sphere of indeterminacy. But the internal sense makes the constructs, such as action and relation etc., manifest by means of its activity which follows close upon indeterminate experience (as just described) and is outside the latter, is of the nature of ascertainment and is called reaction (anuvyavasāya). These constructs rest on unity and multiplicity. (It should not be supposed that because they merely appear in Vikalpa, therefore, they are of the same nature as the appearance of two moons). For, it has been already asserted that all that shines in determinate cognition cannot be represented to be unreal, because essential nature of reality is nothing else than luminousness and if the determinate cognition were not luminous, it would not be right to say that such functions(of Manas, Buddhi and Ahaṅkāra) as those of superimposition, ascertainment and relating (referring) to self, are performed in relation to what figures in it. And therefore, such statement(of the Bauddha) as "They superimpose externality on what is not external" would be meaningless. This has been asserted in "If the determinate cognition were erroneous". But

if the opponent were to say "How can determinate cognition (Vikalpa) touch (have for its object) that which is illumined by sense-perception and is indeterminate?". We reply that it would be so if Vikalpa be independent in its function, but it is not so. It is the work of the subject. And the subject is the same self-consciousness as was present in the former indeterminate experience; and his having the impression of former experiences consists in his retaining the former experiences even at the time of determinative activity. Therefore, as the former indeterminate experience illumines its object, the characteristics of which are self-confined, so Vikalpa, which is merely an action of the subject, who is one with the former experience, has the same object as that of former indeterminate experience. This is what the teacher has said in the following verse:—

"The subject is said to have the impression of the former indeterminate cognition in so far as that former indeterminate cognition persists (in him) even at the time of differentiation."

Therefore, the mind is responsible for various constructs, such as action etc., indicated in the introductory verse of this chapter. They refer to what is unity in multiplicity and in their production the subjective activity of unifying unity and multiplicity predominates.

Although even in indeterminate cognition i.e. in the consciousness of jar etc. as such, universals etc. do shine; yet they do not clearly shine there. The universal, relation, action, substance and space etc., shine clearly when there is the realisation of a characteristic as present in all things, which have similarity; when the two related clearly figure in consciousness; when the chain of successive momentary existences is not allowed to go out of consciousness; when we grasp together all the parts; when we hold together the limited and the limiting, respectively. Therefore, it is established that the universal etc. are grasped through the determinative function of mind. Thus "Saṁvṛti" is determinate cognition. Therefore, let the Bauddha talk of action etc. as real in determinate cognition only (Saṁvṛtisatya). But (let it be remembered) this (Saṁvṛtisatyatva) is also a kind of reality. Therefore, they (action etc.) have not to be supposed to be unreal like two moons. (3)

The universal consciousness as the power of action, descending to the empirical level, manifests action etc. Among these the relation is the principal. That is as follows:—

(1) **Universal is that one (characteristic) which shines in all those which are similar.**

(2) Action is 'extendedness' (vaitatya) of an individual, Devadatta, over time, space and forms.

(3) Whole (avayavin) is union of parts and their extendedness over space.

(4) Relative position (Dik) consists in fixing upon the limit of a thing and then determining the position of another thing in relation to it as "this is in front of that" etc.

(5) Present time is coincidence of a certain action of an individual with his own being. And past and future are absence of such coincidence.

Whatever shines on the back of what figures in consciousness as the meaning of a bare word, i.e. a word without any case termination, is relation. Therefore, all Kārakas are nothing but relations. Only in some cases this relation admits of being called by a different name, e.g. to indicate the particular type of relation of those who have dew-lap etc. which can be presented by one word, (used in plural number) as "cows", the word 'relation' is substituted by 'universal' etc. for practical purpose. But when another word cannot be used, the word 'relation' is retained. Accordingly all measures of land, grain and gold etc. and all that is included in them, such as small and big etc., and number and separateness etc., are forms of relation only. Even those, who hold the universal to be something different from relation, admit the 'inherence' (Samavāya) to be the very life of it. And Samavāya is nothing but relation, according to some, or something that depends upon relation, according to others. For, they say :—

"Relation supports that power which is called "Samavāya."

As for the "Kāraka", it always depends upon predicate (Kriyā) and the latter entirely rests on time. And time, the essence of everything through action, itself depends upon relation. Therefore, the practical life in all its various aspects entirely depends upon relation. This is what the teacher himself has said:—

"We bow to that Śiva, who by means of His free will creates the practical worldly life, which depends on all the objects, which are subjected to relation, which is essentially unity in multiplicity."

Therefore, the author says the following to explain the exact nature of relation : —

(4). "When the objects, which shine separately and as such are self-confined (are independent of one another's existence),

are unified in so far as they are mutually connected in one subject, they constitute the basis of the idea of relation."

Both "king" and "man" externally are independent of each other and are self-confined. But when they are unified in the subject, not perfectly or entirely; for, then the difference will altogether disappear; but only inasmuch as they are mutually connected in respect of their forms, i. e. have invariable concomitance and (to put it figuratively) ride the swing of oneness, which has two ends or extremes (1) unity and (2) diversity, which rise and fall simultaneously, then they constitute the basis of the idea of relation "king's man." That is as follows : —

"King", when grasped by intellect (Buddhi), as not 'satisfied' with his self-centredness and as fulfilling his purpose only when connected with another form, namely, that of "man"; and similar is the case with the latter also; this relation between the two is called "formal relation" (Rūpaśleṣa). It is one in itself, and consists in standing of two things in the aforesaid connection in consciousness (Cit). It rests on the "king", the consciousness of whom arises first and, therefore, the additional consciousness of "man" is merged into it and does not shine separately. It depends upon freedom and, therefore, it shines in consciousness only. The most important idea in it is that of the subordination of "man". Accordingly, the essential nature of relation is that its multiplicity is outside the subject, but its unity is within the subject, because the forms of the terms of relation mutually 'embrace' each other.(4)

(5) "The determinate cognitions, which grasp the concepts "universal" and "whole", rest on unity, that is also outside the subject and similar multiplicity, which is due to diversity of individuals (subsumed under the universal) and the parts (of which the thing is made) respectively."

The determinate cognitions, which grasp the manifestation "universal" i. e. the universal which shines, rest, not in unity, which is within the subject and multiplicity, which is outside, just as does 'relation'; but they rest on multiplicity, characterised by diversity of individuals (subsumed under it) which is outside the subject and on unity (of the universal) which penetrates through all individuals and as such is outside the subject. For instance, when we perceive a number of cows and say "cows"; we have the consciousness of individual cows, separate from one another. It is this consciousness which is responsible for the use of plural number. And at the same time we are also cons-

cious of a characteristic that shines in each individual cow. And it is because of this consciousness of the characteristic that we recognise the meaning of one noun in all individuals. Both of them shine outside the subject. For, we point them out by means of fingure, saying "these". The only thing that is to be kept in mind is that their externality also presupposes their being within the true light of consciousness. Therefore, the admission of both unity and multiplicity (in the case of universal etc.) does not admit of any adverse criticism, just as in the case of consciousness of variegated colour (Citra-saṁvedana). This explains the contrariety also between red and not-red in a thing. But the internal unity of the universal is due to relation. The same holds good of all similar cases. Similarly the determinate cognitions, grasping the "whole" such as 'jar' that shines objectively, do not refer to internal unity and external multiplicity but to the external unity, due to joining (of part) without any gap, and multiplicity, due to parts, taken separately. For, "jar" shines as a unity because of its parts being closely joined together, and also as extended. (5)

(6) "The relation of "Kārakas" is due to determinate consciousness of a predicate (kriyā) : and the concepts, such as relative position (Dik) etc., depend upon the relation between the limited and the limiting."

The mutual relation of 'Kārakas', whereon rest the powers of agent (Kartṛśakti) etc. and of the things, which we perceive, such as the subject, the object and the means of knowledge, is due to the internal right-consciousness of predicate of a particular type. For, without internal right-consciousness (of predicate) a thing is not directly perceived as related to another. The meaning of the word "Viṣaya" is efficient causality such as implies impossibility (of mutual relation of things) elsewhere (i. e. without the consciousness of predicate). The relation of the powers of kārakas with the things, whereon they rest, is also due to determinate consciousness of predicate. And the things and the powers are directly related to predicate. Thus, it is the glorious (Bhagavatī) universal power of action, which manifests relation of so many types. The form of two objects,—which are determinately cognised as external to the subject and separate from each other e. g. this is before, behind or far away from that, if it be at first conceived as a unity in the mind, then be visualised as diversity and lastly be cognised to rest on unity,—is Dik. In this case, the keenness to discern particular parts such as face etc., certainty about one facing or having one's back towards the other; awareness of direct or indirect contact of one

with the other; and consequently their nearness etc. to each other, are useful.

In the awareness of one thing as older or newer etc. than the other, knowledge of shortness etc. of continuity of existence since birth, is useful. The same is the case with knowledge of length or shortness of time.

In the consciousness of future , present and past times e. g. "He shall cook", "He is cooking", "He cooked", determinate cognition of some other activity,—which is manifest, was manifest before, or is possibly to become manifest, which depends upon the cognitive tendency of the subject,—such as that of the sun, or that of the particular fruition of action such as cooked rice, is necessary. Similarly number, magnitude, severality, conjunction and disjunction etc. are to be represented as mere forms of relation. The theory may briefly be stated as follows :—

When an object, that shines, in such a manner as does not bring satisfaction to the percipient so long as it rests within itself and has its form fully determined only when it rests on the determinate cognition of another object, then we have a relation, which is nothing but a manifestation of the universal power of action. There may be a relation within relation in reference to another object, just as some maintain that in the number etc. inherence (Samavāya) is involved. In this case the infinite regress, though it may be there, is not a fault, just as in the case of creations in the preceding and the succeeding 'Kalpas'. For , even if we do not grasp the creation, connected with the future, the grasp of the creation, connected with the past is not adversely affected. Therefore, there is no fear of basic relation being disproved.(6)

Thus, after asserting the importance of relation, which is as if it were the very life of the entire practical life of the world and which is a manifestation of the universal power of action; the author now, in order to establish its validity and utility, referred to in an earlier verse, says the following:—

(7) **"Attainment of purpose by means of an object that has both unity and multiplicity, is possible for a subject, who seeks causal efficiency, only according to the view that has been stated above. Therefore, ideas of relation etc. are not erroneous."**

According to this system, the being of objects does not consist in relation with the extensive universal (Sattā), because such a conception is too narrow and involves the flaws of infinite regress and uselessness. Nor is it constituted by causal efficiency, because the latter is totally different from the former.

Nor is it the discharge of causal function; because the objects are not always found to do that. For, it is asserted :

"The causal efficiency is not natural to objects."

And the discharge of causal function, which is known through invariable concomitance or invariable non-concomitance, which are essentially of the nature of direct cognition and non-cognition respectively, is not always perceptible. Therefore, in the case of its imperceptibility, the thing would have to remain imperceptible, though it may exist. Nor is it capacity to discharge causal function : for, it is difficult to ascertain at the time of ascertaining whether the thing does or does not exist in reality. (The main objection against all the three Bauddha views, given just above, is that) all the three, (the causal efficiency, showing it and its potential existence) do not shine and, therefore, they are as good as horns of man, (i. e. they are not existent). And if we look for another causal efficiency, we shall be involved in infinite regress. Therefore, being of a thing (Sattā) is nothing but shining (Prakāśamānatā), provided that the determinate cognition, which refers to it, is not subsequently contradicted. Such a being the relation etc., which are unity in multiplicity, surely have. Therefore, they are undoubtedly real. Still if the opponent were to assert emphatically that ordinary people mostly seek causal efficiency and they treat that as real which discharges causal function; and ask "Have the relation etc. got that ?" We, therefore, console his heart. If you do not get angry, we would say that in the entire field of practical life, even in those cases, in which there is no clear consciousness of relation, it is exactly so. We assert that purpose is served by that object only which, being essentially of the nature of relation etc., has both unity and multiplicity : and that the object, which is self-confined, nowhere at any time serves any purpose. That is as follows :—

When we remember a past pleasure, we desire for the object that gave it. Accordingly our desire refers to the whole of the practical life and the pleasure, which were once experienced and not to those which were not experienced. When, what was experienced before, is got again we experience satisfaction, because we get the desired. Now if what is got is nothing more than what had been got, then there is no room for desire; because the desired is already got. But if it be different from that, how could it be desired : because it is unknown. Therefore, desire is possible only if " that only " is " not that" also : and "not that only" is " that" also. The same may be said about

the means of pleasure also. This is what the teacher has said :—

"When a person desires the wished for, he is determinately conscious of the desired or the means to it. That which has not been the object of experience, cannot be the object of desire. For, even the heaven is an object of desire, simply because it is the place of experienced joys. If the object of experience be destroyed just at the time when it is experienced, how can any desire for it be possible? Therefore, it is determinately grasped as one with the subject (in the form of residual trace)."

Thus, in the object, which is essentially a manifestation, another manifestation, such as the universal or relation etc., is present though it is not directly perceived; otherwise no practical life in any way or form would be possible. Therefore, if the practical life, which is useful to all persons at all times, places and conditions, be not real, then we have nothing left which may be represented to be real. Therefore, we should not commit the error of looking upon the ideas of relation etc. to be erroneous. The chapter ends (7). From beginning 104.

Here ends the second chapter, called the discussion of unity in multiplicity, in the Kriyādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, written by illustrious teacher, Utpaladevapāda, with the commentary, called Vimarśinī, written by illustrious teacher Abhinavaguptapāda. (2)

ĀHNIKA III.

We bow to that Ṣiva, on whom the means of right knowledge depend, through dependence on the power of self, in producing the knowledge of the object.

While dealing with the particular manifestations of the power of action, the essential nature of the universal etc., among which the relation is predominant, has been explained by the way.

Now the real nature of relation has to be explained to the exclusion of every other thing. This, in reality, is of two kinds, namely, that which exists between the knower and the known, and that between cause and effect. On the former of these, which is the basis of discussion on the objects and means of right knowledge etc., depends all that so far has been dealt with or is going to be dealt with. Because it is a well known principle of the various systems that the existence of a thing can be established only by means of right knowledge. Therefore, as it is helpful in proving the existence of the thing in hand and it is itself of the nature of relation, so to bring out the distinctive nature of means of right knowledge etc., the discussion of which is very necessary, the following chapter, consisting of seventeen verses, beginning with "This is such" and ending in "Make the recognition of the Lord etc., possible in practical life", is begun.

In the first two verses he discusses the essential nature of the means of right knowledge and its effect. Then, in order to discuss the essential nature of the object of knowledge he states in ten verses that the manifestations are determined by intellectual reaction, with a view to prove that the means of right knowledge operate on each isolated manifestation and not necessarily always on the thing the characteristics of which are well defined. Then by the way he discusses the essential nature of erroneous knowledge in one verse. In another verse he shows that the establishment of the essential nature of the object of knowledge is possible even on the basis of the theory of God that is in hand. In the next three verses he shows that the differentiation of means of right knowledge, their effects and their objects etc., is possible only on the presupposition of the subject, the essential nature of which has already been stated, and, therefore, the subject cannot be the object of knowledge. Hence there is no possibility of operation of the means of right knowledge on the subject. The means of knowledge have only one effect, namely, that they make practical life possible. This is the substance.

In order to justify that the ideas of action etc., are not erroneous in their nature, as has been said before, the real nature of the well known means of right knowledge and their effect (Pramiti) is restated in the following verses:—

(1-2) "The means of right knowledge (Pramāṇa) is that because of whose power the object shines determinately as "this" and "of such and such nature". That is also self-luminous and rises afresh every moment. That (Pramāṇa) as determinately cognising within itself an object, for which a single expression stands and which is free from temporal and spatial limitations, is the cognition (Miti), provided that it is uncontradicted."

Because of which i.e. because of whose power, the external objects, blue and pleasure etc., shine within the bound of their limitations without transgressing them, i. e. are positively ascertained as "this" in respect of their form and as " of this nature" in respect of their association with other qualities, such as eternality and transitoriness: that is called the means of right knowledge in the world. This is what has to be discussed by the discriminating mind, as follows:–

According to this system, a thing, with its essential characteristics, does not shine as separate from the rest independently: firstly because it is insentient and secondly because in that case (it would not shine as associated with others and therefore,) such consciousness as "It is manifest to me" "It is manifest to Caitra" will be impossible. Therefore, it has to be admitted that it shines determinately as dependent upon another. Now if that other also be supposed to be insentient, that would be "blind leading the blind". Therefore, the other has necessarily to be of the nature of Saṁvid. But if that be supposed to be of the nature of pure Saṁvid, then it would not be the cause of determinate shining of blue alone, because it is the same in regard to yellow etc. also. Therefore, it has to be assumed as its essential nature that it faces the blue, is tinged by it and shines as so affected, when it makes an external object shine determinately. And its capacity to make them shine determinately consists in its capacity to shine as affected by them.

Now if it be held that it makes 'blue' shine which is not separate (from Cit) then it should equally make 'yellow' also shine (at the same time), because the latter also is as much one with Cit, whose essence is light (of knowledge) as the former. Therefore, it follows that it makes 'blue' shine which is sparated (from Saṁvid). But 'blue' can thus shine as a separate object (ābhāsa), if that Ābhāsa (subjective light) also, which makes 'blue' shine, be separate from the great Light.

For, if it be not separate from that Mahāprakāśa, it would be impossible for it to shine as separate from blue etc. (as its illuminator). But the fact is that nothing in the objective world can bear separation from the Great Light. Therefore, the Great Light has to manifest itself as limited. This limited manifestation (of the Great Light) is spoken of as Śūnya (Pramātā) because it is of the nature of not-being as it were (Nañarthārūpaḥ) (because it is contentless in so far as it is free from objective affections). Its being depends upon limited subjective and objective manifestations as cut off from one another. The rise of limited subject is nothing else than the appearance of the light as limited. Thus, in reality manifestation of the subject, the means of knowledge and the object, is due to only one power of Creation.

And (I) because the light, which is admitted to be the means of right knowledge, emanates from the limited subject, who is limited, because of the limitations of Śūnya, Buddhi, Vital air and body etc., assumed by Him, and who in its introvertness, is ever of the nature of Samvid, and is ever naturally inclined (unmukha) towards the objects, and (II) because the objects are affected (at every successive moment) by the new limiting conditions of time, place and form: (and appear as new every moment) therefore, at every successive moment the extrovert subjective Ābhāsa, (Pramāṇa) has to be manifested afresh as different from that of the preceding moment (to be able to receive the affection of new objects). This is the idea conveyed by "of fresh rise (abhinavodaya)". Fresh means 'not soiled' because of fading as a result of even a moment's (continued) existence.

Now if this (Pramāṇa) be not related to the limited subject, the consciousness "I, who had consciousness of Nīla, am now having that of Pīta" will not be possible. But such personal experience is undeniable and it is never contradicted. Thus the Ābhāsa (the extrovert light) which shines as related to the limited subject and appears every moment in a new form, because of its facing object, is called Pramāṇa, because it operates to bring about cognition.

What is this so called Pramā ? If you say it is of the nature of effect (of Pramāṇa); we assert that that very Ābhāsa, which is essentially the light of cognition (Bodharūpa) is Miti, the fruit of Pramāṇa. This is the construction (of the principal sentence in the second Śloka). But if any one were to say that thus (if you say "the same is Miti") the two would be considered to have been spoken of as synonymous rather than as being related with each other as cause and effect; the reply is that that Ābhāsa

is Pramāna inasmuch as it is extrovert light. But when in its aspect of determinate self-consciousness, which , as has been said before, is characterised by introvertness, it is limited by the affections of the objective world, the same light of consciousness (Bodha) is the effect. Just as in "that I, who am brave, am victorious" though bravery and victoriousness, are represented to belong to one and the same person, yet they are discriminated as cause and effect by a person of critical judgement, as "because I am brave, therefore, I am victorious", so in the present case there is relation of cause and effect "because there is light or manifestation of Nīla, therefore, there is determinate knowledge "this is Nīla", though 'Pramāṇa' and 'Pramiti' are essentially the same. This is what has been asserted in "Because the determinate knowledge is because of that". Moreover, the effect in the present case is no other than action (of the subject) (Vyāpārarūpameva) : and action has no separate entity from both the agent and means, therefore, also there is non-difference of Pramāṇa and its effect.

The chief characteristic of Pramāna (the means of right knowledge) is its power to produce the determinate knowledge. And the word (śabda) is the very life of this determinate knowledge (because the only difference between the determinate and the indeterminate knowledge is that while in the case of one we cannot use any word; in that of the other we can). Now word is used for one manifestation (ābhāsa) only, which is free from all associations with other Ābhāsas, such as place and time etc. e. g. "jar" or "red" (each word standing separately does not convey the idea of time or place etc. of the thing signified by it). Hence the means of right knowledge operates only on an isolated Ābhāsa, which is very much like a universal and admits of no specification, because it is not mixed up with the other Ābhāsas of time and place etc. which are apt to impart their limitations. Even the word "this" refers to the manifestation in front, merely as such , and not to one that is mixed up with other Ābhāsas. This is what the venerable teacher himself has said in the following lines : —

"The determinate consciousness "this" even when it refers to a definite object, which lies in front, implies "universal thisness" which is present in all objects."

Therefore, (as the means of right knowledge operate on an isolated manifestation (ābhāsa) only) 'ābhāsa' alone is real. And the particular (Svalakṣaṇa) is a different kind of 'Ābhāsa', which is characterised by shining of time and space etc. as united with one and the same manifestation . On that the means of right knowledge operate separately. Therefore, when a

means of knowledge operates on the unified whole (made up of what has been separately cognised) it is not valid, because it refers to what is already cognised. We shall discuss this in a subsequent section.

Determinate cognition, according to our view, entirely depends on the use of words. Hence it refers to each Ābhāsa separately. Therefore, even those who hold that the determinate cognition of the whole also is valid, because it is based on determinate cognition of each part separately, have to admit the validity to rest on the cognition of each manifestation. This will do. It is no use discussing the irrelevant. But if the determinate knowledge be simply an activity of Pramāṇa, that is present in(the case of erroneous perception of the existence of) two moons also; (that also should, therefore, be called determinate knowledge). No, because determinate knowledge is so called because, on account of its residual trace, it has continuous existence till it serves its well-known desired purpose. It is not destroyed before that . But if it be destroyed in the middle, it is not determinate knowledge. Nor was the knowledge of two moons determinate knowledge even before (i. e. before it was contradicted by a subsequent experience); because even before it was contradicted by the unexceptionable knowledge of oneness of the moon that we have within. This is supported by the evidence of our own experience, because our personal experience "at that very time" "this" was not "silver" recognises that the determinate knowledge, which arose before, has been proved to be no determinate knowledge at all. This is what the teacher has said in the course of discussion on Bādha and shall deal further with this point in the verse "Rajataikavimarśe". This being so, no sooner does the person, who determinately cognises two moons, want to arouse the curiosity of others, which is the admitted purpose of showing a new thing, then, being overwhelmed by contempt and ridicule on hearing the words of the other people, considers his former so called determinate knowledge "this is the couple of moons"as having been uprooted by his own experience.

But the question is "if the person (who has erroneous determinate cognition) does not seek any causal efficiency from what he determinately cognises, how can there be then talk of its contradiction or non-contradiction ?" Answer to this is "Let it not be : we do not lose anything thereby". For, activity is not always due to determinate right knowledge only. It is caused at times even by uncertainty as in the case of cultivation of land or intensity of desire as in the case of taking poisonous food, or as in the case of theft, in which impediments, as experience

tells us, are sure or possible. Thus, the intensity of desire is, in the case of ordinary men, the cause of activity. And people when active, discover some of their cognitions to be right, when they are not uprooted by the later ones; and others to be wrong, when they find them proved false by later experience. And thus, because the perceiver has had enough practice to differentiate between correct and incorrect or right and wrong means of knowledge, and also because he has been doing so through out his hundreds of former births, therefore, he can find out distinction between Pramāṇa and Apramāṇa at the very first sight, as he does between jewel and silver. And in reality there is distinct difference between them due to difference in the cause etc. Therefore, when he considers his distress to be bearable and so is not goaded to various activities by his desire, which influences human activities as much as does the great planet Rāhu, then being afraid of being contradicted (or falling into error), he is guided in his activities by knowledge which he fully knows to be correct and so he is never deceived. Such a person is said to be very considerate in his action.

Thus, the general conception the Pramāṇa is explained in order to remove the doubt about the validity of determinate cognitions such as those of the universal and relation etc. (which the Bauddha raised) on account of his own ignorance. And because the conception of the means of right knowledge, as has been presented above, is a mere repetition of what is well known, the reader has not been troubled with details such as its classification and criticism of the definition etc.

Pramāṇa is that means of knowledge, which is not proved to be false at a later stage by an experience of the opposite nature, and is the cause of the effect in the shape of determinate knowledge, the continuity of which is not broken till the accomplishment of the fixed purpose. It is essentially the light of consciousness. It is related to an object and springs from the essential nature of the subject. There is no difference of opinion about it in reference to the sense-perception or experience of pleasure etc. or mental apprehension or the cognition of a Yogin, because it directly refers to the Ābhāsa in the form of the object of knowledge.

Anumāna defined

The knowledge derived from inference is the knowledge of an object (Ābhāsa) from that of which it (the inferred,) is an effect; or of which it forms the essential nature. The relation of one thing with the other as cause and effect and the relation of identity (Tādātmya) of two things have to be acknowledged to

be dependent upon the Niyati śakti of the Lord. Therefore, the inference operates within the limit of that time or place within which the invariable concomitance is well known.

Āgama

But Āgama is the inner (Antaraṅga i.e. the essential or natural—Svabhāvatayā sthita) activity (Vyāpāra) of the Lord, who is essentially nothing else than pure consciousness (Cit). For, it is nothing but the inner voice or speech (Parā) (i.e. it is spontaneous thought of one who rises to the transcendental level of complete de-individualisation, which he expresses when he descends to the empirical level. It springs from never changing pure "I" Bh. II, 84-5). It is the very life of other means of knowledge, such as direct perception. Therefore, whatever is said in the Āgama, that is undoubtedly so. For instance, the following Mantra : — "This poison cannot kill me. I am myself Garuḍa".

(This Mantra frees a person from the effect of snake-bite; but only if the person, using it, rises above the empirical personality and exclusively contemplates its meaning. For, according to this system, a person becomes what he contemplates in the aforesaid manner (Ātmānam Yādṛśam Yotra bhāvayet tādṛśo hyasau). Hence Āgama, in reality, is nothing more than the strongest determinate thought of the completely de-individualised self. And the collection of such thoughts in language is secondarily called so, because it is a means of arousing such thoughts. (Tataḥ sa eva vimarśa Āgama ityucyate mukhyatayā, tadupayogitayā tu upacāreṇa tajjanakopi śabdarāśiḥ I. P. V. V. Vol. III P. 84).

And whichsoever other collection of such thoughts in language (Sabdarāśiḥ) is helpful in arousing such strong determinate thought (in the believer in that Āgama) that also is valid (Pramāṇam) as for instance, the Vedas and the Siddhānta (Āgamas) etc. or other Āgamas such as those of the Bauddhas and the Jainas; because the assertions, which have been made by them (Veda etc.) such as "I, who have performed joytiṣṭoma shall go to heaven" "I am initiated (Dīkṣita),I shall not be reborn" "I am compassionate, I shall attain Buddhahood" "I endure great pains, I shall reach the stage of Arhan" etc., are not proved to be invalid, because only those who believe in them, are entitled to follow them. To those, who do not believe in them, they are not valid: because to them they are not articles of unshakable faith; because they do not arouse strongest determinate thought in them. But will it not follow from this that the same scripture is Pramāṇa to some and not so to others? And this is not proper,

because it is said "Pramāṇa knows no partiality". Reply to this question is as follows : —

The objector does not know the real nature of 'belief' (Partīti). However, I am not going to ignore him. Now, what is the meaning of "Pramāṇa knows no partiality". Does the perception of Nīla on the part of one man, make the object (Nīla) known to all; or does the perception of smoke similarly make all infer fire from it; or is Āgama in the form of the prediction of a Siddha "In the morning you will get treasure in this way" Pramāṇa to all persons equally? But if you say that it is so to a certain person at a certain time only, then I say:— "so is the case with this particular kind of the strongest determinate thought, Āgama, which is so called because it makes the object known in every way." The fact that eyes and the light etc., which help wrong knowledge, being helpers of wrong knowledge, are not the means of right knowledge, (in a particular case), does not mean that the means of direct perception, which produces right knowledge (in some cases only) is partial in any way. (For, the wrong knowledge is due to the defect in the eyes).

In the same way, though the same Āgama (Veda),—while asserting the non-validity of such portions as those regarding Jyotiṣṭoma etc. in the case of unqualified Śūdras, because they are not the articles of unshakable faith to them, because they do not arouse the strongest determinate thoughts in them and, therefore, are not of the nature of true Āgama,—asserts also the validity of the same in the case of the qualified Brāhmaṇas, because they are the articles of faith to them, because they arouse the strongest determinate thoughts in them and therefore, are of the nature of true Āgama. But they (Āgamas regarding Jyotiṣṭoma) cannot be attacked on the ground of partiality (to some) and impartiality (to others).

For, all Āgamas, whether of the nature of injunction or of prohibition, are productive of strong determinate thought (Vimarśa) only within the limitation, i. e. in certain persons only who are qualified to follow them and that too at a certain time and place, as co-operating causes. It is just for this reason that in the verse "Tradition" etc. the words "where" and "when" are used. Accordingly it has been asserted by great teachers such as Bhartṛhari and the commentator on the Nyāya Sūtra, that the direct perception and the Āgama invalidate the inference. When the general definition of the means of right knowledge is known, its essential nature is completely grasped. The special definitions, therefore, are useless.

The Bauddha defines the means of right knowledge as that which is not subsequently contradicted. This amounts to saying that it is a helper in reaching the object or that it is prompter towards the object; or that it shows the thing, which can be reached and which is fit for directing one's activity towards. But this definition does not state any characteristic of Pramāṇa, which rests on the light of consciousness, which is primarily admitted to be Pramāṇa. And such a characteristic, if at all it can be established, is established by the definition given in the Kārikā. Otherwise the definition would be no better than (mockery, such as) twisting of the face, shaking of the head and bending or pressing the fingures. It is no use going into details. (2)

It has been stated in the preceding verse that Miti has as its object only that which is signified by a single expression, but a single expression is used for the external object, which is a configuration of various Ābhāsas. How then can it be said that the means of right knowledge operates on each Ābhāsa ? For, the 'Svalakṣaṇa' is a configuration of Ābhāsas. In order to answer this objection the author says the following to give a very correct idea of what the object of means of knowledge really is:—

(3)"Even in the case of one object, which is a product of unification, there is cognition of different kinds of Ābhāsas, according to the taste, or the purpose or the intellectual capacity i.e. the traditional knowledge that one has of the object."

Although jar is externally perceived as one object yet it is not one only (as it is perceived). It can also be differently analysed. That is as follows :—

An object can be analysed in three ways ; according to the taste, the purpose , or the established tradition, which the discriminator follows. But the constituent Ābhāsas differ in each case. But if you ask how then Svalakṣaṇa can be spoken of as one ? The reply is that sometimes determinate knowledge of these Ābhāsas, which shine separately, rests upon each Ābhāsa separately. In such a case we grasp higher and lower universals. But sometimes it rests on unification of them by holding them as principal and subordinate ; as "Here this is so". In such a case the object is one Svalakṣaṇa.

Here the word "Api" has to be joined with a different word from that with which it is connected in the text i.e. it has to be used with "Artha" and not "Ābhāsa". Thus even in the case of that object also, which has been constructed as one particular

object by determinative activity which consists in determinate unification, the Ābhāsas differ, according to the taste, the purpose or established tradition that the cogniser follows. (3)

The following lines illustrate the point, dealt with in the preceding verse:—

(4-5) **"Just as the Ābhāsas, 'long', 'round', 'tall' and 'man'; or 'smoke' and 'of sandal-wood'; though limited by time and space, shine in isolation from one another (to different individuals facing the same object) : so do the Ābhāsas, "is" 'jar', 'substance', 'gold' and 'bright'. Each of them, shows its respective causal efficiency, is the object of a separate determinate cognition (and, accordingly,) is referred to by one word."**

Here in one particular well-known Ābhāsa, 'man' who is known to be sentient, at times, only length, which is characterised by occupying a large space, is definitely perceived. It (length) is common to trees also. At another time only circularity, which is characterised by imperceptibility of joints, and is possible in the case of a rock also, is perceived : or only tallness, which consists in being spread upward and is common to a post. Or only the quality of a man i.e. the freedom in his movements, such as going or coming, which is common to other men also, is perceived at still another time. That is as follows :—

The perceiver may do so because of his free will, unrestrained by any purpose, i.e. Ruci. This is what has been asserted in the following :—

"Ruci, which arises independently of any purpose, because the mind is essentially restless."

He might analytically perceive the objects as covering large space only, when he is prompted by desire for concealing : or when he desires to understand or tries to explain the conception of his elders of what is called long.

Thus, in determinate knowledge, Ābhāsas differ (according to the taste or purpose etc. of the perceiver). But it is one particular Ābhāsa, because it rests on the Ābhāsa of either time or place. The Ābhāsas of time and space impart particularity and exercise the function of as if it were destroying eternality and omnipresence, which are responsible for the rise of the idea of universality. Just in the same manner as that in which the Ābhāsa "Man" has been explained, other Ābhāsas, such as Brāhmaṇa etc. have to be explained. Among the different Ābhāsas mentioned above, the Ābhāsa, "man" is the best known, because in man are found many Ābhāsas, which are common to both the sentient and the insentient. Following this example

various well known Ābhāsas can be differentiated from one another in smoke also, e.g. 'smoke' 'of Sandal', "rising from white sandal wood". And with the help of this above well known illustration, we can ascertain variety of Ābhāsas in jar, which is not ordinarily known to have it, in the following manner :—

When a person, who is getting broken-hearted, finding that there is nothing, sees a jar, he simply perceives the Ābhāsa "existence" only, as "It is". He has no consciousness of other Ābhāsas even in name. Similarly one who desires to fetch water, perceives Ābhāsa "jar". The man, desirous of simply a thing, which can be taken to some place and then brought back, perceives the Ābhāsa "thing". The man, desirous of price, perceives Ābhāsa "gold"; the man, desirous of pleasantness, perceives Ābhāsa "brightness"; the man, desirous of extremely hard substance, sees Ābhāsa "hardness". The same may be said about the taste and the intellectual capacity.

Thus, a thing is nothing else than these various Ābhāsas, because every thing is essentially Ābhāsa. And Vimarśa also, which is the very life of Ābhāsa, is separate for each Ābhāsa, because the indicatory sign, the word, which is known to be the very life of determinate knowledge, rests on (i.e. is separate for) each Ābhāsa e.g., "is" "red" and "jar" etc. Similarly the capacity of serving certain fixed purpose also rests separately on each Ābhāsa, as we know it through positive and negative concomitance. For instance, by the Ābhāsa of mere existence, only the breaking of the heart is avoided. The need of another Ābhāsa (the capacity to fetch water) in the Ābhāsa "being" is related to a different Ābhāsa. For, just as in the case of desire to accomplish the purpose (of fetching fire) the Ābhāsa "vessel" is needed ; so in the case of desire to fetch water, another Ābhāsa of definite nature(i.e. jar)which is invariably concomitant with the Ābhāsa "being" is needed. Thus, from whatever point of view we reflect on the object, we discover it to be essentailly nothing more than an Ābhāsa ; because only as such it shines objectively, is determinately cognised,and serves the required purpose. This is established. Thus, the author, in order to establish one point, has given three illustrations (1) "Long and round" (II) "smoke" and (III) "is" and "jar", because they differ from one another in so far as the first is best known ; the second is simply known and the third is unknown. (5).

But if thus every Ābhāsa is a thing by itself, how then jar can be spoken of as one thing ? To this objection he replies as follows :—

(6) "The causal efficiency of the "ābhāsas", which shine objectively as resting on a common ābhāsa, is collective. But that of those which shine separately is individually fixed."

In the configuration of Ābhāsas, there has to be admitted some Ābhāsa as the chief among them, which may be considered to be the substratum of all others. This would be their common abode. Now the so called "Sāmānādhikaraṇya" is nothing else than the connection of these Ābhāsas with this common substratum. The meaning of the instrumental case(in Sāmānādhikaraṇyena) is "Characterised by". "Pratibhāsa" means the light of consciousness inclined towards a configuration of Ābhāsas, which rest on a common substratum, and the determinative activity, which finds expression, not in a word (but in a sentence); because all these Ābhāsas necessarily rest on one. Therefore, the Ābhāsas, which constitute one particular configuration—because of the determinate cognition in the form of a sentence, "here now this jar is" which is the very life of shining of various Ābhāsas on a common substratum,—discharge a different collective function, though even so they retain their individual differences. But when there is determinate knowledge of each Ābhāsa separately, then each one of them has its separate fixed function.

Here in this Śloka by the words "Ābhāsa" and "Pratibhāsa" determinate knowledge also is to be supposed to be implied. The word "Punaḥ", which indicates distinction, has to be connected with both, just as the eye of a crow is connected with both the sockets. By the use of plural in "abhedinām" the author has conveyed the idea that the Ābhāsas do not lose their separate entity (Svarūpabheda) even when they rest on one substratum.

Thus, when the separateness or diversity (Pṛthaktva) of Ābhāsas occupies a subordinate position to that of identity (e.g. "this place" "this place") then there is true universality (Sāmānyarūpatva) in so far as the identity tinges or qualifies various similar individual (external) objects. But when the Ābhāsa "jar" is determinately cognised in total isolation, (i.e. when "jar" shines as a substantive) then its universality is not real but simply possible, because of its fitness (to tinge a number of similar individual external objects). For, all the categories (of the Nyāya) excepting the substance, are essentially dependent. Thus the idea that "jar" also as such is one thing is right, because it is established as such by its shining in indeterminate and determinate knowledge and its function. (6).

Here the following objection may be raised :—

It is not one Ābhāsa that serves an end ; rather, a collection of a number of them serves a collection of a number of ends. Moreover, if different Ābhāsas mix together to discharge one function, what is it that limits their mixing up ? i.e. Why is it that some Ābhāsas are mixed together and not others ? The author answers this objection in the following Śloka :—

(7)"Just as the idea of oneness of different rays of a lamp or of oneness of different currents in the ocean, depends upon their discharging one function ; so does that of the Ābhāsas, which do not contradict one another."

Though the scattered rays of a lamp, do not discharge the function of bringing about ocular perception of the minute, yet they perform the same function when they are focused. In this case there is no collection of functions discharged by them. And the various currents also, when they fall into the sea, discharge the function of giving rise to innumerable waves. Similarly various "Ābhāsas" "jar", 'of gold' 'red' and then 'it is fit to be used for bringing water to pour on the head of Śiva,' discharge one function of causing great pleasure. Thus the capacity of discharging one function is established (in the case of Svalakṣaṇa.) To the question : "what is it that limits mixing up of these Ābhāsas?" the following is the reply :—

Those, which are not of opposite nature, alone get mixed up together. The Ābhāsa of form does not mix up with that of air, because they are of opposite nature. And this contrariety is due to the power of Niyati.

Thus, just as the one thing that is constituted by separate rays focused, or that one, which is constituted by various currents meeting in the sea, gives rise to the idea of oneness ; so that one, called Svalakṣaṇa, which is a configuration of the various Ābhāsas, 'jar', 'red' and 'gold' etc., which are not of contrary nature, gives rise to the idea of oneness. This is the construction. Thus, it is accepted that shining in indeterminate and determinate cognitions and discharging of function are due to the idea of unity. (7)

But if the means of right knowledge operates on each Ābhāsa separately, it follows that the validity of manifestation "fire" depends upon the cognition of fire ; validity of manifestation "smoke" rests on the cognition of smoke ; and in the same manner the validity of the relation of cause and effect rests on the cognition of their relation only. Such being the case, there is the possibility of perception of fire without that of smoke.

And, therefore, many difficulties would arise. To remove this objection the author says the following :—

(8)"**Even in the case of unqualified fire etc., the causal relation, heat and its being the meaning of a conventional expression etc. are known through one means of knowledge.**"

Here i. e. even in the theory that the means of right knowledge operates on each Ābhāsa separately, no flaw can be pointed out. That is as follows : —

Although the manifestation "fire" may be of generic nature, because of its not being unified with other manifestations, time and place etc. yet this very manifestation is known with certainty only when it is unified with as many manifestations as are made invariably concomitant with it by the power of Niyati. Thus, the manifestation "fire" is naturally invariably concomitant with the manifestation of its being the effect of fuel and cause of smoke as also with that of its being hot in its nature. And it is so perceived at all times and in all places, because they are mixed up together into one.

And even that characteristic which does not naturally belong to it and, therefore, depends upon the convention established by men, such as being signified by the word 'fire' or the capacity to bring about the ocular perception of jar etc., is ascertained by means of a single perception itself. For, to the perceiver, the Ābhāsa of fire, at all times and places, is known, as invariably concomitant with other Ābhāsas, with which either the nature or the humanity has mixed it up. What is then the use of another means of right knowledge in regard to them ?

By the statement "this object, which is of bright and luminous form, is the meaning of the conventional expression, freely fixed by man", the author indicates that in all cases the Lord's power of Niyati is the only refuge. The crux of the whole thing is that the invariable concomitance of one Ābhāsa with others, whether natural or otherwise, that we find, is due to the working of His power of Niyati. The power of Niyati operates differently in relation to different objects. It manifests fuel (as the cause of fire) as associated with the past time. It manifests smoke (as the effect of fire) as associated with future time. It manifests heat as associated with fire at all times; and expressibility by such words as fire etc. for a short time only.

Therefore, because of the dependence on the working of the power of Niyati, there is invariable concomitance of the Ābhāsa of smoke with that of fire. Hence there does not arise any difficulty in regard to inference. All the characteristics

of fire, namely, its being both an effect and a cause; its being hot and its being signified by the various words which stand for it no less than its being without any odour, going upward, and being of the opposite nature from water, as implied by the word "etc." (Ādi), are known through only one means of right knowledge.

The practice, that there should be a break when half the Śloka is finished, obtains only in literary works and not in the philosophical ones. Therefore, it is no fault that the compound runs on from the second to the third foot (pāda) of the Śloka.

The use of the affix 'Tal' at the end of each component part of the compound is meant to indicate that the things signified by them belong to different classes, according as they are natural or artificial because of their dependence on or independence of another thing (such as human convention). (8)

Thuṣ, the essential nature of the object is made manifest by one means of right knowledge, which rests on each Ābhāsa separately. And their proper invariable concomitance with one another, is ascertained by the introvert aspect of the same Saṁvid, on which depend all the preceding various experiences, which had various limited Ābhāsas as their objects. And this introvert light of consciousness is the valid means only in regard to manifestation "oneness" because unification is its essential characteristic. But in the case of the manifestations which are unified, it is not the valid means of knowledge. For, they come to it second hand. In regard to them the former means only, which operates upon each manifestation separately, is the valid means.

Now the author is going to show the manner, in which Pramāṇa is useful in bringing about the physical activity in addition to the mental activity, the essential characteristic of which is to make manifest the essential nature of the objects.

(9) "The activity of the person, with purposive attitude, is possible in reference to a particular object at the time of its perception, when it is determined by other cognitions such as those of time etc."

The external causal efficiency of an object is due to its determination. And in this determination, the connection of an Ābhāsa with the Ābhāsa of time or place is of great importance. Here there is one point which deserves special attention, namely, that this determination of Ābhāsa will serve no purpose (is nothing) unless it be definitely cognised as such. But even when it is grasped determinetely, if it be resting on the subject, who is pure consciousness and, therefore, free from limitation of

time etc., it will entirely give up its particularity. Thus, in reality all is one. But the particularity shines. The cause of that is the power of freedom of the Lord. This is called Māyā Śakti.

The activity of the organ of speech, body, and mind, which takes place at the time of perception of a definite object, which is a combination of various Ābhāsas, in the person, who is actuated by the desire for realising a definite purpose, which can be realised only with the help of a definite object, is possible only if that Svalakṣaṇa be determined by many other perceptions, such as those of place and time, implied by the word "ādi", and that of any other characteristic that we unify. It is not possible otherwise. For, such an activity is not possible from one Pramāṇa but from a collection thereof.

This collectivity is not possible if the theory of the opponent be accepted. But, according to us, it is possible, as resting in one subject, whose essential nature is sentiency. This is what has already been said in "Na cedantaḥkṛta" etc. (2-3-7). This very unification of means of knowledge is called 'yojikā' or 'Yukti' on the analogy of unification of sweet-smelling things etc.

Thus the point that has been established is that activity is due to a collection of perceptions. The verse may be construed in other ways also as follows:—

Even when there are perceptions of time etc. i.e. there is unification with Ābhāsa of time etc., the activity of mind etc. is possible in regard to Svalakṣaṇa, that shines within the subject as a unity. Or, activity is possible only when there is its cause in the shape of Svalakṣaṇa, which is determined by other perceptions such as those of space etc., i.e. other Ābhāsas, which are directly perceptible. In this case also the collection of means of knowledge,-which is referred to, through reference to plurality of the objects of knowledge, as that which follows it - is spoken of as the cause of activity.

But is this collection of Pramāṇas the cause of activity that coincides with direct perception only? No, says the author:—

"Even that which is due to inference"

Not only the activity of mind and body etc. that coincides with the direct perception is caused by a collection of Pramāṇas, each of which is different from the rest, because of its relation to a different Ābhāsa, such as that of time, but also that activity which coincides with inference. The various perceptions of Ābhāsas of smoke, fire, their invariable concomitance, and that of mountain separately, as well as the inference "there is fire"

which relates to what is not known through perception and asserts its presence, form one collection. And the activity of the inferer, possessed of purposive attitude, that coincides with inference, is based on that collection. This is the connection of this part of the verse with the rest. (9).

Thus unity and diversity are due to vimarśa or determinate knowledge. And that is the manifestation of the power of freedom of the great Lord, who is essentially consciousness (Saṁvedana). This will explain the view of the opponent, who holds "thing is the same whether it be far or near". This can be explained in no other way. This is what the author establishes in the following two verses:—

(10-11) "Sameness of the objects, which appear to be different because of their nearness or remoteness, their direct relation to senses or its absence, their externality or internality or defects in the accessaries of knowledge, remains intact, because they primarily shine as such, a fact which is made manifest by subsequent intellectual reaction, which recognises them to be the same."

How can those who try to explain every thing in terms of indeterminate cognition only, establish that the thing, whether far or near, is the same ? Because there is sure to be a difference in two cases, according as the reflection of the object on the mirror of extrovert "Saṁvid" falls partly or wholly, distinctly or indistinctly. But if you say that in the case of Vimarśa also there will be the same difference, (because Vimarśa is almost entirely dependent upon indeterminate knowledge), I say "quite so". But there is the determinate knowledge that follows this in the form of recognition "this is the same object," which is nothing more than determinate consciousness of identity (of the objects of past and present cognitions). And this recognition is as it were the very life of indeterminate cognition. It makes the chief objective manifestation (Avabhāsa), the objective manifestation of 'the Sameness', shine. Thus, because in recognition there is consciousness of the sameness, that fits in with it; for, Ābhāsa and Vimarśa always go together; therefore, from the point of view of chief or principal consciousness (i.e. recognition as the same) sameness of the object, whether it be far or near, is unaffected. Similarly in the judgement "the same as was inferred has been perceived", sameness of the objects, which are objects of two kinds of knowledge, perception and inference, and, therefore, are conceived in two different ways in respect of their subsidiary Ābhāsas, is unaffected; because identity of them is made to shine predominantly by subsequent intellectual reaction, which recognises them to be the same. This is the construc-

tion. Similar is the case with those which are objects of internal and external cognitions: for, they are also recognised as the same; "the same that I saw then am now imagining within".

The same is the case with those which appear differently because of the defective light of the lamp etc. They are also recognised as the same: "the same red lotus that appeared to be blue in the lamp-light is now seen to be red in the sun-light". Similarly whatever other objects have different appearances either because of difference in the perceptive organs or of meeting one side thereof, they also are the same because the essential nature of the objects (i.e. their identity) shines in consequence of the principal determinate cognition (i.e. the recognition). (10-11)

The object may be considered to be the same in both the cases i.e. when it is far or near, because of its being equally capable of exercising the functional capacity, as conceived or ascertained by the perceiver in both the cases; but how can the thing be similarly called the same whether it be externally perceived or internally conceived; because in the later case it cannot discharge the function, that it was thought to be capable of doing by the perceiver. To remove this wrong notion the author says as follows:—

(12) "The functional efficacy (Arthakriyā) of the objects is not naturally their own. It is fixed by the will of the Lord. Therefore, the object cannot be considered to be different simply because of its not excercising functional power."

In the verse "Kāryakāraṇatā" (2-3-8), like distinctive nature of the thing, its functional capacity also is referred. But this functional capacity is not natural to the object. It is not the essential nature of the object. It is fixed by the will of the Lord in its being as well as not-being. Therefore, as the functional capacity is not the essential nature of the object, so the object should not be considered to be different because of its not discharging its function. For, the difference can be possible only if there be difference in essential quality; but exercising the functional power is not the essential quality. This is what has already been stated and shall also be stated on many occasions. And the essential nature is the same in the state of internality as well as that of externality, because the determinate cognition is the same in both cases. (12)

But if difference and non-difference of the things from one another is to be decided with the sole help of the determinate knowledge, then there should be no talk of error in all the three worlds. From this it will follow that even the mother-of-pearl

is in reality silver; because there is determinate knowledge of it "this is silver". Therefore, there being nothing like erroneous knowledge there can be no possibility of any contradiction thereof. What is then the use of the statement "Determinate knowledge is that which is not proved to be false at a later stage" (2-3-2.) For, in the absence of error there remains nothing to be excluded by the adjunct "uncontradicted" (Abādhitā). This objection he answers as follows:—

(13) "Even when there is consciousness of silver at the sight of mother-of-pearl, there is no silver in the mother-of-pearl; because there is no agreement (between the two cognitions) in respect of their spatial limitation. In the case of 'two moons' also it is particular point in the heavenly vault that shines differently."

In the erroneous knowledge "this is silver, hard, common object to all perceivers and capable of accomplishing its purpose" there is no error about the various Ābhāsas "*this*" "silver" and the connection thereof, because there is the determinate knowledge. But erroneousness of it arises later on when there is deter minate knowledge "this is not the thing, called silver, hard, capable of being perceived as such by other perceivers and of serving its purpose"; because in this later determinate knowledge, the essential nature of earlier determinate knowledge, which is to be ascertained through this later one, does not shine as it did before, i.e. at the time of former determinate knowledge, but it should; and because in reference to that very time, at which arose the consciousness "this is silver". there is determinate knowledge later on "this was not silver". In the case of the erroneous cognition, the form of the cognition is not "It is not just at this very time" as in the case of lightning which disappears as soon as it appears. Therefore, as it does not continue to shine in as perfect a form as it should up to the time of ascertainment, so it is error. This type of error is technically called "Apūrṇakhyāti". This not-shining of the object in a perfect form as it should, (up to the time of ascertainment) is the essential nature of error. On the basis of it we may talk of (1) Asatkhyāti (2) Viparītakhyāti and (3) Anirvacaniyakhyāti. But (the opponent may point out that) the consciousness of the real silver is also Apūrṇakhyāti. What of that ? From this it will follow that all the cognitions are erroneous in their nature. (The exponent replies). It is fortunate that your eyes are now opening. All that shines in the condition of Māyā is illusory. And the erroneous knowledge in the sphere of Māyā is an error on error. It is like a dream in dream or a boil on the cheek; because there is a break in the continuity of that determinate knowledge, the continuity of which should

not be broken. Therefore, there is no error so far as the separate consciousness of "this" etc. is concerned. But the contrary cognition (Bādhaka) destroys the continuity of definite cognition in respect of unification right from the time of rise of determinate cognition. The error lies in the unification, this is established.

Although silver (wrongly perceived) in a shell shines as identical with real silver in the definite knowledge, yet there is no existence of silver in the shell as has been made manifest by that erroneous knowledge "this is silver". The reason is that the place, which forms the limiting condition of that knowledge "here is silver" i.e. the place in the form of shell, which (falsely) shows in itself the brilliance of silver, does not show itself as such in the correct determinate knowledge. Here the root "vad" means to shine.

Well, let it be so in the case of erroneous perception of silver in a shell, but in the case of erroneous knowledge of two moons as expressed in the judgement "there are two moons", there is no consciousness of mixing up of this with any other, as it is in the case of silver with shell, in connection with which contradiction may be possible. For, you yourself have said that in the case of one unconnected Ābhāsa there can be no contradiction. Reply:—But who has said this that the Ābhāsa of two moons is not mixed up with any other Ābhāsa? For, if it be so, then, being without any characteristic, how could it appear with distinctive characteristics of being limited by certain time and place. Therefore, in the case of the two moons also there is Ābhāsa of mixing up with time and place. For, if it be not there, how could there be checking (Nirodha) of the determinate knowledge, which appears to be inclined to continue? (because Vimarśa does not operate on a single Ābhāsa, unmixed with those of time and place).

And (leaving aside the idea of its being mixed up with the Ābhāsa of time) there has to be pointed out the reason why correct determinate knowledge does not follow the unification of the Ābhāsa of duality and that of moon. Therefore, the author says "not only in the case of the Ābhāsa of silver, but also in that of the two moons, there is unification with the Ābhāsa of place, namely, "sky". Explanation of "Anyathā" is "the sky, which was seen as occupied by two moons, is not so". By this contrary determinate knowledge the former (erroneous one) is uprooted.

Thus, the point that has to be proved is that Ābhāsas and their union are controlled by the power of Niyati. They (Ābhāsas) shall be dealt with as Tattvas in Āgamādhikāra. Thus

'vastu' 'Tattva' and 'Prameya' are synonymous terms. Thus, earth (Pṛthvī) is the Ābhāsa of hardness. Fire and (red) colour are the Ābhāsa of "red". Rajas is the Ābhāsa of union. Arrangement (sanniveśa) is essentially "Niyati". "Niyati" is nothing but order. The order has the not-being (Abhāva) as its very life. For, the shape (of a jar) like that of a big belly with a base, is nothing but the strange shining of not-being of Ābhāsa of the earth. The Ābhāsa of difference is the Māyā. The Ābhāsa of the true light of consciousness, which is beyond the Māyā, is the category "Śiva". This will do. We shall deal with it in the sequal. The Lord alone has free power to unite or disunite the objects of knowledge. The means to be followed to realise the Ultimate real unity is seeing non-difference in the difference of Ābhāsa of jar (i.e. seeing it as one with the self). Thus, it is established that the practical life is not a positive obstruction on the way to union with the Highest Lord. (13).

Trying to make this very point clear, the author proves that the being of all the prameyas depends upon the Lord alone.

(14) "Thus difference of objects (from one another) in respect of qualities, such as sound etc., and their identity in respect of the universal etc. can be explained on the basis of one subject."

An object shines as separate (on account of its element of particularity) and also as commingled with others, (Anuvṛttam) (on account of its element of universality). Both of these two aspects should be considered to be real. For, there is no contrary reason to prove the falsity of either. In reality if there be reason to contradict either of these, then, once having risen and thereafter becoming incapable of rising again (because of having been contradicted) the contradicted would disappear like the flash of lightning. But it is not so. Therefore, the Vedāntin, considering this contrariety between diversity and unity as difficult to maintain, calls it Māyā, and as such indefinable. And others (Bauddhas) say that because it shines in the determinate cognition only, therefore, it has no external existence. Both of them have deceived themselves and the common people.

But, according to us, shining of both is possible as resting on Saṁvid; because the Saṁvid is free. Even the birds know this through their own experience that resting within Saṁvid (consciousness) and, therefore, becoming one with it, even the blazing fire and water are non-contradictory. Hence the following assertion has been made:—

"Therefore, because of picturing up, according to free will" (1-6-11)

Therefore, diversity, which is due to the qualities, which serve as limiting condition and are used as restrictive attributes, or to words etc. or even to rod etc. (as in Daṇḍin); as also the unity, which is due to universal, similarity, or non-perception of difference, which have been discussed from "Kriyā sambandha" onwards, can be explained only if we admit that every thing rests within the Lord, called by the name 'Śiva' who rests in our hearts and is free to do innumerable things of diverse nature such as uniting and separating the right knowledge and the means thereof. What is the use of admitting other innumerable Viśeṣas, when the adjuncts can distinguish one from the other. For instance, in the case of Paramāṇu we may say, "it is one that got mixed with another at the time of formation of Dvyaṇuka, which comes into being later than atom and which precedes the time of making the jar, associated with this place". Similarly in the case of Ātmā, we may say "It is that which in the past was in heaven and embraced this heavenly damsel in this manner". In this way in the case of Yogins and all-knowing persons distinction between atom and self etc. is established. It is no use going into details. Thus the Prameya is established to be characterised by diversity and unity. The unity in diversity of the object, is beyond all doubt, because it rests on one subject. (14)

If the subject be the resting place of all the objects of knowledge, the attempt should be made to support his existence, and not that of the object, by adducing proofs; as the writer of the Mahābhāṣya says "the effort for (proving) the primary thing is fruitful". With this objection in mind, the teacher reminds us of what he said before "Who, holding the self to be essentially sentient, can disprove or prove the existence of the self" (1-1-2).

Now that the correct nature of the means of right knowledge as well as that of the Highest Lord is known; the statement, "how can such means of right knowledge operate on such a Lord?" can be presented as the conclusion. To show this clearly he says the following:—

(15-16) "What room is there for the operation of the means of right knowledge in the case of the Lord, who is like a smooth surface of wall, whereon the picture of the diversity of the universe is painted, who is essentially such as cannot be touched by not-being, who is ultimately real, who is the eternal subject, who is ever self-shining and wherein rest all forms of cognition."

The light (of consciousness),- which is associated with the limited perceiver, has a new rise every moment, and faces the object,-is called Pramāṇa. Now how can this means of right

knowledge be of any use or possibly apply to the Lord, who is pure consciousness and eternal? Moreover this Pramāna establishes the existence of a thing, which has not already been established, through determinate knowledge, "it is this", which rests in the introvert light of the subject, connected with the universal Light. It presupposes the universal light. But on what can the establishment of the self-established universal Light depend? The variety of this world can shine only if there be the Highest Lord, who is essentially pure light, just as a picture can, only if there be a wall. If the external objects be cognised in isolation from one another, then,—because Nīla and Pīta etc. rest in themselves and their cognitions are like insentient, mute or dumb with regard to one another, because they refer to their objects only, and because the determinate cognitions thereof, which follow the indeterminate, are similarly cut off from one another,-how can there be such consciousness as "this is variegated". But just as when depths and elevations are represented by various lines on a smooth wall, there is the possibility of cosciousness "she is of deep navel and elevated breasts"; so there can be consciousness of difference in relation to 'the variegated' only when all the different cognitions are connected with one wall of universal light (of consciousness). Thus, the author speaks of ever lasting self-luminousness of the wall of light of consciousness for receiving the impress of all the various objects.

Thus what can the means of right knowledge do in regard to one who is self-luminous? But if you say that He does not shine before (the working of the means of right knowledge); that would mean that He has no existence, because He is nothing else than pure light. Further, we can have no negative cognition of Him as "He is not"; because He alone has real existence. For, light of consciousness alone exists and what exists cannot be non-existent.

But if you say that His unlimited power, which is unknown, shall be made known by Pramāṇa; that also is not possible. For, if He did not shine as subject, whose work is the use of the Pramāṇas? But if He shines then He is the Lord, because the Lord is non-different from the subject. This is the idea, conveyed by three adjuncts in the text "Īśvare, Pramātari and sarvadābhātavigrahe". "Vigraha" here means special characteristic, which is particularly grasped. Because free self-luminousness is His characteristic nature, therefore, non-existence cannot touch Him at any time. He is free from limitation of time; because temporal limitation cannot be attributed to what is not touched by not-being. Therefore, He is said to be eternal (Purāṇa). "Kimpramāṇam" means: what is Pramāṇa in regard to Him;

why is this Pramāṇa to be used with regard to Him; or what useful purpose can the use of Pramāṇas serve? The Pramāṇa cannot rightly be represented to operate in His case; because Pramāṇa is so called because of its appearing ever anew and bringing about the rest of the object in the subject, which is technically called Pramiti. And the subject, being of unbroken light, has all the Pramitis in his introvert aspect. How then can Paramāṇa, which appears ever anew, can operate in His case; and where will rest Pramiti which owes its existence to the former?

Therefore, Pramāṇa is possible only in the case of the subject, limited by body, vital air, the group of eight (Puryaṣṭaka) and Śūnya. And there too it operates on the objective aspect only and not on the subjective (Saṁvedanāṁśe). And in regard to the subjective aspect, we may say that one's own experience is the means of knowing it in its limited aspect, i.e. when it is limited, because it faces the object and so appears anew, because of its contact with the real subject who is free from all limitations. Even the Bauddha has to admit that the consciousness "this is my Jñāna" is associated with limited subject. Pramāṇa has nothing to do with the true subject. This is what I have said myself:—

"All feel ashamed at having been reduced to the level of an object by the great Lord. How can that Lord, therefore, be himself reduced to the level of object of knowledge ?" (16)

But if the means of right knowledge are of no avail and cannot possibly function on the Lord, what is then the use of the Śāstra about Him? For, the Śāstra is only a means of knowledge. Reply is that the fact that the direct means of knowledge do not apply to Him, does not affect the utility of the Śāstra as a means of knowledge, because the Śāstra is a collection of inferences (inferential means for the realisation of the highest reality) for the sake of others. The highest object of a Śāstra is to present the subject in terms of the sixteen Padārthās, Pramāṇa etc. (as enumerated by Gautama). Although the Bauddhas find fault with Pañcāvayava etc., yet that is simply their obstinacy. It is made clear in that part of the book, which contains the quotation "Hitāhitaprāptiparihārayoḥ". And it is a fact that after the subject has been presented in terms of sixteen Padārthas, the other person can well understand what is explained to him.

But if any one were to ask what is the object of another person (that is served) through Parārthānumāna; reply is "it is for convincing others". That is possible through 'Parārthānumāna'.

Five parts of syllogism are used in it. Thus the founder of the Nyāya system, Akṣapāda by name, has established that all the Śāstras, excepting the Āgamas,are in reality collections of inferential proofs, such as bring full conviction to others.

Therefore, in this connection also, in order to remind us of what he stated in "But because of ignorance" (1-1-3) the author says as follows:—

(17) "Because of the ignorance, the "I" in the limited subject has never before been looked upon as the Lord etc. This Śāstra, through bringing the powers to light, prompts people to do so."

The power of freedom of the Highest Lord consists in His accomplishing that which is very difficult and seems impossible in that particular prior state, which is known as Paśu, and in which we are. What more difficult of accomplishment can there be than this that in Him who is essentially light there is manifest what is the negation of light, right at the time when His essential nature, the light of consciousness, is shining in full? Therefore, it is all due to the power of freedom that He does not shine as perfectly free, i.e. makes or gives rise to that part (of the universe), which is known as the subjective, by manifesting limited individual subject, and through him manifests the perceptible This is called the power of Māyā of the Lord. This is asserted in "Māyā is the principle of ignorance". Ignorance is due to the power of freedom, called Māyāśakti, as described above. Ignorance consists in the loss of perfection in knowledge i.e. in considering perfection, freedom and eternality, which are shining within himself, as not shining. Perfection consists in being full of the objects of the universe, clearly manifested because of the rise of the stir, the power of Will. Freedom consists in the powers of remembrance etc. And eternality and omnipresence of the Universal light are automatically established because it is free from limitations of time and place.

The idea,—that what shines as "I" is perfect, omnipresent, omnipotent and eternal being i.e. the idea that the "I" is identical with the Lord, the Subject, the Lustrous, as presented in the preceding two verses,—was not in practice before, because of ignorance. This Śāstra makes people fit to live this idea in practice by bringing to light His powers of knowledge, will and action by means of treatise on Pratyabhijñā, which is a collection of inferential proofs to justify the idea in practice.

In "Pravartyate" there is double causative. The significance of the word "Kevalam" is that nothing new is done, nor what was really non-manifest is made manifest. Only wrong idea about that, which is shining, as not shining, is removed. And

Mukti is nothing but the attainment of godhead at the removal of this wrong idea. Accordingly Saṁsāra is non-removal of the same. For, both of them depend upon the unshakable ideas and both are manifestations of the glorious one.

The crux of the whole discussion is this:— The wrong notion of a person, who is under the influence of a spirit and considers himself as having been taken away (through wrong notion)even though he is there, is removed (by interrogating) in the following manner:—What are you? If you say "one whose face and clothes are such", then see, you have got them. The person who says this repeatedly does not produce anything new. In the same manner the wrong notion, "I am not the Lord" which is due to ignorance in the worldly people, in regard to the Self, that is always shining as "I", is removed by the Śāstra as follows:—

(1) He, who is possessed of power of freedom in respect of knowledge and action, is "Īśvara", as is the one whom we know through Purāṇas and Āgamas. You are such.

(2) He, on whom something depends is the Lord of that as a king is of his kingdom. So does the world depend on you. Thus, looking upon yourself as the Lord does not depend on any external ground. This is the invariable concomitance.

(3) Whatever shines in something else, that something is full of what shines in it e.g. treasure is full of gems. And the world shines in you.

(4) Whatever shines within something else, that something pervades what is within it e.g. casket pervades the gems. The whole of the universe, beginning with the earth and ending in Sadāśiva, as stated in the Śāstras, is within you, who are essentially of the nature of consciousness (Saṁvid).

(5) If a certain thing presupposes something else as the condition of its coming into being and dissolution, that something must exist before and after that, by which it is presupposed, e.g. sprout presupposes the earth in such a manner. The whole universe presupposes you, who are essentially the light of consciousness. Similarly thousands of other attributes, such as are well established by the Āgamas, may be attributed.

Thus, when the ignorance is removed, but because of persistence of the residual trace of ignorance, though there may still

be the idea of identity of the self with body etc., (in practical life) and that of non-identity (in the state of Samādhi) and there may also be the consciousness of jar etc., as not identical with the self; yet, just as the person who knows the secret of magic, is not deluded even when he sees its creations, so the person, who has recognised the self, is not (deluded). Therefore, when the body has been brought to end by death, he attains the state of the great Lord (Parameśvaratā). But the person, who through continuous practice of concentration, as enjoined in the Śaiva Śāstra, realises the identity of jar and body etc. with the highest Lord, acquires the attributes of the highest Lord in his very life time. He, however, does not attain perfection. For, true identity with the universe, is realised only after the body, which is essentially a limitation, has been dissolved. But if there be a person, who thinks that the mass of reasons, which establish that the individual is identical with Universal in practical life, is unsound, his ignorance has to be removed by means of Smṛti etc. which are prompters to practical life. But the person, whose ignorance is not dispelled by the Smṛtis etc., should be considered to be doomed to remain ignorant, because of the will of the Lord. Such a person also, if the injunctions of the Śāstra fall into his ears, and impressions thus created attain maturity, will sometime surely realise the Self. Thus, what was asserted in the two verses "Kartari" etc. (I,I,1-2) has been re-asserted in a polished form, in three verses beginning with 'Viśvavaicitrya' etc., by saying: "How can the means of right knowledge, which are of such a nature, can justly apply to the Lord, who is of such a nature". Thus, what was rightly stated in the beginning of this Śāstra, has been established now in another way. The chapter ends. (17) From the beginning 120.

Here ends the third chapter, called the discussion on the means of knowledge, its fruit and its object, in the Kriyādhikāra in the Pratyabhijñāsūtravimarśinī, written by illustrious teacher, Abhinavagupta (3).

ĀHNIKA IV.

We bow to that Śiva, who, manifesting the objects and different types of causal relation on His clear mirror-like self, shines as the creator.

In the course of discussion on relation, which is simply a manifestation of His power of action, by the way, the real nature of relation between the knower and the known has been explained. Now, in order to explain the essential nature of the relation existing between cause and effect, the following chapter consisting of 21 Ślokas is begun. It begins with "And this" and ends in "Thus the will itself is the cause, the creator and the action". In the first verse it is summarily stated that, according to the author, the relation between cause and effect is non-different from that which holds between the creator and the object of creation (Kartṛkarmabhāva). Then in the next three verses the causality of the insentient is refuted. In the following six verses it is established that causality, which is identical with creativeness really belongs to the sentient. The next three verses show, by the way, that (possibility of) inference depends upon the power of Niyati. The next three verses show that causality, as conceived by the Bauddhas, ultimately follows our view on the subject. If it does not, it is nothing. The next three verses show that conception of causality, as presented in the Sāṅkhya system also, does not stand to reason, if it does not accept the creativeness of the sentient, as stated by us. The following two verses show that the creativeness of the sentient also does not stand to reason if the sentient be not the Lord. (Anīśvaratāyām). This is the summary. Now begins the explanation of the text.

Having shown, in the course of discussion on the power of action, that from the practical point of view the Lord is essentially the subject, the author now, attempting to show that His being the creator also follows automatically from the same (power of action), says the following:—

(1) "And the Lord, being of unlimited power, makes the objects manifest through His power of will. It is this power of action in which His creativeness consists."

The word 'ca' implies emphasis. This very eternal Subject makes manifest, without any break in continuity, these objects which were manifested even before. How? By virtue of His will, which has no definiteness or succession and is identical with the Lord. Where do these objects have existence? Reply

is "because of His being of unlimited power or His powers being innumerable" i.e. all the objects exist as His very self i.e. as one with His self. They are essentially Śakti or power. This is what has been stated in "Which exist within the Lord" (1-5-10). Action is nothing more than this manifestation and this will. The same is the creativeness of this Lord. (1).

But the sprout is seen coming out of the seed, and no sentient being is seen present in the seed. How can it then be said that the sentient alone is the manifester of all? To this objection he replies as follows:—

(2) **"It is not due to the power of the insentient seed that the sprout, whether (it be considered to be) existing or not (in the seed), has its apparent existence. The relation, therefore, between cause and effect, is essentially the relation between the creator and the object of creation."**

The insentient seed has got no such power as to be able to make the sprout, existing or non-existing in itself, manifest. The birth of the sprout from the seed is not due to any capacity belonging to sprout, because it has no existence. And coming into being of the sprout cannot be due to the power of seed: for, the latter is different from the former. Therefore, effect is nothing else than the object (of action), made manifest by the power of action. This is what is indicated by the Kṛadanta affix "ṇyat". Similarly Kāraṇa is that by which the agent is made to do an act by being made fit for it. Thus, cause also rests on the sentient doer. (Various interpretations of "Asataḥ sataḥ")

I. Of the existent which appears to be non-existent.

II. If the meanig of "or" (Vā) be considered to be implied, it would then mean, "of the sprout, that is non-existing, and the seed, which is existing".

III. Whether the sprout be considered to be existing or non-existing (in the seed). (2).

But why can the insentient not have this power (of bringing about the manifestation or existence)? Reply is as follows :—

(3) **"Whatever is non-existing will ever remain so, because non-existent cannot become existent. And what is existing has nothing to gain by again coming into being."**

The effect may be postulated to be existing or non-existing. But the assertion that it is of the nature of both or of neither or that it is indefinable, is self-contradictory. Therefore, it is to be left out of consideration.

If jar has no existence, then in reality it is of non-existing nature. How can it then come into existence against its nature? For, black does not become yellow, though one may prostrate at its feet hundred times. But if jar is existing then what is expected from wheel, rod and thread? The same question as to whether it is existent or non-existent in its essential nature, can be raised even in regard to the view that it is made manifest or clear.

But you may say then "be silent". I say that also is not proper.

"For, the relation of cause and effect is talked of in this world".

And, therefore, it has to be necessarily proved.(3).

Therefore, he shows the way to explain it as follows:—

(4) "This relation of cause and effect (causality) is nothing but the attainment of objectivity to both, the internal and the external senses, by what was already revolving within, through the power of that some one (Saṁvid)."

The manifested, (a jar for instance,) even before it is an object of internal perception, has its being, lives, throbs (sphuratah) strangely (vicitratvena), both as identical and as different, within the "heart" of the potter, because it is essentially one with his self-consciousness. The relation of cause and effect is nothing more than such a manifestation of what is within (as has been stated above) as makes the manifested an object of both, the internal and external senses. The word "both" implies the idea that the manifested is such as fully serves the purpose. Thus, creation of pleasure etc. consists in making them the objects of internal perception. But in the potter, who is nothing but Prāṇa and Puryaṣṭaka etc., this object cannot be supposed to have its existence, because he also is insentient. Therefore it follows that Saṁvid makes the universe manifest, because of manifoldness of its power. "Of that some" (Tasya kasyāpi) means: because of Him, who has been described above and whose glory is beyond the reach of thought and cannot be questioned.

You cannot raise the question here as to whether its being the object of both the internal and the external senses, is existing or non-existing, (as was raised before in connection with sprout). For, the only truth in this is that just as in the case of the reflection of jar etc., which is being made by potter, in a mirror, the power of making them so manifest belongs to the mirror; so in the case of the objects

which shine in dream, the power of making them manifest belongs to the Saṁvid. There is, however, the rise of false consciousness "potter is making the jar externally manifest" (in regard to the manifestation in dream). But this also is due to the glory of Saṁvid. Thus, potter, wheel, rod and jar etc. being existent, through His glory alone there is the rise of various egoistic consciousnesses also, such as "I did it". "He did it". "It arose in my heart". "It arose in his heart" etc. But as this egoistic consciousness cannot be attributed to the insentient clay etc., creativeness is, therefore, established to belong to one who is essentially of the nature of Saṁvid. But one may say: "Assert that the objects become externally manifest. What is the use of saying "as objects of both the internal and the external senses ?" Reply to it is that this implies the idea of their such manifestation as makes them fit to serve completely their purpose. Therefore, there is no contradiction. (4)

This discussion establishes the essential nature of action (Kriyā), which is the primary subject for discussion here. This is what the author shows in the following lines:—

(5) "Thus, action is one. It involves succession and exists both within and without. [It is the embodiment of the whole process (series of changes) from the beginning, i.e. the stage of its appearance within as one with Saṁvid, to the end i.e. the stage when it is the object of both the internal and external perceptions]. This definitely belongs to one who is capable of assuming both internality and externality. this has been established."

"That this" (Saiṣā) implies that action, which was refuted (in 1,2,9) in respect of its essential nature as well as of its substratum. That is now rationally established. It is of the nature of Ābhāsa, which has continued. existence (through various stages) from the time of that form of it, in which it is one with Saṁvid within, to the time of its form in which it is externally manifest when it becomes the object of sense-perception. (But if anybody were to say that pleasure is never externally manifest,how can then the experience of pleasure be represented to be successive ? (Reply is:) It is so (i.e. characterised by succession), because of its association with the object in the form of the perceptible (i.e. the pleasure, when it is simply desired, is not of the same nature as when it is actually experienced. Therefore, there is succession in the experience of pleasure on account of its association with an object). And it (kriyā) is one, because of its oneness with the one common substratum of both the subjective and the objective aspects of the universe. This one substratum is Saṁvid. And because it is pure and free, it is, therefore, capable of assumin both externality and internality. (5)

But this (Antarviparivartinaḥ ubhayendriyavedyatvam) may be so in the case of a jar etc. (where the agent is sentient e.g. potter) but why in the case of seed and sprout etc., which we know through direct perception to be insentient, we do not acknowledge the seed itself to be the cause of the sprout? To this he replies:—

(6-7) "That which is admitted to be within a thing at one time, is spoken of as its effect when it is out of it at another time. The internality and externality of existence are admitted to be in relation to the subject. Therefore, the subject alone is the cause. And he remains the same in both the kinds of manifestations of the object (internal and external). Therefore, action is said to belong to one."

Creation is to make that, which shines within, externally manifest, while it still preserves its original nature of being internal. Therefore, it is to be externally manifested by that with reference to which it is spoken of as internal and which manifests the internal as external. And as the objects are admitted to shine within the Subject, who is essentially sentient, so they have to be made manifest as external by Him. Thus, He alone can reasonably be represented to be responsible for their external manifestation. Therefore, the Subject Himself is the cause and not the insentient one.

Here the particle "Ca" is used in the sense of reason (hi). Because the Subject is the cause of internal and external manifestations: for, without Him, both the manifestations, which depend on Him, are not possible, therefore, the act of creation, the nature of which has already been well defined, definitely belongs to one subject and not to the insentient. (7).

This very point he further strengthens as follows :—

(8) "Therefore, in the case of sprout also the Highest Lord is admitted to be the cause, because no other, even the seed etc., can reasonably be represented to be the cause."

As the sentient one alone is the creator, so the Naiyāyikas and others have accepted the sentient Highest Lord alone to be the cause even of sprout etc. But if any one were to say that they admit (I) that the Lord is only an instrumental cause (of sprout): for, they admit the causality of atoms also, in which action is generated (by His Will), in consequence of which there take place the separation and conjunction (of atoms) in a fixed order; and (II) that there are other causes also which are different from the God, e.g. seed, land and water etc.;because they are responsible for the commencement of (formation of)

the series of such constituents of the sprout as are related to it by the relation of inherence, but are in reality the parts of these contributary causes. (Our reply is) "Right". Of course they say so, but their statement lacks the support of reason. Because in view of the reason, given above, the insentient cannot be represented to be the cause. Thus, the crux of the whole thing is that the Lord Himself, in union with (Sāhityena) the Ābhāsas of seed, water, and earth, appears as sprout. (8).

But what will be the difficulty if we were not to admit a sentient cause, separate from the seed etc., which we see? To answer this question the author says the following:—

(9) "Therefore, it is that potter, in accordance with the laws, fixed by the Lord, produces jar through regular successive operations on clay etc."

The use of "Tathāhi" strengthens the previous position by implying that the illustration shows that such is the invariable concomitance.

The insentient causes work only when they are prompted by the sentient. For, if clay etc. could bring about their effect simply by being near one another, then what is the use of potter? They produce the effect through a regular succession of various forms such as that of a small Śivaliṅga and of a pilloret (which are given to the clay in the course of making of a jar,) and that is dependent upon potter. If that be the case, my point is established that even in making a śivika, they (clay etc.) need a sentient cause as prompter. From this it follows that insentient causes, without being prompted by a sentient, can never bring about an effect. For, if that had been so, it would equally have been so in the case of clay etc. This reason is without an exception (Ekānta). Therefore, naturally it follows that whatever insentient is seen producing an effect it depends upon the sentient e. g. clay: and such are seed etc. This is "Svabhāva hetu." The production of an effect by an insentient is not without any prompting cause, because it is only occasional. And no other prompting cause than the Lord can reasonably be represented to be responsible for it, because we do not find any (anupalambha) If the sentient be not admitted to the prompting cause, it would involve the flaw of assuming the absence of a prompting cause, in violation of the generally accepted law of invarible concomitance. That is not reasonable, because then there would be no reason why similar absence of the instrumental cause should not be assumed in the case of clay etc. also. Thus the invariable concomitance is proved. Therefore, in the case of a jar the potter himself is the Lord. This is what is stated in the following

lines:—(Thus potter through) the various fixed operations on clay rod, and wheel etc, in accordance with the fixed law, which is only a manifestation of the Lord, for instance, kneeding of clay, use of rod, revolving of wheel, brings about the existence of jar through a regular succession of forms, śivika and pilloret etc.

Here the use of potential mood (Liṅ) in "janayet" conveys the idea of accordance with the fixed law.

And if you do not get angry (I would say) that in reality potter also brings jar into existence in accordance with the law, which is essentially the free will of the Lord of the universe, which has manifested its power, called Niyati, which necessitates the operations of wheel etc. (in the creation of a jar). Otherwise how could the insentient clay etc. follow the will of the potter, and why should not the threads also respect the desire (follow the potter's will) to make a jar? This also has been conveyed by this Sūtra, "Tathā hi" etc.

But if the Lord Himself is the creator in all cases, the potter ceases to be the creator of jar etc. The line of demarcation, therefore, between merit and demerit (Dharmādharma) will disappear. Quite so: if you believe in reason and authority of the scripture, it is exactly as you say. But there is another thing to be noted in this connection, that the Lord, while creating other things, has created this also that individual soul such as that of a potter, erroneously considers itself to be an agent, exactly as a surety considers himself to be the debter. And if it be the Lord's will "Let not false egoism arise in him" then he is not a doer. This also has been indicated by this verse "Tathā hi" etc.

And even the thought, the essential nature of which is the question that one puts to one's own self, "shall I create a jar by working on clay or not", in order to decide one way, is due to the Lord's variety of manifestations which either conceal or reveal the essential nature. Here potential mood conveys the idea of question.

Therefore, one has to realise that in all cases in reality the Lord Himself is the doer; I am that; and, therefore, I am not a limited but the universal creator. (9).

And we see the freedom of the sentient manifesting itself everywhere. For, it makes even the insentients one with itself. (i.e. makes the objects shine). But the insentients have no capacity of making others manifest. This has been asserted before. The same he supports by means of an illustration, known to all the schools:—

(10) "By sheer power of will of the Yogins, even without clay or seed, jars etc., which have permanency and serve their respective purposes, come into being."

If the causes, which are known to be dependent on the prompting of the sentient, (in the production of their effects) such as clay etc.; and those which are known to be independent of it, such as seed etc., were the ultimate causes, how, without them, the things could be created by sheer power of the will of a Yogin. For, in such a case, the conclusion will be either that clay etc. are not causes or that the creation of a Yogin is without any cause.

But if you say that the sprouts etc., which are creations of the will of a Yogin, are different from those which owe their being to clay and seed etc., then also I have to tell you that, there being no difference in cognition, they have to be taken to be non-different. This has already been asserted. And Yogin is of unobstructed free will, and his will is "Let the jar be such as may be capable of serving various purposes which that jar, which is made up of clay, can possibly serve". This is the idea conveyed by "Tattat sthirasvārthakriyākaram". Here the word "Sthira" means that which lasts till its purpose is served. "Svasya" means "its own". "Karam" means that which possesses the form which fits in with its essential nature and its cause. Thus the second half of the verse means "jar etc., which last till their respective purposes are served; which possess such forms as fit in with their respective essential natures and causes and which are capable of serving their respective purposes, come into being."

Some hold that jar etc. cannot come into being without material cause. A Yogin, therefore, they assert, sees the necessary atoms and brings them together, because of his will. To them I have to say; "If your heart approves that the relation of cause and effect, known from authoritative sources as well as negative and positive invariable concomitances, does not get broken in the case of a Yogin, then what is the use of saying that a Yogin brings atoms together. If the causal law is not violated even in the creation of a Yogin, the reasonable position to maintain would be that the causes of jar are Kapālas etc.; and those of the body are the parts ofthe body itself and that cause of each of them (Kapāla etc.) also is the same as that which is well known in the world and which does not brook the least change. Thus, in the case of a jar, clay, wheel and rod etc. and in that of the body, co-habitation of man and woman and laps of so long time as we find necessary for the production of effect, will be necessary.

Thus the creation of jar and body etc. by a Yogin's will-power will become difficult to establish."

But there is no flaw, to be pointed out, in the view that the sentient Lord of great glory, Mahādeva, who is perfectly free to follow or transgress the law of Niyati, Himself assumes the various forms. Thus, there is no contradiction between the views; (I) that the person, who belongs to the domain of Niyati, has freedom (to follow) the well known worldly causal law and (II) that one (Yogin) who likes to transgress the law of Niyati, has freedom to follow the supernatural causal law, which is most known to yogins. This much is said from the worldly point of view. In reality, however, He alone, who is essentially nothing more than the five powers of creation etc. and manifests the universe which has both succession and simultaneity, shines. For, the established view is that the sentient Lord manifests the objective world like reflection in the mirror of His Self. This is what the older teacher has said:—

"I bow to that Ṣiva, who is praise-worthy because of Kalā and who paints the picture of world on 'no-wall' (abhittau) without the multitude of material causes." (10)

But if the things, which are produced even without the well known causes, be similar in all respects to the effects, brought about by their accepted causes, all talk of inference would cease. For, the possibility of inference is explained as follows:—

How can one thing be invariably concomitant with another? (Because every thing is self-confined). With this question in their minds, those, who look upon themselves as the greatest authority (the Bauddhas), hold that the primary cause of invariable concomitance is either the relation of identity or that of cause and effect (between two things). For, a thing cannot be without its peculiar characteristic nature, nor can one thing be of diverse natures, because with the diversity of natures, the unity of the thing cannot stand. It cannot be said that the two different characteristics are abandoned in turn; because in that case also it would follow that the thing is without any characteristic. (For, the characteristic cannot be abandoned).

The same thing, (that has been said in regard to a thing which is represented to be without any essential characteristic or to have various characteristics,) has to be said in regard to an effect which is spoken of as having no cause or having diverse causes. (The latter is the view of the Naiyāyika). In both the cases (tādātmya and tadutpatti) the invariable concomitance depends upon the cause. For, if Ṣiṁṣapā can never be without the essential

nature of a tree, it is because of the cause (seed): similarly, it is because of its own cause (fuel) that the essential nature of fire is to produce smoke. But now if the relation of cause and effect be transgressing the law of Niyati, all the inferences would be impossible. For, because of power of will of a Yogin even Śiṁśapā can be without the essential nature of a tree. As for the smoke we have got to say two things about it, namely, (I) things which are capable of producing smoke such as fire etc., will not, because of the will of a Yogin, produce smoke: (II) and the will of Yogin will produce smoke even without fire. Thus, inference will be out of the question. But we do draw inferences. How is then this to be explained? To this the author replies as follows:—

(11) "When it is known through other means of knowledge that the object, that we perceive, whether it be an effect or an essential nature, is not a creation of a Yogin, then alone it can serve as reason for drawing an inference. But in both the cases the reason has causal law as its source."

It is generally accepted that a product of the will-power of a Yogin is in every way, i .e. in respect of semen and other constituent fluids of the body, similar (to natural product) and not dissimilar, as a scorpion of natural birth is from that which is an outcome of cowdung. Therefore, (i.e. for this very reason, namely, because Yogic production is in every way similar to the natural) an effect, such as smoke in inferring fire, or an essential characteristic, such as the universal nature of Śiṁśapā (a kind of tree) in inferring the treeness, (Vṛkṣatva) serves as reason for inference, only if the object is ascertained to be not a Yogic creation, either through the words of an authoritative person or some other means. In inference, the practice of former birth and the well established popular tradition have to be depended upon. This view is supported by Patañjali, who maintains that the objective facts, grasped by the intellect (of a Yogin), in which truth alone shines, are the bases of both popular tradition and inference. And the followers of other schools of thought, who are staunch rationalists, have postulated that, for grasping a thing in its entirety, there is a kind of direct perception, which is very much like the direct cognition of a Yogin. But we are not primarily concerned with the means of right knowledge which is used in practical life. For, the matter in hand is the real nature of the Lord, and that is ever manifest, even though other objects of knowledge may not shine. This is what we have said many times before.

But what is the use of such a discussion (i.e. discussion of the inference which is based upon causal law) in the case of such inferences as are based upon the very essential nature, as the reason (e. g. Vṛkṣoyam śiṁśapātvāt)? The reply is as follows:—

It is because of the cause (the seed) of the origin of Śiṁśapā, which is invariably concomitant with the essential nature of a tree, that the essential nature, namely, "treeness", is invariably concomitant with Śiṁśapā and the like alone, (and not with man or any other thing). Accordingly there is the following rule about the inference from essential nature as a reason:—

We know taste from colour, which is invariably concomitant with it in a particular configuration (though the two are not causally related) through "Hetudharmānumāna": i.e. through inference of a quality (which is invariably present in the effect of a particular cause) from the cause: just as we infer a particular quality in smoke (e.g. sweet smell) from its being the effect of fuel of a particular kind (e.g. Sandal wood).

The following is another interpretation of Utpattimūlajaḥ:—

It is a fact of experience that scorpions can be produced by different causes, such as parent-scorpions or cowdung (preserved under certain conditions). That there is difference between the two scorpions (produced by two different causes) in respect of powers and fluids (Rasa) is a different matter. (i.e. It is not important, because the difference in the powers of the two scorpions (Vīryabheda) does not mean difference in the essential nature (Svabhāvabheda). Therefore, there is no harm in admitting that the smoke, which is a creation of a Yogin may be even such as has no relation with fire. But how can there be change of essential nature? No logician would believe that Nīla, while existing as such, would become different from itself (in its essential nature), because of the will of a Yogin. To this we reply as follows:—

The essential nature as a reason, (Svabhāvahetu) is of two kinds; (I) that in which the causal relation is latent, and (II) the opposite of it. The illustration of the former is "This mountain has fire, because it has smoke": and that of the latter is "This is transitory because it is a product of action". We have nothing to say about the former; because it is based upon the causal relation. Let us, therefore, consider the latter. If it be the essential nature of the product of action that it owes its being to cause, how can the transitoriness, which in its essential nature is "being", as delimited by "not-being", be the essential nature of the product of action? For, the two "Ābhāsas" (I) dependence upon cause (Kāraṇāyattatva) and (II) "having

'being' limited by 'not-being' as the essential nature" (Abhavanaparicchinna-bhavanasvabhāvatva) are essentially different. (And one thing cannot have two essential natures). But, if you admit the identity of the two 'Ābhāsas' (mentioned above) you fall into the logical error of proving the apparent. But if you say that you are trying to establish the convention e.g. the word "taru" is to be used for the object, because it is a tree, (i.e. if you are trying to establish the usage only) the usage is essentially of the nature of 'learning' or of 'expounding' and, therefore, it is an effect. And you also have admitted the power of "Niyati" in the 'usage' (vyavahāra). Therefore, in all cases of "essential nature as reason" (svabhāvahetu), if there be no diversity of "Ābhāsas", (i.e. if the Ābhāsa, which is put forward as a reason be not different from that which is proved;) nothing more than the usage is established. For, this reason is fallacious, because the major term is non-different from 'reason'. The same may be asserted about the 'particulars' (viśeṣas). The same is the way of the universal: (i.e. the argument, that has been advanced against Svabhāvahetu, applies to them also when they are put forward as reason). Hence, according to the law, that has already been mentioned, the shining of Śiṁśapā and Vṛkṣa, as distinct Ābhāsas on a common substratum, depends upon the power of Niyati and, therefore, is due to the cause (the seed). Thus, the so called Svabhāvahetu is based upon causal law. Therefore, the assertion made in the Kārikā has to be interpreted in general terms : "All Svabhāvahetus are based upon the cause of the origin ".

(Now the author tries to show that, according to the Ābhāsavāda, the defect of identity of the reason with what is to be proved (Sādhyābhedadoṣa) does not arise even if we were to discard the view that the Savbhāvahetu merely establishes the usage, as follows : —)

And we have established it earlier that the object is nothing but 'manifestation' (Ābhāsa). And (because Svabhāvahetu depends upon causal law) therefore, at the time of creation (manifestation) of a particular Śiṁśapā, the other objects, which possess branches, (trees) are not yet created (manifested): therefore, the universal Vṛkṣa as an Ābhāsa, which is the major term, does not exist even in name. This is not an impossible position. And the particular tree, which is identical with Śiṁśapā, is nothing more than Śiṁśapā as such. And that is directly perceived (Siddha) and, therefore, there is no necessity of inferring it. (i. e. it cannot be accepted to be the major term). (Hence in the case of the inference "Vṛkṣoyam Śiṁśapātvāt", there is no fallacy

of Sādhyābheda; because from the particular, which is Siddha the universal, which is Sādhya, is proved).

(He now tries to show that Anityatva and kṛtakatva also are not identical, as follows : —)

The Ābhāsa 'transitoriness' (anityatā) may not be there even when there is the Ābhāsa "it depends upon a cause". Similarly there may be Ābhāsa of momentariness even when there is the not-being of the Ābhāsa of causal efficiency. The irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that all 'svabhāvahetus' depend upon the power of Niyati. (11).

But, according to the theory that things of the world are nothing else than Ābhāsas or manifestations, the fire (on the mountain), which is not shining to the inferer, is nothing. How then that which is not shining can be the cause of smoke and how then can fire, which is supposed to be the cause, be inferred from smoke ? With this objection in mind and with a view to support the Ābhāsavāda the author says as follows : —

(12) "The fresh smoke etc. again (i. e. after the acquisition of invariable concomitance of fire and smoke etc.) is possible only on account of the cause that is not perceived, such as the Ābhāsa of fire etc. because it was manifested as a common Ābhāsa to all the subjects, made identical (by His Will)."

The causal relation between the Ābhāsa of fire and that of smoke was known by means of direct perception and anupalabdhi once in the kitchen. Now, according to the view of the Vijñānavādin, the Ābhāsas are different in each chain of cognition. Therefore, according to them, the causal relation between fire and smoke has been known only in the case of such Ābhāsas (of smoke and fire), as belong to the individual subject. But the causal relation between smoke and fire, which belongs to other individual subjective chains of consciousness, is altogether unknown. Therefore, inference of the Ābhāsa of fire, belonging to other chains of cognitions of other perceivers, from a worm up to the all-knowing, by means of Ābhāsa of smoke, belonging to his chain, will be impossible. This is certain.

But, according to this system, at the time of forming the idea of invariable concomitance, the Ābhāsas of smoke and fire are common to all perceivers, who can possibly have their existence at that place, as according to those who admit the existence of external objective world. For, in relation to them the Lord has made the subjects one. This has already been stated. Therefore, the idea of invariable concomitance of fire in general with smoke also in general is formed without any reference to chains of cognitions either one's own or those belon-

ging to others : consequently when invariable concomitance, namely, the smoke that is on the mountain is from nothing else than the Ābhāsa of fire, is remembered at a subsequent time, the inference is drawn "There is fire on this mountain"(at the sight of smoke).

This means that the particular subject, that infers, at first gets identified with other subjects,(who stand there) in relation to the particular Ābhāsa of smoke (i. e. the one that is perceived at the top of a mountain) : and then he attains identity with other subjects in relation to the Ābhāsa of fire in its universal aspect, which is associated with the idea of imperceptibility and which is distinct from other particular Ābhāsas (of fire). 'Bhūyaḥ' means the perception of smoke that arises after the knowledge of invariable concomitance has been acquired. The word "Ādi" indicates that Ābhāsa of sprout etc. also is implied. "Nūtana" (new) means fresh and not old, like smoke arising from smoke.

This appearance of new smoke or sprout is due to the cause, the Ābhāsa of fire or that of seed, which is not perceptible to the perceiver but is the cause ("Adhipati"); (Bhavet means) it can originate from that alone and nothing else. Here Liṅ is used in the sense of possibility. And that Ābhāsa is the same to all perceivers. For, if it be considered to be different in the case of different perceivers (as according to Buddhists) then it will be impossible to infer anything. This is the implication (of "Tattatpramātreka"). And because that Ābhāsa of fire as a cause (Adhipati) which is common to other subjects is the cause of smoke, therefore, Ābhāsa of smoke, being an effect of that of the fire, is sure indicative sign of the latter, when, of course, there is certainty that the Ābhāsa of smoke is not the creation of a Yogin. Thus from that effect (the smoke) the fire is inferred, because it is not perceived but is the cause (Adhipati) of smoke. (12).

But then there should be inference of fire from the smoke, which is coming out of the jar of a cowherd, wherein it has been long kept confined (even after fire had been extinguished). To this the author replies as follows:—

(13) "The effect, that is invariably concomitant with the cause, is the reason (Liṅga). But the other Ābhāsa of smoke, which is not fresh, is due to another Ābhāsa "the smoke," which is the cause and which is the object of perception to other perceivers but not to the inferer."

That Ābhāsa of smoke, which is not new, (i.e. is not immediately coming out of fire), is from (originates from) Ābhāsa of smoke itself which is its cause, which is imperceptible to the inferer and which is perceived by other perceivers. Therefore, there is no causal relation between this old smoke and fire: (its cause is rather smoke itself, from which it directly originates). Hence the fire, which is not the cause, cannot be inferred from such smoke. This is the underlying idea. The experienced people, of course, see the difference between two kinds of Ābhāsas. But because the inference is used for various practical purposes, based upon inference, therefore, it had to be specially well defined. With this object in view, the idea, that the author had conveyed by means of the word "new" has been made clear by pointing out what is to be excluded. (13).

But if thus you accept the view that Ābhāsa of smoke is due to that of fire, then what about your view that the sentient alone is doer (Kartā). That is, how can the capacity of the insentient to bring about certain effects, as we have seen in the case of sprout, coming out of seed, be refuted in view of the analogy of causal relation between fire and smoke(which has been accepted in the preceding verses)? With this objection in his mind the author says the following:—

(14) "The causal relation, which (according to the Buddhist) is nothing more than 'this being there that is there' (asmin sati idam asti) cannot hold good in the case of the insentient objects, which feel no need or desire (apekṣā)."

We cannot talk of causal relation in reference to one and the same thing. Nor can two things, which have simultaneous existence be represented to be cause and effect, like jar and cloth: nor can those which come into existence in succession one after the other, but not regularly, like Nīla and Pīta. And of things which come into being in a fixed succession, that which comes before cannot be the effect, nor can that which comes afterwards, be the cause. Thus, according to the Bauddhas, the cause is that which invariably comes before and so the effect is that which always comes after. Now if the priority or posteriority be nothing additional to the two things then there would be only two things 'that and that': or rather, there would not be even conjunctive sense, because that also implies relation. Therefore, it would be simply "that that". But if priority means that state which is the cause of another, and similarly posteriority means that state which is to be brought about by another, then it shall have to be assumed that that aspect of the seed, which is res-

ponsible for its causing the sprout,rests on the sprout i.e.involves the existence of sprout within itself. For, if it be not so then it would be simply impeller or not even that: for, that also depends upon another. The same has to be said with regard to that, the existence of which is to be brought about by another.

Thus not only the theories that the causal relation is nothing apart from things, pure and simple etc., are not supported by reason; but also that theory of causal relation,—which is expressed by "this being there", which implies the existence of causal agent through locative case, which conveys the sense of the past tense; and "this is" which implies the existence of the object of the activity of the causal agent,through the personal termination,which means that something is to be effected,--cannot be established with reasons on the basis of the insentients. For, mutual need (apekṣā) is the very life of it; and that is not possible in the case of the insentients (14).

If any one were to ask "how"? the reply is as follows:—

(15) "For, the meaning of the locative case (Apekṣā) cannot be attributed to the insentients, which are self-confined and possess no power of unification, whether they are admitted to be of the nature of 'being' or that of non-being."

The insentients are not capable of unifying the form of one with that of another: for, unification of one form with another is invariably concomitant with sentiency, which is quite opposite of insentiency. And this unification implies 'need' (Anusandhānamapekṣā) and that is a characteristic of sentiency alone. The use of the word 'apekṣā' in relation to the insentient is only a transference of epithet. Therefore, the insentient object is self-centered or self-confined, because it is contented with resting within itself. How can it then move towards another? (i.e. How can the need for another arise in it to bring about the desired effect?)

Therefore, whether you consider the seed to be existing and sprout to be non-existing, or the reverse, or both to be existing or both to be non-existing; or hold one of these to be directly perceptible and,therefore,fit for the use of the language about it, and the other to be quite the opposite: or both to be presentable in language, or both to be unpresentable in language: in all these cases, it (seed) will be simply an object indicated by a word, but will have no attribute (Dharma) even such as the conjunctive connection: because all kinds of relations are of the nature of (conscious) dependence of one upon another and, therefore, rest on the sentient .(15).

(Thus, having shown how,according to the Bauddha theory, the relation of cause and effect is not possible, the author now shows its possibility according to his own system).

Because, the 'need' (apekṣā) is not possible in the insentients;

(16) "Therefore, the mutual relation of the objects, which is indicated by case terminations, is rationally possible, if they be resting on one subject. It can be no other than that which is known as Kriyākārakabhāva i.e. the relation, subsisting between nouns and a verb."

There is no other relation existing between two objects, excepting that which is defined as the relation that subsists between nouns and a verb and which is expressed by the locative or any other case termination. That is possible only if both the objects rest in the free sentient Being. It is not possible in any other way. To explain this point it may be added that the 'idea' of this mutual relation of two things cannot be held to rest on the external (vastu) even though it may be admitted that it is grasped in determinate cognition somehow. For, the essential characteristic of the determinate cognition is that it follows an external object through following the indeterminate cognition. But in the case of determinate cognition of relation that (following of the indeterminate cognition) is absent, because it does not arise from an external object. For, indeterminate cognition follows an external thing: but the thing itself is admitted (by the Bauddhas) to be self-centred. (Hence relation has no external objective being to which the indeterminate cognition of relation may refer.)

Therefore, relations such as "there being seed sprout comes into existence" can be explained only if all be supposed to rest in free sentient Self, but in no other way.(16).

On the assumption that the seed and the sprout etc. are perfectly self-centred, the need (apekṣā), which is characterised by (presupposes) the existence of causal agent and of the object of his action, may not be possible. But it is certainly not impossible, according to the system of the Sāṅkhyas, who believe in oneness of cause and effect. What is then the use of propounding the theory of causal agent, (Kartṛvāda) who is mere manifestation of the principle of sentiency? To this objection the author replies as follows:—

(17) "If cause and effect also are identical with each other in their essential nature, then there would be unity only. For, if difference be admitted, there would not be mutual identity."

If the sprout be the very essential nature (i.e. the very self) of the seed, then there is sprout alone and there is nothing like seed: or the case may be represented to be the reverse. Thus, what can be represented to be the cause as distinct from the effect? But if you say that seed is one thing and the sprout is a different thing, then they are not mutually identical, because unity and diversity are of opposite nature and, therefore, cannot co-exist simultaneously in one and the same object.(17).

But still the seed, appearing in multifarious forms such as sprout etc., is clearly seen by far-seeing persons as of one undivided form like a stream. And this experience is not subsequently contradicted. Accordingly, when the question is put "Where is the seed gone"? They say "It has not gone anywhere; it is existing in the form of sprout;" "it has assumed the form of sprout: the sprout is the seed". Similarly Pradhāna, evolving and assuming the forms, beginning with Mahat and ending with earth, appears in the form of a chain of innumerable creations and destructions. This is the comprehensive conception. But things are imagined or represented to be cause and effect, when only a part of the whole is taken into consideration (so that what precedes is cause and that which comes after (in this chain) is called effect). Thus the conception of causality is based on the analysis of what is essentially a unity. With this objection in his mind the author says the following:—

(18) "Action is nothing more than the assumption of multiplicity (of forms) by what is essentially a unity, provided that it follows the temporal order. Thus, because Pradhāna etc. evolve in such a manner, therefore, it automatically follows that they are causal agents."

The wise sage (Kapila) in his system, depending upon recognition, supported by any one of the three means of right knowledge, direct perception, inference, and verbal authority, justifies the view that the same equilibrium of pleasure,pain and ignorance, assuming inequilibrium in innumerable ways, becomes the universe. Now this assuming of variety of forms by one, that is essentially a unity, because it is known as such through recognition, is action, because it is marked by succession of time. For, action is nothing but a fixed series of forms, (in which a thing appears), which, (forms) being different from one another,do not shine simultaneously. And because such is the essential nature of action, therefore, as Pradhāna, being characterised by a perticular kind of action, cannot be simply represented to be the cause, so it has to be spoken of as "causal agent".

(The explanation of "Tathāpariṇamattayā") Because Pradhāna is always intent on (Āviś) the act of evolving, which is characterised by successively appearing in the forms of Mahat etc. i.e. because Pradhāna, having abandoned certain form and having put separately i. e. having definitely distinguished (Vyavasthāpya) the two forms (I) the one to which evolutive activity is to be directed and (II) the other, from which it is to be withdrawn, inclines towards the third form, which is in the process of making. (18).

But by these arguments Pradhāna has been established to be an agent (Kartṛrūpam) in relation to the act of evolving. Well. There is no harm; because we do not hold Pradhāna to be as dissociated from action as the Puruṣa is. With this objection in his mind the author says:—

(19) "And it is not consistent with reason to hold that evolutive activity belongs to the insentient. For, the insentient is an isolated unity and therefore, is the opposite of the unity in multiplicity (which characterises action). It is, therefore, reasonable to admit it (evolutive activity) to belong to the sentient."

Thus, it is not reasonable to represent Pradhāna, which is an isolated unity, as doer of the act of evolution, which is characterised by the power of freedom to assume multifarious changes which are constantly taking place; because it is insentient. For, the insentient is essentially self-confined; it is the object of knowledge. But (if Pradhāna be admitted to evolve) it is to be represented as a multiplicity, because of the different forms (such as Mahān etc.) which differ like Nila and Pita;it is also to be represented as a unity because of oneness of its essential nature. But the same essential characteristic cannot be represented to be both multiplicity and unity, because it is contradictory to make opposite assertions simultaneously in regard to one and the same thing. Nor can it be said that one essential characteristic is unity and the other is multiplicity. For, that would mean that two essential characteristics belong to one thing. But that is not reasonable, because of the following authority:—

"Thus nothing that is objective, can have both the unity and the multiplicity, (which are essentially opposed to each other) as its essential characteristics."

Thus multiplicity as an essential characteristic is not possible in the case of the insentient,-which is to be spoken of as "this" and is an essentially limited 'Ābhāsa' which is cut off from all, and, therefore, has fallen to the state of being the object of knowledge,—if it is to be admitted as one. But both the characteristics,

unity and difference, are found in that which does not fall to the state of being the object of knowledge, but which, because it is of the nature of light of consciousness, is ultimately real light, which has only one essential characteristic, namely, 'Cit' and which is pure. This is what our experience tells us. For instance, we find that a mirror, which is clear, mixes up with (assumes) thousands of forms such as those of mountain and elephant etc. (which are reflected in it) without its peculiar essential constitution being affected in any way. Now the appearance of mountain etc. in the mirror (reflection) does not conceal the mirror as the appearance of silver conceals the shell, or that of two moons does the real moon For, even when mirror appears in those multifarious forms, its 'being as a mirror'is not concealed, because even then there is the consciousness "this mirror is excellent and clear". Now the mountain, which is external; does not enter into mirror: for, that would involve leaving of the place: nor does it shine on it ; for in that case mirror would be concealed; nor does it shine within: for, there is no possibility of entering into it; because the mirror is solid hard, and capable of resistance; nor does it shine behind: for, it is not seen there, rather it is always seen in the front: nor is it right to say that the rays of the eyes, having turned back from the mirror, because of their being reflected back as they fall on the mirror, perceive the mountain itself; because we see both the reflection and the reflected when we see the mirror which is placed near mountain (i.e. we see two objects which will be impossible if the rays were simply turned back by the mirror and the object of perception had been the real mountain.) Therefore, it has to be admitted to be the glory of the purity that there is mixing up with various Ābhāsas and still there is oneness. And the person, who is on the peak of a mountain, perceives thousands of objects present in a city in one perception. Thus, only Cit can be represented to be Kartā, because it is capable of assuming different forms, without its oneness being affected in any way thereby, and as such it is capable of exercising power of action. (19).

But let us assume then that the consciousness (Vijñāna) which is called Brahman (in the Vedānta philosophy) assumes the various forms which constitute the universe. What is the use of postulating the Lord? To this objection he replies as follows:—

(20) "Even if we admit the unity of consciousness (Cit) to be truly real, there can be no act of creation of different 'Ābhāsas' unless there be determinate consciousness of identity (of the objects with the self) which is the characteristic of the desire to create."

If you say that the "sentient" (Cidrūpa) is really one and that this duality is all due to the trouble of Māyā or Avidyā; then you cannot explain "To whom does this Avidyā belong?" It cannot be the characteristic of the Brahman, because He is simply pure consciousness: and in reality there is no other limited soul to whom this may belong. But if you say "this Avidyā etc. is inexplicable"; we cannot understand as to whom it is so. Moreover, you say that it shines with its characteristic nature and that it is indescribable. What is this? If you say that the idea present in your mind, when you say that it is indefinable, is that it cannot be explained with reasons ; I would say "what is that reason which disregards our experience? (it is no reason at all, if what it tries to establish is not in consonance with our experience). And what strange improbability (of existence) can there be of one that is shining? (i.e. what better reason is required to establish the existence of a thing than this that it is an object of experience?)

But you say that the Brahman is Sat and shines indeterminately as a unity and that duality is due to the act of determination. The question, therefore, arises "to whom does this act of determination belong?" But if you say "to the Brahman" then it follows that the Brahman is associated with Avidyā (and as such ceases to be omniscient). For, there is in reality no other (to whom Avidyā may be represented to belong). But if you say "indeterminate knowledge is true knowledge, while determinate one is false". I would question "why this distinction (why one is right and the other is wrong); because both of them are equally shining?" But if you again say that duality, though shining, is proved to be false, I would rebut by saying that non-duality is proved to be false by the appearance of duality, because consciousness of falsity of a thing is due to rise of a different consciousness. And Bādha also exists because it shines. Duality also shines: how can it, therefore, be called Avidyā ?

But if you say, that, leaving the idea of shining, the conception of our non-duality is based upon the authority of Āgama, then I would say that Āgama also, because it involves the idea of duality, is nothing, and so is the division of perceiver, perceived, and means of perception. Therefore, all this is nothing.

Therefore, even though Cit may be admitted to be really one, yet the act of assuming or entering into different forms, which is the essential characteristic of a doer, is not possible. But all this becomes possible if there be freedom, whose essential feature is Parāmarśa i.e. will in the form of desire to do. In

that will exists all that is to be created as if one with it. This has been asserted in "Living within the Lord". Therefore, the Highest Lord manifests the universe in diverse forms, the ultimate reality of which consists in shining. This universe is essentially identical with Self. It is real in its nature. Its highest reality lies in its being one with the light of consciousness, and its oneness with the light of consciousness never gets broken. This freedom constitutes His Aiśvarya; it consists in His capacity of doing what is extremely difficult.

The genitive case in "Ābhāsa-bhinnayoḥ" is indicative of general relation with action (Kriyā). After this (general statement) the various constructions, in which this word fits, are being separately given as follows:—

(I) The two, namely, the sentient and the insentient, differ from each other in respect of "shining" (Ābhāsa). The insentient, the jar, is an object of action; and the sentient Ābhāsa, the Cit, is doer. Their relation with action, namely, one's being the object and the other's being the subject of action is not possible. For, without consciousness of oneness with the whole of the mass of objects, to be created, in the form of desire to do so, how this action, being one, could be the characteristic of two, which are essentially different.

Here, only the relations of subject and object with action have been stated, for the simple reason that all this discussion proceeded from consideration of the correct nature of the relation of cause and effect. Other relations also, for which other case terminations stand, in reality follow in the wake of the power of action, which rests in one doer (eka kartṛtvānupraveśini). For, otherwise, how can action be called one, in spite of its multiplicity of relations, such as that with instrument etc. Or it may be interpreted as follows:—

(II) Without the determinate grasp of oneness, which is the chief characteristic of the desire to create, of the two, the insentient and the sentient, which are distinct from each other in so far as one is the subject and the other is the object of desire.

(III) Without the determinate cognition of the two distinct Ābhāsas as "I and this", the essential characteristic of which is that it rests on one (subject) and which itself is the characteristic of desire, (no action is possible).

(IV) Or unless the two distinct Ābhāsas be grasped in one determinate cognition, how could there be action, which is characterised by the will to do.

Hence the genitive case in (Ābhāsabhinnayoḥ) refers to action or to desire to do or to determinate consciousness. And the compound (ending in Parāmarśam) is due to the fact that the components are ever interdependent. (20).

Now he concludes the discussion by saying:—

(21) "Thus the Will itself of the Lord, who wills to appear as jar and cloth etc. which constitute the world, which is nothing but an Ābhāsa, is the cause, the agent and the action."

Because neither the insentient nor the Cit, which is without the power of freedom, can reasonably be represented to be either the cause or the doer, therefore, it follows that it is the will of Him who desires to create, which, being externally manifest, is called action. The essential nature of the doer as also that of the cause consists in that and nothing else. Therefore, when the statement "the jar stands" is made, the meaning is that the Lord, desiring to manifest Himself as "jar" and assuming the form of jar, because of His "freedom" and not without such an assumption, stands shining.

Thus the construction of the Śloka is: "Action is the strange will of the Lord, who is free and wills to appear in the form of the universe, constituted by Ābhāsas of jar etc., in the various stages of their becoming, such as creation, existence etc. and thousands of their sub-varieties. Therefore, the glorious Highest Lord alone is the creator of the universe. The chapter ends.(21).

Here ends the fourth chapter, called the presentation of the essential nature of causal relation, in the Kriyādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, written by illustrious teacher, Utpaladeva, with the commentary, called Vimarśinī, written by illustrious teacher, Abhinavagupta. (4)

Here ends the Kriyādhikāra, the Second of the Adhikāras.

ĀGAMĀDHIKĀRA

ĀHNIKA I.

I bow to that all-surpassing ocean of the Āgama, the most important thing in which is the mass of jewels in the form of ideas about the supreme category of the Śaiva system, and after reaching which the group of all the rivers of the other Āgamas attains perfection and realises its end.

We bow to that Śiva, within whom shines the group of the categories, beginning well with the glorious Sadāśiva and ending with the earth.

Thus, in the preceding two Adhikāras, the exact nature of the power of knowledge and that of action have fully been explained. It has been stated that the power of action is capable of bringing about the manifestation of all the objects, contained in the universe. Now it has to be explained "what are all these Padārthas?" In this connection it has to be noted that the objects of the world, characterised by sentiency or insentiency, are simply manifestations. The question, therefore, is what are the categories under which they are subsumed. The direct perception of the limited individual soul does not work everywhere, and similar is the case with the inference; because we cannot have the knowledge of distinguishing characteristics and invariable concomitances of all things. But Āgama in its essence is simply the 'determinate thought' (Vimarśa) of the Highest Lord, who is unlimited pure light (of knowledge). Nothing is, therefore, beyond its view, (or range). Therefore, the teacher, in order to explain the exact nature of the objective world with a view to bringing home to the people that state of the subject, which is transcendental and is attained by making the universe an object of knowledge (i.e. knowing what it really is); begins the third, the Āgama Adhikāra. Here, in eleven verses, beginning with "Thus, having internal and external existence" and ending in "Because of difference in grossness and subtleness", the author separately discusses the group of categories, which is based on the authority of the Śaivāgamas and is also supported by reason. This group of categories, begins with the Śiva and ends with the earth: every one of these is a single Ābhāsa, which is spoken of as 'universal' in other systems. And the entire domain of bodies and worlds etc. which is consequent upon the peculiar combinations of these

Ābhāsas, which give rise to the innumerable definite objects, is due to the fact that all Ābhāsas rest on one common basis. This is the gist of the chapter.

Now with a view to showing the mutual connection of Adhikāras, and concluding the refutation of prima facie view, the author says the following to explain the exact nature of the category, technically called 'Śiva' :—

(1) **"Thus, because action is nothing more than the free consciousness, manifesting itself both internally and externally, in accordance with the temporal order; therefore, action really belongs to the Subject. Hence the powers of knowledge and action are mutually inseparable."**

The sense conveyed by "evam" is:— "Because the relation of cause and effect, which has been represented by other systems to be dependent upon the insentient, is not possible in any way." On the contrary, the sentient, the Cit,-manifesting itself both internally and externally in the form of different Ābhāsas, (such as those of cause and effect) which are essentially nothing but the light of consciousness (Prakāśa), in temporal order,-is called action. This (action) is the characteristic of the subject, who is essentially the power of knowledge. Therefore, the powers of knowledge and action are not separate. For, knowledge is enlivened by Vimarśa and action is nothing else than Vimarśa.

And as no association with action is possible for one that is without the power of knowledge, so that category is called 'Śiva', which is characterised by powers of knowledge and action in union,which, through the power of action, is capable of bearing the reflection of the innumerable creations and destructions of the entire mass of Tattvas, and which, though it appears in meditation and instruction as mere appearance or Ābhāsa, is not of the nature of Ābhāsa. (1)

But if such be the category, called 'Śiva', and the universe be non-different from it, what other categories then can there be? And if all the categories rest on one principle of pure consciousness, how can there be any succession thereof; because there is no temporal or spatial difference among them? (Reply is:) It is exactly as you say.

(2) **"But at first there comes into being the category called Sadāśiva, because of the rise of the internal aspect, i.e. the power**

of knowledge, to prominence : and then there comes into existence Parameśvara Tattva when the external aspect comes into predominance."

Although there is only one Śiva-Tattva, yet its own power of freedom shows in itself multifarious forms, like reflections. And succession of time and place is nothing else than variety of forms, because spatial succession is simply variety of forms : and temporal succession is the variety of forms involved in action. Therefore, because of the rise of internal aspect, i. e. the power of knowledge to prominence there arises that Tattva which is known as Sādākhya, because of its having its being in Sadākhyā. And Sādākhya is so called because here the consciousness of "being" arises for the first time. Or here the word Sādākhya means that this category is the meaning of the word Sadākhyā, which is synonymous with the Sadāśiva. This has to be first dealt with in teaching the order of creation etc. Similarly at the rise of the external aspect, which consists in the power of action, there comes into being the category, which is the meaning of the word 'Parameśvara'. It is called Īśvara Tattva. Therefore, its manifestation after the Sādākhya is reasonable.

From this it follows that here "Tattva" (the essential nature of that) means one that shines undivided in the various groups of things, with distinctive features, and so serves as the cause to justify their being represented as belonging to one class. For example, mountain, tree and city, all are, in their essential characteristic, earth; and so are river, lake and sea, water.

Sadāśiva-Category is the concretisation of "Cit" (consciousness). It consists in the "this-consciousness" of the mass of objects on the part of sentient beings, who are pure consciousness and who are technically called Mantramaheśvara. This mass of objects shines like a reflection on them. It is very dim like that which shines as the object of inner sense only in the new creation, (the first descent from the state of "free-consciousness" or Savimarśa-Caitanya). It is like an extremely dim outline of a picture. It may also be compared to the mass of objects, when it is on the verge of complete annihilation at the time of dissolution of the universe, and, therefore, is extremely dim (vague). But to the sentient beings, who are technically called 'Mantreśvara', the universe, which has attained a stage of clarity, similar to that of the objects of our external cognition, shines almost as a reflection. The category, technically called Īśvara, is nothing but the shining of it in the aforesaid manner. But Sadāśive, as a god, and also Īśvara, as a god, who are the objects of

contemplation and worship, are admitted to be different from the categories, called by the same names. They are like Brahmā and Viṣṇu. The former have not to be confused with the latter, because of similarity in names, as some, who questioned, "why have not Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra been counted amongst the categories?" have done. (2).

Now the author shows that there are other names also of these two categories:—

(3) "Unmeṣa (opening up), which consists in the external manifestation, is Īśvara Tattva, while Nimeṣa (closing up), which consists in the internal manifestation, is Sadāśiva."

"Because of the opening up of which there is the rise of the universe" in this quotation, by the word "opening" (unmeṣa) Īśvara Tattva is meant, because what is called clearness (of manifestation) of the universe is its externality, and the same is opening. But closing up (nimeṣana) consists in making it obscure i.e. in the predominance of "I-consciousness". Thus Nimeṣa is Sadāśiva-category, because of which there is the annihilation of the universe. Therefore, it is pure Spanda i.e. the Sadā śiva-category is nothing but the pure activity of the Lord. It is nothing but the assumption of another obscure form by the Lord, who is motionless; because He manifests Himself in a form, marked by slight motion.

In reality all these so called categories are the powers of the Highest Lord. Certain power, -because of its including many other powers and, therefore, of its being nearer (more closely connected with) the Lord, as is genus jar with the individual jar, -is to be meditated upon. Some other power is dependent upon another and is self-centred, and, therefore, its connection with the Lord is not so close, as for instance, that of jar with its "being" (Sattā).

Thus the powers of opening up and closing up are called Sadāśiva and Īśvara, and deities, which preside over them, are also called by the same names.

Now he speaks of the means (karaṇa) of the two presiding deities, namely Vidyā Tattva.

(The following is the second half of the verse No. 3.)

"The state of resting of both the I-consciousness and the this-consciousness on one substratum is called Sadvidyā."

Resting of the light of consciousness on itself alone, i.e. consciousness, as activity (Vimarśa) characterised by resting on self-luminousness, perfectly independent of all others, is represented as "Aham." And the consciousness, which is dependent upon another, is represented as "Idam". The latter in reality rests on that which is simply self-luminous and is perfectly independent of others. Of these the first consciousness "Aham" is Śiva Tattva and the second is Vidyeśa. In the state, which comes in between the above two (Śiva and Vidyā) there arises the consciousness "I—this". At this state the "I" and the "this" are at the same level, like the pans of an evenly held beam of a balance. Such is the form of consciousness at the level of the categories, called Sadāśiva and Īśvara. The distinction lies in the fact that in the former case "thisness" is obscure, while it is clear in the latter.

These two forms of consciousness, 'I' and 'this', in the case of the limited subject rest separately on the subject and the object respectively. Therefore, Sadvidyā (or pure knowledge) is characterised by the elimination of separateness of the bases and the union of these i.e. the consciousness of the subjective aspect as "I" and that of the objective as "this", in one resting place (the Cit). This is different from Aśuddha Vidyā, associated with the limited subject.

Now in Śuddhavidyā, (there are two states). When in the pure Cit, where the I-consciousness rests, the objective aspect is made manifest (by Vidyā), (i.e. grasped as emerging from the "I") then, because of the obscurity of the "this", it is called the state of Sadāśiva, which can be represented as "I-this". But when in the clear consciousness of the "this" aspect the I-consciousness merges, the former being substratum, it is called the state of Īśvara and the consciousness can be expressed as "this-I". This is the distinction (between the two). (3).

But why is this called Śuddha Vidyā? In reply to this the author says as follows:—

(4) **"(This is called Śuddha Vidyā) because in it the things, which have descended to the level of objectivity to knowledge and, therefore, are conceived as "this", are essentially of the nature of I-consciousness; and because they are conceived as they really are."**

"Avalokana" means "knowing", "conceiving". These words are synonymous with Vidyā. The purity, i.e. correctness,

of knowledge consists in its following the true nature of the thing. The purity of Vidyā lies in the fact that it remains uncontradicted. 'Bodha',—the light of consciousness, the essence of which is the Self-consciousness, free from dependence on any other,—is the essence of all the objects, which are correctly conceived as "this"; because they have assumed the state of being the objects of knowledge. The consciousness "I-this" is pure knowledge, because it rests on ultimately true nature of the objects. (4).

The two Tattvas are different from the deities, presiding over them, (though they have the same names). This is what the author is trying to establish in a round about way through (reference to) Āgamic practice, as follows:—

(5) "In the two categories (Sadāśiva and Īśvara) the objects are not only in the state of imperfection (aparatvam), because they shine as not-self: but they are also in the state of perfection (paratā) because they are covered (ācchādāt) by I-consciousness, (i.e. because they shine as identical with the self). For, the Sadvidyā (which is common to the categories of the Sadāśiva and the Īśvara) is the "perfect—imperfect state" (Parāparadaśā)."

'Paratā' here means perfection i.e. independence of others, the 'I-consciousness'. 'Aparatva' similarly means imperfection i.e. dependence on others, "this-consciousness". In the two categories (Sadāśiva and Īśvara) the objects, which are obscure in one case and clear in the other, are in "perfect-imperfect state", because they touch both the "I" and the "this". The State, which is related to the object of knowledge, (i.e. the state of the object) is the category. It is essentially the object of knowledge of the pure subjects, Mantreśvara etc., who manifest it. And Śuddha Vidyā is the state of their consciousness. The gods Sadāśiva and Īśvara are the deities presiding over these subjects. This is the summary-view.(5).

According to some, Śuddha Vidyā is that in which consciousness of the subjective aspect "I", which is represented to grasp all as identical with itself, is predominant. While others hold that it is the consciousness of the objective aspect, which is to be covered (comprehended as identical with "I") that is predominant in Śuddha Vidyā: otherwise how will the objective aspect shine at all, as there is no Māyā? But if it be supposed to be there its growth will follow. And because it manifests objective aspect such as is not capable of growth, therefore, it is pure. And because it shines, therefore, it is called 'Vidyā'. For this

very reason i.e. because of its being almost undeveloped Māyā, it is called Mahāmāyā by such preceptors as Raurava. This is what the author says in the following verse:—

(6) "Others maintain that Vidyā is nothing but the distinct consciousness of the objects in the subject, who is still essentially of the nature of pure consciousness; the distinct consciousness which is similar to that which is brought about by the power of Māyā. Such a consciousness is found in the subjects, which are called Vidyeśvaras."

That power of freedom, which is characterised by manifestation of difference (i.e. as not identical with Cit) of the objects, which are really one with Cit, even at the time when pure Cit itself is both perceiver and doer i.e. before even the rise of limited perceiver Śūnya etc., is called Śuddha Vidyā. It is like the power of Māyā, because of its manifesting difference in respect of the objective aspect (and not the subjective aspect also). It is not Māyā itself, because difference is not manifested in respect of the subjective aspect i.e. pure Cit. In this way glorious Vidyeśvaras, Ananta etc. have their being. Though they are one with pure Cit, yet they perceive the objective world as different from themselves, just like Īśvara of those who believe in duality.

Thus, Śuddha Vidyā is that power of Vidyeśvaras, which consists in manifesting the objective aspect as different from the Cit, to the subjective, which is pure Cit and ultimate reality.(6).

Others say as follows:—

Sadāśiva and Īśvara Tattvas are those manifestations of Parama Śiva, in which the difference (between the subject and the object) has not yet grown or much developed. Thus, when the difference is not clear, the Lord's power of will operates; but when it is clear it is the power of knowledge that works.

When difference is sufficiently developed, then, though there is mistake in respect of the objective aspect, yet there is none in regard to the subjective. Therefore, the subject being of the nature of pure consciousness, the power of action operates, as in the case of Vidyeśvaras.

But when there is the growth of misapprehension in respect of both the subjective and the objective aspects, Māyā Śakti works. This is so in the case of the limited subjects i.e. those who are still in the bondage of Māyā.

But in the case of the subjects who are free from the bondage, such as Yogins and Jñānins, it is Vidyā Śakti which is responsible

for their consciousness of the ultimate nature of the objects, when, though the misapprehension of the true nature of both, the subjective and the objective aspects, has disappeared, yet the residual trace thereof is still there. This is what he shows in the following verse:—

(7) "In the state of Paśu, it is Vidyā Śakti, which reveals the real nature of the Lord."

The state of limited subject is that, which is characterised by the erroneous knowledge, is fit for bondage and is devoid of freedom, and in which there is at least the residual trace of the idea of difference among the perception and the subject and the object thereof (though there may be no idea of it). The power of the Lord, which makes the essential nature of the Highest subject (Aiśvarya) manifest in this state,-as has been established by means of reasons, stated before, because of which only some people, who accept those reasons as sound and, therefore, whose hearts are satisfied, become successful in their undertaking,—is Vidyāśakti. This view, which is found in Ṣaḍardhaśāstra etc. appeals to the heart of the teacher also because here he has not used the word "Anye", and also because of his dealing with Māyā immediately after this, as it comes in due order.

Māyā is defined as follows:—

(This is the last part of the verse No. 7)

"And that power, which is responsible for the obscuration, is called Māyā."

But the power of obscuration, the Māyā, causes the wrong notion of being a subject to develop fully in Śūnya etc., which are insentient : it also causes the wrong notion of the objects, which are in reality non-different from Cit, as different from it (Cit). Thus, it obscures the essential nature of subject and object in every way; because its nature is to delude. Here by the word "obscuration" (tirodhāna) one has not to understand Vilaya i.e. scoffing at both, the preceptor and the Mantra, on the part of the initiated, which is counted among five Kṛtyas in Āgamas, but simply obscuration. (7)

In the following Śloka he clearly explains Tirodhāna which is essentially obscuration:—

(8) "The power of Māyā shows itself in manifesting undiluted diversity and in bringing about the identification of the not-self such as Śūnya, Buddhi and Prāṇa, with the self."

In the state of deep sleep, fainting and meditation on non-existence "No", the vacuum (Ṣūnya), which is very much like ether (Ākāśa) and which is in reality objective in its nature and, therefore, is not-self, is conceived as the very self "I". Similarly in exhaling and inhaling, Prāṇa, which is nothing but air, is conceived as self: e.g. "I am breathing". In the case of rise of anger or desire for food in the beings moving or motionless, it is Prāṇa, invigorated by fire, (that is thought to be the self). Buddhi also, which is simply like a reservoir of clear water (tank), whereon the objects are reflected, is mistaken to be self: e.g. "I know within" "I am unhappy" etc., at the time of introspection. And even body, which is mostly earthy, appears as self within one who realises one's physical state as " I am lean".

In reality, all these Ṣūnya etc. are essentially non-different from Cit. They have been manifested as different from Cit by Māyā. Further, Ṣūnya etc., in that very state (of their assumed difference from Cit), while their state of insentiency (jaḍabhāva) still persists, have been made to be erroneously assumed as identical with Saṁvid (Aham) (the principle of self-consciousness). Thus, the power of Māyā of the Lord is characterised by freedom to accomplish the most difficult things. This is the idea conveyed by the word "Vijṛmbhate". By the use of the word "Vā" the author indicates the inclusion of son, wealth and wife etc., which are really objective in their nature, amongst the objects which are erroneously assumed to be identical with self, though they are not enumerated or mentioned here (8).

But, if Ṣūnya etc., though they be different from the self, because they are devoid of sentiency, yet, because they are assumed to be sentient, and therefore, be identical with Cit, they would naturally have the attributes of the pure divine omniscience and omnipotence etc. To this objection he replies as follows:—

(9) "The limited subject, Ṣūnya etc., who knows the limited objects, which are separate from it, is really an object and as such is limited by the five limiting conditions of time etc ."

There will be the possibility of possession of divine attributes by Ṣūnya etc., if they were to abandon their limited nature even when they are assumed to be identical with self, the "I-consciousness". For, if they were to abandon their limited nature, their so called object of knowledge, such as Nīla etc. would cease to shine as separate from them. For, Ṣūnya etc., which are represented to be limited subjects, are limited only in so far as they cognise the limited external objects as separate

from themselves. And at the time when they cognise limited objects, they themselves fall to the level of object. The reason is that Meyatva (objectivity) consists in being limited. And it is because of the limitedness of the subject that there is the possibility of its being separate from other similar limited objects. But such is not the case with Cit, because it is unlimited.

That which constitutes limiting condition of Śūnya etc., identified with the self, is the group of five, time etc. That is as follows:—

Kāla (time) is that which is at first responsible for the idea of successive stages in the limited subject, where it manifests itself, and then arouses a corresponding idea in relation to the object also, e.g. "I, who was thin, am now fat and shall be fatter still." Thus, the subjective limitation of time (Kāla) is responsible for the idea of successiveness of body, which is assumed to be identical with self: and through that it arouses a similar idea of succession, such as that of past time, in relation to the object of knowledge of the limited subject.

Vidyā is that limiting condition of the insentient subject, such as Śūnya, etc. which is responsible for the rise of limited cognitive power. It distinguishes between Nīla and pleasure etc. in the mass of objects which are reflected on the mirror of Buddhi.

Kalā is that which is responsible for the rise of limited power of action. It gives rise to the idea of "Kārya" (what ought to be done). "I know something" and "I do something" are the forms of judgement, aroused by Vidyā and Kalā respectively.

Rāga is that subjective limiting condition which is responsible for the choice of something to the exclusion of other things, though every one of them is equally something that ought to be done. It is also responsible for superimposition of qualities (beauty etc.) on the limited subject, body etc., and on the objects. This Rāga is not simply want of indifference (avairāgya), a quality, which, according to the Sāṅkhyas, is associated with Buddhi. For, that is something gross, that may not be in an old man in relation to a handsome young lady. But Rāga is certainly there. Attachment (Rāga) is also accepted in this system, as one of the eight attributes of Buddhi.(But that is gross).

(But the question is) "Why is the attachment to a certain fixed object only?" (The reply is) the object of attachment is

fixed by Niyati, i.e. Niyati is that limiting condition which is responsible for the attachment to a certain fixed object.

Thus, the subject, being limited by or intertwined with Kāla, Vidyā, Kalā, Rāga and Niyati and being deprived of divine glory by Māyā, shines as limited, with a part of the whole glory that is restored, as "that which knows something now, does this, and is attached to this, am I". These limiting conditions (or limited powers) do not necessarily always function in relation to the same object. Occasionally they function in relation to different objects. For instance, a person, who is attached to one object of action, is made by Niyati to do something else.

These Kāla etc. shine only as associated with the subject and, therefore, they are like his powers. They differ in the case of each subject. But sometimes, because of His will, for instance, when acting of an excellent actor or fight of two wrestlers is being witnessed, they lose their difference, (which they have in relation to each individual spectator.) For, they have no independent life: they are absolutely dependent upon the Lord's will. This is what has been said many times and shall also be repeated in future. (9).

It has been stated that the limited subject has for his object of perception what is separate from himself and can be spoken of as "this". This 'Prameya' is now being explained:—

(10) "Meya (the object) is of twenty—three kinds, consisting of objects and means. There is one category, called Pradhāna, which is nothing but the state of identity of all Meyas. It is the Primary cause of all."

The objects and means which are of twentythree kinds; and their primary cause, which is nothing but the state of identity of objects and means and which is called "Pradhāna"; all these are the objects. This is the connection.

To Yogin and Mantramaheśvara etc., because of their capacity to have all the Bhūtas, Tanmātras and Pradhāna under their control, all these constitute the objects of direct knowledge; and to the transmigratory souls also they are known through inference and verbal authority (Āgama). Therefore, they are called Prameyas.

Time etc., though they are of the nature of Prameya, yet, because they are primarily related to and constitute the powers of the limited subject, therefore, they are not counted here, when

only those Prameyas, which are separate from the subject who is a creation of Māyā, are being counted. In reality the so called Pramātā himself, of which we are talking here, is Prameya. Here his nature as Prameya is kept concealed and he is represented as Pramātā. (10)

But of these twenty-three, which are the objects and which are the means? To this he replies:—

(11) "The internal and external means are of thirteen kinds: and the objects are of ten kinds, because of their division into gross and subtle."

The subject uses the means first of all. Therefore, here the thirteen means are stated first. To know determinately when it confronts an object, is the general function of the Buddhi. The egoistic feeling (grāhakābhimāna) in relation to an object is the Ahaṅkāra. Manas is the cause of desire (Saṅkalpa) etc. Thus the internal sense is of three kinds. The five perceptive senses, the senses of hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell, are useful in (acquiring) the determinate knowledge of sound etc. The five organs of action are useful in acting. Action is of two types (I) giving up and (II) reception. In the action that is related to external object, hand, anus and foot are the means. That means of action, which is instrumental in performing the two kinds of action in relation to vital air, that is within, is the organ of speech. The organ of generation is that which is useful in the act of resting, consequent upon the cessation of agitation of vital air.

The organs of action (Karmendriyas) pervade the whole body and are particular forms of Ahaṅkāra. Hence the person, whose hands have been cut off and who receives by means of arms, really receives by means of hand. The same may be said about others also. But simply because a particular Indriya can perfectly perform its function in a particular part of body, therefore, the hand, consisting of five fingures, is spoken of as its abode. Thus, there are thirteen means. Though they are the effects, yet, instrumentality being their peculiarity they are spoken of as the means.

Gross objects are earth, water, air, fire and ether. The subtle forms of these are smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound. On this point systems differ. Some hold that ether etc. have only one quality each. But others maintain that each preceding (in the order, given above) has one quality more than the succeeding. This point is not very important. Hence it has not been

discussed here. The gross, which presents the state of differentiation, is the means of inferring the undifferentiated state. Hence the gross categories are stated here first. According to this system, the 'Ābhāsas' such as earth etc. mixing up with one another, assume the form of a definite object, such as jar etc. They rest in (Viśrāmyanti) the subject, when they are approached by organs of action, perceived by perceptive senses, desired by 'Manas', taken as "this" by Ahaṅkāra, ascertained by Buddhi, differentiated by Vidyā and affected by Kāla etc. This is the implication. This has been discussed by me in detail in the Tantrāloka and the Tantrasāra etc., which primarily deal with matters of this kind. Hence, here this has not been elaborated, because elaboration is not necessary. The Chapter ends. (11).

Here ends the first Chapter, called the presentation of the categories, in Āgamādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, written by illustrious teacher, Utpaladeva, with the commentary, called Vimarśinī, written by illustrious teacher, Abhinavagupta. (1).

ĀHNIKA II.

We bow to that Ṣiva, who, in the circle of his heart (mind), determinately manifests variety of limited subjects, though still He retains His essential nature intact.

Thus, in the preceding chapter Tattvas have been discussed. And although the essential nature of the subject has been dealt with in so far as the subject is included in the categories, yet the essential nature of the subject is the main topic in this book, it has, therefore, to be better defined and its exact nature is to be well settled. Therefore, the following Āhnika consisting of 20 Ṣlokas, beginning with "There the pure subject" and ending in "Vyāna" etc. is begun. That is as follows : —

In this system the recognition of the real nature of the subject is taught. For, the limited subject,—knowing what to shun and what to seek after as also what is his own real nature; and entering into, realising oneness with, his True Self, which is of the nature of Ṣiva and is the highest object of achievement,—gets liberation right in his life time.

The first verse states the essential nature of the trinity, Brahmā etc. Then in two verses the essential nature of the subjects, which are to be abandoned as well as of those which are to be sought after, are stated. Then in seven verses the essential nature of impurities (Mala) which is useful in that, (i. e. in pointing out the essential nature of each type of subject) and the difference of subjects from one another, which is due to them, are stated. In two verses the essential nature of the state of union with the Ultimate is stated. In five verses the states of deep sleep etc., which belong to the subject, are discussed. In the last three verses these states are divided so as to point out, which is to be abandoned and which is to be acquired. This is the summary of the chapter. Now the meaning of each verse is going to be discussed separately.

(1) "Such being the real nature of Tattva, Rudra is the presiding deity in that state, which is characterised by the fact that the subject stands alone in it. And Brahmā and Viṣṇu are the presiding deities in the creation and the unbroken continuity respectively of different Prameyas."

The idea, implied by the word "Tatra", is:—"Such being the real nature of Tattva, as is well established by verbal authority (Āgama) and is supported by reason". In that state, which is

known as that of dissolution, wherein the subject only, limited by five limiting attributes of time etc., exists in all his purity, with the whole mass of Prameyas withdrawn, the presiding deity is Rudra, who is meditated upon, because of his effecting or bringing about that condition, as also because of making those devotees of his incline towards himself, who exclusively meditate on that state. Rudra is nothing but Īśvara. He, because of the predominance of that essential characteristic of the subject, which is nothing more than the middle light (Suṣumṇā), which is free from merit and demerit, sun and moon, and day and night etc., which are nothing more than 'Prāṇa' and 'apāna' (iḍā and piṅgalā), (i. e. because of his being at the objectless level of the subjective experience) has his third eye open even in the condition of Māyā.

Brahmā is the presiding deity in the creation of different Prameyas and so Viṣṇu is in unbroken continuity of the created. Therefore, it is that, because of the predominance of the continuous chain of Prameyas, which shines as "this is blue" etc; and because of absence of pure subjectivity "I"; there is no opening of the third eye in their cases. Here "Daivata" means the same thing as Devatā. 'Prasara' is used in the sense of creation and chain. (1).

The state of pure subject (Pramātṛ) has been referred to above. Now the various types of the subject, according to Āgama and also their various names are given below:—

(2) "The subject, who is limited by time etc., because he is blinded by Māyā and, therefore, thinks that Karma binds him, is transmigratory. But when he is made to recognise his powers by true knowledge, then, being pure Cit, he is spoken of as liberated."

(3) "The subject is called Pati, (Lord) when he looks upon the objects as non-different from himself. But he is called limited subject (Paśu), when they are manifested as separate from him by Māyā and he is defiled by troubles (Kleśa) and Karmans etc."

'This', the subject, called śūnya-pramātā etc.—who is blinded, rendered ignorant, by Māyā and, therefore, considers himself to be tied by Karmans, and who is limited by time etc.—transmigrates. He is, therefore, called 'transmigratory being'. Body also, continuing to have some similarity in different states of youth etc., transmigrates as if it were. So far as Buddhi etc. are concerned, they transmigrate to other births also. But he,—who is made to recognise his power by Vidyā, which is a power that reveals the essential nature of the self; and, there-

fore, who considers body and also the rest of the world as non-different from Saṁvid and consequently who is one with Cit, unmixed with anything differnt from it,—is called liberated, because he is free from the bondage of rebirth, even when his body still exists. But when the body is destroyed, he is pure Śiva; and, therefore, then there can be no talk of liberation, because there is absence of both bondage and liberation. But in consideration of the previous stage or in comparison with other subjects he is, for practical purposes, spoken of as liberated, Śiva.

And he, who is liberated, apprehends the objects as constituents of himself, and therefore, because he imparts to them the reality, which is his own chief characteristic, and so maintains them, he is called protector (Pati) in scriptural books. But when he perceives them as separate from himself, as they have been separated by the power of māyā, then, being bound by those very bondages, the objects, he is called Paśu. And it is because of the mass of the external objects that there are troubles in the shape of ignorance, egoity, attachment, aversion and devotion etc., and also Karmas meritorious or others. By means of the word 'ādi' the author has implied the inclusion of residual trace, left by actions, good or bad, which is nothing more than 'Āśaya' as also the fruition thereof, the Vipāka. Thus impurity is of innumerable kinds. He is called Paśu because of his being bound down by them. (3).

That which constitutes the essential aspect of the limited subject, is called Mala or impurity. It is represented to be of three kinds in Āgamas, as follows:—

(4-5) "The impurity, called Āṇava, is due to loss to Consciousness (Bodha) of its essential nature. It is of two kinds, it consists (i) in the loss (to consciousness, Cit) of its freedom (Svātantryahāni) or(ii) in the loss of power of knowledge. The impurity, called "Māyīya" is nothing but the consciousness of the object as distinct from the subject . Birth and subjection to the effects of actions are due to it. And the impurity "Kārma", belongs to the subject which is insentient, (body etc.). All the three are due to Māyā."

According to this system, the essential characteristics of 'Cit Tattva' are omniscience and omnipotence. The impurity, called Āṇava, consists in the loss of these, so that the Self becomes limited. Here limitedness consists in the obscuration of the real nature. Thus, even when omniscience is there but simply there is obscuration of omnipotence, which consists in perfect freedom and forms another characteristic feature

(of real self) or *vice versa*, there is the same impurity, called Āṇavamala, which consists in the obscuration of real essential nature.

'Atraiva' means when there is the impurity, called Āṇavamala i. e. when the self has been limited in two ways. The consciousness of what is separate, constitutes Māyīyamala. It is merely a name. For, really all the three impurities, being due to Māyā, are Māyīya.

There arises Kārmamala in the form of merit or demerit, when there is the consciousness of the external world as separate from self, in the doer, body etc., which are really insentient. To this are due transmigration and varied experiences. This lasts for limited time only. This means that definite caste, life and varied experiences are fruits of Karma. (4-5).

Now in order to show clearly the essential nature of these impurities by fully explaining their respective spheres, the author speaks of the sphere of "Loss of freedom to 'consciousness' (Bodha)".

(6) "Those, who are pure consciousness, but at the same time are without the power of perfect freedom of action, are made separate from Himself by the Highest Lord, because of the absence of freedom of action in them."

Those, who are essentially of the nature of pure consciousness, but are without the supreme freedom,—which consists in pure self-consciousness, "I", which is essentially of the nature of "Bliss", which consists in resting on the Self,-have been made so by the Highest Lord, i. e. separate from Himself. The reason for this is that there is the absence of Kartṛtā, which is characterised by perfect freedom. The underlying idea is to point out the difference from the Lord, who is pure knowledge, coupled with (Aviyukta) perfect freedom. (6).

Well, there may be the possibility of their separation from the Highest Lord, because of the reason, stated above. But how can they (who, though essentially of the nature of pure consciousness, are yet devoid of power of freedom) be separate from one another. For, in the case of him who is essentially pure consciousness there is no possibility of temporal and spatial limitations, because of his omnipresence and eternality. And in the absence of mutual difference,how can the use of plural in "Nirmitāḥ" in the preceding śloka be justifiable? He removes this objection in the followmg śloka : —

(7) "Although there is no difference in respect of such characteristics as omniscience etc., yet they are different from one another,

because of the will of the Lord to shine differently. Such subjects are called Vijñāna-kevalas."

This has been stated many a time before that, according to this system, the Lord Himself, who is of unchecked power, desiring to become "that", becomes "that". In reality nothing different from Him exists. Therefore, because of the Lord's will "I, though essentially of the nature of consciousness, eternal and omnipresent, may yet shine separately" there is the mutual difference of the subjects (Pramātṛs), who are beyond the limited subjects, beginning with body and ending with Śūnya, though there is non-difference in respect of omniscience, eternality and omnipresence. They are called "Vijñānakevalāḥ" in the Śāstras. Therefore, in "Vijñānakevala has only one impurity" the meaning of "Vijñānakevala" is those who have Vijñāna i. e. consciousness, without freedom, as essential characteristic.(7).

Thus, having stated that the statement "Svātantryahānirbodhasya" applies to Vijñānākala, he now makes clear the other part of the previous Śloka "Svātantryasyāpyabodhatā" by showing its sphere :—

(8) "The subjects, Śūnya etc. who are essentially insentient, are Pralayākalas. They have the impurity of Karma also. But the impurity of Māyā they may or may not have."

Pralayākalas are those subjects, whose "I-consciousness" shines in relation to (identified with) Śūnya,—which is devoid of all power of knowledge, because of its insentiency, —or vital air or Buddhi. They are called Pralayākalas, because they have been made Akala (i. e. without Kalā Tattva) by Pralaya (i. e. one of the acts of the Universal Mind). They are without bodies and senses, which are implied by Kalā Tattva. They are subjects, but are devoid of knowledge. They remain without bodies and senses so long as the time of dissolution of the world lasts, but after that they get connected with bodies and senses. Therefore, they are associated not only with Āṇava Mala but Kārma also, in the form of residual traces, left by the pious or impious deeds.

But if so, then they should have consciousness of separate object also. Quite so, they do have that consciousness in the state of deep sleep, when there is the object of knowledge. (In the deep-sleep-experience "I had pleasant sleep", the pleasure is the object of knowledge.) But there is none in that state in which there is no object of knowledge (in the Apavedya suṣupta). Hence in the case of the Pralayākalas the impurity of Māyā is

not necessarily always there; because this impurity depends upon the consciousness of separate external object. That is as follows:—

Some, resting on (identified with) Ṣūnya etc. and made inactive (i. e. insentient as it were) by extremely deep sleep, are said to be in Apavedya suṣupta i. e. in which there is no consciousness of object. Others, identifying themselves with Buddhi etc., have consciousness of separate objects in the form of pleasure and pain only, which lack distinctive features. These subjects are merged in Savedyasuṣupta, i. e. deep sleep which has objective reference. The characteristic of being without gross body and senses is common to all Pralayākalas. (8).

Thus, the part "Svātantryasyāpyabodhatā" has been made clear. And by the way the sphere of Kārmamala also has been shown. But Māyāmala is said to be present only alternatively (Pākṣika). Now the author points out that there is the sphere of Māyīya mala where both the other Malas, Āṇava and Kārma are absent :—

(9) "The subjects, who identify themselves with pure consciousness and are omniscient and omnipotent in consequence of destruction of the impurity of Karma, possess the impurity of Māyā because they are conscious of separate objects. They are called Vidyeśvaras."

There are some subjects, who are one with pure consciousness and who have self-consciousness (which refers to nothing else than Cit). They are, therefore, subjects (Kartāraḥ) (i. e. possess unchecked powers of knowledge and action) and as such are omniscient and omnipotent. But body, senses and Bhuvana etc. shine as separate from them, as the objects of knowledge and action, as does cloth from a weaver. Therefore, these subjects, called Vidyeśvaras, are associated with Māyīya impurity. (9)

Now he is going to show the cases in which all the three impurities are present, as follows :—

(10) "Although all the gods and transmigratory souls have all the three impurities, yet the chief among them is kārma, and that is the cause of repeated re-birth."

According to this system, Vidyeśvara and Vijñānākala, being beyond the sphere of Māyā, do not have transmigratory existence. And Pralayākalas also do not transmigrate so long as the time of dissolution of the universe lasts. But those, who have their being in the Tattva, called Māyā, and are counted in the Ṣāstra to be of fourteen kinds, are all transmigratory and have all the three impurities. But which is that impurity which

is responsible for their transmigration ? Reply is : "though all the three impurities are there, yet it is Kārmamala which is responsible for repeated re-birth". The following quotation supports this view :—

"The bodies, the objects and the senses are all due to Karma". And transmigration is nothing else than uninterrupted continuity of connection with the chain of present and future bodies, senses and objects.

The Āṇava and Māyiya impurities are not directly responsible for transmigration, because without Karma they are not capable of bringing into existence the various kinds of limited objects such as body etc. as in the case of Vijñānākala etc. Therefore, in different Śāstras, Kārma mala alone is held to be primarily responsible for transmigration. Hence, stepping on the ladder to freedom from rebirth begins only at the destruction of Kārma mala. Therefore, it is that in scriptural texts of Sāṅkhya, Purāṇa and Bhārata, giving up of the wrong notion (Abhimāna) of bondage of karma is specially preached.

Thus, because of each of the three Malas in isolation from the rest, three groups, consisting of two Malas each, and one group consisting of all the three Malas, there arise seven kinds of subjects. (Three Malas separately are responsible for three, Śiva, Mantramaheśvara and Mantreśvara). These very Malas, in groups of two each, are responsible for three more; i. e. Vidyeśa, Vijñānākala and Pralayākala. And all the three together give rise to the seventh (Sakala). Accordingly the Scripture asserts :—

"There are seven subjects, from Śiva to Sakala. They all possess power".

In fact Malas are of endless variety, because of their subdivisions; because of their being related to one another as principal and subordinate in a variety of ways; and because of difference due to the fact that some are alternant (Vikalpa) and others are aggregative (Samuccaya). (10).

Because of the difference in these impurities, due to their rise and disappearance, the transmigratory beings are of two kinds. This is what he shows in the following:—

(11-12) "And this "Free-consciousness" (Cittattva),-in which the power of action predominates (Kartṛtāmayam) and which is revived by the power of kalā and constitutes the subjective aspect of Śūnya etc., which are in reality devoid of sentiency,-is limited, i. e. is of the nature of an object, because it occupies a

subordinate position (i.e. "I" element is subordinate to "this" element)."

"Now Jñāna (true knowledge,) which is the most essential characteristic of liberation, (entering into the Reality) consists in the equal predominance of both "consciousness" (Bodha) and "freedom." (Kartṛtā) and consequent subordinate position of Śūnya etc. to that which is sentient in its nature(Cit)."

Here the word "Etacca" stands for that "free-consciousness" (Caitanya) which belongs to the transmigratory beings, gods etc. This consists primarily in 'freedom', because the other aspect, namely, pure consciousness (Saṁvid), after having been deadened as it were by impurity, is revived (udbodhita) by the Lord's power, called Kalā; i. e. because of its having been given rise to, though this also was obscured by Mala. This "free-consciousness" is the essential characteristic of the sentient. As associated with limited subjects, beginning with body and ending with Śūnya, it is limited; because it occupies a subordinate position, i. e. it is objective in its nature, because of its being merged in the objective aspect of subject i. e. body and Śūnya etc., which have assumed "thisness" e. g. "He who is fair in complexion, he who is happy , he who is thirsty, he who is without any form, I am that".

In all these instances it is the "thisness", the objectivity of the transmigratory beings, in which the subjectivity (Ahantā) is merged, that shines. The transmigratory state, consisting of the states of waking, sleep and deep sleep, is nothing but this (objectivity in which the subjectivity is merged).

But that state,-in which the same principle of free-consciousness or self-consciousness, because of the instruction of a teacher or any other similar reason, shines, in its full freedom, emerging as it were out of the objective Śūnya etc., and there is full consciousness of the presence of qualities of omnipresence and eternality etc. within,—is called 'beyond the fourth' Turiyātita.

But that state,—in which all, from Śūnya to body etc., are converted (into self) by self-consciousness, which has the consciousness of possession of the above described glory of omnipotence and enternality etc., as a metal is (converted into gold) by the alchemical process,—is called the "fourth" (Turīya) state. In this body etc. give up as if it were their objective nature. Both these states of liberation in the very life time, are known as "Samāveśa" in the Śāstras. In all these, well entering (into reality) is the only important thing. And other instructions are only to bring that about. For instance, the Gitā says:—

"Those who by making their minds (Manas) enter into me" and

"But if you are not able to make your mind enter into me" etc.

And entering into Him (Samāveśa) is the only fruition of all the well known five reverential acts, such as offering of prayer, bowing to, worship of and concentration and Samādhi on the Highest Lord, the essential part of which is the identification of such aspects of the limited subject as body etc. (with the Lord). This is what is said in the Gitā also : —

"If you cannot practise (concentration), devote yourself to a work that relates to me".

But after the fall of the body, the Highest Lord alone remains, and, therefore, there can be no talk of "Samāveśa". For, who can enter where and how ? This is what the next Śloka says:—(Commentary on Kārikā 12 begins here).

The merging (Samāveśa) is characterised not only by the predominance of free-consciousness (Kartṛtā) and consequent reduction of Śūnya etc. to subordinate position; but also by the equal prominence of another aspect of Cit, the "pure consciousness" (Bodha), which was before obscured by Mala. For, the Mala, "the loss of power of knowledge to freedom" has now ceased to function. And such predominance of free-consciousness is called 'knowledge' (jñāna), because of its being the opposite of the impurity, called ignorance. This is the chief characteristic feature of Samāveśa; because, on account of this, a subject, though associated with body, is yet Lord. Accordingly in the Śāstras such a subject is called liberated (Mukta). (12).

There may thus be 'fourth' (Turya) and "beyond the fourth" (Turyātita) states of the 'Pati' but how can there be three different states, waking, sleep and deep sleep states, of the Paśu, of which the Āgamas talk ? With this objection in mind he describes the exact nature of deep sleep in the following three Ślokas:—

(13—15) "The absence of object of knowledge characterises the Śūnya Pramātā, who is nothing more than not-being of Buddhi etc. and who experiences subjectivity as "I", which is related only to the vague and absolutely formless residual trace.

In the Śūnya resides the power, which sets vital air etc. in motion and is the internal activity of the senses (Indriyas). This power is called life (Jīvana). Another view of 'life' is that it is

nothing but self-consciousness, identified with vital air (Prāṇa) which is identical with the group of eight (Puryaṣṭaka).

Thus, deep sleep consists in the rest of self-consciousness in Śūnya or Prāṇa. It is like the state of dissolution. It is of two kinds (1) that in which the objective consciousness persists and (II) that in which there is no objective consciousness. In the former the subject has the impurity of Māyā; but in the latter he is free from it."

According to this system, the principle of sentiency, concealing its real nature, manifests itself as the objects of knowledge, beginning with Buddhi and ending with body or Jar etc. All this is one manifestation of the power of freedom. In this there is neither succession nor difference in reality. But still, because of that very power of freedom there appear both succession and difference. This being so, there arises a state when that aspect of the principle of sentiency,—which obscures the essential nature of Cit and is not associated with the later part of the manifestation i. e. Jar etc., either because of its (objective world's) not having risen; or its destruction, as at the time of dissolution of the world; or its not being attended to, as at the time of deep sleep, Samādhi and fainting fit—rests in itself, and Kartṛtā (free-consciousness), the chief characteristic of which is self-consciousness, also rests on (i. e. refers to) the same and gets associated with residual trace, which is formless because it is not clear and is pure i. e. has not come down to the objective state. In this state, there is no other consciousness left excepting that of nothingness. And though it does not require clear consciousness of the objects, Buddhi etc., which have simply to be negated, yet, because the relation with the negativable is necessarily there, as in the case of the experience "I have nothing", therefore, it has negativable in general as one with itself. Hence its object is nothing more than the residual trace. The Śūnya is so called because it is essentially nothing else than not-being of all, beginning with Buddhi and ending with body etc. and Nīla, because there is the Śūnyatā i. e. the not-being of the objects. And the essential nature of not-being consists in existing nowhere than in the residual trace. This is the only way in which the objects can be said to be non-existing, in any context. For, they are never totally destroyed.

In that very Śūnya-subject there is a power, which is responsible for the working of the group of airs, called Prāṇa, Apāna Udāna, Samāna and Vyāna. And this (power) is nothing but inner working (Āntarīvṛtti) of the groups of senses (Indriyas) of perception and those of action, which are mere expansions

of Vidyā and Kalā respectively. But their external working consists in perception of sound etc. as also in striking the places of the articulation etc. This has been asserted in:—

"The five airs, Prāṇa etc. are the general activity of the senses" (San. Ka. 29).

Thus, I—Consciousness, resting on Śūnya, associated with (power of) group of senses, is life. Therefore, Śūnya is jīva and the same transmigrates.

Or if the self-consciousness be resting on that inner power of the powers of senses, which, functioning as principle of life in general, is responsible for working of Prāṇa etc. and is called Prāṇa, then Prāṇa itself is jīva. It transmigrates and the same is Śūnya. And Prāṇa is signified by the word "Puryaṣṭaka".

Five vital airs, group of senses of perception, group of Indriyas of action, and that which is responsible for the rise of certain knowledge, all these constitute Puryaṣṭaka. According to others five Tanmātras and Manas, Buddhi and Ahaṅkāra constitute Puryaṣṭaka. They say:—

"It is essentially the rise of Tanmātras and (has its being in) Manas, Buddhi and Ahaṅkāra". (Spa. Ka. 3—17) and

"Earth , water and fire" (Gi., VII, 4.)

Thus, self-consciousness, resting on Puryaṣṭaka, two different conceptions of which have been given above, is spoken of as "Suṣupta". Now 'Sauṣupta' is the state of Ahantā at that time of rest (on Puryaṣṭaka), which is characterised by Bhāva (being) which is essentially nothing but pure consciousness (bodha) and Karma which is of the nature of action. (Another explanation of Sauṣupta). The subject is asleep, because of impurity; but he is not asleep as it were because of kalā. But when the latter (kalā)gets merged in sleep he is in deep sleep (Suṣupta). The state and act of that is Sauṣupta.

Now in the case of Sauṣupta of Śūnya there is no separate object of knowledge; therefore, because of the absence of Mala of Māyā, it is called Apavedya (without object). But in the case of Sausupta of Prāṇa, there being experience of pleasure or pain, due to touch (Sparśakṛta),there is Māyīya Mala. Hence it is called Savedya.

Pralaya also has to be assumed to be like two kinds of Suṣupta, deep and not-deep. But Pralaya is of long duration, because it is due to destruction and non-rise of body etc. But Suṣupta is of a short duration and it is due to absence of attention to

body etc. This is the distinction. In the latter case also, sleep is due to fatigue, fainting is due to there being something wrong with the constituent fluids of the body, and intoxication and madness are due to a certain thing (taken). Samādhi is due to free will of the man. These are minor differences. Some hold that Samādhi is Savedya Sauṣupta and other Sauṣuptas are Apavedya. (15).

Thus, it is clear that deep sleep state is without consciousness of clear separate object of knowledge. But what is the difference between dreaming and waking in both of which there is clear consciousness of objects? With this question in mind, he draws distinction between the two in the following two verses:—

(16-17) "The state of dreaming is that in which the objects, though they are the objects to mind (manas) only, yet they are so created that they shine as clearly as they do when they are related to external senses. It is an illusion.

And the wakeful state of the subjects is that in which the creation (the object) is common to all subjects, has stability and is external inasmuch as it is the object of all senses."

The eyeballs etc., which are the abodes of external senses, of a person who is sleeping, are found closed. And when they are closed there is no external sense-activity of perceiving the external objects. Therefore, the objects of sight and touch etc. such as are capable of shining like objects of various kinds of perceptions, are created by the Lord in the range of mind. This is not the creation of the limited subject, because we see the undesired; and even when the desired is seen, it is found connected with different times and places. And because it is simply a creation in the sphere of mind i. e. it has existence in mind alone, therefore, it is not the object of common perception of other subjects. And no doubt there are certain objects which appear as objects of common perception of other subjects, yet they are not so, after the dreamer rises from sleep, and there is then the consciousness that these appearances were baseless. Hence it is illusion. And the other perceivers as well as one's own perceptive and other senses, which appear in dream, seem to be certainly non-different from those of the wakeful state, (so long as dream lasts); yet they do not appear to be so in the state of waking. Thus continuity of certainty is broken. Therefore, the perception of both (the types of objects) is spoken of as erroneous. For, the lack of persistency is nothing more than erroneousness. Thus uncommonness has been clearly implied by

representing them as not the objects of sense-perception. This is directly asserted in the following:—

"The break in the continuity of (the idea of) certainty is due to illusion".

This was not referred to even at the time of stating the qualities, which are opposed to those which belong to the objects of wakeful state. Such a creation shines at the time of dream to limited subject. Hence it is object of cognition in dream.

And this state of limited subject, in which such an object is cognised, is called the state of dreaming. Here the word "akṣa" implies all the ten external senses (Indriya).

But wherein the objects are perceived by external senses in common with others, and there is the uncontradicted continuity of consciousness of their having true existence; and, therefore, there is persistency in the objects; such a creation in relation to the limited subject is technically called jāgara. And a subject, perceiving such a creation, is said to be in the wakeful state. This jāgara lasts only so long as there is continuity of certainty in regard to reality of existence of external objects. But when continuity of the consciousness of certainty is broken in the middle then that is dream-state. For, things are mere manifestations.

In a long dream, the shorter dream that comes within, is jāgara as compared to the long dream. And similarly what is considered to be jāgara, there being break in the continuity of consciousness of its certainty at another time, is simply a dream as compared to another Jāgara. (17).

In the following Śloka the author indicates that the conditions or states from Turīya onward have to be coveted by showing that these three are to be shunned :—

(18)**"These three states have to be given up, because of the predominance of Prāṇa and subordinate position of power of 'freedom' (Kartṛtā) in them. For , there is pleasure or pain in them, according as the predominance of this power of freedom increases or decreases."**

The subject considers those things to be the objects of aversion, in which he sees trouble in the form of hard labour that he feels, he shall have to do, because of desire either to shun or to gain them. The aversion etc. are due to variety of mixture of pleasure and pain (which those various things are capable of giving). And this is possible in the case of all these three states. For, when that aspect of the principle of pure sentiency,

which consists in the power of freedom and is characterised by resting in one's own perfect independence of others and pure bliss, is reduced to a subordinate position, in the condition of (identity of self with) the working of Prāṇa etc., or Śūnya, or Puryaṣṭaka or body etc., then the predominance of Prāṇa etc., becomes manifest. Consequently the greater the obscurity of the principle of pure sentiency the greater also is pain; and similarly the more it rises to prominence the greater is also pleasure. For instance, at the time when keen appetite is felt, there is pain, because of the rise of Prāṇa to prominence. Therefore, when a person has had his fill, Prāṇa goes into obscurity and Ahantā comes into prominence; consequently there is pleasure. The same holds good in the case of shampooing and not-shampooing the body of one who is tired, according as there is the predominance or subordination of the body. But there is no rise of pain at that time in the case of the person, who knows the real nature of Samāveśa. The following quotation says the same thing :—

"For, even a weak person, having identified himself with that (Spanda), succeeds in his work: and similarly one who is extremely hungry, is able to quell his hunger."

Thus at the time of predominance of Prāṇa and comparative subordination of the "power of freedom" (kartṛtā) there are experienced hundreds of varieties of pain and joy. This is the level of toil and suffering. Thus, in these three states there is predominance of Prāṇa etc., and Kartṛtā is reduced to subordinate position. Therefore, all these are to be shunned.

And the states of Turīya, in which there is predominance of Kartṛtā and Turīyātīta, in which there is its continuity, therefore, are to be coveted. For, after the realisation of one's own essential nature, which is nothing but 'pure unmixed bliss' there is an end to one's toils, which one has helplessly to do in one's attempt at gaining or averting certain things. This is the substance. (18)

But if the reason for giving up the first three states is the predominance of Prāṇa etc. in them, and if this predominance is in these three states only, and there is absence thereof in Turīya etc., how then after entering into Turīya there is rise again (Vyutthāna). This doubt he removes with the following two Ślokas :—

(19-20) "In the states of both, waking and dream, the principle of life (Prāṇa) manifests itself primarily in inhaling and exhaling. In the state of deep sleep it (Prāṇa) is called Samāna, the most

essential feature of which is the rest (of Prāṇa for a while in the cavity of the heart i.e. the non-manifestation of Prāṇa in the forms of inhaling and exhaling). As such Samāna is comparable to the time, technically called Viṣuvat (equinoctial time)."

Another translation

(Samāna is like the time, technically called Viṣuvat. For, Samāna is characterised by the equality of (the movement of) Prāṇa and Apāna and the rest of the principle of life in the cavity of heart (i.e. not moving to the right or to the left) for a while ; exactly as the time 'Viṣuvat' is characterised by the equality of (the duration of) the day and of the night and stoppage for a very short time of the movement of the sun (logically) towards either the south or the north (i.e. its being at the equator).

"In the state of Turiya, it moves up through mid-passage (Suṣumṇā). As such it is called Udāna. Here the dissolution of the objective world starts. From Vijñānākala to Sadāśiva are in this state. And the Turīyātīta state is the state of Parama Śiva. It is characterised by the working of Vyāna."

Prāṇa means the 'being' (Sthiti) of the sentient principle (Cid-rūpa)as Prāṇa and Apāna, the characteristic of life. It is essentially nothing more than the universal motion ('Sāmānyaparispanda' as admitted by the Spanda system). It brings sentiency to the insentient body etc. When because of "freedom" (Svātantrya) self is superimposed on it, it is determinately apprehended as "I". This very 'being' of Cit, manifesting itself in the particular forms of movement such as those of vital air (Prāṇa) etc., assumes five different forms. It shows (in itself) the particularity of 'Prāṇa' and that of 'apāna' in succession, according as it shows itself in the form of inhaling and that of exhaling, when it leaves something (the heart) or falls on something. These two particularities are clear in the state of waking: because here it (Prāṇa) proceeds from the body and rests on the external object and from there comes back to the body; and also in remembrance etc., because of its (Prāṇa's) resting on the internal object, Prāṇa and Apāna are very distinctly cognised. In dreams also both are there, because an observer clearly sees Prāṇa and Apāna in the form of inhaling and exhaling of a person who is asleep. And the sleeping person also himself realises their existence in the form of leaving (the heart) and coming back (to it), because he has the consciousness of object. Thus the principle of life (Prāṇa) has two particularities inhaling and exhaling in the wakeful state. The same is the

case in the state of dream. The state of sleep is called Svapna. When this state grows very strong then we have a subject in deep sleep (Suṣupta). Sauṣupta is nothing but the state of subject in deep sleep. The Suṣupta state is of two types. Both the types are characterised by the possession of the particularity of the principle of life, called Samāna. Although in the Savedya Suṣupta the movement of Prāṇa and Apāna is perceptible, yet in reality deep sleep consists primarily in the rest of the principle of life (Prāṇa) in between the two movements in the Hṛdayasadana, the place in the heart, the spatial point which is beyond the reach of senses. Thus, the suspension of activity of Prāṇa and Apāna, the rest for a while, is the characteristic of Samāna. Its primary function is to produce equality in the vital fluids in the higher as well as in the lower animals. It is responsible for the digestion of drink and food, because it brings about the opening of the lotus of the heart. It is like the time, technically called 'Viṣuvat', because it is nothing but the equality (Sāmya) of Prāṇa and Apāna, which are like day and night, and the 'rest' (in the cavity of the heart), for a while.

Another Interpretation

The word "Viṣuvat" is formed by adding affix "vat" , which means "to deserve", according to Pāṇini's rule "Tadarham" (Pā, Sū 5-1-117), to the word "Viṣu" which means 'pervasion'. It (secondarily, Lakṣaṇayā) means that which deserves (is characterised by) equality. The affix 'Vat' is indeclinable only when it is used in the sense of comparison. For, we find in use such forms as "udvataḥ" and 'nivataḥ' . The statement (that 'Vat' is indeclinable, only when it is used in the sense of comparison) is not a mere assertion; it is based upon the authority (Taddhitaścāsarvavibhaktiḥ Pā. 1-1-38). Or the word may mean 'that which removes the difference in the length and shortness of day and night'. In this case the word is to be derived from the root 'Su' with the prefix 'Vi' and with affix 'Śatṛ'. In the Viṣuvat, (i.e. Samāna.) Prāṇa and Apāna, which are in suspension, have their being in the form of residual trace. Their suspension (Viccheda) is their being in the form of residual trace only and not their total destruction. This has been repeatedly asserted. Thus, in the state of deep sleep, leaving (hāna) and receiving (i.e. coming to) (Ādāna) are in the rudimentary stage. All the limited subjects up to Pralayākala are in these states.

But when the activity of the principle of life abandons the left and right passages, follows the upward central path, then that movement brings about melting away of all duality like

that of congealed Ghee and produces a state that is characterised by unity. This is the function of Udāna, which is found in all the subjects from Vijñānākala to Sadāśiva. This state is technically called 'Turya'. Vijñānākalas are beyond Māyā. Therefore, melting away of duality starts with them. But when the duality completely disappears, the activity of the principle of life (Prāṇvartti) assumes the form of Vyāna inasmuch as it operates in the body, consisting of the entire mass of the categories, elements and worlds, which constitute the entire sphere of objectivity. This is the 'Turyātīta' state. This befits the Paramaśiva, who is essentially the whole universe. Thus, the subject, who is nothing more than the principle of life (Prāṇarūpa), assumes the forms of Prāṇa, Apāna, Udāna, Samāna and Vyāna. Therefore, Udāna is put in the same case as that of Vijñānākala, Mantra and Īśa, i.e. Sadāśiva and Īśvara, according to classification. It means this: although in the states of Turīya and Turīyātīta the principle of life is there, because otherwise there would be no rise from them, yet, because there is destruction of duality in these states and they are characterised by rest on unity, therefore, there is no variety of pleasure and pain in them and they are nothing more than the highest bliss, which is characterised by perfect rest on the Self. Hence these states ought to be acquired. But in the states of deep sleep etc., because there is either vague consciousness of object, because it is in the form of residual trace only, or very clear cognition of it, therefore, there is variety of pleasure and pain etc. Hence they have to be shunned. Hence it has been rightly said:—

"The three are to be shunned". The highest Lord, whose body is the whole universe, appears as the powers of exhaling and inhaling in the Sakalas. He is also all classes of subject such as Pralayākala and Vijñānākala. He is all this because He is Prāṇa, Apāna, Udāna, Samāna and Vyāna. He is Sadāśiva also. This also has been indicated by what has been stated above. The following says the same:—

"The universe , consisting of the thirty-six Tattvas is nothing more than the Lord's powers of Prāṇa etc." (20). From the beginning 171.

Here ends the second chapter, called the presentation of the essential nature of the subject, in the Āgamādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, written by illustrious teacher, Utpaladeva, with the Commentary, called Vimarśinī, written by illustrious teacher, Abhinavagupta. (2).

Here ends the Āgamādhikāra, the third of the Adhikāras.

TATTVA SAṄGRAHĀDHIKĀRA
ĀHNIKA I.

We bow to that Śiva, who manifests the self of devotees as one with innumerable variety of the means and the objects of knowledge.

Thus the self in its essential nature is identical with the Highest Lord. This has been established fully in the preceding three Adhikāras. This is proved by self-experience, reason and Āgama. For a clear understanding of it by the pupils, the same is now being stated through a summary view of the contents of the Āgamas, in one Āhnika, consisting of 18 verses beginning with "The self itself of all living beings" and ending in "Utpala has established." In one verse the Ultimately Real Nature of the Self is stated. The following nine verses state what is bondage, in order to show what the subject and the object are in reality. The seven verses show the essential nature of liberation, which is nothing more than Recognition. In one verse the conclusion is stated. This is the summary. Now the meaning of verses is to be given as follows:—

(1) "The one Highest Lord alone is the very self of all the living beings. He is full of unbroken consciousness "I am this entire universe."

According to this system, the insentients shine only as merged in the sentient. The consciousness of the insentient "this" rests on the self-consciousness "I". From this it follows that the insentients are without self. The sentient beings alone have self. Their self is nothing else than the Highest Lord. Therefore, the self and none else is the Maheśvara. And because He is of the nature of Saṁvid and Saṁvid has no limiting attributes of time, place or form; though there may be difference in body and vital air etc. : for, they belong to that part of the creation, which is called insentient, and as such are merged in the sentient principle. There is, therefore, one sentient principle which manifests in himself (itself?) all the forms of the universe because of his freedom. Hence the Highest Lord, holding all that is objective in its nature within Himself, is perfect, because He is self-consciousness, which is characterised by resting within His own self and independence of all others. Therefore, no effort is required to establish His omnipotence and omniscience (i.e. they are self-evident). Just as the cognitions and actions of Buddhi and the organs of action and perception,

in relation to the respective diverse objects, in reality belong to the self, so the cognitions and actions of Rudra and Kṣetrajña, who are thousands in number, and who are like the senses (Indriya-sthāniya) of the Highest Lord, in relation to the mass of objects, belong to the principle of sentiency (Cidātman). (1).

But if the one Highest Lord alone is the self, what is then the bondage, for freedom from which attempt has to be made? With this objection in mind the author says:—

(2) "In the objective world, which has been created by Himself, the Lord makes Buddhi etc. the substratum of false self-consciousness, because they are (fit to be) the limited subjects."

The Highest Lord, resting within His own self, in the very luminous mirror of His self, creates (manifests) within Himself by means of power of perfect freedom, the objective (aspect of the) world, which is limited in its nature. The creation of objective world is preceded by self-concretisation (Saṅkocapuraḥsara). In the midst of this creation there are the objects, such as Prāṇa, Buddhi and body etc. They are objects and are to be referred to as "this". But they are fit to be subjects in relation to objects, which are separate from them. Therefore, as they cannot completely cast off the objectivity, so they shine as illumined with unreal and imperfect self-consciousness, as "I am Devadatta" or "I am Caitra". (2).

Let it be as you say. But still who can be in bondage? Who is there different from the Lord? To this objection he replies as follows:—

(3) "The individuality of the limited individual subject is due to ignorance of the real nature of his true self. Such souls are admitted to be many. They have Bhoga, which is made up of pleasure and suffering, which are nothing but limited action and bliss (Kriyānandau); i.e. Rajas and Sattva."

Quite so. In reality there is no bondage. But only when He, because of His all-transcending power of freedom, manifests Himself as limited, then He is not conscious of His perfection, though it is there even in that state. This is the reason why He is called Puruṣa. 'Puruṣa' is essentially nothing more than the ignorance of being perfect in reality. It is because of the limitedness through association with different bodies, vital airs and Buddhis, that Puruṣas are many. And the limited individual soul is enjoyer of fruits of his action and, therefore, he is in bondage. Bhoga is nothing else than the (limited) action and bliss. Limited action is suffering, because Rajoguṇa,

which is nothing but a mixture of knowledge and ignorance and is characterised by motion, is pain. Sattva, which is essentially light of knowledge, is pleasure. Tamas is complete ignorance. It is the rest between the two. It is like Pralaya. (3).

But what is to be excluded and what is to be included by the word "Sṛṣṭau"? To this he replies:—

(4) "What are spoken of as knowledge and action of the Lord in relation to the objects, which are identical with Him; the same, together with the third, the Māyā, are the three Guṇas of the limited subject, namely, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas."

All consciousness and freedom, that is in the universe is identical with the Lord, who Himself is the universe. And the consciousness (Prakāśa) and freedom (Vimarśa) are the powers of knowledge and action respectively. Māyā is the Lord's power, which is responsible for the consciousness "I this" which is the ultimate reality of Sadāśiva and Īśvara, which are characterised by the consciousness of separate objectivity as resting on the self-consciousness. In these two states the consciousness of Prakāśa and Vimarśa, as the essential nature of the self, still persists. These three powers are recognised to be natural i.e. not-created, in the Lord. But when there is the ignorance of the esssential nature of the self and cognition and action refer to objects, which are (recognised to be) separate (from the self) and there is consciousness of the separate objects as devoid of both Prakāśa and Vimarśa, then arise Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, which are characterised by pleasure, pain and absence of both (Moha) and the functions of which are knowledge, action and restriction (Niyama) respectively (4).

But the powers of knowledge, action and Māyā are thus spoken of as non-different from the Lord. Therefore, it follows that similarly Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are non-different from the limited subject. But they are counted as separate from Puruṣa. How is this? This doubt he sets at rest in the following Śloka:—

(5) "In the course of the discussion on the practical life, which is based on diversity, Guṇas, which change into various means and objects, should not be mentioned as the powers of the possessor of them (Śaktimataḥ)."

Right. It would be so, i.e., there would be identity of Guṇas with the limited subject, if there be no talk of the state of diversity. But here we are discussing difference between one thing and another in practical life. Now Puruṣa, in his essential nature, is nothing more than the limited sentiency; and it is not

who is chidatman (चैतन्यात्मा).

his essential nature to make the objects shine. For, then they would shine always. The fact is that it (shining of objects) is due to connection of Puruṣa with others (the means). Therefore, as these Sattva etc. have separate existence from Paśu, who is supposed to possess them, so they are not represented to be non-different from him, but, as they are helpful (in bringing about the manifestation of external objects) so they are represented to be his qualities. But why are they talked of as separate from Puruṣa? Reply is that these thirteen means and ten objects are the effects of pleasure pain and ignorance, because they are experienced as essentially of the nature of pleasure etc. Therefore, if pleasure etc., which have their existence as one with the group of objects and means were to be identical with Puruṣa also, then it would follow that Puruṣa is identical with the whole creation, inclusive of both the means and objects We have already refuted the theory of evolution. And this (identity of Puruṣa with objects etc.) is of course an unwelcome conclusion. For, it would mean that Puruṣa, with Svātantrya śakti(in the form of all the qualities) is omniform (Viśvarūpa). It would mean that there is no Puruṣa and that the Lord alone exists. Therefore, in discussing the essential nature of Puruṣa, whose existence is due to lack of self-recognition, Sattva etc., have to be presented as separate. This is the correct position. (5).

But how do the powers of knowledge etc., become Sattva etc., in the case of the limited subject? To this he replies as follows:—

(6) **"The powers of being, (Sattā) self-consciousness (Ānanda) and action (Kriyā) belong to the Lord. But the limited subject has both Sattva and its not-being. That which is of dual nature (of being and not-being) is Rajas, which is pain. It is mixture Sattva and Tamas."**

According to this system, the Lord is naturally self-luminous and preserves the world by bringing about its existence etc. This world is characterised by apparent glaring variety. His (Lord of the world's) being i.e. freedom in respect of being (Bhavanakartṛtā),—as has already been shown in 1-5-14 "That is transcendental motion, that is transcendental being",—is characterised by slight flutter, quiver or motion. The same, because the light of consciousness is inseparable from self-consciousness, shining in the form of self-consciousness, which is essentially Vimarśa, is called power of action. The same, because of its perfect independence of others and entirely resting on itself is called ānanda. Thus the Lord, because of His being Cit (sentiency), is characterised by all these powers.

But the limited subject has both being and its negation, and bliss and its negation, because he is limited in his nature. That aspect (of the Lord's power), which is called being and bliss (Sattānanda), appearing as light of knowledge and pleasure (in the case of limited subject) is called Sattva. That, which is the negation of Sattva or Prakāśa and Ānanda, and, therefore, is essentially the veil of ignorance, is called Tamas. Although these Sattva and Tamas mutually exclude each other, like Nīla and negation thereof, yet, like 'genera' of cause and effect, they shine also as mixed up with each other, inasmuch as they are grasped together in one determinate knowledge of an object, exactly in the manner of two different colours, black and the opposite thereof, harmoniously mixed up in a bird of variegated plumage. Therefore, that which consists of two, Sattva and Tamas, and is of mixed nature, is called Rajoguṇa. It is (essentially of the nature of) pain, because in it Sattva and Tamas, which are respectively of the nature of light and darkness, are mixed together. For instance, the consciousness of a son as "dear" (i.e., unmixed with any other consciousness), is Sattva and therefore, pleasure. Total absence of the consciousness (of son etc.) is Moha. But the consciousness of certain aspects, for instance, his body being subjected to a disease and lack of consciousness of others, for instance, his being free from all diseases and full of good qualities, that is so much desired, is pain. This very continuity from a former to a later stage is the true nature of action. There is no such state of the limited subject, as is free from both Sattva and Rajas. For, such a state does not fit in with any form of cognition, determinate or indeterminate. That is as follows :—

The object (Nīla) shines in indeterminate cognition. Not-being of Nīla, though it is nothing, (materially) yet it is a product of determinative activity, and as such has its reality in practical life only, because it shines. "The blue and not-blue" (Nīlānīla) may shine because of the mixture of blue and not-blue. But not-being of both (Anubhayarūpatva), if it is not grasped in the indeterminate cognition of object, it would run after (i.e. become the object of) the determinate cognition, (to get itself grasped). But if it does not enter into determinate cognition, it would be indeterminately grasped object and nothing else. Hence the limited subject does not possess any fourth quality. Here the word "Api" is used in the sense of "Ca". In the case of the limited subject the "Being" (Sattā) is the quality, called Sattva. Not-being of that is Tamas. Rajas is the mixture of the two, that is the connection of words. (6).

Thus the essential nature of the subject, both, limited and perfect, has been settled in brief. Now, in order to ascer-

tain the exact nature of the object of perception, the following Śloka shows clearly how is this objectivity (Prameyatattva) connected with the Lord:--

(7) "The Ābhāsas, which shine differently, as mixed up with one another, or as separate from each other, are (in their totality, without any internal distinction) the object of Lord's consciousness (apprehension) of objectivity, which is expressed as "this", which does not stand for any conventional meaning."

It has already been stated that, according to this system, the objects are mere manifestations (Ābhāsas). At times these Ābhāsas are mixed up, united together, by the determinative activity which combines a number of Ābhāsas into a unity, which is the distinctive characteristic of the particular. At times they are conceived separately. Then they are universals. Now both the kinds of objects (the universal and the particular) form the object of consciousness of objectivity, expressed as "this"; which does not stand for any conventional meaning, not only in the case of just born children etc., but also in that of the Lord. This consciousness is very much like that which is expressed by pointing the thing out with a fingure. "Tathā" means "in that manner i.e. as particular or as universal". They shine variously. The variety of forms of objects is due to the fact that their particularity and universality both appear simultaneously resting on Ahantā (principle of self-consciousness).Therefore, (it is admitted that Maheśvara) manifests the unconventional objectivity (Asāmayikīm idantām) which is merely negation of subjectivity and may, therefore, be represented as mere not-being (śūnya), the meaning of the negative particle (Nañartha) without reference to the negativable; which is nothing but Saṁvid itself, but limited; and which shines with the light of Saṁvid (i.e. as identical and not different from Saṁvid) in the state of Īśvara, because it is invariably concomitant with the manifestation of the object.(7)

Thus, it has been shown how does the objective world shine to Pati, who is identical with Īśvara. But there can possibly be no talk of object in relation to the Highest Lord, ParamaŚiva, because all such talk is due to Sadāśiva and Īśvara, who are His first manifestations. Therefore, now the author explains how these Prameyas shine to Paśu, in the following three ślokas:—

(8-9-10) "But the objects, which shine differently, are determinately grasped (Prakalpya) by the limited subject in terms of various indicatory signs (words) in the sphere of remembrance and imagination etc.

The uncommon creation (the world of imagination) of the limited subject depends upon the creation of the Lord. It is not common to all limited subjects, because the limited subject is ignorant of his identity with the Lord. But the creation of the limited subject, who has realised his oneness with the Lord, is real i. e. common to all. It is due to his determinative activity, which is of changing nature, because of its being permeated by variety of letters, which is essentially nothing more than the (activity-of) Prāṇa and which is impermanent. This (determinative activity) itself is due to the power of the Lord, the chief purpose of which is to obstruct rest on one's own self.''

Here the word "Tu" indicates difference. To the inner or limited self the objects shine as described below; and not in the manner in which they shine to Īśvara, as stated above. In remembrance, imagination, ideation and other definite cognitions, the objects, which appear differently, i.e. in indefinite or definite form, according as they shine separately or mixed with other Ābhāsas, are determinately grasped, according to the residual traces of each individual, as associated with different indicatory words such as "This is dear" "This is enemy" which stand for different kinds of pains and pleasures, according to the previous experience of each individual limited subject, who is of the nature of limited individual self-consciousness, and is distinct from other similar self-consciousnesses. In brief it means that to Īśvara the Prameyas are the objects of pure consciousness, unmixed with the element of determinacy. But to the limited subject they shine as related to different determinate cognitions, each of which is naturally different from and exclusive of all others, because they are used for practical purposes such as accepting or rejecting. (8).

But if the object, even when it is an object of pure consciousness, is exactly the same as it is when it is determinately cognised, what then is the difference in the object in its two states, namely, (I) when it is the object of consciousness of Īśvara and (II) when it is determinately grasped by limited subject? Reply is as is given in the following Śloka beginning with "Tasya".

The creation, for which a limited subject is responsible, is based upon that of the Lord and, therefore, being dependent on the creation of the Lord, it is not common and is related to that particular subject alone i.e. is not common to other subjects; for instance the creation, "This is pleasant", shines only to its creator and to none else.

But if the limited subject also be capable of creating then is he Lord himself? Quite so. He is Lord himself. But if so,

why then his creation is not common to other times and subjects? Well, it would be, if he knew his power. And because he does not know his power (therefore, his creation is not similar to that of the Lord). The determinative activity i.e., the power to grasp determinately, arises in him only who is dependent upon another.

But who is responsible for the rise of that power to grasp determinately? Reply is as follows:—

The Lord is the embodiment of all ideas and, therefore, is characterised by the mass of words. He possesses the power, the chief function of which is to obscure the state of being the Highest Lord, which is characterised by perfect rest in His essential nature. It (this power) is nothing more than the eight "Vargas" (groups of letters), which are essentially different powers (deities), called Brāhmī etc. It has variety, because of the variety of letters, "K" etc. This power is responsible for the rise of the determinative activity of the limited subject, which is changing, because the limited subject does not rest on one determinate cognition. Therefore, through the determinative activity, which is permeated by such varied arrangement of letters as "this is friend" and "this is enemy", springs up the uncommon creation of the limited subject, who is essentially identical with the Highest Lord. (The creation of imagination) "The elephant with five mouths and four tusks runs in the sky" is also a creation of determinative cognitive power, because it is also a peculiar unification of Ābhāsas. This also depends upon the Ābhāsas, manifested by the Lord. This means that all that is created by limited subject in the field of determinate cognition, depends upon the creation of the Lord. (9-10).

But if the creation of the limited subject is nothing but phenomenal world, what will the creation of Lord do to him (Paśu)? This is what he explains in the following Śloka:—

(11) "The creation is of two kinds: one is common (Sādhāraṇa) and the other is uncommon. Both are clearly manifest. By giving up the determinative activity and concentrating (on "I am this") gradually the state of Īśvara is reached."

The creation of Īśvara is of two kinds; common, such as jar etc., and uncommon such as is indicated by the word "Anyathā": e.g., two moons etc. Both of these have the common characteristic of being clearly manifest. When, through a slow and gradual process of giving up determinacy through concentration on the clearly manifest object, which is only indeterminately grasped; this creation is referred to as "I am this", as in the experience at the level of Īśvara; then it slowly destroys the limited nature

of Paśu and makes the divine nature manifest, according as the practice of concentration develops, as a result of following the instruction:—

"The eyes, which are directed to the external, should be free from winking and opening and the true object of meditation should be within."

Further, if the world, a creation of determinative activity of the limited subject, as has been stated above, be otherwise, i.e., be the creation of the determinative activity of one who has realised his identity with the well recognised power of the Lord, then it is also common: just as is the creation of the determinative mental activity of one who has realised the Supreme, has his mind thoroughly absorbed (in the idea, for which the mantra stands) and has applied his Mantra determinately for promoting health, or bringing about death or for pacification.(11)

Thus, it has been shown how Mokṣa is nothing but self-realisation, which is nothing but the realisation of ParamaŚiva, which follows from one's identifying one's self with what is free from all determinacy, through giving up of all Vikalpas. Now he is going to show that there can be Mokṣa even when there are Vikalpas.

(12) "He, who has realised his identity with the universe and knows that all that is manifest is simply his glory, is the Highest Lord even when the determinate cognitions are still arising."

"The inner self, which is called Paśu and is referred to as "I" is nothing different from the Supreme Self, who is essentially the light of consciousness, grasping both, the subject and the object: on the contrary, that transcendental being I am and He is I. There is no difference between the two. Therefore, even this determinate creation is nothing but my own glory, known as the power of freedom." This consciousness having grown firm, he becomes liberated in his very life time, though his Vikalpas may not have been destroyed. The following line says the same:—

"That is surely a state of freedom from doubt, in which even doubt is not definitely doubted." (12).

But if the case be such, as has been stated above, what then is the difference between the liberated and the one who is still in bondage, in relation to the object? The reply is:—

(13) "The liberated, looks upon the common object of perception as one with himself, as does the Great Lord; but the bound sees it as altogether different from himself."

The liberated considers himself identical with the self-consciousness "I", which is the prompter (Adhiṣṭhātṛ) of all subjects right from Sadāśiva and Īśvara down to worm. Accordingly he thinks "all that can be the object of cognition of any being in the universe is also of mine, and similarly my object of cognition is that of all beings in the universe." And he also thinks "that object is only a part of my self and so are others also". And slowly he begins to think that Prameyas are non-different both from one another and from the subject. Thus, all figure in his consciousness as ultimately merged in the undiluted unity. But quite opposite is the case with the bound. He rests on pure diversity. (13).

It has been discussed how the objects appear at the states of Sadāśive and Īśvara and in relation to the liberated and the bound. But it remains to be stated how does the object stand in relation to Parama Śiva? To this he replies:—

(14) "Śiva is ever full of the mass of the endless Tattvas, which rest in or have their being in Him. He is pure consciousness and bliss (cidānandaghana). He is perfectly changeless."

In relation to the glorious Highest Lord there can be no talk of the object of knowledge. For, the whole mass of Tattvas is completely merged in Him; because it rests on pure Cit. Therefore, that state is pure unity, characterised by rest on the Self, the Ānanda, which is nothing more than spontaneous natural self-consciousness (Saṁvitsvabhāva). It is eternal self-consciousness. It is absolutely changeless. It is called the transcendental state of the glorious Lord, who is the whole universe, whose all-transcending glory is without any break and who is eternally pure. In it all talk of the object ceases. It is represented to be all-transcending. (14).

He now gives the conclusion of what has been discussed in the preceding four Adhikāras.

(15) "Thus, fully knowing the Self and its powers of knowledge and action, and realising the powers to be non-different from the self, he knows and does all that he desires."

Thus, knowing the Self to be essentially Īśvara, and His powers of knowledge and action to be identical with the power of freedom and to be non-different from Him; and determinately apprehending "such is the self and not as conceived by Kaṇāda etc."; and realising that powers of knowledge and action are non-different from Him; a subject, who practises Samāveśa, becomes capable of knowing and doing all that he desires, while he is still associa-

ted with the body. But one, who does not practise that, is liberated in his life time and after the fall of body becomes the Highest Lord. (15)

This matter, though it is based on personal experience, yet the tradition, that has been handed down from teacher to teacher, has to be referred to as a corroborator. For, it has already been shown in the Āgamādhikāra that it is based on the Śāstra. Thus, it can be shown to be fully supported by preceptorial teaching, scripture and personal experience. With this object he states the preceptorial line as follows:—

(16) "Thus , this new easy path has been shown by me, exactly as it was given in the Śiva Dṛṣṭi Śāstra, written by the teacher. Therefore, a person, putting his feet on this, after realising himself to be the Creator of the Universe, becomes Siddha, when he enters into unbroken identity with the state of Śiva."

This path,-which is new, because it was not well known, on account of its being hidden in all the sacred scriptures, and which is easy, because it is free from all troubles in so far as it needs no such efforts as are involved in practising the internal and external discipline and Prāṇāyāma etc,—was talked of by the great grand-teacher Śrī Somānandapāda in his Śiva Dṛṣṭi Śāstra. The same has been clarified here by removing the blemish in the form of objections from the point of view of other systems of thought. And because the matter, discussed here, has the support of the preceptors, scripture and personal experience; therefore, when a person concentrates his mind on what is given here and, after realising (Vibhāvya) that he has the omnipotence, the chief characteristic of which is the creation of the universe, he is unshakably convinced; then because of this conviction itself he attains liberation in this very life and is identical with Śiva. This is what the great grand-teacher himself has stated as follows:—

"When the presence of the true nature of Śiva in all is recognised through indisputable experience, the means of knowledge and concentration of mind lose all their value. When the gold is once known as such, does contemplation play any part as a means of its knowledge? That knowledge is true and firm like the one that we have of our parents etc."

After realising one's identity with Śiva, if one remains continuously merged in it and merges any one, two or all of the triad of body, intellect and Śūnya in it, one attains all powers, including the highest. (16).

But if the essential nature of the Self is ever the same, there would be no difference in it (i.e. in its causal efficiency) in the

case of either its recognition or non-recognition. For, a seed, though it may not be recognised, yet, if all the contributory causes are present, it does produce the sprout. Why then is there so much insistance on Self-recognition? Reply is as follows:—

The causal efficiency is of two types: (I) external, such as the production of sprout, and (II) internal, such as causing pleasure etc., which is essentially nothing else than the self-consciousness, the rest of the subject on itself. The former undoubtedly does not depend upon recognition; but the latter does. In the present case the causal efficiency lies in the arousal of the consciousness "I am the Highest Lord", which is characterised by the possession (by the realiser) of both, higher and lower, "Siddhis" and the glories of the liberated in life. Therefore, in this case recognition is surely necessary.

But it may be asked "where do you find that the causal efficiency, which is essentially the rest on the subject, is not seen without recognition and is co-incidental with recognition? In reply to this the author says the following:—

(17) **"Just as an object of love, who has been brought to the presence of a slim lady by her various entreaties, cannot give her any pleasure, though he may stand before her, so long as he is not recognised and, therefore, not distinguished from common man; so the Self of all, which is the Lord of the world, cannot manifest its true glory so long as its essential nature is not recognised. Hence the means of its recognition has been dealt with."**

Suppose that the passion of love is aroused in a young lady by mere hearing of the excellences of a hero and that she,-intensely desiring day and night to see him and with her heart completely out of control—sends messengers, writes love-letters, presenting her condition, and has her already slim body made slimmer still by pangs of separation. Now the hero unexpectedly turns up in response to her entreaties and stands before her. But she is not able to apprehend clearly his distinctive great qualities and consequently to her he is nothing more than an ordinary man. Under such circumstances, the perception of the object, though it actually takes place, does not give any satisfaction to the heart. Similarly, though the Lord of the Universe is ever shining within as the very self, yet His shining does not make the heart full (of Ānanda); because the self is not realised to be transcendental, and possessing the supreme Lordliness,characterised by unchecked freedom of thought and action. The Self, therefore, shines as do other ordinary objects, such as jar etc.

But when she distinctly cognises those excellences in him, either in consequence of a word from the messenger, or of recognition of a characteristic or something else, her heart immediately blooms fully like a wonderful bud. And in consequence of repeated enjoyment of union, she experiences the rest of the heart in other forms also. Similarly when transcendental Lordliness is fully recognised in the self, either as a result of preceptorial instruction or recognition of the powers of knowledge and action, then immediately in the very life time there is final emancipation, characterised by perfection. But if a person makes repeated efforts at merging himself in the Supreme, he attains mystic powers. Thus, it is the recognition of the Self which gives both the higher and the lower spiritual powers. (17).

This system is beneficial to all. It gives final emancipation. In order to induce common man to follow it by arousing in him the urge,—which is characterised by the belief in the possibility of the promised and which is aroused by the remembrance of its (system's) greatness, because of its connection with great family and famous name,—the author concludes by referring to his as well as his father's name as follows:—

(18) "In order that common man may have the transcendental power (Siddhi) without much effort, Utpala, the son of Udayākara, has written this Īśvara Pratyabhijñā."

The word 'jana' means simply 'man'. In following this system, therefore, the qualification of belonging to a particular caste etc. is unnecessary. Hence it is asserted that it is for the benefit of all. Its aim is great, because its purpose is to enable common man to realise the higher and lower Siddhis without much effort. My illustrious grand-teacher, Utpaladeva, the son of Udayākara, wrote this system. Common man, therefore, follows it, because of the fame of its founder. The author has benefitted common man by inducing him to follow it by referring to both the names. The meaning of 'Iyam' is 'this 'which has been made so appealing to the heart by hundreds of reasons. The Chapter ends. (18). From the beginning 190.

Abhinavagupta has written this small commentary on the (Īśvara) Pratyabhijñā. It cannot be adversely criticised. It clearly explains the meaning of the verses.

Through this system, which is based upon personal experience, the subject matter of Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa and Śaivāgama becomes helpful in the realisation of the Self. For, no other than the sun is capable of uniting the juices (Rasa) of earth and water for the development of grains.

What reply can be given to the question "What are you.?" by one, who wants to discuss the Ṣāstras, before realising the self, and who is, therefore, under the influence of an evil spirit (as it were)?

Here ends the Tattvasaṅgrahādhikāra in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā, written by Utpaladeva, with the commentary, called "Vimarśinī' written by Abhinavagupta.

The Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī ends.

THE END.

PS. UP AP. IS.C.E.--1953—500.

APPENDIX

Textual authorities indicated by foot-notes.

Page I

(४) न यातव इन्द्र जूजुवुर्ना न वन्दना शविष्ठ वेद्याभि : ।
स शर्धदर्यो विषुणस्य जन्तोर्मा शिश्नदेवा अपि गुर्ऋतं नः ।।

Page II

(२) वेदेऽस्ति संहिता रौद्री वाच्या रुद्रश्च देवता।
सान्निध्यकरणेऽप्यस्मिन् विहितः काल्पिको विधिः ।।

Page VI

(१) अतश्च भेद-भेदाभेदाभेदप्रतिपादकं शिव-रुद्र-भैरवाख्यं त्रिधैवेदं शास्त्र-मुद्भूतम् इति सिद्धान्त : ।

Page VII

(१) एवमष्टाविंशतिभेदा दिव्यागमाः । परार्ध-शंख-पद्म-षट्पञ्चाशत्सहस्राधिकैः षडुत्तरषष्ठ्या लक्षन्यूनं पद्मं चेत्येतावत्संख्या ग्रन्थाः। तदुपभेदाः अष्टोत्तरद्विशतसङ्ख्याः ।

Page VIII

(२) षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वानि द्वितीयश्लोकोल्लासे विवृतानि। पञ्चभूतानि पञ्चप्राणाः चतुर्दशेन्द्रियाणीति चतुर्विंशतिः, महान् कालः प्रधानं माया विद्या पुरुष इति षट्, बिन्दुनादौ शक्तिशिवौ शान्तातीताविति षट्, एवं षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वानि यानि शैवागमे प्रसिद्धानि ।

Page IX

(१) एवं सदुःखान्तः कार्यं कारणं योगो विधिरिति पञ्चैव पदार्थाः समासत उद्दिष्टाः ।

(२) माहेश्वरास्तु मन्यन्ते कार्य-कारण-योग-विधि-दुःखान्ताः पञ्च पदार्थाः ।

(३) अत्र 'भव' इति विद्याकलापशूनामेव ग्रहणम् । तस्योत्पत्तिकर्त्ता भगवानित्यतो भवोद्भव इति ।

(४) यदेतत् पत्युः पतित्वं शक्तिः सामर्थ्यमैश्वर्यं स्वगुणः सद्भावः सतत्त्वं तत्त्वधर्मः तद् आसनम् ।

Page X

(१) अन्यत्र दुःखनिवृत्तिरेव दुःखान्तः । इह तु पारमैश्वर्यप्राप्तिश्च ।

(२) एतद्वृत्ति प्रणेतृणां श्रीमदाचार्य गुणरत्न सूरीश्वराणां सत्तासमयो वैक्रमिक १४६६ प्रतीयते ।

(३) तत्पदपयोजभृङ्गो विद्यातिलको मुनिर्निजस्मृतये।
षड्दर्शनीयसूत्रे चक्रे विवृतिं समासेन।

Page XI

(१) दर्शनानि षडेवात्र, मूलभेदव्यपेक्षया।
देवतातत्त्वभेदेन, ज्ञातव्यानि मनीषिभिः॥
बौद्धं नैयायिकं साङ्ख्यं, जैनं वैशेषिकं तथा।
जैमिनीयं च नामानि, दर्शनानाममून्यहो॥

(२) 'सर्वं धरणिधरणीधरतरुपुरप्राकारादिकं बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकम्, कार्यत्वात्, यद्यत् कार्यं तत्तद्बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकं दृष्टम्, यथा घटः, कार्यं चेदं तस्माद्बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकमिति प्रयोगः।

(३) शिवदैवतसाम्येऽपि तत्त्वादिविशेषविशिष्टत्वाद्वैशेषिकाः, तेषां वैशेषिकाणां काणादानां नैयायिकैरक्षपादैः समं सार्द्धं देवताविषये शिवदेवताभ्युपगमे भेदो विशेषो नास्ति।

Page XIII

(१) शैवाः पाशुपताश्चैव, महाव्रतधरास्तथा।
तुर्याः कालमुखा मुख्या भेदा एते तपस्विनाम्॥

Page XIV

(१) कम्बलिकाप्रावरणा जटापटलशालिनः।
भस्मोद्धूलनकर्त्तारो नीरसाहारसेविनः।

Page XV

(१) शिवात्परंपरायातौ भोगमोक्षौ ससाधनौ।
आत्रेयाय मुनीन्द्रेण रुरुणा संप्रकाशितौ॥

Page XVI

(१) सुवृत्तिः सद्वृत्तिरिति रौरववृत्तेर्नाम तत्कर्त्रेवं निर्मितमित्यर्थः।

(२) तथोक्तमाचार्येण स्वायम्भुववृत्तौ 'यद्यशुद्धिर्न पुंसोऽस्ति'
इत्यत्रान्तरे, व्याख्यातं च तट्टिप्पकेऽस्मत्पित्रा तत्र भवता भट्टनारायणकण्ठेनेति तत एवावधार्यम्।

(३) रुरुसिद्धान्तसंसिद्धौ भोगमोक्षौ ससाधनौ।
वच्मि साधकबोधाय लेशतो युक्तिसंस्कृतौ॥

(४) सिद्धान्तशब्दः पङ्कजादिशब्दवद्योगरूढ्या शिवप्रणीतेषु कामिकादिषु दशाष्टादशसु तन्त्रेषु प्रसिद्धः।

(५) यं चानुशासयामास भगवानीशसंमतः ।
उग्रज्योतिर्गुरुः श्रीमान् सर्वविद्यासरित्पतिः ।।

(६) आश्रयान्तरसंक्रान्तिः पूर्वाश्रयविवर्जनम् ।
विना नैव प्रसिद्धा स्यात्त्यागे पूर्वस्तु निर्गुणः ।

(७) शङ्करनन्दन-सद्योज्योतिर्देवबल-कणभुगादिमतम् ।
प्रत्याख्यास्यन्नवमं व्याचख्यावाह्निकं जयरथाख्यः ।।

(८) याभ्यां प्रकाशितं वर्त्म सिद्धान्ते सिद्धभावतः ।
गुरूणामपि तौ वन्द्यौ सद्योज्योति-बृहस्पती ।।

Page XVII

(१) शङ्करनन्दन-सद्योज्योतिर्देवदल-कणभुगादिमतम् ।

Page XVIII

(१) अद्वैतवासनाविष्टैः सिद्धान्तज्ञानवर्जितैः ।
व्याख्यातो ऽत्रान्यथाऽन्यैर्यत्सततोऽस्माकमुद्यमः ।।

(२) श्री मच्छ्रीकण्ठनाथाज्ञावशात्सिद्धा अवातरन् ।
त्र्यम्बकामर्दकाभिख्यश्रीनाथा अद्वये द्वये ।।

(३) साक्षाच्छ्रीकण्ठनाथादिव सुकृतिजनानुग्रहायावतीर्णाच्छ्रुत्वा
श्रीरामकण्ठाच्छिवमतकमलोन्मीलनप्रौढभास्वान् ।

(४) श्रीरामकण्ठसद्वृत्तिं मयैवमनुकुर्वता ।
रत्नत्रयपरीक्षार्थःसंक्षेपेण प्रकाशितः ।

Page XIX

(१) साक्षाच्छ्रीकण्ठनाथादिव सुकृतिजनानुग्रहायावतीर्णा-
च्छ्रुत्वा श्रीरामकण्ठाच्छिवमतकमलोन्मीलनप्रौढभास्वान् ।
श्रीविद्याकण्ठभट्टस्तदिदमुपदिशन्नादिदेशैतदेनाम्
स्पष्टार्थामत्र लघ्वीं विरचय विवृतिं वत्स सर्वोपयोग्याम् ।।

(२) रामकण्ठमहाकण्ठकण्ठीरवपदानुगः ।
न कुतार्किकमातङ्गगर्जितेभ्यो विभेम्यहम् ।।

(३) एतच्च विस्तरेणोक्तं तत्र भवता रामकण्ठेन नादकारिकासु ।

Page XX

(१) स्वरूपज्योतिरेवान्तः सूक्ष्मावागनपायिनी ।

(२) मुक्तापीड इति प्रसिद्धिमगमत्कश्मीरदेशे नृपः ।
श्रीमान् ख्यातयशा बभूव नृपतेस्तस्य प्रभावानुगः ।
मन्त्री लक्ष्मण इत्युदारचरितस्तस्यान्ववाये भवो
हेलाराज इमं प्रकाशमकरोच्छ्रीभूतिराजात्मजः ।

(४) See textual authority page XIX (१)

Page XXI

(१) तत्त्वसङ्ग्रहचन्द्रस्य प्रकाशाय वितानिता।
श्रीनारायणकण्ठेन बृहट्टीका शरन्निशा।।

(२) केचित्स्वबोधविभवप्रथनाय ताव-
द्गर्जन्त्यलं न किल यत्प्रकृतोपयोगि।
अन्ये पुनः पटुधियो न विवेचयन्ति,
स्पष्टार्थमेतदिति तत्तदुपेक्षमाणाः।

(३) यदाह तत्र भवान् खेटकनन्दनः—

(४) तदिदमुक्तं तत्र भगवद्बृहस्पतिपादैः।

(५) तदुक्तं तत्वत्रयनिर्णये।

(६) तदुक्तं भोगकारिकासु।

Page XXIV

(१) अन्यच्च सूतसंहिताव्याख्याने विद्यारण्ययतीन्द्रैः तत्र तत्र एतत्प्रकरण-
गताःश्लोकाः प्रमाणीक्रियन्ते।

(२) परं तु श्रीमदघोरशिवाचार्यकृतपद्धत्यामुत्सवविधौ गोत्रविधि-
निर्णयपटले–"ततो ऽभूल्लाट उत्तुङ्गशिवो विन्ध्ये व्रतीश्वरः।
कल्याणनगरीवासी गुरुः पद्धतिकृत्सुधीः।।
सर्वविद्याधिपो यस्य कनीयानार्यदेशजः।
सर्वागमार्थनिर्णेतुश्श्रीभोजनृपतेर्गुरुः।।"

(३) श्रीमद्घोरशिवाह्वयेन गुरुणा श्री जन्यया व्याख्यया।
लोकेपि प्रथितेन कुण्डिनकुलं चोलेष्वलङ्कुर्वता।।

(४) नादज्ञेये शकस्याब्दे वर्तने कलौ युगे।
ग्रन्थतास्त्रसहस्रेश्च (?) संयुक्ता पञ्चभिः शतैः।।
कलौ शालिवाहनशकाब्दे अशीत्युत्तरसहस्रे स्वेन कृतेयं पद्धतिरिति च
स्पष्टं प्रकटीकृतम्।

(५) इति लक्षद्वयाध्यापक–श्रीमदघोरशिवाचार्यविरचिता
तत्त्वप्रकाशिकावृत्तिः समाप्ता।

(६) श्री सर्वात्मशिवङ्घ्रिपद्मरजसामाराधकेनामलाछ्री-
तत्त्वत्रयनिर्णयस्य विवृतिर्लेशादियं निर्मिता।

Page XXV

(१) इत्यादि विस्तरेणास्माभिमृगेन्द्रवृत्तिदीपिकायां दर्शितं
साधितञ्च रामकण्ठादिभिर्मतङ्ग वृत्त्यादाविति ततोऽवधार्यम्।

(२) श्रीमत्स्वायंभुवकिरणमतङ्गादिवृत्तिष्विति ततोऽवधेयम्।

(3) See above (१)

(४) यदुक्तं कालोत्तरवृत्तौ तत्र भवता रामकण्ठेन शिवभेदाष्टकप्रकरणे।

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(१) सांहिती वारुणी याज्ञिकी चेति । तत्र प्रथमप्रपाठके संहिताध्याय–
स्योक्तत्वात्तद्रूपोपनिषत्सांहिती । द्वितीयतृतीययोः प्रपाठकयोर्या
ब्रह्मविद्याऽभिहिता तस्याः संप्रदायप्रवर्तको वरुणस्तस्मात्तदुभय–
रूपोपनिषद्वारुणी। चतुर्थप्रपाठके यज्ञोपयुक्ता अपि मन्त्रास्तत्रतत्रा–
ऽऽम्नाता अतस्तद्रूपोपनिषद्याज्ञिकी।

(२) तथैवं नारायणीयाख्या याज्ञिक्युपनिषदपि खिलकाण्डरूपा
तल्लक्षणोपेतत्वात्।

(३) तदीयपाठसम्प्रदायस्तु देशविशेषेषु बहुविध उपलभ्यते।

(४) सदसस्पतिमद्भुतं प्रियमिन्द्रस्य काम्यम्।
सनिं मेधामयासिषम्।

(५) इत ऊर्ध्वं तेषु तेषु देशेषु श्रुतिपाठा अत्यन्तविलक्षणाः। तत्र विज्ञानात्म·
प्रभृतिभिः पूर्वनिबन्धकारैर्द्राविडपाठस्याऽऽदृतत्वाद्वयमपि तमेवादृत्य
व्याख्यास्यामः।

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(१) कुशिकभगवानभ्यागत्याचार्यं,

(२) तेषां नामान्यथ ब्रूमो लकुलीशोऽथ कौशिकः।

(३) नकुलीशः कौशिकः गार्ग्यः,

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(१) अतः शिवागमो द्विविधः, त्रैवर्णिकविषयस्सर्वविषयश्चेति। वेदः त्रैवर्णिक–
विषयः। सर्वविषयश्चान्यः। उभयोरेक एव शिवः कर्ता।

(२) शिवागमैकदेशे शिवस्य परब्रह्मणः केवलनिमित्तत्वमुपपादितम्।
तत्परिहारार्थमिदमधिकरणमिति पूर्वाचार्याणां व्याख्या।

(३) भेदाभेदकल्पनं विशिष्टाद्वैतं साधयामः।

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(१) न शिवः शक्तिरहितो न शक्तिर्व्यतिरेकिणी।
शिवः शक्तस्तथा भावानिच्छया कर्तुमीहते।
शक्तिशक्तिमतोर्भेदः शैवे जातु न वर्ण्यते॥

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(२) सुप्रभेदागमे :—

रेवणो मरुलश्चैकोरामः पण्डित एव च ।
विश्वाराध्य इति ख्याताः कलौ गुरुवरोत्तमाः ।।

(३) इति सामजंगीषीयशाखायां सदानन्दोपनिषदि जीवस्य प्राणलिङ्गमुख्यत्वं सूचितम् ।

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(१) वेदशास्त्रपुराणेषु कामिकाद्यागमेषु च ।
लिङ्गधारणमाख्यातं वीरशैवस्य निश्चयात् ।

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(१) श्रीमच्छिवाचारविचारदीक्षं स्वशिष्यसत्प्रीणनपूर्णपक्षम् ।
दुर्वारकामादिविदारदक्षं भजाम्यहं रेवणकल्पवृक्षम् ।।

(२) मिथ्याद्वैत शून्याद्वैत जैन बौद्ध लोकायतनाद्यवैदिकाश्चापि व्याख्याताः ।

(३) कामिकाद्यागमविरुद्ध पाशुपत पाञ्चरात्राद्यागम निराकरणमुपादेयम्, एवं रेवणसिद्ध मरुलसिद्ध रामसिद्ध उद्भटाराध्य वेमनाराध्यादिभिः श्रौतशैवाचार्यैर्व्यपदेशात् ।

(४) अतस्सर्ववेदान्तमुख्यार्थवेदिभिः रेवणसिद्ध मरुलसिद्धोद्भटाराध्य-वेमाराध्यादिभिः सगुणश्रुतीनां सर्वासाम् शक्तिविकासपरत्वं निर्गुणश्रुतीनां शक्तिसङ्कोचविषयत्वमिति व्यवस्था निर्णीता ।

(५) वीरशैवसिद्धान्तस्थापक.....सहस्रशीर्षानुवाकस्य शिवपरत्वेन राद्धान्तितम् ।

(६) शङ्करसंहिता सिद्धान्तशिखामण्यादौ कर्मकर्तव्यतादर्शनात् ।

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(१) रेणुकभगवद्.....इत्यन्तेन सिद्धान्तशिखामणौ तस्यैवोपदेशात् ।

(३) श्रीमत्सर्वकलासु कोविदतमः प्रालेयशैलात्मजा-
जानेः पूर्णकृपाविशेषनिचयप्रज्ञानधौर्यो बभौ ।
सम्यग्रेवण देशिकेन्द्रधृतषड्लिङ्गावधानोज्ज्वलं
सिद्धार्यं मरुलप्रभुं बुधनुतं तं मन्महे श्रेयसे ।।

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(१) दुर्वासोपमन्युरेवणसिद्ध मरुलसिद्धादिभिश्च निराकृताः ।

(२) तस्मान्निर्गुणश्रुतीनां सर्वासां तत्कालपरत्वमिति वेदितव्यमत एव ।

(३) एकोरामाख्यसिद्धं प्रथितगुणगणागण्यपुण्योदयश्री-
सम्यक्संसेव्यमानं बुधनुतचरितं द्वापराचार्यवर्यम् ।
उद्यद्वेदान्तशास्त्रोभयगतविलसच्छैवसंस्थापनाढ्यं
पूर्वाचार्यप्रशिष्यं शरणमहमिमं देशिकेन्द्रं प्रपद्ये ।।

(४) एकोरामसिद्धभगवत्पादाचार्यैः--

(५) एकोरामसिद्धाराध्यभगवत्पादाचार्यादिभिः स्वीकृतत्वादेतदेव सम्यगुपादेयम्।

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(१) रेवणसिद्ध-मरुलसिद्ध-रामसिद्ध।

(२) मध्वाद्वैत क्षपणक तार्किकादयो जीवानां विभुत्वाङ्गीकारात्तन्निरसनार्थमेतदधिकरणप्रारम्भः।

(३) तार्किक-मध्वादिकेवलभेदवादिनां बौद्धादिवत्सर्वश्रुतिसमन्वयाभावात्।

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(१) श्रीमच्छ्रीपति पण्डितेन्द्रयतिना व्याचक्षते सांप्रतम्।

(२) वीरशैवैकसिद्धान्ते सर्वश्रुतिसमन्वयः।

(४) यथा जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोर्द्वैतसिद्धिः।

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(१) अगस्त्यमुनिचन्द्रेण कृतवैयासिकां शुभाम्।
सूत्रवृत्तिम् समालोक्य कृतं भाष्यं शिवङ्करम्।

(२) सदाशिवं शक्तिधरं सुकेशं चण्डीश्वरं भृङ्गिरिटं शिलावम्।
कुम्भोद्भवं चिन्मयवामदेवं श्रीरेवणासिद्धगुरुं प्रपद्ये॥

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(१) वेङ्कटेश्वरस्याभासविष्णुत्वम्। तदङ्गे नागभूषणादि--
धर्माणां द्योतनात्। मूलविग्रहे शङ्खचक्रादिलाञ्छनानामदर्शनात्।

(२) चिदचिदीश्वरपरिभाषाप्रधानरामानुजशास्त्रं वेदमूलत्वाभावादवैदिकमिति घण्टाघोषः।

(३) रुद्रद्वेषिणां ब्राह्मणेभ्यो बहिष्कार इति घण्टाघोषः।

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(१) अत्र शैवाग्रगण्यश्रीकण्ठशिवाराध्यकृत ब्रह्ममीमांसाभाष्ये विशिष्टाद्वैतं स्वाभिप्रेतत्वेन प्रसाधितम्। .... अतस्तन्मतमुपेक्षणीयम्।

(२) एवं बुद्धमतं निरस्य प्रच्छन्नबौद्धाभिधानजीवेश्वरजगन्मिथ्यात्व--
प्रतिपादक श्रुत्याभासप्रधान निर्विशेषाद्वैतमतमधिकरणान्तरेण निराकरोति।

(३) एवं निःश्रेयसविरोधेन शुष्कवेदान्तनिर्विशेषाद्वैतवादकवासिष्ठमतं निराकृत्य स्वात्महननसिद्धान्तशून्याद्वैताख्यसान्दीपमतमधिकरणान्तरेण निराकरोति।

(४) तस्माद्रज्जुसर्पवदविद्याकल्पितवादप्रधाननिष्प्रपञ्चब्रह्माद्वैतवादस्त्ववैदिकः इति वेदितव्यः।

(५) तप्तलिङ्गमुद्राङ्कितरौद्रमतात्तप्तशूलडमरुकमुद्राङ्कितन्त्रपाशुपत–मताच्छ्रौतशिवलिङ्गधारणावच्छिन्नशैवमतस्य सर्वाधिकत्वमनिवार्यम्।

(६) दर्शितश्चतादृशान्वयो ज्ञानाय विचारः कर्त्तव्य इति परमशिवाराध्यस्वामिना शिवज्ञानचन्द्रोदये।

कैवल्यप्रकाशे व्याख्यातं च परमशिवाराध्यभट्टाचार्येण।

(७) तथा चतुर्वेदपारङ्गतैर्ज्योतिर्नाथ घण्टानाथ भीमनाथ भट्टभास्करादिभि-र्वैदिकैर्वेदमार्गप्रतिष्ठापनाचार्यैरपि पाषण्डपाञ्चरात्रबुद्धाद्वैतादिदुर्मत-निराकरणानन्तरम्। नीलकण्ठ भगवत्पाद भट्टभास्कर घण्टानाथ ज्योति-र्नाथादि पूर्वाचार्यैः छान्दोग्यभाष्ये।

(८) "ऋतं पिबन्तौ" इत्यत्र बुद्धिक्षेत्रज्ञसाधारणार्थशतृप्रत्ययस्य कर्तृत्व-शक्तस्य कारकत्वमात्रलक्षणाया दुर्वासीये प्रतिपादनाच्च।

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(१) वेदवेदान्तनिष्ठागरिष्ठमनुवामदेवागस्त्य दुर्वासोपमन्यु रेवणसिद्ध मरुल-सिद्धादिभिश्च निराकृता इति सूत्रावयवार्थः।

(२) (i) ईशानस्सर्वविद्यानामीश्वरस्सर्वभूतानाम्, इत्यादि श्रुतिशतेषु शिवस्यैव सर्वपतित्वोपदेशात्।

(ii) बहुश्रुतिसिद्ध रेवणसिद्ध मरुलसिद्ध रामसिद्ध वेमाराध्योद्भटाराध्यादि–ब्रह्मनिष्ठाचरितभक्तिवैराग्यश्रद्धाश्रवणमननाद्युपासना—फलकमोक्षवैकल्यप्रसङ्गः।

(३) एतद् द्वैताऽद्वैतमतमेव केचिद्विशेषाद्वैतमिति सेश्वराद्वैतमिति शिवाद्वैतमिति सर्वश्रुतिसारमतमिति भेदाऽभेदमिति पर्यायत्वेन प्रवदन्ति।

(४) विश्च शेषश्च विशेषौ। विशेषयोरद्वैतं विशेषाऽद्वैतमिति निरुक्ता।

(५) (i) षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वरूपत्वं तल्लिङ्गस्यैव सर्वदा।

(ii) षट्त्रिंशत्सङ्ख्योपपत्तेर्न पञ्चविंशतिसङ्ख्याप्रतिपत्तिरित्युपदिश्यते-

(६) (i) तदुत्तरसूत्रे सन्धिकालदृष्टान्तेन तदुभयसिद्धान्तस्थापनाद् भेदा-ऽभेदप्रधानकाशकृत्स्नमतमेव मुख्यसिद्धान्त इति घण्टाघोषः।

(ii) भेदाऽभेदमतस्यैव सर्वाधिकत्वम् "अनवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः" इति सूत्रेण राद्धान्तितम्।

(७) शरीराभिमानरहितेच्छाशक्ति-क्रियाशक्ति-ज्ञानशक्ति-व्यापाराणां नित्यवैभवपरमानन्दकन्दस्वप्रकाशविभूतिमय–शिवसामरस्य–साङ्ख्यरसैक–प्रपञ्चावगाहिनां परिपूर्णसर्वशिवात्मकभावप्रकटनं श्रुतिर्दर्शयति।

(८) सकामानुष्ठितकर्मणां फलस्वातन्त्र्येऽपि निष्कामानुष्ठितकर्मणामाणवादि-मलत्रयनिर्मुक्तपरमपुरुषार्थोपपत्तेः ।

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(१) अन्त्यवर्णचतुर्दशं तु पाणिन्युद्देशेनैवोपदिष्टमित्यपि तत्रैव स्पष्टम् ।

(२) सोयमक्षरसमाम्नायो... ब्रह्मराशिः ।

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(१) तथा चोक्तमिन्द्रेण ।

(२) अत्र केषांचिद्ग्रन्थे अकारादिक्षकारान्ताः षट्त्रिंशत्तत्वमयाः कतिचित्तन्त्रराजादिग्रन्थे पञ्चभूतक्रमेण लिपिप्रकारेण ।

(3) See textual authority page XLVIII, (१)

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(१) संसारस्य परं पारं दत्तेऽसौ पारदः स्मृतः ।

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(१) तत्रपञ्चस्तु गोविन्द भगवत्पादाचार्य-सर्वज्ञ रामेश्वर भट्टारक प्रभृतिभिः प्राचीनैराचार्यैर्निरूपित इति ग्रन्थभूयस्त्वभयादुदास्यते । ......पूर्वं लोहे परीक्षेत पश्चाद्देहे प्रयोजयेत् ।

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(१) गोविन्दभगवत्पादाचार्यो गोविन्दनायकः ।
चर्पटिः कपिलो व्याडिः कापालिः कन्दलायनः ॥

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(१) दर्शनानि षडेवात्र, मूलभेदव्यपेक्षया
देवता तत्त्वभेदेन, ज्ञातव्यानि मनीषिभिः ।

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(१) एवं पशुपतेरिति कार्यकारणयोः प्रसादस्य चोद्देशः ।

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(१) ततश्च घृतकीटन्यायेन एकदेशेनैव माया परिणमत इत्यदोषः ।

(२) कर्म हि कृष्यादिवत्प्रकृतिसंस्काररूपत्वाद् बुद्धिगुणत्वेनैवेष्यते ।

(३) तस्य भूतादिरूपेण त्रिविधत्वादचैतन्ये सत्यनेकत्वेनास्यानित्यत्वं सिद्धमिति भावः ।

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(१) अतएवाश्रयादन्यत्रोपलब्धेराकाशैकगुणः शब्द इति यद्वैशेषिकादिभिरुक्तम्, तदयुक्तम् ।

(२) अनेनैतेषां परमाणुरूपतामभिदधाना नैयायिकादयः प्रतिक्षिप्ताः ।

(३) ननु निर्मल एवाऽऽत्मा सांख्यैरभ्युपगतः । तदयुक्तम् । निर्मलस्य भोगासक्त्यसम्भवात् । तत्संभवे वा मुक्तस्यापि प्रसङ्गात् ।

(४) तस्मात् तयोरात्मविषययोर्भोक्तृभोग्यतायोग्ययोर्बुद्धितत्त्वे संबन्धो यावद्गतिपरस्पररूपमेलनात्मा वासगृह इव यूनोः यः स एव भोक्तृभोग्यभावः ।

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(१) बुद्धिबोधं हि यदात्मनि अविशिष्टतया अहङ्कारो व्यवहरति, स एव अयं भोगः ।

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(१) अतो भोक्तृत्वाच्चेतनस्य पुरुषस्यैव कर्तृत्वं नाचेतनानां भोग्यानां बुद्ध्यादीनामिति मन्तव्यम् ।

(२) तथा ह्यात्मैकत्वं तावत्साधयितुमशक्यम् अनेकत्वप्रतिपादकानां श्रुतीनां सम्भवात् । एकत्वश्रुतीनामन्यपरत्वादनेकत्वज्ञापकस्य दृश्यमानस्य जननमरणादिप्रतिनियमस्यानपह्नवनीयत्वाच्च ।

(३) चिदचिद्विश्वसंभूतिः
आत्मनो यदि सोपि हि ।
चिदचिज्जायते यस्मात्
कार्यं कारणधर्मगम् ॥

(४) सर्वस्यापि हि धर्मिणो धर्मः सर्वत्र स्वेतरविषयेष्वेव प्रकाशते । यथा वह्नेरुष्णत्वादि काष्ठादौ ।

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(१) एवं पशुपतेरिति कार्यकारणयोः प्रसादस्य चोद्देशः ।

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(१) इह पुरा पाणिनीयेऽस्मिन् व्याकरणे व्याड्युपरचितं ग्रन्थलक्षपरिमाणं संग्रहाभिधानं निबन्धनमासीत् ।

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(१) आप्रलयं यत्तिष्ठति सर्वेषां भोगदायि भूतानाम् ।
तत्तत्त्वमिति प्रोक्तं न शरीरघटादि तत्त्वमतः ॥

(२) मायायाः परतोऽध्वा शुद्धः शक्तौ निलीयते सकलः ।
परमात्मनि सापि शिवे तिष्ठत्यविभागमापन्ना ॥

(३) माया पुरुषः शिव इत्येतत् त्रितयं महार्थसंहारे ।

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(१) शैवागमेषु मुख्यं पतिपशुपाशा इति क्रमात् त्रितयम्।

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(1) See textual authority page LXXII (३)

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(१) चिद्घन एको व्यापी नित्यः सततोदितः प्रभुश्शान्तः।

(२) विधाता कमलस्योष्णगभस्तिः स्यात्तथा शिवः।
कर्त्ता सर्गादिकार्याणामविकारोऽपि शक्तिमान्॥

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(१) शक्तो यया स शम्भुः भुक्तौ मुक्तौ च पशुगणस्यास्य।
तामेकां चिद्रूपामाद्यां सर्वात्मनाऽस्मि नतः।

(२) यथैका सवितुः शक्तिर्दानादानादिकर्मभिः।

(३) शिवशक्त्योरात्मभेदाभावेऽपि धर्मिधर्मभेदः।

(४) शक्तेर्धर्मत्वेनाश्रयं विनाऽवस्थानासम्भवात् तदाश्रयः स एव शक्तिमान् सङ्कल्पमात्रेण विश्वकर्ता।

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(१) चिच्छब्देनात्र ज्ञानक्रिये वक्ष्येते।

(२) अस्मिन्निलीय निखिला इच्छाद्याः शक्तयः स्वकं कार्यम्।

(३) ध्यानार्थमेवेश्वरस्य पञ्चवक्त्राद्याकारः श्रूयते, निराकारे ध्यानपूजाद्ययोगात्।

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(१) नित्यमुक्तत्वादीश्वरस्य ज्ञेयादिविषये शक्तिव्यतिरेकेण न बुद्ध्यादिकरणापेक्षा।

(२) शिवस्य सर्वदा विन्द्वावेर्नित्यस्य विषयस्य ग्राह्यत्वात्।
ग्रहणसामर्थ्यस्य गृहीतृसमवेतत्वेन सर्वदावस्थानाच्च।

(३) व्यापको भुवनादीनामभिव्याप्तः स बिन्दुना।
विन्दुश्शक्त्या शिवेनैषा नान्येन व्याप्यते शिवः॥

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(१) चितिः चैतन्यात्मिका शिवस्य समवायिनी शक्तिः।
सङ्कल्पमात्रेण सृष्ट्यादिकृत्यं विदधाति।

(२) वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणानां पशूनां पक्वापक्वयोरुभयोर्वर्गयोः क्रमेण शुद्धाशुद्धभोगनिष्पत्तये बिन्दुमायोत्पादितैस्तनुकरणभुवनभावैः संबन्धजननात्मिका सृष्टिः।

(३) शुद्धेऽध्वनि शिवः कर्ता प्रोक्तोऽनन्तोऽसिते प्रभुः।

(४) यद्येवं शिवस्यापि शुद्धविषये कर्तृत्वात् शरीरेन्द्रिययोगादिप्रसङ्गः। तन्न, तस्य नित्यनिर्मलनिरतिशयसर्वार्थज्ञानक्रियायुक्तत्वात्। अशरीरस्यापि आत्मनः स्वदेहस्पन्दादौ कर्तृत्वदर्शनाच्च।

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(१) अशुद्धाध्वविषयेत्वनन्तादिद्वारेणेत्युक्तम्।

(२) यद्येवं शिवस्यासर्वकर्तृत्वप्रसङ्गः। तन्न, साक्षात्कर्तृत्वम् अत्र निषिद्धम् न तु प्रयोजककर्तृत्वम्।

(३) जगतानेन संयोज्य तान् पुंसो लोलिकावतः।
भोगार्थं साधनाकारं करोति स्थितिमीश्वरः॥

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(१) माया पुरुषः शिव इत्येतत्त्रितयं महार्थसंहारे।
अवशिष्यते पुनस्तत्प्रवर्तते पूर्ववत् सृष्टौ॥

(२) मायायाः परतोऽध्वा शुद्धः शक्तौ निलीयते सकलः।
परमात्मनि सापि शिवे तिष्ठत्यविभागमापन्ना।

(३) स्थित्यन्ते सोपि संसारे विश्रमार्थं प्रधावताम्।
पशूनां प्रकृतीनां च क्षमत्वोत्पादनाय च
ततः सर्वोपसंहारं विधत्ते भगवानिति।

(४) मायेयार्थसंबन्धनिमित्तम् अनादिकर्मभोजनात्मकं संसारमापादयति। तदापादनमेवास्य सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारानुगतं तिरोधानाख्यं कृत्यमुच्यते।

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(१) तेषु हेयताज्ञानरोधात्मकं तिरोधानम्।

(२) अनुग्रहोपि पाशतिरोधानेनात्मनां परापरमोक्षदानमिति।

(३) ननु प्रागर्थपञ्चकं पाशा इत्युक्तम् अत्र चतुर्विधत्वोक्तिर्विरुद्धेति चेन्न। बिन्दोर्महामायात्मनः परमुक्त्यपेक्षया पाशत्वेपि तद्योगस्य विद्येश्वरादिपदप्राप्तिहेतुत्वेनापरमुक्तित्वादत्र पाशत्वेनानुपादानमित्यविरोधः।

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(१) शिवशक्तेस्तु पाशाधिष्ठानेन आत्मनि तिरोधायिकत्वादुपचारेण पाशत्वमुक्तम्।

(२) एक एव मलो जडत्वे सति नित्यत्वाज्जडानामनेकानां घटादिवदनित्यत्वं स्यात्।

(३) निवृत्तिश्चास्य मलस्य चक्षुःपटलादेरिव द्रव्यत्वात् ईश्वराख्यवैद्यव्यापारसाध्यत्वेन तत्प्रवर्तनाय कमपि व्यापारमपेक्षते।

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(१) आद्याननुगृह्य शिवो विद्येशत्वे नियोजयत्यष्टौ।
मंत्रांश्च करोत्यपरान् ते चोक्ताः कोटयः सप्त॥

(२) माया च तावद्वस्तुरूपा। न तु वेदान्तवादिनामिवासत्यरूपा।

(३) मायीयतिरोधायकशिवशक्तिसमुद्भवौ चान्यौ।

(४) मोहहेतुत्वाद्विपरीतप्रतिपत्तिहेतुना मायाख्येन बन्धेन भाव्यम्।

(५) निर्हेतुकत्वे मुक्तस्यापि भवेत्। ततस्तत्कारणतयाऽनाद्यावारको मलोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः।

(६) कर्मणोऽनादित्वं प्रवाहानादितयेत्युक्तम्।

(७) भोगस्य सुखदुःखादेर्भोगसाधनानां च शरीरेन्द्रियाणां प्रत्यात्मनियतत्वेन विचित्रत्वाद्वैचित्र्यकारणं कर्माप्यवश्यमभ्युपेयमिति।

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(१) पाशत्वं तु तस्याः पाशधर्मानुवर्तनेनोपचारात्।

(२) तिरोभावश्च पाशानुग्रहेणात्मनां यथानुगुणभोगभोजनम्।

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(१) उत्तीर्णमायाम्बुधयो भग्नकर्ममहार्गलाः।
अप्राप्तशिवधामानस्त्रिधा विज्ञानकेवलः॥

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(३) एवंभूतमुपादानरूपं महामायाख्यं शिवतत्त्वमाचार्या जगदुरिति। नत्वियमार्या परमशिवविषयतया तच्छक्तिविषयतया वा व्याख्येया। शिवादिपृथिव्यन्ततत्त्वलक्षणप्रस्तावे तत्त्वातीतयोस्तयोरत्राप्रस्तुतत्वात्।

(४) शिवतत्त्वं बिन्द्वात्मकमाद्यं प्रधानमुपादानं स्मरन्ति पूर्वाचार्याः। परमो–पादानत्वेनैव चास्य मायावन्नित्यत्वं सिद्धमित्युक्तम् अतश्चान्यानि चत्वारि तानि तत्कार्याणीति भावः।

(५) ज्ञानक्रिये स्वस्मिन् स्थिते आत्मनां भावयतीति ज्ञानक्रियास्वभावम्। अयमर्थः तत्तद्भुवनेश्वराराधनात् दीक्षया वा स्वकार्यभूतशुद्धाध्वभुवन—प्राप्तानां ज्ञानक्रिये प्रकटयतीति।

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(१) न तु शक्त्यधिष्ठाननैरपेक्ष्येणास्वातन्त्र्यात्। अचेतनस्य चेतनाधिष्ठानं बिना कार्योत्पादनायोगात्।

(२) किञ्च उपादानं हि परिणामेन वा कार्यमुत्पादयति यथा क्षीरस्य दधिभावः। वृत्तिरूपेण वा यथा पटस्य गृहादिभावः। शिवादीनामेषां तु वृत्तिपरिणामौ न संभवतः अविकारित्वात्, विकारित्वे जडत्वानित्यत्वादिदोष-प्रसङ्गात्।

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(१) विद्याशरीरो भगवाननन्तः क्षोभको मतः।
मायायाः सा च विद्वद्भिर्वैन्दवं तत्वमुच्यते॥

(२) अत्र आत्मनां चिच्छक्तिः येन नादात्मना परिणतेन अभिधेयबुद्धिबीजेन संपृक्ता मायेयसविकल्पार्थावलोकने प्रवर्तते।

(३) यस्य च प्रत्यात्मनियतैः नादाख्यैः विचित्रैः वृत्तिभेदैः उपहिता विचित्रैव प्रकाशते स बिन्दुः।

(४) एवं ज्ञानवैचित्र्यमपि नादसहकृतमेव करोति न केवलम्।

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(१) बुद्धेरध्यवसायहेतुत्वेऽपि बिन्दुकार्यशब्दसहकारादेव सविकल्पकज्ञानं जन्यते।

(२) केचिदाचक्षते बिन्दुः समवैति शिवे ततः।
दृक्छक्तिवत्क्रियाशक्तिरियं कुण्डलिनी परा॥

(३) स हि तादात्म्यसंबन्धो जडेन जडिमावहः।
शिवस्यानुपमाखण्डचिद्घनैकस्वरूपिणः॥

(४) ईश्वरस्याचेतनत्वाभ्युपगमे जगत्कर्तृत्वेन ईश्वरं साधयता
अनुमानेन तस्य चेतनत्वादिस्वरूपप्रतिपादकैः आगमैश्च बाधः॥

(५) महामाया भवेत् त्रेधा तत्र स्थूला गुणात्मिका।
बुद्ध्यादिभोग्यजननी प्रकृतिः पुरुषस्य सा॥
सूक्ष्मा कालादितत्त्वानामविभागस्वरूपिणी।
जननी मोहिनी माया सर्वाशुद्धाध्वकारणम्।
मन्त्रयोनिः परा माया नित्या कुण्डलिनी तु या।
उपादानं शरीराणां विद्याविद्येश्वरात्मनाम्॥

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(१) ननु उक्तवद्वर्णानामर्थप्रतिपादकत्वासंभवात्तदन्यथानुपपत्त्या तदभिव्य-ङ्ग्योऽन्य एव अविनिर्भक्तो मायूराण्डरसवदेनेकवर्णावभासकः क्रम एव पदात्मा पदव्यतिरिक्तश्च वाक्यस्वभावः समस्तस्य जगतो युगपत्क्रमेण वार्थप्रतीतिहेतुत्वाद्व्यापको नित्यश्चस्फोटोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः। यतः स एव व्यवहर्तॄणामर्थं स्फुटयतीति वैयाकरणाः।

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(२) पदवाक्यैकदेशभूतानां वर्णानां क्षणविध्वंसित्वेन परस्परोपकारकत्वाभावस्योक्तत्वात्तद्व्यतिरिक्तयोश्च पदवाक्ययोर्भेदेनादर्शनान्न तयोरपि अभिधायकत्वमिति प्रत्यक्षनिराकृतत्वेनानुमानेनापि न तयोः सद्भावः।

(३) गौरिति नामादिपदं श्रोत्रग्राह्यं सदस्ति चेन्नैवम्।
न गकारौकारविसर्जनीयबाह्यं यदतोऽन्यदत्रास्ति।
तेषां युगपद्भावाभावात् परोपलम्भे न पूर्वयोर्भावः।
प्राप्ताद्विसर्जनीयात् खुरकम्बललक्षणा न चिद्व्यक्तिः॥

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(१) स्मर्यमाणानुभूयमानवर्णसमूहात्मकं पदम् अभिधायकमिति चेत् तन्न। स्मर्यमाणानां प्रदीपानां अर्थप्रकाशकत्वादर्शनात्।

(२) तत्र यत्तावदुक्तं वर्णव्यतिरिक्तः स्फोट इति तदयुक्तम्। न वर्णव्यतिरेकेण तस्य स्फोटस्य तद्ग्राहकयोर्मध्ये स्थितिरुपपद्यते। यतः स हि वर्णेभ्यो भिन्नो वा स्यादभिन्नो वा। न तावद्भिन्नः। वर्णव्यतिरेकेण तस्योपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्यानुपलब्धेः शशविषाणादेरिव। न चानुमानात्स्थितिरुपपद्यते। तस्य प्रत्यक्षनिराकृतत्वात्।

(३) व्यक्तं हि तावत्खुरकंबलादिलक्षणमर्थं बुद्ध्याऽध्यवस्य तदनुगुणं गौरित्यादि पदं चिन्तयैवानुसन्धाय ततः स्थूलशब्दं प्रयुङ्क्ते।

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(१) अयमेवास्य बुद्ध्याकारस्य वाचकस्य वाच्याद्बाह्याकाराद्विशेषः, यद्बाह्याकारपरामर्शरूपत्वाद्वाचकत्वम्, ततश्च वाचकैः परामर्शज्ञानभेदैर्गवादिलक्षणा बाह्याकारभेदा विमृश्यमाना वाच्या भवन्तीति विशेषः।

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(१) बुद्धिर्हि तावद्बाह्ये चक्षुरादिना विषयीकृत एवार्थेऽध्यवसायिनी दृष्टा नाविषयीकृते अतिप्रसङ्गात्। ततश्चान्तरे बुद्धिः केनापि विषयीकृत एवार्थे परामर्शं करोति। अन्यथा सर्वदा सर्वार्थपरामर्शप्रसङ्गात्। तस्माद्रूपरसादयोर्थाः येन वक्तृबुद्धेः परामृश्यतां नीताः स एवात्र नादः।

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(१) स बिन्दुः परनादाख्यः नादविन्द्वर्णकारणम्।
बिन्दुश्च तत्कार्यः मयूराण्डरसबिन्दुवदव्यपदेश्यः परामर्शज्ञानरूपः अक्षरबिन्दुः तत्रैव सूक्ष्मत्वेनोक्तः अर्णश्च वर्णः।

Page XCVI

(१) शब्दतत्त्वमघोषावाग्ब्रह्म कुण्डलिनी ध्रुवम्।
विद्याशक्तिः परा नादो महामायेति देशिकैः।
बिन्दुरेवं समाख्यातो व्योमानाहतमित्यपि।

(२) वैखर्या मध्यमायाश्च पश्यन्त्याश्चैतदद्भुतम् ।
अनेकतीर्थभेदायास्त्रय्या वाचः परं पदम् ।

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(१) स्फोट एव हि पश्यन्ती तदन्या वा द्वयं भवेत् ।
तदन्यत्वे तदैक्ये वा तदङ्गत्यग्ररूपया ॥

(२) आत्मस्वरूपविदस्तु शैवाः तां सूक्ष्माख्यां बिन्दुकार्यभूतां
शब्दवृत्तिमेव मन्यन्ते न तु पुरुषसमवायिनीम् ।

(३) अविभागेन वर्णानां सर्वतः संहृतिक्रमात् ।
स्वयंप्रकाशा पश्यन्ती मयूराण्डरसोपमा ॥
इयं च अक्षरबिन्दुरूपेत्युक्तम् ।

(४) स्वप्रकाशा संविद्रूपा वाक् सा पश्यन्तीत्युच्यते ।

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(१) यस्यां दृष्टस्वरूपायामधिकारो निवर्तते ।

(२) पुरुषे षोडशकले तामाहुरमृताह्वयाम् ।

3. See textual authority Page XCVII, (२)

(४) अस्य बिन्दोर्य आद्य उन्मेषः प्रथमः परिणामः । शान्त्यादि—
भुवनात्मको नादात्मकश्च तच्छक्तितत्त्वमुच्यते ।

(५) ज्ञानक्रियाख्य शक्त्योरपकर्षोत्कर्षयोरभावेन ।
यः प्रसरस्तं प्राहुः सदाशिवाख्यं बुधास्तत्त्वम् ॥

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(१) न्यग्भवति यत्र शक्तिर्ज्ञानाख्योद्वृत्ततां क्रिया भजते ।
ईश्वरतत्त्वं तदिह प्रोक्तं सर्वार्थकर्तृ सदा ।

(२) न्यग्भवति कर्तृशक्तिर्ज्ञानाख्योद्रेकमश्नुते यत्र ।
तत्तत्त्वं विद्याख्यं प्रकाशकं ज्ञानरूपत्वात् ।

(३) पञ्चानामप्येषां न हि क्रमोऽस्तीह कालरहितत्वात् ।
व्यापारवशादेषां विहिता खलु कल्पना शास्त्रे ।

(४) सकलो बिन्दुःअक्षरबिन्द्वात्मको नादश्च स्थूलध्वनिरूपः ।
द्वौ च सदाशिवतत्त्वान्तर्भूतौ ज्ञेयौ ।

Page C

(१) शक्तय इहास्य करणं मायोपादानमिष्यते सूक्ष्मा ।
एका नित्या व्यापिन्यनादिनिधना शिवाऽऽसक्ता ।

(२) साधारणी नराणां कारणमपि चेयमखिलभुवनानाम् ।
निखिलजनकर्मखचिता स्वभावतो मोहसञ्जननी ।

(३) तुर्याद्यादिप्रत्ययस्यार्थः कालो मायासमुद्भवः।
कलयन्नासमुत्थानान्नियत्या नियतम् पशुम्।

(४) नन्वेष कालो नैयायिकादिभिर्नित्योऽभ्युपगतः अत आह भावीति, तस्य भूतादिरूपेण त्रिविधत्वादचैतन्ये सत्यनेकत्वेनास्यानित्यत्वं सिद्धमिति भावः।

Page CI

(१) नियत्यभावे अन्यैरुपार्जितान्यपि कर्माण्यन्ये भुञ्जीरन्। राजनियमाभावे कृष्यादिफलानीव दस्यवः, अतस्तन्नियामकत्वेनेयं सिद्धा।

(२) मायातस्तदनुकला मलं नृणामेकतस्तु कलयित्वा।
व्यञ्जयति कर्तृशक्तिं कलेति तेनेह कथितेयम्॥

कला हि भोक्तृस्वरूपोपकारकत्वेनान्तरङ्गत्वात् प्रधानं कालादिस्तु बहिरङ्गत्वादप्रधानमिति भावः।

(३) उद्बुद्धकर्तृशक्तेः पुंसो विषयप्रदर्शननिमित्तम्।
विद्यातत्त्वं सूते प्रकाशरूपं कलैवैषा॥

(४) ननु विषयग्रहणे बुद्ध्यादीनि करणानि सन्ति, सत्यम्, यथा घटादिज्ञानं चक्षुरादिव्यतिरेकेण न संभवति तथा सुखादिविषयग्रहणं करणसापेक्षमत एवेयमात्मनः परममन्तरङ्गकरणम् तेषां बहिरङ्गत्वात्। एतदुक्तं भवति। अश्वेन पथा दीपिकया वा यातीत्यादाविवात्रानेककरणसाध्येऽपि फले विद्यैव परमं करणमिति।

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(१) बुद्धिर्यदास्य भोग्या सुखादिरूपा तदा भवेत्करणम्।
विद्यैवं करणं स्याद्विषयग्रहणे पुनर्बुद्धिः॥

(२) अवैराग्यस्य च बुद्धिधर्मत्वेन वासनारूपत्वान्न पुरुषोपकारः संभवति। अन्यथा बुद्धेरनन्तवासनायोगेन पुंसो युगपद्विरुद्धानन्तप्रतिपत्तिवैशसप्रसङ्गात्।

Page CIII

(१) पशुस्त्रिविधः। विज्ञानाकल प्रलयाकल सकल भेदात्। तत्र प्रथमो विज्ञानयोगसंन्यासैर्भोगेन वा कर्मक्षये सति कर्मक्षयार्थस्य कलादिभोगबन्धस्याभावात्केवलमलमात्रयुक्तो विज्ञानाकल इति व्यपदिश्यते।

(२) प्रलयकेवलाख्यो वर्गः प्रलये कलादेरुपसंहारात् मलकर्मयुक्तो भवति।

(३) मलमायाकर्मयुतः सकलस्तेषु द्विधा भवेदाद्यः।
सकलस्तु बन्धत्रययुक्तः तत्र च मायायाः साक्षात्संबन्धाभावात् मायाशब्देन तत्कार्यभूताः कलादयः कथ्यन्ते।

(४) तत्र पुर्यष्टकं नाम प्रतिपुरुषं नियतः सर्गादारभ्य कल्पान्तं मोक्षान्तं वाऽवस्थितः पृथिव्यादि-कलान्त-त्रिंशत्तत्त्वात्मकोऽसाधारणरूपः सूक्ष्म देहः ।

Page CIV

(१) तत्त्वैरेभिः कलितो भोक्तृत्वदशां यदा पशुर्नीतः ।
पुरुषाख्यतां तदायं लभते तत्त्वेषु गणनां च ॥

(२) ननु गुणा एवाव्यक्तं बुद्धयादिकारणमिति साङ्ख्याः । तदयुक्तमित्याह गुणानामचैतन्ये सत्यनेकत्वात्कारणपूर्वकत्वमित्युक्तमतोऽनभिव्यक्तगुण-रूपकार्यत्वादेव तदव्यक्तमित्युच्यते ।

(३) अव्यक्ताद् गुणतत्त्वं प्रख्याव्यापारनियमरूपमिह ।

(४) ननु "अव्यक्तं मायातः" इत्यादिना प्रकृत्यधस्तनतत्त्वानां चतुर्विंशते-रुक्तत्वात्कथमत्र ऽयधिका विंशतिरुच्यते अत आह "यस्मात्प्रकृतिगुणानाम्" इति .... ततः कार्यकरणयोरभेदविवक्षयैवमुक्तमित्यविरोधः ।

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(१) अधिकारमलांशावशेषतोऽधिकारनिबन्धन एव । अत एव मायोत्तीर्ण-त्वान्मलरहितत्वाच्च विद्याविद्येश्वरप्राप्तेरपरमुक्तित्वम् ।

(२) न च तस्य मोक्षस्य 'आत्मा ज्ञातव्यः' इत्यादाविवायं पशुः कर्ता, पशो-रीश्वरसंस्कार्यत्वेन सर्वदा कर्मत्वात् ।

Page CVI

(१) अतो विमुक्तास्सर्वज्ञा न तु चिन्मात्रवेदिनः । न तु स्वसंवेदनमात्रनिष्ठा अपि तु शिववत्सर्वज्ञा एवेति ।

(२) नैषां च सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वकर्तृत्वसंभवेऽपि प्रवृत्तिरित्याह ।
न ते विश्वस्य कर्तारः कर्तास्य शिव एव यत् । कुत इत्यत्राह—
न हि कर्तृबहुत्वस्य जनकं विद्यते क्वचित् ।

(३) नन्वात्मनां कैवल्यमेव श्रेय इति सर्वतन्त्र प्रसिद्धम् ।

(४) वेदान्ते तावत् सच्चिदानन्दलक्षणमात्मानमन्तरेण न वस्तु किञ्चिदभ्युपगम्यते । विषयाभावेनास्य धर्मिधर्मात्मकस्वसंवित्परसंविद्रूप-भेदोऽनुपपन्नः सर्वस्यापि हि धर्मिणो धर्मः सर्वत्र स्वेतरविषयेष्वेव प्रकाशते । यथा वह्नेरुष्णत्वादि काष्ठादौ ।

Page CVII

(१) आत्मधर्मत्वे तु तस्य नित्यत्वव्यापकत्वादेरिव निवर्तयितुमशक्यत्वेन अनिर्मोक्षः ।

(२) निवर्त्यत्वे न आत्मधर्मतेति वस्त्वन्तरमेवात्मनोऽनाद्युपरोधहेतुत्वात् अज्ञानहेतुश्चक्षुष इव पटलादिः मलो वाच्यः। न च द्रव्यस्याज्ञानहेतोः पटलादेरन्यस्य वा ज्ञानान्निवृत्तिर्दृष्टा प्रतिपक्षत्वाभावात्। कथं तर्हि शुक्तिकारजतादौ ज्ञानान्निवृत्तिः।

Page CVIII

(१) पटलादेश्चक्षुर्वैद्यादिवत् ईश्वरादेव तन्निवृत्तिरिति ईश्वरकर्तृक एव मोक्षः नाऽत्मकर्तृकः।

(२) एकत्वदर्शनं मुक्तेः साधनं स्वात्मबाधितम्।
मोच्यमोचनकर्तॄणां नाभेदे सा यतो भवेत्॥

(३) सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणः परमेश्वरसम उत्पद्यत इति उत्पत्तिसमतापक्षः कैश्चिदभ्युपगतः।

Page CIX

(१) यैर्मुक्तावीश्वरसमता सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणसाम्यमुत्पद्यते पुंस इति इष्यते तन्मते उत्पत्तिमदनित्यत्वात् अनित्यत्वं मुक्तेरिति।

(२) ईश्वरगुणा मुक्तौ सङ्क्रमन्त इति गुणसङ्क्रान्तिर्नैवा भवतां तावत्प्रत्यक्षसिद्धा। अतीन्द्रियत्वात्तेषाम्। अथानुमानादित्युच्यते। तदयुक्तम्। गुणसङ्क्रान्तिसाधनेऽनुमाने नोदाहरणस्य दृष्टान्तस्य सद्भावोऽस्ति।

(३) अपरज्ञानिनस्तु अधिकारिण आचार्यास्सिद्धान्तव्यक्तचैतन्यत्वेनापरमुक्ताः। त एव परमुक्त्यर्थमागमदृष्टासु क्रियायोगचर्यासु यथायोग्यं वस्तुत्रयं शिष्यैः सह विनियुञ्जते।

(४) तदेवं समधीतसामान्यविशेषशास्त्राणां समर्थानां समस्तसम्पत्सम्पन्नानां ब्राह्मणोत्तमानामेव सर्वपदार्थविनियोगभरणाय परमेश्वराधिकरणतापरपर्यायमाचार्यत्वं व्यवस्थितमित्युपदिशन्त्याचार्याः।

(५) वस्तुतस्तु गुरूणां स्वार्थतया विहितं सर्वं परार्थमेव। सिद्धिफलदानामेवां चरितस्य साधकादिमार्गदर्शनार्थत्वात्।

Page CXI

(१) तथाहि शास्त्रान्तरे दुःखनिवृत्तिरेव दुःखान्तः इह तु परमैश्वर्यप्राप्तिश्च। तथाऽन्यत्राभूत्वा भावि कार्यमिह तु नित्यं पश्वादि। तथाऽन्यत्र कैवल्याभ्युदयफलो योगः, इह तु परमदुःखान्तफलः। तथान्यत्रावर्त्तकः स्वर्गादिफलो विधिरिह त्वनावर्तको रुद्रसमीपादिफल इति।

Page CXII

(१) कारणं प्रधानमीश्वरश्च ।

Page CXIII

(१) मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।

(२) योऽयमाकाशो मायाविशिष्टब्रह्मण उपादानकारणादुत्पन्नस्तस्मिन्ब्रह्मांशो मायांशश्चोभावनुगतौ ।

(३) यथा ब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य सच्चिदानन्दैकरसत्त्वं स्वभावस्तथा मायाविशिष्टस्य सृष्टिस्थितिसंहाराः स्वभावभूता अतो निःस्पृहस्य प्रयोजनविशेषो न कल्पनीय इत्यष्टमं मतम् । एतदेव सिद्धान्तरहस्यम् ।

(४) ननु कर्माण्येव स्वस्वफलदानाय प्राणिदेहानुत्पादयन्ति किमनेनेश्वरेणेति चेन्न । ईश्वर एव फलदातेति तृतीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयपादे चिन्तितत्वात् ।

(५) किञ्च ब्रह्म सद्रूपं प्रवेष्टृत्वात् यथा गृहादौ प्रवेष्टा पुरुष इत्यभिप्रेत्य प्रवेशं दर्शयति—

(६) तदनुप्रविश्य । सच्च त्यच्चाभवत् । निरुक्तं चानिरुक्तं च । निलयनं चानिलयनं च । विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च । सत्यं चानृतं च सत्यमभवत् ।

(७) यस्मादेवं तस्मात्तद् ब्रह्म सुकृतमित्यनेन शब्देनोच्यते । सुशब्दोऽत्र स्वयं शब्दपर्यायः । कृतशब्दः कर्तृ शब्द पर्यायः । सुकृतं स्वयं कर्तृ ब्रह्मेत्येवं शास्त्रविद्भिरुच्यते ।

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(१) सर्वो वै रुद्रस्तस्मै रुद्राय नमो अस्तु । पुरुषो वै रुद्रः सन्महो नमो नमः । विश्वं भूतं भुवनं चित्रं बहुधा जातं जायमानं च यत् । सर्वोह्येष रुद्रस्तस्मै रुद्राय नमो अस्तु ।

(२) तस्या एवाम्बिकाया ब्रह्मविद्यात्मको देह उमाशब्देनोच्यते ।

(३) यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । येन जातानि जीवन्ति । यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति । तद्विजिज्ञासस्व । तद् ब्रह्मेति ।

(४) अन्नमयादिभ्य आनन्दमयान्तेभ्यः पञ्चभ्यः कोशेभ्यो ब्रह्मतत्त्वं विवेक्तुकाम आदावन्नमयकोशं दर्शयति ।

(५) उत्तरवक्त्ररूपो वामदेवस्तस्यैव विग्रहविशेषा ज्येष्ठादिनामकाः । एते च महादेवपीठशक्तीनां वामादीनां नवानां पतयः पुरुषाः ।

(६) एष जिज्ञासुरेतस्मिन्सद्भावसाधनेन प्रवर्तते स्वानुभवगम्ये ब्रह्मणि प्रतिष्ठां स्वात्मत्वबुद्धिदार्ढ्यं यदा लभते. अथ तदानीं स विद्वान् अभयं जन्ममरणादिभयरहितं मुक्ति पदं प्राप्नोति ।

(७) संङ्क्रमणं नाम दृढसंयोगरूपप्राप्तिः । जलूका तृणे संक्रामतीत्यादौ तथा दृष्टत्वात् ।

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(१) सङ्क्रमशब्देनात्र भ्रान्तिविनाशलक्षणस्य विद्याफलस्य विवक्षितत्वात् ।

(२) ब्रह्मणः सायुज्यं सलोकतामाप्नोत्येतासामेव देवतानाँ–सायुज्यं-सार्ष्टितां–समानलोकतामाप्नोति य एवं वेद इति ।

(३) तस्मात्साक्षात्कारात्तल्लोकवासिदेहपातादूर्ध्वं हिरण्यगर्भलोकं गत्वा तत्र ब्रह्मणो हिरण्यगर्भस्य महिमानमैश्वर्यं प्राप्नोति । तत्रोत्पन्नब्रह्म-तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारस्तस्माज्ज्ञानाद् ब्रह्मलोकविनाशादूर्ध्वं सत्यज्ञानादि–लक्षणस्य ब्रह्मणो महिमानं महत्त्वं च प्राप्नोति ।

(४) तस्माद् गुहानिहितं प्रत्यक्त्वमेव ब्रह्मतया विद्यात् ।

Page CXVI

(१) अम्नात्पुरुषः ।

(२) योऽयमाकाशो मायाविशिष्टब्रह्मण उपादानकारणादुत्पन्नस्तस्मिन् ब्रह्मांशो मायांशश्चोभावनुगतौ ।

(३) भेदाभेदविरोधव्यवहारस्याऽऽकारभेदेनापि रहितेऽत्यन्तमेकस्मिन्नपि वस्तुनि सावकाशत्वात् । तस्माद् ब्रह्माकारेणाद्वैतं भोक्तृभोग्याकारेण द्वैतमित्याकारभेदाद् व्यवस्थासिद्धौ न कोऽपि बाधः ।

(४) सद्योजातनामकं यत्पश्चिमवक्त्रं तद्रूपं परमेश्वरम् प्रपद्यामि प्राप्नोमि । उत्तरवक्त्ररूपो वामदेवस्तस्यैव विग्रहविशेषा ज्येष्ठादिनामकाः । एते च महादेवपीठशक्तीनां वामादीनां नवानां पतयः पुरुषाः । अघोरनामको दक्षिणवक्त्ररूपः ।
प्राग्वक्त्रदेवस्तत्पुरुषनामकः ।
योऽयमूर्ध्ववक्त्रो देवः सोऽयं सर्वविद्यानां वेदशास्त्रादीनां चतुःषष्टिकला-विद्यानामीशानो नियामकः ।

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(१) अन्यत्र दुःखनिवृत्तिरेव दुःखान्तः इह तु पारमैश्वर्यप्राप्तिश्च । अन्यत्रा–भूत्वा भावि कार्यम् । इह तु नित्यं पश्वादि । अन्यत्र सापेक्षं कारणम् इह तु निरपेक्षो भगवानेव । अन्यत्र कैवल्यादिफलको योगः । इह तु पारमैश्वर्यदुःखान्तफलकः । अन्यत्र पुनरावृत्तिरूपसामीप्यादि-फलको विधिः । इह पुनरपुनरावृत्तिरूपसामीप्यादिफलकः ।

(२) तदेतद्वैष्णवमतं दासत्वादिपदवेदनीयं परतन्त्रत्वं दुःखावहत्वान्न दुःखान्तावी प्सितास्पदमित्यरोचयमानाः पारमैश्वर्यं कामयमानाः पराभिमता मुक्ता न भवन्ति परतन्त्रत्वात् पारमैश्वर्यरहितत्वादस्मदादिवत् । मुक्ता-त्मानश्च परमेश्वरगुणसंबन्धिनः पुरुषत्वे सति समस्तदुःखबीज-विधुरत्वात्परमेश्वरवत्—इत्याद्यनुमानं प्रमाणं प्रतिपद्यमानाः केचन माहेश्वराःपरमपुरुषार्थसाधनं पञ्चार्थप्रपञ्चनपरं पाशुपतशास्त्रमाश्रयन्ते ।

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(१) स्वतन्त्रस्याप्रयोज्यत्वं करणादिप्रयोक्तृता।
कर्तुः स्वातन्त्र्यमेतद्धि न कर्माद्यनपेक्षता ॥

(२) आङिति कार्यकारणत्वं आत्मनो मुक्तानां च मर्यादा। तदुच्यते-उद्गाद्यानुग्राह्य (तिरोभाव्य) कल्पकत्वाभावकत्वेनापरिणामित्वम्, आत्मनो मुक्तानां च पुनर्दुःखैरसंयोजनमित्येषा कारणमर्यादा।

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(१) यदेतत् पत्युः पतित्वं शक्तिः सामर्थ्यमैश्वर्यं स्वगुणः सद्भावः सतत्त्वं तत्त्वधर्मः तद् आसनम् न तु पद्मासनवद्रूपवेशनलक्षणमित्यर्थः। आसनं कस्मात्। आस्तेऽस्मिन् (इति) आसनम्। कार्यसनेन वा अध्यास्त इत्यासनमित्यर्थः।

(२) के कारणगुणाः इति ? तदुच्यते पतित्वसत्त्वाद्यत्वाजातत्वोत्पादकानुग्राहकतिरोभावकत्व ....।

(३) ते देव पितरो वद्रशक्त्यां हार्यधार्यकार्यत्वेन वर्तन्ते।

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(१) अत्र सदिति नित्यत्वे। कस्मात्? विनाशहेत्वभावात्। नित्यं ध्रुवमविनाशि पत्युः पतित्वं नान्येषाम् इत्यतोऽभिधीयते सदिति। आह किम् अयमादिमत्त्वे सति नित्यो मोक्षवत्? उच्यते, न, यस्मादाह—आद्यः।

(२) नम इत्यात्मप्रदाने पूजायां च। नमस्कारेणात्मानं प्रयच्छति, पूजां च प्रयुङ्क्त इत्यर्थः।

(३) भव इति विद्याकलापशूनां समस्तानां ग्रहणम्........अतिशयितभवेषु मा भवामीत्यर्थः।

(४) भवोद्भवः ॥४४॥ अत्र भव इति विद्याकलापशूनामेव ग्रहणम्। तस्योत्पत्तिकर्त्ता भगवानित्यतो भवोद्भव इति।

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(१) क्रीडावानेव स भगवान् विद्याकलापशुसंज्ञकं त्रिविधमपि कार्यमुत्पादयन् अनुगृह्णाति तिरोभावयति चेत्यतो देवः

(२) अत्र परत्वाज्ज्येष्ठः केषां केन वा परः? तदुच्यते सिद्धसाधकपशूनाम् च प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिस्थित्यादिफलानाम् इत्यतो ज्येष्ठः परतरः। परतमश्चेति। अकृतकं चास्यैश्वर्यम्। उक्तं हि—
दृक्क्रियालक्षणा शक्तिस्तत्त्वधर्मोऽस्य नित्यता।
श्रेष्ठोऽतः सर्वभूतेषु तस्मादेष परः स्मृतः ॥

(३) नानाविधैः कृतैर्थस्माद् भयैश्च विविधैस्तथा ।
संयोजयति भूतानि तस्माद् रुद्र इति स्मृतः ॥
अत्रापि तद्धर्मित्वे षष्ठी ।

(४) तच्छन्दात् तेषां प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिः स्थितिरिष्टानिष्टस्थानशरीरेन्द्रिय-विषयादिप्राप्तिर्भवति ।

(५) ब्रह्मादि भूर्जपर्यन्तं जगदेतच्चराचरम् ।
यतः कलयते रुद्रः कालरूपी ततः स्मृतः ॥

(६) सिद्धेश्वरवर्जं चेतनेष्वेव सर्वभूतशब्दः ।

(७) कलविकरणाय नमः ।

(८) अत्र मनःशब्देनान्तःकरणम् तत्तन्त्रत्वादुदाहरणार्थत्वाच्च मनोग्रहणस्य उभयात्मकत्वाच्च मनसः सर्वकरणग्रहणानुग्रहणाच्च कार्यग्रहणमित्यतः कार्यकरणाधिष्ठातृत्वाच्च सकल इत्युपचर्यते । तथा चैतादृशमनसः प्रतिषेधादत्र कार्यकरणरहितो निष्कलो भगवान् अमन इत्युच्यते ।

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(१) अघोरेभ्यः ।

(२) विद्यादिकार्यस्य शरणाच्छर्व इत्युच्यते । सर्वं विद्यादिकार्यं रुद्रस्वम् ।

(३) महादेवाय धीमहि ।

(४) समस्तसृष्टिसंहारानुग्रहकारि कारणम् । तस्यैकस्यापि गुणकर्मभेदा-पेक्षया विभाग उक्तः पतिः साद्य इत्यादिना । तत्र पतित्वं निरति-शयदृक्क्रियाशक्तिमत्वं तेनैश्वर्येण नित्यसंबंन्धित्वम् । आद्यत्वमना-गन्तुकैश्वर्यसंबंन्धित्वम् इत्यादर्शकारादिभिस्तीर्थकरैर्निरूपितम् ।

(५) तत्र तावदीश्वरस्यैकैकशः परिमितेषु तेष्वेवबिभुत्वादपरिमितेषु तथा परिमितापरिमितेष्वर्थेषु अभिव्यक्तास्य शक्तिः ।

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(१) तत्पुरुषाय विद्महे ।
अत्र पूर्वं कारणत्वबहुत्वनानात्वेनोपदिष्टस्य परामर्शः तद् इति ।

(२) ऋषिः कस्मात् । ऋषिः क्रियायाम् । ऋषित्वं नाम क्रियाशंसनादृषिः, तथा कृत्स्नं कार्यं विद्याद्यमीशत इत्यतः ऋषिः ।

(३) यदेतद् दृक्क्रियालक्षणमस्ति अनागन्तुकमकृतकमैश्वर्यं तद्गुणसद्भावः सतत्त्वं तत्स्वधर्मः तदकृतकं पुरुषचैतन्यवत् ।

(४) यस्मादस्यैश्वर्यं निष्कलस्यापि स्वगुणसद्भावः सतत्त्वं तत्त्वधर्मः। तद-कृतकत्वं पुरुषचैतन्यवत्।

(५) सर्वस्येशानः। सर्वशब्दो विद्याप्रकृतेर्निरवशेषवाची दृष्टव्यः। विद्यानां धर्मार्थकामकैवल्यतत्साधनपराणाम् ईशानः।

(६) ब्रह्म च कस्मात्? बृंहणत्वाद् बृहत्त्वाद् ब्रह्म। बृंहयते यस्माद् विद्या-कलाभूतानि, बृहच्च तेभ्य इत्यतोऽधिपतिर्ब्रह्मा।

(७) शिवः कस्मात्? परिपूर्णपरितृप्तत्वाच्छिवः।

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(१) पश्यनात् पाशनाच्च पशवः। तत्र पाशा नाम कार्यकरणाख्याः कलाः।

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(१) भवोद्भवः। अत्र भव इति विद्याकलापशूनामेव ग्रहणम्। तस्यो-त्पत्तिकर्त्ता भगवानित्यतो भवोद्भव इति।

(२) पालको नित्यः। पालकनित्यत्वाच्च पाल्यमपि नित्यम्। कस्मात्? नह्यसति पाल्ये पालक इत्येव। सति नित्यत्वे तान्येव पश्वादीनि संयो-जयति। मृल्लोहमयप्राकारादिवद् दृष्टान्तात्। वृत्तिलाभश्चो-त्पत्तिरित्युच्यते।

(३) कलितं शोभितं शब्दितं नभस्ताराभिरिवेत्यर्थः।
अतोऽव्ययोऽमृतो भगवान् कामतः स्वशक्तिस्थं कार्यं स्वशक्त्या अध्यास्ते। तस्मादासनस्थं कार्यं कारणं चेति।

(४) आह–कार्यकारणयोर्वृत्तिसङ्करदोषो गोजाविमहिषीक्षीरवत्। तदुच्यते–न। अङ्गुल्यग्ररूपादिवदित्यसङ्करः। दीपादित्यप्रकाशनयन-रश्मिवच्चासंकरः।

(५) एकोत्तरोत्कर्षेण व्याप्यव्यापकभावेनावस्थितानां तत्त्वादीनां नापरि-च्छेददोषः।

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(१) आह–वृत्त्यसङ्करग्रहणे दृष्टान्ताभावादयुक्तम्। तदुच्यते हरिद्रोदक-वद् व्याप्यंव्यापकं च। तद्यथा–हरिद्रोदके स्निग्धत्वशैत्यादिधर्मैरपां ग्रहणम्, गन्धवर्णघनक्षारत्वादिभिर्हरिद्रायाः।

(२) अस्वतन्त्रं सर्वं कार्यम्।

(३) विद्या पूर्वोक्ता स्वपरान्यप्रकाशिका प्रदीपवत्।

(४) विद्या नाम [सा] या ग्रन्थार्थवर्ति पदार्थानामभिव्यञ्जिका विप्रत्वलक्षणा। न्यायात् पदार्थानामधिगतप्रत्ययो लाभमलोपायाभिज्ञः (अधिगत प्रत्ययस्य?) विद्वानित्युच्यते।

(५) तत्र पञ्चपदार्थविषयं समासविस्तरविभागविशेषोपसंहारनिगमनत-स्तत्त्वज्ञानं प्रथमो विद्यालाभो ज्ञानमिति चोच्यते।

(६) तत्र प्रमाणाभासजं ज्ञानं मिथ्याज्ञानमुक्तं संशयविपर्ययादिलक्षणम्। शास्त्रान्तरेभ्योऽपि तर्हि संशयादिनिवृत्तेरविशेषप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न, शास्त्रान्तरप्रणेतृणामपि विपर्ययानिवृत्तिप्रतिपादनादाचार्यवैशे-ष्यप्रकरणे। तन्न शास्त्रान्तरेभ्योऽपि संशयादिनिवृत्तिरिति कामक्रोध-द्वेषाः कलुषं तस्याप्यज्ञानेऽन्तर्भावः। कस्मात्? अव्यक्तावस्थागमने प्रत्यनीकत्वात्। तदिदं संशयादिकलुषं चसहबीजेन मिथ्याज्ञानमित्युच्यते।

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(१) (i) तत्र पशुगुणो विद्या। सापि द्विविधा–बोधाबोधस्वभावभेदात्। बोधस्वभावा विवेकाविवेकप्रवृत्तिभेदाद् द्विविधा। सा चित्तमित्यु-च्यते।

(ii) तत्र पशुगुणो विद्या स्वशास्त्रदृष्ट्योक्ता। वैशेषिकदृष्ट्या द्रव्यवत्। सा द्विधा बोधाबोधस्वभावभेदात्। तत्राबोधस्वभावा धर्मादि–लक्षणा। विद्यान्तर्भावकरणादविद्यात्मकस्य विद्यान्तर्भावे कलादेरप्यन्त र्भावः स्यादिति। बोधस्वभावा तु विषयभेदाच्चतुर्धापञ्चधा चोक्ता।

(२) तत्र विवेकवृत्तिः प्रायेणोपदेशव्यङ्ग्या न च तत्र समाख्यान्तरमस्ति।

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(१) चित्तेन हि सर्वः प्राणी बोधात्मकप्रकाशानुगृहीतं सामान्येन विवेचित-मविवेचितं चार्थं चेतयत इति।

जीवो हि घटादीन्पदार्थांश्चित्तेन जानाति। चेतयते जानाति येन तच्चि-त्तम्। चित्तं चात्र दर्शने नान्तःकरणस्यावान्तरभेदः। किन्तु जीवस्य विषयज्ञानार्थं या प्रवृत्तिस्तद्रूपो जीवनिष्ठो गुणविशेषः। स च गुणः स्वयं बोधात्मकत्वाद् घटादीन् पदार्थान्बोधयति यथादित्यःस्वयंप्रकाश-रूपत्वाद्घटादीन्पदार्थान्प्रकाशयति तद्वत्।

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(१) तत्र दृष्टमपि द्विविधं–पूर्ववच्छेषवच्च। तत्र पूर्वंदृष्टोऽयं षडङ्गुलीयकः स एवेति पूर्ववत्।

(२) चेतनानाश्रितत्वे सति निश्चेतना कला। साऽपि द्विविधा कार्याख्या करणाख्या चेति। तत्र कार्याख्या दशविधा पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाश–गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दलक्षणा, करणाख्या तु त्रयोदशविधा, पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाणि पञ्च बुद्धीन्द्रियाण्यन्तःकरणत्रयं चेति।

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(१) अनैश्वर्यं बन्धः। कारणशक्तिसन्निरोधलक्षणमस्वातन्त्र्यमनैश्वर्यं बन्धोऽनादिः।

(२) पश्यनाच्च पशवः। यस्माद्विभुत्वेऽपि चित्समवेतत्वेऽपि च शरीरमात्रमेव पश्यन्त्युपलभन्ति च न बहिर्द्धानि (?) कार्यकरणरहिताश्च न कार्यकरणं प्रतिपद्यन्ते त्यजन्ति वा। धर्माधर्मप्रकाशदेशकालचोदनाद्यपेक्षित्वाच्च। अतः सुष्ठूक्तं पश्यनात् पाशनाच्च पशवः।

(३) आत्मा इति क्षेत्रज्ञमाह।

(४) तस्य सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नचैतन्यादिभिर्लिङ्गैरधिगमः क्रियते।

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(१) ततोऽस्य योगः प्रवर्तते।
सर्वज्ञता।

मनोजवित्वम् कामरूपित्वम् विकरणधर्मित्वं च। सर्वे चास्य वश्या भवन्ति, सर्वेषां चावश्यो भवति। सर्वांश्चाविशति। सर्वेषां चानावेश्यो भवति। सर्वे चास्य बध्या भवन्ति। सर्वेषां चाबध्यो भवति। अभीतः। अक्षयः। अजरः अमरः। सर्वत्र चाप्रतिहतगतिर्भवति।

(२) तत्र प्रमाणाभासजं ज्ञानं मिथ्याज्ञानमुक्तं संशयविपर्ययादिलक्षणम्।

(३) धर्माधर्मव्यतिरिक्तः प्रतिघातानुमेयः पुरुषगुणः पशुत्वम्। तस्य चतुर्दशलक्षणोपेतस्य मलत्वम्। तानि च लक्षणान्यसर्वज्ञत्वादीन्यपतित्वान्तानि सर्वज्ञत्वादिविपर्ययेणैव व्याख्यातानीति।

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(१) कैवल्यगतानामन्यमलाभावेऽपि पशुत्वादेव पुनः संसारापत्तिरिति।

2. See textual authority page CXXXIII, (१)

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(१) ग्रहणधारणोहापोहविज्ञानवचनक्रियायथान्यायाभिनिवेशानां 'वास' इति संज्ञा।

(२) धर्मस्योपायः चर्या।

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(१) किन्तु प्रत्याहारद्वैविध्यमिहेष्टं परापरभेदात्। तत्रान्तःकरणपूर्वकोऽपरः।

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(१) प्रातिपदावस्था खलु व्यक्तावस्थेत्युक्ता। कस्मात्? पाशुपत्येऽयमिति व्यक्तिनिमित्तत्वात् भस्मस्नानशयनानस्नानादिभिर्लिङ्गधारीत्युपदेशादिति

(२) सर्वस्वत्यागो दानावस्था।

(३) गुरुभक्तिः प्रसादश्च मतेर्द्वन्द्वजयस्तथा।
धर्मश्चैवाप्रमादश्च बलं पञ्चविधं स्मृतम्।

(४) अत्र विद्याकलापशुसंज्ञितं त्रिविधं कार्यं द्रव्यमित्युच्यते।

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(१) तत्र पञ्चपदार्थविषयं समासविस्तरविभागविशेषोपसंहारनिगमनत-स्तत्त्वज्ञानं प्रथमो विद्यालाभो ज्ञानमिति चोच्यते।

(२) भस्मस्नानादिविधिजनितो धर्मस्तप इत्युच्यते।

(३) यद्देवे भावाभ्यासलक्षणं नित्यत्वं तृतीयो लाभः स उच्यते।

(४) विज्ञानम् इत्यत्रापि नस्त्रिकं चिन्त्यते। विज्ञाता विज्ञानं विज्ञेयमिति। तत्र विज्ञाता सिद्धः। विज्ञानमस्य सिद्धिर्ज्ञानम्। विज्ञेया वृत्तयः। तस्मादेका ज्ञानशक्तिरपरिमितेन ज्ञेयेनानेकविधोपचर्यते।

(५) यादृङ् मनसो जवित्वमाशुकारित्वम् ईदृशमस्य सिद्धस्य कर्तृत्वे शीघ्र-त्वम्। न चास्य प्रजापतिवत् तपोनिमित्तत्वाद् भावोत्तरा प्रवृत्तिः। किन्तु भावस्य बलीयस्त्वात् प्रवृत्तेरुत्पन्नस्वभावः, करोमीति कृतमेव भवति। विनाशयामीति विनष्टं वा कस्मात्? दृक्क्रियोरप्रतीघातत्वात्।

(६) अथ किमयं सिद्धस्तेषां स्वकृतानां रूपाणां संहारे शक्तः, उत विश्वामित्र-वदशक्तः इति? उच्यते। यस्मादाह—"विकरणः"।

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(१) सिद्धयोगी न लिप्यते कर्मणा पातकेन वा।

(२) तत्र यतः प्रवर्तते? विषयेभ्यः प्रत्याहृतचित्तस्य यत् प्रवर्तते तद्योगः। यथा प्रवर्तते? क्रमशः। येन प्रवर्तते? तपसा प्रवर्तते [यस्य प्रवर्तते] आत्मनः साधकस्य। यस्मिन् प्रवर्तते। योऽयमात्मन्यात्मभावः, स महेश्वरे प्रवर्तते इत्यर्थः।

(३) अध्ययनध्यानादिलक्षणः क्रियायोगश्चरतः प्रवर्तत इत्यर्थः।

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(१) यस्मात् सति विभुत्वे अनधिकारकृतत्वाद् वियोगस्य। वियुक्तस्यैव च संयोग उपदिश्यते। विषयरक्तविरक्तवत् क्रियायोगे। इह तु समाधि-लक्षणे योगे संनियम इति।

(२) शून्यागारगुहावासी। देवनित्यः। जितेन्द्रियः। षण्मासान्नित्य-युक्तस्य। भूयिष्ठं सम्प्रवर्तते।

(३) भस्मना त्रिषवणं स्नायीत। भस्मनि शयीत। अनुस्नानम् निर्मा-ल्यम्। लिङ्गधारी। आयतनवासी। हसितगीतनृत्तडुंडुंकार-नमस्कारजप्योपहारेणोपतिष्ठेत्।

(४) अहिंसा ब्रह्मचर्यं च सत्यासंव्यवहारकौ ।
अस्तेयमिति पञ्चैते यमा वै संप्रकीर्तिताः ।।
अक्रोधो गुरुशुश्रूषा शौचमाहारलाघवम् ।
अप्रमादश्च पञ्चैते नियमाः संप्रकीर्तिताः ।

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(१) हसितगीतनृत्तडुंडुंकारनमस्कारजप्योपहारेणोपतिष्ठेत् ।

(२) न चैषां क्रमो नियम्यते। किन्त्वपमानादिनिष्पादकत्वं येन परिभवं गच्छेदित्युपदेशाद्वाग्नितुल्यत्वेनापमानादेरिष्टतमत्वादिति ।

(३) इन्द्रो वा अग्रे असुरेषु पाशुपतमचरत् ।

(४) अनेन विधिना रुद्रसमीपं गत्वा......... ।

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(१) मांसमदुष्यं लवणेन वा।

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(१) स द्विविधोऽनात्मकः सात्मकश्चेति।

(२) एवं यत्सांख्यं योगश्च वर्णयति, असङ्गादियुक्ताः मुक्ताः शान्ति प्राप्ता इति, तदविशुद्धं तेषां दर्शनम्, तैमिरिकस्य चक्षुषश्चन्द्रदर्शनवत् । अयन्तु युक्त एव न मुक्त इति विशुद्धमेतद् दर्शनम् दृष्टव्यम् ।

(३) नित्यत्वन्नाम सति विभुत्वे पुरुषेश्वरयोर्मनसा सह गतस्यात्मताभावस्य वृत्त्याकारस्य विषयं प्रति क्रमोऽक्षोपोऽवस्थानं वृक्षशकुनिवत् ।

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(१) असङ्गित्वमप्यतीतानागतवर्तमानानां
विषयाणामननुचिन्तनम् ।

(२) इच्छाद्वेषनिवृत्तोऽप्रवृत्तिमान् सैत्र इत्युच्यते ।

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(१) शिवागमैकदेशे शिवस्य परब्रह्मणः केवलनिमित्तत्वमुपपादितम् । तत्परिहारार्थमिदमधिकरणमिति पूर्वाचार्याणां व्याख्या ।

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(१) चिदात्मैव हि देवोन्तः स्थितमिच्छावशाद्बहिः ।
योगीव निरुपादानमर्थजातं प्रकाशयेत् ।।

(२) पशुपतिपाशादिवस्तुव्यवहाराणाम् ।

(३) एवमेतानि परशक्त्यादीनि पृथिव्यन्तानि जडानि षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वानि।
(४) मलत्रयसंबन्धोऽपैति।

Page CL

(१) भेदाभेदकल्पनं विशिष्टाद्वैतं साधयामः। न वयं ब्रह्मप्रपञ्चयोरत्यन्तं भेदवादिनः घटपटयोरिव। तदनन्यत्वपरश्रुतिविरोधात्। न वाऽत्यन्ताऽभेदवादिनः शुक्तिरजतयोरिव। एकतरमिथ्यात्वेन तत्स्वाभाविकगुणभेदपरश्रुतिविरोधात्। न च भेदाभेदवादिनः, वस्तुविरोधात्। किन्तु शरीरशरीरिणोरिव गुणगुणिनोरिव च विशिष्टाद्वैतवादिनः।

Page CLII

(१) अश्मकाष्ठतृणादेरचेतनस्येव जीवस्याप्यज्ञत्वादिना सर्वज्ञत्वाद्युक्तादीश्वरात् अत्यन्तविजातीयत्वश्रवणात् तयोरेकभावानुपपत्तेः।
(२) चेतनाचेतनप्रपञ्चविशिष्टस्य शिवस्य तद्विशेषणयोश्चेतनाचेतनयोस्तस्य ताभ्याञ्चान्तर्गणिकभेदसत्वेऽप्युक्तरूपेण तत्समानजातीयवस्त्वन्तराभावोऽस्तीति स एव वस्तुपरिच्छेदराहित्यम्।

Page CLIII

(१) बृंहणत्वं च सर्गकालोन्मिषत्सकलप्रपञ्चविस्तारयितृत्व-मुचितकालविलसन्मुच्यमानजीवगतधर्मज्ञानविकासकत्वादिसर्वविध बृंहयितृत्वरूपं वाच्यम्।
(२) अनेनैवाभिप्रायेण कृत्स्नस्यापि शब्दराशेर्वेदवेदान्तादिरूपस्य शिव एव तात्पर्यमित्यमुमर्थम् "इमा रुद्राय शतधन्विने गिरः" इतिमन्त्रभागो दर्शयति।
(३) ज्ञेयपरिच्छेदरूपत्वाज्ज्ञानस्य तदपरिच्छिन्नब्रह्मविषयं न सम्भवतीति तदज्ञानविलसितम्। ईदृगिदमिति ब्रह्मणः परिच्छेदासम्भवेऽपि लक्षणमुखेनेतरव्यावृत्ततामात्रेण परिच्छेदसम्भवात्।

Page CLIV

(१) चेतनाचेतनसम्मेलनसमरसीभूतस्य।
(२) चिदचित्प्रपञ्चरूपशक्तिविशिष्टत्वं स्वाभाविकमेव ब्रह्मणः कदाचिदपि न निर्विशेषत्वमित्यनेन सिद्धम्...... ।

अनन्तशक्तिमत्वाद् ब्रह्मणोऽपरिच्छिन्नप्रपञ्चसमवायिकारणत्वं सिद्ध्यति।

(३) यथा सागरे पवनादिसंक्षोभ्योपरितनपरिणामो वीचीफेनबुद्बुदप्रपञ्चः, एवं ब्रह्मणि तदिच्छासंक्षोभ्यमाणतदाश्रितशक्तिपरिणामः सर्वोयं प्रपञ्च इति भावः।

(४) अत एव भगवती शक्तिः शक्तिमदोऽवरस्वरूपाद् व्यतिरेकं पृथक् सिद्धि न वाञ्छति नानुमन्यते । किन्तु चन्द्रचन्द्रिकान्यायेन ब्रह्मापृथक्सिद्धैव भवति ।

(५) स्वात्मनि संहृत्य यदा वर्तते परमेश्वरः तदा सर्वमिदं निरस्तचन्द्रसूर्यादिप्रकाशतया विध्वस्तरात्रिदिनादिकालविभागम् अपगतनामरूपविशेषतया स्थूलसूक्ष्मदेवमनुष्यादिव्यवहारशून्यतमोमात्रं वर्तते स एक एव परमेश्वरो निरङ्कुशप्रकाशः सर्वसाक्षी तदानीमपि परिशिष्यते ।

(६) इच्छाशक्तिभित्तौ निखिलजगच्चित्रमुन्मीलयति ।

Page CLV

(१) परमेश्वरो हि जीवानां विचित्रं कर्म सर्वज्ञतयावलोक्य स्वशक्त्या तदनुगुणमेव भोगायतनं देवादिशरीरं सृजति । ततः कर्ममूलमेव सृष्ट्यादिवैषम्यम् । संहारश्च जीवानां संसारव्यापारखिन्नानां सुषुप्तिवद्विश्रान्तिहेतुतया परमेश्वरस्य न नैर्घृण्यापादकः ।

(२) अनाद्यज्ञानवासनावष्टम्भविजृम्भितविचित्रकर्मफलभोगानुगुणबहुशरीरप्रवेशनिर्गमव्यापारपरवशनिस्सीमतापसहिष्णुत्वं जीवत्वम् ।

(३) विस्फुलिङ्गदृष्टान्तोऽपि जीवोत्पत्त्यनुगुणः श्रूयते "यथाग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिंगा व्युच्चरन्ति एवमेवैतस्मादात्मनः सर्वे प्राणाः सर्वे लोकाः सर्वे देवाः सर्वाणि भूतानि सर्व एवात्मानो व्युच्चरन्ति" इति ।

(४) ज्ञातैवायमात्मा .... मलत्रयसंबन्धोऽपैति ।

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(१) व्यतिरेको गन्धवत् तथा हि दर्शयति ।

(२) सिद्धान्तस्तु—आत्मा कर्तैव शास्त्रार्थवत्त्वात् । अन्यथा कुर्यान्न कुर्यादिति शास्त्रस्य वैयर्थ्यं स्यात् ।

(३) जीवः स्वेच्छया प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिहेतुं करोति स्वकर्मपाकवशेन, जीवकृतप्रयत्नं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिहेतुमवेक्ष्य तदनुमतिदानेन परः प्रवर्तयतीति विधिनिषेधावैयर्थ्यं निग्रहानुग्रहादिभ्योऽवगम्यते ।

(४) सिद्धान्तस्तु—जीवात्मा परमेश्वरस्यांशो मूर्त्येकदेश एव...... यदुक्तम् "अयमात्मा ब्रह्म" इत्यादिना ब्रह्मण एव जीवत्वमिति । तत्राह—अन्यथा "तत्त्वमसि" "अयमात्मा ब्रह्म" इत्यादिकाद् व्यपदेशात् तयोर्जीवब्रह्मणोर्व्याप्यव्यापकभावेनानन्यत्वम् । अपि च तथैवानन्यत्वमधीयत एके "ब्रह्म दाशा ब्रह्म दासा ब्रह्मेमे कितवा उत" इत्यादिना ब्रह्मणोंऽशत्वेऽपि जीवस्य तद्व्याप्ततया तद्व्यपदेशो युक्तः ।

(५) जीवो देहान्तरप्राप्तये भूतसूक्ष्मैः परिष्वक्तो यातीति पञ्चाग्निविद्यायां प्रश्नप्रतिवचनाभ्यामवगम्यते ।

(६) मलत्रयसंबन्धोऽपैति ।
(मुक्तस्य तु मलमायाकर्मबन्धापायात्।)

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(१) मलतिरोधानापगमप्रकटितशक्तिमरीचिव्याप्तमुक्तजीवविषयम्। तस्मादणुरेवात्मा ।

(२) जीवानां जीवत्वापादकस्य सकलसंसारनिदानस्य मलावरणस्याग्राहकतया रोधशक्त्याख्यस्य पाशत्वव्यपदेशस्य शिवागमेषु तस्यांप्रसिद्धत्वात् । यदाहुः

"तासां माहेश्वरी शक्तिःसर्वानुग्राहिका परम्।
परानुवर्तनादेव पाश इत्युपचर्यते ।।

(३) तथा चाभियुक्तस्मृतिः "यस्यैते चत्वारिंशत्संस्काराः" इत्यादिना "स ब्रह्मणः सायुज्यं सालोक्यं च गच्छति" इत्यन्तेन गर्भाधानादिसकलकर्मणां पापमलापकर्षसंस्कारहेतुतां प्रकाशयति ।

(४) शिवस्य परब्रह्मणः प्रसादातिशयेनास्याधिकारिणः प्रध्वस्तपाशपटला प्रत्यक्षीभूतनिरतिशयज्ञानानन्दस्वरूपा तत्समानगुणसारा कैवल्य-लक्ष्मीः प्रयोजनं च भवति ।

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(१) वेदान्तविज्ञानोपलब्धया ब्रह्मात्मसामरस्यभावनया ब्रह्मभावमुपगतस्य विगलितमनुष्यादिदेहविषयकल्पिताहंभावसंकोचस्य संपन्नविश्वाकारपराहंभावस्य वामदेवस्य स्वात्मनः सर्वगतत्वावगमान्मनुसूर्यादिप्रपञ्चभावोक्ति :। एवमिन्द्रस्यापीति निश्चीयते ।

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(१) न हि मुक्तात्मनां प्राकृतप्रपञ्चो दर्शनविषयः। किन्तु निरतिशयानन्दस्वरूपं ब्रह्मैव प्रपञ्चाकारेण दर्शनगोचरीभवति ।

(२) निरवधिकपरमानन्दमयनिष्कलङ्कशिवत्वप्राप्तिर्हि मुक्तिः ।

(३) ब्रह्मप्राप्तजीवस्य मलतिरोहितं ब्रह्मसदृशगुणं स्वरूपं पूर्वं सदेव मलावरणापगमादाविर्भवति ।

Page CLX

(१) मुक्तस्य ब्रह्मणा सादृश्यमस्ति । कुतः "निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति" "मुक्तः शिवसमो भवेत्" इति मुक्तस्य ब्रह्मगुणस्वरूपाविभागेन ब्रह्मसदृशतया दृष्टत्वात् अतः "ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति" इति ब्रह्मसादृश्यमेवोच्यते ।

(२) ततः जीवस्य जगद्व्यापाराद्यभावात् । वक्ष्यति "भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गा-च्च" इति ।

(३) मुक्तस्य परमेश्वरसाम्येऽपि जगत्सृष्ट्यादिव्यापारवर्जमेव स्वातन्त्र्यमस्य भोगवस्तुषु ।

(४) सायुज्यमिति । सादृश्यं विवक्षितम् ।

(५) घटादिपरिच्छिन्नस्य प्रदीपस्य परिच्छेदापाये स्वप्रभया यथा गृहादि-व्याप्तिः, तथा मुक्तस्य स्वशक्तितिरोधायकमलापाये स्वशक्त्या विश्वव्याप्तिः आवेशः भवति ।

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(१) विश्च शेषश्च विशेषौ । विशेषयोरद्वैतं विशेषाद्वैतमिति निरुक्त्या तत्राद्वैतपदेन भ्रमरकीटवज्जीवस्य स्वाभाविकभेदनिवृत्तिरुपपाद्यते ।

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(२) नीलकण्ठ शिवाचार्यनाम्ना भाष्यमचीकरत् ।
विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्तप्रतिपादनमुत्तमम् ॥
मयापि तस्य तात्पर्यं श्रोतॄणां सुखसिद्धये ।
कारिकारूपतः सर्वं क्रमेणैव निबध्यते ॥
वक्ष्यमाणरीत्या शक्तिविशिष्टं ब्रह्म जगत्कारणमिति ।

(३) नीलकण्ठ शिवाचार्यभाष्यार्थमनुसंदधन् ।
वीरशैवैरभिमतमभिधास्ये श्रुतेर्मतम् ॥

(५) विशब्देनोच्यते विद्या शिवजीवैक्यबोधिका ।
तस्यां रमन्ते ये शैवा : वीरशैवास्तु ते मता : ॥

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(१) विशब्दो वा विकल्पार्थः र शब्दो रहितार्थकः ।
विकल्परहितं शैवं वीरशैवं प्रचक्षते ॥

(२) इह तु केचित् निष्प्रपञ्च–निर्धर्मिक––निर्गुण–निरवयव–निर्भेदनित्ये ब्रह्मणि प्रपञ्चकारणत्वायोगात् स्वप्न–प्रपञ्चदृष्टान्तेन जाग्रत्स्व-प्नसुषुप्तिमूर्च्छावस्थानां चतसृणामपि मिथ्यात्वं साधयन्ति ।

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(१) ब्रह्मणः व्यावहारिकदृश्यत्वानङ्गीकारे निरधिष्ठानभ्रमप्रसङ्गः ।

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(१) व्यावहारिकसत्यत्वं नाम कालान्तरानवस्थायिवस्तुत्वं सदसद्विलक्ष-णत्वं वा, सत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वं वा । नाद्यः यत्किञ्चित्-

कालान्तरानवस्थायिवस्तुत्वस्य घटपटादौ अस्माभिरङ्गीकारादंशतः सिद्धसाधनात् "गौरनाद्यन्तवती" इत्युक्तायाः प्रकृतेः सर्वकालान्तरावस्थायितया अव्याप्तेश्च । कालान्तरावस्थायित्वावच्छिन्नसामान्याभावविवक्षायां द्वितीयक्षणस्यापि कालान्तरतया तदनवस्थायित्वसाधनेन वैभाषिकाङ्गीकृतं क्षणिकत्वमेव साधितं स्यात्, न तु स्वदेशकालनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं मिथ्यात्वमिति स्वसिद्धान्तविरोधः, प्रातिभासिके अतिव्याप्तेश्च ।

(२) न द्वितीयः सदसदात्मकस्य प्रतियोगिनोऽप्रसिद्ध्या तद्विलक्षणस्याप्रसिद्धेः ।

(३) नाभाव उपलब्धेः........ज्ञातुरात्मनोऽर्थविशेषव्यवहारयोग्यतापादनरूपेण ज्ञानस्योलब्धेः । एवमेव हि सर्वे लोकाः प्रतीयन्ति "घटमहं जानामि" इत्येवंरूपेण सकर्मकेण सकर्तृकेण ज्ञातात्वर्थेन (?) सर्वलोकसाक्षिकमपरोक्षमवभासमानेनैव । ज्ञानमात्रमेव परमार्थं इति साधयन्तः सर्वलोकोपहासोपकरणं भवन्तीति व्याचक्षते ।

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(१) "मिथ्यात्ववादिवाक्यानि मिथ्येति परिगीयते" इति न्यायेन तन्मते वेदवेदान्तानां मिथ्याभूतत्वाङ्गीकारात्, तन्मिथ्याभूतवेदवेदान्तप्रतिपाद्यब्रह्मणः सत्यत्वं कथमुपपद्यते । निर्विशेषे वेदवेदान्तानां प्रतिपाद्यत्वायोगात्, ब्रह्मसत्त्वे तदतिरिक्तप्रमाणाभावाच्च । तस्मात्तच्छास्त्रोक्तजगज्जीवेश्वरादिप्रपञ्चवत् तन्निर्विशेषब्रह्मणः मिथ्यात्वं दुर्निवारम् ।

(२) निर्विशेषाद्वैतशास्त्रे स्वप्नशुक्तिरजतादिदृष्टान्तत्वेन प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वाङ्गीकारे निर्विशेषब्रह्मणः भावः विद्यमानत्वं नास्ति । कुतः? अनुपलब्धेः ।

(३) तत्पदवाच्यमीश्वरचैतन्यं मायाप्रतिबिम्बरूपमिति केचित् । तेषामयमाशयः जीवपरमेश्वरसाधारणं चैतन्यमात्रं बिंबम्, तस्यैव बिंबस्याविद्यात्मिकायां मायायां प्रतिबिंबमीश्वरचैतन्यम् ।

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(१) अत्र केचित् । अस्मिन्नानन्दमये ब्रह्मणि जीवस्यास्य तद्योगं शेषस्वसंबन्धं शास्ति शास्त्रं प्रतिपादयति इति विशिष्टाद्वैतमेव मुख्यमिति जल्पन्ति । तदवैदिकत्वान्न मुमुक्षुभिर्ग्राह्यम् । वैदिकमीमांसाकर्तृभिर्भट्टभास्करादिपूर्वाचार्यैः स्वसिद्धान्तस्थापनावसरे पूर्वपक्षस्याप्ययोग्यत्वेनोपेक्षितत्वात् । विशिष्टमद्वैतमिति उक्तिविरोधात् । विशिष्टस्य दुर्निरूप्यत्वेन मिथ्यात्वाच्च ।

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(१) विशिष्टं नाम विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्ध एव वा तदतिरिक्तं वा । नाद्यः त्रयाणामनेकत्वेन अद्वयत्वासंभवात्, एते "दण्डपुरुषसंबन्धाः" इति समूहावलम्बनस्य दण्डीति विशिष्टप्रत्ययत्वप्रसङ्गात्, विशिष्टप्रत्ययस्य अनतिरिक्तविषयत्वात् । न द्वितीयः । विशेष्यरूपपरमात्मनोऽप्यन्यत्वेन विशिष्टाभिमतपरमात्मनो विशिष्टाद्वैतासिद्धेः ।

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(१) न तावज्जीवपरयोः समवायसंबन्धः, युतसिद्धत्वात् । नापि स्वरूपसंबन्धः, स्वरूपद्वयात्मकस्य स्वरूपसंबन्धस्य संबन्धिरूपत्वात् । संबन्धसंबन्धिनोरेकत्वानुपपत्तेः स्वरूपद्वयात्मकसंबन्धस्य स्ववृत्तित्वे आत्माश्रयप्रसङ्गात्, स्वरूपद्वयस्य स्ववृत्तित्वासम्भवात्, अन्यवृत्तित्वासंभवाच्च । तस्मान्न जीवपरयोः स्वरूपसंबन्धः । नापि संयोगसंबन्धः ।

(२) अत्र शैवाग्रगण्य–श्रीकण्ठ–शिवाराध्यकृतब्रह्ममीमांसाभाष्ये विशिष्टाद्वैतं स्वाभिप्रेतत्वेन प्रसाधितम् । तत्र मुक्तात्मनां गौरीपतित्व सर्वान्तर्यामित्वादिधर्मनिराकरणपूर्वकं तत्साम्यञ्चोपनिषन्मयदिव्यमङ्गलविग्रहात्मकसर्वैश्वर्यविशिष्टकल्याणविभूतिभिर्बहुधा प्रपञ्चितम् । यथा "नद्यः स्यन्दमानाः समुद्रे" इत्यादिश्रुतिनिष्ठत्रिपाद्विभूत्यधिककैवल्यविभूत्यात्मकशिवसायुज्यलक्षणा मुक्तिर्विरुध्यते तस्मात्तदेव युक्तमिति प्राप्ते ब्रूमः ।

(३) तत्प्रणीतकामिकादिवातुलान्ताद्यागमविरुद्धमन्वादिस्मृतिपुराणानां मानाभावात् ।

(४) वेदागमोभयवेदान्तप्रतिपादितस्वाभाविकानन्तशक्तिविशिष्ट–जगदुभय–कारणपशुपाशनियामकसकलनिष्कलस्थूलसूक्ष्मचिदचित्प्रकाशकसत्यज्ञानानन्तकल्याणगुणविभवाश्रयत्वं ब्रह्मत्वम् ।

(५) मलत्रयविध्वंसाभावान्न साधनचतुष्टयानन्तर्यम् ।

(६) मलत्रयात्मकमायापाशदुःखनिवृत्तिपूर्वकपरमपुरुषार्थपरशिवतत्त्वप्राप्तिदर्शनात्प्रयोजनम् ।

(७) इत्यादिवाक्यानां प्रात्यक्षिकवेदवेदान्तेषु दर्शनात् पतिपाशपशु–पदार्थत्रयप्रतिपादकशैवागमानां वैदिकत्वं घण्टाघोषः ।

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(१) स पुनस्तं होवाच कानि षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वानि इति । स तस्मा आह शिवशक्ति-सदाशिव-ईश्वर-विद्येत्येतानि शुद्धानि पञ्च तत्त्वानि । माया कालो नियतिः कला विद्या रागः पुरुष इति शुद्धाशुद्धानि सप्त । चत्वारि ततः, प्रकृतिः प्रकृतेर्गुणत्रयम् । गुणत्रयान्नामरूपक्रियास्पदानि परस्परविभिन्नानि धरण्यादीनि विंशतितत्त्वानि ।

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(१) ननु स्वाभाविकस्य निम्बकषायवन्निवृत्तित्वं सर्वदा न संभवति । तदङ्गीकारेऽपि जलोष्णवदागन्तुकस्यानित्यत्वमेव स्यात् तस्मान्मोक्षस्याप्यनित्यत्वमेव स्यादिति चेन्न। भ्रमरकीट-शुक्तिसलिलादिषु स्वाभाविकस्य सर्वदा निवृत्तिदर्शनात् भेदाभेदमतमेव वैदिकं सिद्धम् ।

(२) ननु "एक एव रुद्रो न द्वितीयाय तस्थे" इत्यादि श्रुतिशतेषु सर्वप्रपञ्चनिषेधपूर्वकाद्वैतव्यवस्थापनात् "द्वासुपर्णा" इत्यादिमन्त्रगत-जीवब्रह्मणोर्भेद औपचारिक एवेति चेन्न । अद्वितीयप्रतिपादकश्रुतीनां निर्गुणत्वप्रतिपादकश्रुतीनाञ्च सृष्टेः पूर्वं मूर्तामूर्तोभयप्रपञ्चाभावात् तत्कालपरत्वम् । भेदश्रुतीनां सर्वासां सृष्ट्युत्तरकालपरत्वम् । ननु महेश्वरे सृष्टेः पूर्वं जगत्कारणप्रकृतिसद्भावात् कथमद्वैतत्वमिति चेन्न । "देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढाम्" परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च " इत्यादि श्रुतिशतेषु तच्छक्तेस्तदभिन्नत्वदर्शनात् ।

(३) ननु भेदाभेदयोः तमःप्रकाशवत्परस्परविरुद्धस्वभावत्वात् तयोरेकः पक्षः परमसिद्धान्तत्वेन निर्णेतव्य इति चेन्न । श्रुत्यैकदेशप्रामाण्ये मानाभावात् पक्षैकस्वीकारे परस्परश्रुत्यप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गाच्च ।

(४) पृथ्वीवाय्वोरनुष्णाशीतत्वं महेश्वरस्य अर्धनारीत्वं लक्षणायां जहदजहत्वं योगसांख्याद्वैतमतेषु साक्षिरूपस्य सगुणनिर्गुणात्मकत्वं मानुषे पुण्यपापोभयविशिष्टत्वं खद्योतस्य प्रकाशाप्रकाशत्वं च दर्शनात् ।

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(१) अद्वैतमते सगुणब्रह्मत्वमीश्वरत्वं च रज्जुसर्पवत् कल्पितम् इति सिद्धान्तेन भक्तिशास्त्राणां विधिनिषेधव्यवस्थापकवेदशास्त्रागमपुराणादीनां दत्ताञ्जलिप्रसङ्गात् पूर्वोक्तमतद्वयं न विधेयम् ।

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(१) जन्मादिसृष्टिस्थितिलयतिरोधानानुग्रहात्मकं कृत्यपञ्चकम् अस्य चिदचित्प्रपञ्चविलासस्य यतो यस्मात् स्वाभाविकानन्तशक्तिविशिष्टब्रह्मणः सम्भवति तद् ब्रह्मेति सूत्रार्थः ।

(२) ब्रह्मणः शिवस्यैव स्वशक्तिसंकोचेन निर्गुणत्वं शक्तिविकासेन सगुणत्वं प्रसाधितम् ।

(३) यथाकाशः सर्वगतत्वेपि सर्वकारणत्वसर्वशरीरत्वसर्वान्तिर्यामित्वेन व्यवस्थितोपि सर्वदोषकलङ्कविलक्षण इति सूत्राभिप्रायः ।

(४) प्रलयावस्थायां प्रपञ्चस्य संकुचितत्वं सृष्टिकाले विकासवत्वञ्च स्पष्ट-मुपदिष्टम् । जगत्सत्यत्वं प्रसाध्य इदानीं कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वे निदर्शनं सूत्रद्वयेन दर्शयति ।

(५) एवं परमेश्वरस्य स्वभावजीवत्वनिवृत्तिपूर्वकस्वात्मप्राप्तिप्रदायकश-क्तिमत्त्वं प्रसाध्य तस्यैव मूर्तामूर्तोभयात्मकत्वमधिकरणान्तरेण दर्शयति ।

(६) लोके जीवानां सुखदुःखभोगदर्शनात् परमेश्वरस्य वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यादि-प्रसक्तिर्नोपपद्यते । कुतः । सापेक्षत्वात्, जीवकृतपुण्यपापसापेक्षत्वात् ।

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(१) अनादिस्वाभाविकमायापाशबद्धघोरापारनिःसारसंसारव्यापारतापत्रया-नलदन्दह्यमाननानाशरीरप्रवेशनिर्गमनवर्णाश्रमाभिमानविशिष्टकाम-क्रोधाद्यनुस्यूतसुखदुःखाश्रयत्वं जीवत्वम् ।

(२) जीवपरमेश्वरयोर्वैशेष्यम् । तस्माद्विशेषातिशयद्योतनाज्जीवपरमात्मनो-श्चित्त्वैकत्वेऽपि विभुत्वाणुत्वसर्वज्ञत्वकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वनित्यतृप्तत्वसंसार-भोक्तृत्वादिपरस्परविरुद्धधर्मस्वभावत्वात् तयोः स्वाभाविकं भिन्नत्वं श्रुतिसिद्धम् ।

(३) श्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवतया जीवेश्वरयोः स्वभावचित्त्वावगमाच्च ।

(४) तस्माज्जडजातिलोहादौ ताम्रसुवर्णादिवत् चिज्जातौ जीवब्रह्मणोः स्वाभाविकभेदो निर्दिष्टः ।

(५) बहुश्रुतिषु परमशिवत्रिपाद्विभूत्यात्मकसालोक्यसामीप्यसारूप्यसिद्ध-कल्याणविभूतिः स्वभावजीवभावनिवृत्तिपूर्वकशिवत्वप्राप्तिरूपकैवल्यविभू-तिश्च दर्शनात् । चतुर्विधमुक्तिप्रतिपादकं सर्वं शास्त्रं प्रामा-ण्यमेव ।

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(१) "एषोऽणुरात्मा, चेतसा वेदितव्यम्" इति श्रुतिनिर्दिष्टाणुत्वमेव जीव-स्याङ्गी करणीयम् ।

(२) यथा चन्दनस्यैकप्रदेशस्थितस्य सकलशरीरशैत्यजनकत्वम् एवं क्षेत्र-ज्ञस्यैकस्मिन् प्रदेशे स्थितस्यापि सर्वाङ्गसुखदुःखभोक्तृत्वमुपपन्नम् ।

(३) यथा पृथिव्या गन्धस्य गुणत्वेनोपलभ्यमानस्य ततो व्यतिरेकः तथा जानामीति ज्ञातृगुणत्वेन प्रतीयमानस्य ज्ञानस्य आत्मनो व्यतिरेकः सिद्धः दर्शयति च श्रुतिः ।

(४) प्रकाशादिवज्जीवः परमात्मनोंऽशः, यथाग्न्यादित्यादेर्भास्वतो भारूपः प्रकाशोंऽशो भवति ।

(५) See textual authority page CLXX (६)

(६) See textual authority page CLXXV (५)

(७) यथा नद्यः स्यन्दमानाः समुद्रे ऽस्तं गच्छन्ति नामरूपे विहाय ।
तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् ।।

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(१) शिवोपासकजीवन्मुक्तानां प्रचण्डातपमध्यनिक्षिप्तकर्पूरदीपवदन्तः करण-सद्भावेऽपि सर्वशिवात्मकज्ञानसद्भावात् ।

(२) तथा घटनाघटनसामर्थ्यस्य सर्वशक्तिविशिष्टस्य भक्तवात्सल्यस्य भक्ताभीष्टफलप्रदायकस्य सर्वविद्याश्रयस्य सत्यकामस्य सत्यसङ्कल्पस्य परब्रह्मणः शिवस्य स्वभक्तस्वाभाविकजीवत्वनिवृत्तिपूर्वकं पुनरावृत्ति रहितस्वस्वरूपप्राप्तिप्रदायकत्वशक्तित्वे किं वक्तव्यम् ।

(३) श्रुतिसिद्धवर्णपदमन्त्रकलाभुवनतत्त्वात्मकषडध्वप्रतिपादकत्वेन ।

(४) हिरण्मयस्य सदाशिवस्य प्रभाकरमुख्यशरीरत्वमधिकरणान्तरमारभते .... । अन्तः य एषोऽन्तरमादित्ये स एषोऽन्तरक्षिणीत्यादित्याक्ष्णो-रन्तः श्रूयमाणः पुरुषः साक्षात् परमशिव एव ।

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(१) विद्याविद्याविलक्षण निरतिशयनिरञ्जन निर्विकार निरवयवपरमाकाश-रूप परिपूर्णशिवतत्त्व साक्षात्कारानुभवेन प्रचण्डातपमध्यनिक्षिप्त निर्वात-निश्चलित कर्पूरदीपवत् स्थितिं व्यपोह्य शरीरेन्द्रियमनःप्राणादि वाह्या-भ्यन्तरवस्तुपरिज्ञानशून्यमनोविलयात्मकोन्मन्यवस्थाप्राप्तिष्षट्को ह्यैक्य-स्थलेऽभिधीयते ।

(२) सिद्धान्ताख्ये महातन्त्रे कामिकाद्ये शिवोदिते ।
निर्दिष्टमुत्तरे भागे वीरशैवमतं परम् ।।

(३) वीरशैवास्तुषड्भेदाः स्थलधर्मविभेदतः ।
भक्तादिव्यवहारेण प्रोच्यन्ते शास्त्रपारगैः ।।
शास्त्रन्तु वीरशैवानां षड्विधं स्थलभेदतः ।
धर्मभेदसमायोगादधिकारिविभेदतः ।।
आदौ भक्तस्थलं प्रोक्तं ततो माहेश्वरस्थलम ।
प्रसादिस्थलमन्यत्तु प्राणलिङ्गि स्थलं ततः ।।
शरणस्थलमाख्यातं षष्ठमैक्यस्थलं मतम् ।

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(१) सर्वतत्त्वजनकः स्वयं तत्त्वातीतः इति ज्ञापनार्थमेतत्सूत्रं चकारे त्याह "तत्त्वातीतः" इति। सर्वानुग्रहविग्रहः साक्षी तत्त्वातीतो हल् स्यामिति ढक्कानिनादव्याजेन सर्वेषां मुनिजनानां तत्त्वमुपदिशन् तिरोदधे इत्यर्थः।

(२) अकारो ब्रह्मरूपः स्यान्निर्गुणः सर्ववस्तुषु।
चित्कलामिं समाश्रित्य... ... ... ॥
अकारः सर्ववर्णाग्र्यः प्रकाशः परमेश्वरः।
अकारं सन्निधीकृत्य जगतां कारणत्वतः।
इकारः सर्ववर्णानां शक्तित्वात्कारणं मतम्॥
अकारो ज्ञप्तिमात्रं स्यादिकारश्चित्कला मता।

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(१) स्वेच्छया स्वस्य चिच्छक्तौ विश्वमुन्मीलयत्यसौ।

(२) See textual authority page CLXXXI, (२)

(३) Ditto.

(४) चितिः प्रत्यवमर्शात्मा परा वाक् स्वरसोदिता।
स्वातन्त्र्यमेतन्मुख्यं तदैश्वर्यं परमात्मनः॥

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(१) See textual authority page CLXXXI, (२)

(२) वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोरत्र भेदलेशो न विद्यते।
चन्द्रचन्द्रिकयोर्यद्वद् यथा वागर्थयोरपि॥

(३) See textual authority page CLXXXI, (२) (last line).

(४) "चितिशक्तिरपरिणामिनी" "....तद् दृशेः कैवल्यम्"

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(१) ऋलृवर्णयोर्मिथः सावर्ण्यं वाच्यम्।

(२) सगुणनिर्गुणयोरैक्ये बोधिते।

(३) जन्यजनकत्वञ्च स्वस्यैव तद्रूपेण वर्तमानत्वादिति नाद्वैतहानिः

(४) प्राणादिपञ्चकं चैव मनो बुद्धिरहंकृतिः।
बभूव कारणत्वेन ख फ छ ठ थ च ट त व्।
प्रकृतिं पुरुषञ्चैव सर्वेषामेव सम्मतम्।
सम्भूतमिति विज्ञेयं कषय् स्यादिति निश्चितम्॥

(A variant reading of the above)

प्रकृतिः पुरुषश्चैव सर्वेषामपि सम्मतौ।
सम्भूताविति विज्ञेयं कथम् स्यादिति निश्चितम् ॥
सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति गुणानां त्रितयं पुरा।
तत्त्वातीतः परः साक्षी सर्वानुग्रहविग्रहः।

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(१) अपरे माहेश्वराः परमेश्वरतादात्म्यवादिनोऽपि पिण्डस्थैर्ये सर्वाभिमता जीवन्मुक्तिः।

(२) प्राभृते वातुले ब्राह्मे वैष्णवैन्द्रे च शाङ्करे।
बृहस्पतिमते शौक्रे यत् सारं तदिहोच्यते ॥

(३) प्रमाणत्रयेण सिद्धं नृपञ्चाननाङ्कं कथमसत्स्यादिति सदादीनि विशेषणानि गर्भश्रीकान्तमिश्रैर्विष्णुस्वामिचरणपरिणतान्तःकरणैः प्रतिपादितानि।

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(१) नागार्जुनः सुरानन्दो नागबोधिर्यशोधनः।
खण्डः कापालिको ब्रह्मा गोविन्दो लम्पको हरिः ॥
सप्तविंशतिसङ्ख्याका रससिद्धिप्रदायकाः।

(२) हरितालादिसिद्धिश्च रसपारदसाधनम्।
नानारससमुद्भूतं रसभस्मादिसाधनम् ॥

(३) सूचिता सर्वतन्त्रेषु या पुनर्न प्रकाशिता।
जीवन्मुक्तिरियं नाथ कीदृशी वक्तुमर्हसि ॥

(४) सप्ताहमम्लिताः सर्वे आयुधेनापि अर्चिषट्।
शुल्वं कुर्वन्ति वापेन पाण्डरं गन्धवर्जितम्।
नागार्जुनमुनिः श्रीमान् दृष्टयोगमिदं परम्।

(५) रसार्णवादिशास्त्राणि निरीक्ष्य कथितं मया।
रसोपयोगि यत्किञ्चिद् दिङ्मात्रं तत् प्रकाशितम् ॥

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(१) दीर्घमायुः स्मृतिं मेधामारोग्यं तरुणं वयः।
प्रभावर्णस्वरौदार्यं देहेन्द्रियबलं परम्।
वाक्सिद्धिं प्रणतिं कान्तिं लभते ना रसायनात् ॥

(२) रसवीर्यविपाके च सूतकस्त्वमृतोपमः।
तेन जन्मजराव्याधीन् हरते सूतकः प्रिये ॥

(३) घोषं वा घण्टलोहं वा सहस्रांशेन बेधयेत् ।
एवं बिद्धं भवेद्धेमं जाम्बूनदसमप्रभम् ।।

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(१) लोहैरुपरसैश्चापि रसैस्तद्वन्महारसैः ।
मूलिभिः शुष्कबीजैश्च लोहं रज्येत नैकधा ।

(२) पीतरोहितवर्णा ये द्रुमाःकाञ्चनिकाः स्मृताः।
अन्ये च सितपुष्पाश्च द्रुमा रजतकारकाः ।।

(३) यत्र कूर्पासमुत्पन्नो भूमिभागश्च पीतकम् ।
कृष्णाश्च बालुकाः स्निग्धाः काञ्चनं तत्र जायते ।।
मत्स्यगन्धोग्रगन्धाश्च मृत्तिकाश्च गुरूणि च ।
कृष्णाश्च सितवर्णाभा रजतं तत्र जायते ।।

(४) देवैः संभाव्यतां याति विद्युज्ज्वलनसप्रभः ।
न च शस्त्रं क्रमेद् देहे नाग्निर्दहति न क्षुधा ।।

(५) तस्य मन्त्रं प्रवक्ष्यामि त्रिदशैरपि दुर्लभम् ।
प्रणवो भुवनेशी बीजं लक्ष्मीबीजं ततः परम् ।।

(६) रसदीक्षाविधानन्तु तस्मान्निगदितं श्रृणु ।

(७) रसलिङ्गं न्यसेत् तत्र हेम्ना च सहितं प्रिये ।

(८) यावन्न शक्तिपातस्तु न यावत् पाशकृन्तनम् ।
तावत्तस्य कुतो बुद्धिर्जायते मृतसूतके ।।

(९) आदौ परीक्षयेद् देवि साधकान् सुसमाहितान् ।
ब्राह्मणान् क्षत्रियान् वैश्यान् शूद्रांश्चानुक्रमेण तु ।।

(१०) गुरुसेवां विना कर्म यः कुर्यान्मूढचेतनः ।
स याति निष्फलं कर्म स्वप्नलब्धं धनं यथा ।
यः कर्म कुरुते दृष्टं तस्य लाभः पदे पदे ।

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(१) वेदो ह्याथर्वणो दानस्वस्त्ययनबलिमङ्गलहोमनियमप्रायश्चित्तो
पवासमन्त्रादिपरिग्रहात् चिकित्सां प्राह ।

(२) सर्वदा सर्वभावानां सामान्यं वृद्धिकारणम् ।
ह्रासहेतुर्विशेषश्च प्रवृत्तिरुभयस्य तु ।।
सामान्यमेकत्वकरं विशेषस्तु पृथक्त्वकृत् ।
तुल्यार्थता हि सामान्यं विशेषस्तु विपर्ययः ।।
खादीन्यात्मा मनः कालो दिशश्च द्रव्यसंग्रहः ।

सेन्द्रियं चेतनं द्रव्यं निरिन्द्रियमचेतनम् ॥
सार्था गुर्वादयो बुद्धिः प्रयत्नान्ताः परादयः ।
गुणाः प्रोक्ता प्रयत्नादि कर्म चेष्टितमुच्यते ॥
समवायोऽपृथग्भावो भूम्यादीनां गुणैर्मतः ।
स नित्यो यत्र हि द्रव्यं न तत्रानियतो गुणः ॥
यत्राश्रिताः कर्मगुणाः कारणं समवायि यत् ।
तद् द्रव्यम् .... ॥

(३) आप्तोपदेशः प्रत्यक्षम् अनुमानं युक्तिश्चेति ।

(४) प्रत्यक्षपूर्वं त्रिविधं त्रिकालं चानुमीयते ।
वह्निर्निगूढो धूमेन मैथुनं गर्भदर्शनात् ॥
एवं व्यवस्यन्त्यतीतं बीजात्फलमनागतम् ।
दृष्ट्वा बीजात्फलं जातमिहैव सदृशं बुधाः ॥

(५) पुनश्च धातुभेदेन चतुर्विंशतिकः स्मृतः ।
मनो दशेन्द्रियाण्यर्थाः प्रकृतिश्चाष्टधातुकी ॥

(६) खादयश्चेतनाषष्ठा धातवः पुरुषः स्मृतः ।
चेतनाधातुरप्येकः स्मृतः पुरुषसंज्ञकः ॥

(७) आत्मा ज्ञः करणैर्योगाज्ज्ञानं त्वस्य प्रवर्तते ।

(८) अव्यक्तमात्मा क्षेत्रज्ञः शाश्वतो विभुरव्ययः ॥

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(१) रजस्तमोभ्यां युक्तस्य संयोगोऽयमनन्तवान् ।
ताभ्यां निराकृताभ्यां तु सत्त्ववृद्ध्या निवर्तते ॥

(२) एतैरविमलं सत्त्वं शुद्ध्युपायैर्विशुद्ध्यति ।
मृज्यमान इवादर्शस्तैलचेलकचादिभिः ॥
ग्रहाम्बुदरजोधूमनीहारैरसमावृतम् ।
यथार्कमण्डलं भाति भाति सत्त्वं तथाऽमलम् ॥

(३) शुद्धसत्त्वस्य या शुद्धा सत्या बुद्धिः प्रवर्तते ।
यया भिनत्त्यतिबलं महामोहमयं तमः ॥
सर्वभावस्वभावज्ञो यया भवति निःस्पृहः ।

(४) याति ब्रह्म यया नित्यमजरं शान्तमव्ययम् ।

(५) See textual authority page CXCI (८)

(६) चतुः पले तु रुद्रत्वमीशः पञ्चपले भवेत् ।
षट्पले भक्षिते देवि सदाशिवतनुर्भवेत् ॥

(७) सद्योजातं तस्य जानु वामदेवन्तु गुह्यकम् ।
अघोरं हृदयन्तस्य वक्त्रं तत्पुरुषं स्मृतम् ।

निष्कलं निर्मलं नित्यं निस्तरङ्गं निरामयम् ॥
निष्प्रपञ्चं निराधारं निर्गुणं गुणगोचरम् ।

(८) गुञ्जामात्रन्तु देवेशि महाकल्पायुषो भवेत् ।
माषमात्रं वरारोहे मम तुल्यगुणो भवेत् ॥

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(१) सर्वज्ञः सर्वकर्त्ता च सूक्ष्मरूपो निरञ्जनः ।
इच्छया कुरुते सृष्टिमिच्छया संहरेज्जगत् ॥

(२) यस्मिन्सर्वं यतः सर्वं यः सर्वं सर्वतश्च यः ।
यश्च सर्वमयो नित्यं तस्मै सर्वात्मने नमः ॥

३. See textual authority page CLXXXVI (१)

४. See textual authority page CXC (८)

(५) तत्संयोगजनितस्य नित्यशरीरस्य प्राप्तौ न षाट्कौशिकस्य पूर्वशरीरस्य त्यागः। प्रत्युत हरगौरीसृष्टिजशरीरसंबन्धेन तत्र दिव्यत्वं दार्ढ्यं च संपाद्यते तेन तस्य मृत्युभयं नास्तीति सिद्धं भवति ।

(६) अजरामरदेहस्य शिवतादात्म्यवेदनम् ।
जीवन्मुक्तिर्महादेवि देवानामपि दुर्लभा ॥

(७) यदि मुक्तिर्भगक्षोभे किन्न मुञ्चन्ति गर्दभाः ।
अजाश्च वृषभाश्चैव किन्न मुक्ता गणाम्बिके ॥
तस्मात्संरक्षयेत्पिण्डं रसैश्चैव रसायनैः ।
शुक्रमूत्रपुरीषाणां यदि मुक्तिर्निषेवणात् ।
किन्न मुक्ता महादेवि श्वानशूकरजातयः ॥

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(१) See textual authority page CXCII, (८)

(२) वज्रदेहः स सिद्धः स्यात् दिव्यस्त्रीजनवल्लभः ।
क्रीडते खेचरैर्भोगैः स्वेच्छया शिवतां व्रजेत् ॥

(३) एवं जीवेन्महाकल्पं प्रलयान्ते शिवं व्रजेत् ।

(४) तस्मिन्नेकार्णवे घोरे नष्टस्थावरजङ्गमे ।
देवा यत्र विलीयन्ते सिद्धस्तत्रैव लीयते ॥

(५) रुद्रतुल्यो महादेवि अजरामरकारिणि ।

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